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Category: East Asia
China’s ‘little pinks’ go after drinks maker over ‘Japanese’ styling
Shares of Chinese soft drink maker Nongfu Spring have dropped after some consumers said they were boycotting their products due to a perceived lack of patriotism, and posted videos of themselves on social media dumping out their contents. Hong Kong-listed shares in Hangzhou-based Nongfu Spring slid 7.7% from HK$44.60 on Feb. 29 to HK$41.20 on March 5, as online nationalists launched a boycott at the start of the annual National People’s Congress, which ended Monday. Users shared photos of labels on some of the company’s spring water bottles, complaining that it depicted a Japanese temple. Others likened a Greek letter on the company’s bottled jasmine tea to the shape of Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine, where the Japanese war dead are remembered. Others targeted the company’s founder and China’s richest man Zhong Shanshan, calling him a profiteer, and pointing out that his son Zhong Shuzi is an American citizen, citing the company’s 2020 prospectus. Still others said the red bottle cap used on Nongfu Spring water bottles recalled the red sun emblem in the Japanese national flag. Zhong Shanshan, chairman of Nongfu Spring, gestures during a speech at a press conference in Beijing, May 6, 2013. (CNS via/ AFP) Nongfu Spring responded on March 8, saying that the labels on its Oriental Leaf Green Tea bottles are based on a Chinese temple, and pointing to text on the label which mentions that the Japanese art of tea-drinking originated in China. “The content is not only authentic but also meticulously sourced, with the intention of highlighting the profound impact of Chinese tea and tea culture on a global scale, thereby showcasing a strong sense of national pride and confidence,” the company said in comments reported in the nationalistic Global Times newspaper. Targets of wrath The statement appears to have done little to mollify the “little pinks,” a nickname for zealously patriotic supporters of the ruling Chinese Communist Party. On Sunday, two branches of 7-Eleven in the eastern province of Jiangsu said they had pulled all Nongfu Spring products from the shelves, saying that they won’t sell products that “adulate Japan,” the paper reported. Nongfu Spring hasn’t been the only target of nationalists’ ire in recent days, either. They have also gone after Nobel literature laureate Mo Yan for hurting their feelings by “insulting the People’s Liberation Army, late Chairman Mao Zedong, and the Chinese people.” Mo’s work “Red Sorghum,” which was made into a 1987 film starring Gong Li, “vilified the Eighth Route Army” and “insulted revolutionary martyrs,” according to some comments, while others demanded compensation for hurt feelings and “reputational damage.” Chinese Literature Nobel Prize winner Mo Yan, center, leaves following a panel discussion at the Beijing International Book Fair in Beijing, Aug. 23, 2017. (Mark Schiefelbein/AP) Netizens also took aim at Beijing’s Tsinghua University for being the only top university that hasn’t been targeted for U.S. sanctions. China has laws banning insults to revolutionary heroes and martyrs, as well as to the national anthem, its soldiers and police force. You’re hurting my feelings Its lawmakers are also considering a law criminalizing “hurting the feelings of the Chinese people,” a stock phrase frequently used by Chinese officials and state media to criticize speech or actions by outsiders that Beijing disapproves of. Under a proposed amendment to the Public Security Administration Law, wearing the wrong T-shirt or complaining about China online could lead to a fine of up to 5,000 yuan (US$680) or 15 days in jail. The law doesn’t specify what kind of acts might do such a thing, but does warn that “denying the deeds” of revolutionary heroes and martyrs or defacing their public memorials would count. “Sometimes it’s directly organized by the government, and sometimes it’s not — it’s just people jumping on the bandwagon,” political commentator Ji Feng said. He said the hate campaign against Mo Yan recalled the public denunciations of the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, and the Anti-Rightist Movement of the 1950s. If such denunciations continue, Ji warned that they will eventually target people who say nothing at all, and eventually move on to include those who don’t sing the praises of the Communist Party or its leaders loudly enough, “layer by layer.” Hard-wired U.S.-based political commentator Hu Ping said both Mo Yan and Nongfu Spring were once considered to be firmly inside the Chinese political establishment, and they are now next in line because public figures who supported democracy have long since been dealt with. “[Their targets] are getting more and more left-wing, because there’s nobody left on the other side of the political spectrum,” Hu said. “So they just find the most liberal-minded person and attack them, which we all think is pretty ridiculous.” Members of security look on after the opening session of the National People’s Congress at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on March 5, 2024. (Pedro Pardo/AFP) Independent political scholar Chen Daoyin said patriotism has become hard-wired into China’s legislation, administrative regulations and throughout law enforcement under the leadership of Xi Jinping. “Anyone deploying this kind of patriotic [attack] is protected by these structures, so internet censors wouldn’t dare to stop them, or they might get burned themselves,” Chen said. He said nationalistic witch hunts drive huge amounts of traffic on Chinese social media platforms, suggesting that the latest wave of “little pink” activity wasn’t driven by any government order. “It was a spontaneous thing, and purely driven by economic motives.” Mo, who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2012, has yet to respond publicly to the criticisms of his work. British-Chinese writer Ma Jian said totalitarian regimes lend themselves to such dramas in the absence of freely available information. “When a totalitarian country has eliminated true patriots, and anyone with a sense of morality or justice … then when the mob starts to bite there is nowhere they won’t go once they take the opportunity,” Ma said. “We will continue to see stories like this, and the most extreme kind of absurdities — it won’t just be…
The US need not appease the Communist Party to engage with Vietnam
The death last month of William Beecher, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who, among other scoops, revealed the Nixon administration’s secret bombing campaign in Cambodia during the Vietnam War, ought to make us remember two things: First: Washington has been guilty of criminality abroad, especially when it believes that noble-ish ends justify brutal means. And second, despite those who regard the U.S. government as perpetually conspiratorial, Washington is bad at keeping secrets. Obsessed with the idea that the Viet Cong’s persistence could be traced to allies or resources external to Vietnam—namely Cambodia and Laos—and that the will of the communist North, and thus its ally, the Soviet Union, could be overcome by displays of mass destruction, the Nixon and then Ford administrations resorted to great iniquities for the sake of the purported greater good. They also courted unsavory allies. The same logic led the U.S. to continue supporting the genocidal Khmer Rouge in Cambodia after – and because – it was overthrown by Vietnam, and because it was backed by Beijing, the budding U.S. Cold War partner at the time. Cambodians flee Khmer Rouge insurgents during artillery shelling of Phnom Penh, Jan. 28, 1974. (AP) There are signs of this old fixation in Washington on viewing events in Southeast Asia solely through Cold War politics in U.S. engagement with Vietnam. There are still some people in Vietnam who resent the United States for abandoning the South to the communists in 1975, although most people who think this way risked their lives and fled abroad in the late 1970s. Today, a younger generation, while not nostalgic for the corrupt and dictatorial Republic of Vietnam in Saigon, is becoming resentful that Washington appears to be doing its utmost to entrench the Communist Party of Vietnam’s (CPV) rule. On my last visit to Vietnam, in late 2022, I met up with prison-scarred pro-democracy activists who cannot quite stomach the fact that the laudatory “reconciliation” since the 1990s between the former enemies has been conducted to ensure maximum exposure for the communist regime. In 2015, for instance, the Obama administration broke protocol when it invited Nguyen Phu Trong, the CPV general secretary, on a state visit, a privilege usually only offered to heads of government or state. When President Joe Biden traveled to Hanoi in September to upgrade relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, he didn’t have to sign the improved partnership deal alongside Trong; he could have done so with Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh or State President Vo Van Thuong. Blurring the lines But by signing it alongside the party boss Trong, Washington symbolically implied it bought into the communist propaganda that the CPV is the Vietnamese state. “The degree to which the U.S. is willing to blur the lines between the Vietnamese state and the CPV represents the most substantial recognition of the CPV-led regime by Washington thus far, marking a significant achievement for both the CPV and Trong,” wrote prominent Vietnamese academic Hoang Thi Ha in October. This is playing out even as quite a few senior CPV apparatchiks, including the general secretary, still think that Washington is plotting “peaceful evolution,” a communist euphemism for regime change that long predates the “color revolutions” modern-day autocrats fear. As one democracy campaigner told me, in fact, Washington is effectively engaged in supporting the political status quo in Vietnam and is making the lives of reformers much more difficult. They can, he said, no longer count on rhetorical support from the U.S.. In the past, when trying to convert others to their cause, they could have at least pointed at speeches made by American officials who condemned the Hanoi regime’s repression. Not anymore. Vietnam’s Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong and President Barack Obama speak to reporters after their meeting in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, D.C., July 7, 2015. (Jonathan Ernst/Reuters) Washington officials push back. “We question whether public lecturing is the best plan of action with countries that are seeking to work closely with us,” one told the Washington Post after Biden’s visit to Vietnam in September. However, that overlooks the impact this has on the Vietnamese people. Without “public lecturing,” many Vietnamese reckon that the U.S. is no longer interested in human rights in Vietnam. Worse, some think that Washington is praising the communist regime, influencing their own opinions on whether its monopoly of power is legitimate or beneficial. Writing about Biden’s meeting with Trong in the Washington Post’s opinion page last year, Max Boot noted that “when Biden glad-hands Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and now Nguyen Phu Trong…he is, at the very least, open to the charge of hypocrisy in a way Trump was not.” But Boot added: “Sometimes you have to make common cause with the lesser evil to safeguard the greater good. That’s what Biden is doing in Hanoi.” Party state The case made by the human rights activists isn’t that the U.S. should have no relations with Vietnam; it’s that Washington shouldn’t be conducting this engagement so openly and cordially through the CPV. There is also no reason to think that if Washington is friendly enough to the communist regime, Vietnam is going to become the next Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally that allows it to station troops on its soil. Vietnam will never be an “ally,” in any meaningful sense, of the United States. And with the CPV in charge, Hanoi will not engage in containment of China. Some 90 days after Biden upgraded relations, Trong met with President Xi Jinping and signed Vietnam up to China’s “Community with a Shared Future.” “[Washington is] in thrall to the idea that Vietnam can be part of an anti-China group. That idea is nonsense.” said analyst Bill Hayton. Those who truly seek an alliance with Vietnam to contain China should logically support regime change in Vietnam that produces a nationalist government in Hanoi that would be more receptive to the anti-Chinese voices of the masses…
The Geopolitical Weaponization of Maps by China
The investigative report by Ij-Reportika aims to scrutinize the contentious matter of Chinese maps throughout history.
Embattled Hong Kong women rights defenders deserve support and solidarity
On International Women’s Day, as we celebrate the rights of women around the world and shine a spotlight on inspiring women, the women of Hong Kong who have paid a high price for fighting for equal rights and for basic rights and freedoms under an increasingly intolerant government. Women human rights defenders face gender-based challenges and restrictions that drive them to use alternative strategies in their activism to achieve their goals and overcome obstacles. They have demonstrated immense bravery and perseverance in the Hong Kong that has emerged since the imposition in 2020 of the National Security Law. During the 2019 Hong Kong pro-democracy protests, young women were prominent in protests, and many faced gender-based and sexual violence. In particular, a number of women reported sexual assault and harassment by the Hong Kong police when they were in detention or in other forms of custody. Few of these cases were prosecuted and the perpetrators have not been held accountable to this date. Many women from Hong Kong said that gender-based and sexual violence was a known phenomenon, particularly at the hands of the police. They added that they would not file a complaint, because the investigation would also be conducted by the police, who were unlikely to hold their own officers accountable. Riot police detain a woman as anti-government protesters gather at Sha Tin Mass Transit Railway station in Hong Kong, Sept. 25, 2019. (Tyrone Siu/Reuters) The women acknowledge the violations that they faced were an unfortunate part of pro-democracy activism, and although they did what they could to avoid assault and protect themselves, it was still worth the risk when fighting for democracy and rights and freedom in Hong Kong. In 2023, I wrote a submission to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women on behalf of Hong Kong Watch, about these issues. I provided statistics and case studies, and interviewed women human rights defenders about their own experiences of gender-based and sexual violence, as well as what they observed around them. It was chilling to learn that such violations against women were normalized and that there were so few tools for accountability. But it is nevertheless inspiring to see these strong women persevere. At the United Nations in Geneva, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women did raise concerns about women’s rights in Hong Kong. The body urged the Hong Kong government to hold perpetrators accountable and strengthen the framework to protect women’s rights. They also warned the Hong Kong government against using national security and public order measures in a way that could violate women’s rights. A year on, the Hong Kong government has yet to implement these recommendations or show that they are taking women’s rights seriously. Chow Hang-tung At the top of the list of women deserving support on this day is Chow Hang-tung. The former vice-chairperson of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, Chow was charged with “inciting others to participate in an unauthorized assembly” for a Tiananmen Square Massacre vigil in 2021. Remanded in custody since September 2021, Chow, an activist and lawyer, faces a potential 10 years in jail if convicted of “inciting subversion of state power” in a trial that is expected to begin in late 2024. Having reviewed her circumstances, the UN Human Rights Council’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that Chow was arbitrarily detained, should be released immediately, and that her treatment is in contravention of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Hong Kong is a signatory. Activist and barrister Chow Hang-tung arrives at the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong on June 8, 2023. (Isaac Lawrence/AFP) Chow faces a number of very serious violations to her rights and freedoms, some of which are related to her gender. One thing is clear: she deserves to be free and to exercise her rights, including freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. Chow remains calm and poised and a source of hope for many of us who stand up to the Hong Kong government, as well as the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing. She has not given up and shows no sign of doing so. This year, Chow was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize by Swedish MP Guri Melby. Her brave and principled peaceful activism against the Chinese Communist Party makes her a deserving candidate. Chow has made immense sacrifices for the rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong, as well as the people of China. Article 23 advances Many more women in Hong Kong languish behind bars, many of whom are political prisoners, in the jurisdiction that has the highest percentage of women prisoners in the world. This includes women who have been arrested and charged under the 2020 National Security Law and the sedition law. Also on the list are women who were former key personnel at Apple Daily, former members of the Legislative Council, former district councilors, and many others. International Women’s Day this year coincided with the publication and Legislative Council reading of the Safeguarding National Security Bill, under Article 23 of the Basic Law in Hong Kong. Lawmakers take part in reading the draft of the Safeguarding National Security Bill at the Legislative Council in Hong Kong on March 8, 2024. (Li Zhihua/China News Service/VCG via Getty Images) This fast-tracked law is set to prohibit new types of offences, and has proposed provisions which are vague and will criminalise the peaceful exercise of human rights while dramatically undermining due process and fair trial rights in Hong Kong. The bill will contribute to institutional violations of human rights, including women’s rights, in Hong Kong, and it is something the world must condemn and stand up against. Many human rights defenders, including many women human rights activists, are taking action today to raise awareness and coordinate responses to this Bill. On International Women’s Day, the strong women of Hong Kong who have fought for equality and against…
Kachin army storms northern Myanmar, taking 14 camps
A rebel army in Myanmar seized over a dozen junta camps in the north, an official told Radio Free Asia on Friday. Since the Kachin Independence Army launched an offensive on Sunday, it has captured 14 camps near its headquarters in Lai Zar city on the Chinese border, said information officer Col. Naw Bu. Several townships in Kachin state have been caught in frequent conflict as junta troops and Kachin Independence Army soldiers fight for control of the area’s jade mines, highways, and border areas. Since China brokered a ceasefire between the Three Brotherhood Alliance and junta forces, Kachin state’s largest army – not in the alliance – has been a formidable opponent for the military in both Shan and Kachin states. Rebel soldiers seized camps on Myitkyina-Bhamo road on the fifth day of the six-day attack. “The largest camp, Hpun Pyen Bum where 120 millimeter heavy weapons are based, was captured on Thursday evening. Ntap Bum camp was also captured,” he said. “Most of the junta’s small defensive camps around Bum Re Bum and Myo Thit were captured. Now, these small defensive camps are being used [by the KIA] to attack big camps, like Bum Re Bum and Ka Yar Taung.” The junta army has been firing heavy artillery at the Kachin Independence Army’s headquarters in Lai Zar since Thursday, he added. The bombardment has impacted not only Lai Zar, but also the border with China. Shells fired by junta troops killed three civilians, including a child and a woman on Thursday. Three more fell across the Chinese border, destroying property, locals said. RFA contacted the Chinese Embassy in Yangon and national junta spokesman Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun to confirm the army fired shells into China, but neither responded by the time of publication. A Lai Zar resident told RFA this morning that the sounds of fighting could be heard everywhere as the junta continued to attack the city with heavy weapons. “Since this morning, gunshots have been heard in many places. There were more than eight rounds of artillery fired this morning until 8 a.m.,” he told RFA on Friday. “The shells landed on the other side of Lai Zar city, on the Chinese side and burned houses. Many people in the city have been fleeing to safety.” Grounded Flights and Closed Roads The Kachin Independence Army has not had control of these camps since 2011, Col. Naw Bu said, adding they also plan to reopen Bhamo-Myitkyina Road. The highway was closed in July after fighting erupted between the junta and Kachin Independence Army in Nam Sang Yang village, near Lai Zar. Bhamo Airport, Kachin state in Feb. 2024. (Citizen Journalist) Clashes in Kachin state’s capital have also impacted transportation in and out of the state. An airline ticket sales representative told RFA resistance groups began attacking multiple flight locations across the region. On Thursday, the Kachin Independence Army and allied People’s Defense Forces attacked the junta air force headquarters with short-range missiles. The groups also fired heavy weapons at Bhamo Airport, forcing it to close indefinitely and suspend flights. “Bhamo Airport has been closed since Thursday. The airport authorities have shut down the airport and are not sure when the planes will be allowed to land again,” a representative told RFA, asking to remain anonymous for security reasons. “I am not sure if the canceled flights will be replaced so I am just refunding people’s money.” A Bhamo resident who wished to remain anonymous for security reasons said fighting in the city continued into Friday. “The airport was attacked by a short-range missile and the runway was hit and damaged a little. People who are traveling urgently and the sick are having a hard time now the airport is closed,” he said. “Heavy weapons were also firing all night last night. I couldn’t sleep.” RFA contacted Kachin state’s junta spokesperson Moe Min Thein regarding the closures and conflict, but he did not respond. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn.
China says upgrade, trade-in policy creates billion-dollar market
China’s top state planner has projected a multi-billion-dollar market from Beijing’s policy pushing for industries to upgrade their equipment and citizens to trade in their old vehicles and home appliances for new ones. The domestic consumption push, an integral part of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s latest mantra to unleash “new productive forces,” is seen as instrumental to Beijing’s efforts to revive growth. Zheng Shanjie, chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission, also assured the media that Beijing’s 5% GDP goal is achievable. “This goal is in line with the annual requirements of the ‘14th Five-Year Plan’ and matches the potential of economic growth, a goal that can be achieved with positivity and hard work,” he told reporters at a press conference on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress Wednesday. Zheng said the economy is recovering and showing new results, without specifying. One such potential result could be the over 5 trillion yuan (US$694 billion) that is forecast to be created annually as industries and companies upgrade their equipment to raise development quality. “Chinese industries and the agricultural sector last year invested about 4.9 trillion yuan in equipment. The push to raise quality development will only increase demand for equipment upgrade,” he said at the joint briefing with China’s finance minister, commerce minister, central bank chief, and head of the securities regulator. The campaign will focus on industrial, agricultural, construction, transport, education, cultural tourism and healthcare, where the upgrade will foster reduced carbon emissions, safety, digital transformation and smart intelligence, Zheng added. Similarly, Zheng described the trade-in market for vehicles and home appliances as “huge” and in the “trillion yuan” level, given that car and white goods ownership last year reached 336 million units and 3 billion units, respectively. The upgrade and trade-in drives could enhance China’s efforts to build a circular economy, he noted. “The promotion of such large-scale equipment upgrade and consumer goods trade-in is a systematic project … to be supported by fiscal, financial and tax policies.” “New productive forces” was coined by President Xi during a trip to the rustbelt Northeast region last September, where he highlighted the need for a new economic model. In Xi’s China, the state’s role is expanding and the private sector is retreating. Central government agencies and local governments are now focused on putting the new vision into play. Chinese Premier Li Qiang in his maiden government work report on Tuesday called for a “new leap forward” to modernize the industrial system and accelerate the development of new productive forces across sectors like electric vehicles, hydrogen power, new materials, life sciences and commercial spaceflight. To support the domestic demand policy, Beijing will issue 1 trillion yuan of special long-term bonds this year, and more in the next few years. The thrust of China’s economic policy direction is “seeking progress while maintaining stability, promoting stability through advancement, and in construction before destruction,” according to the Chinese premier’s work report. As such, authorities could be banking on “new productive forces” to buffer the structural challenges that clouded the outlook of the Chinese economy, like a deepening real estate market crisis, local government indebtedness and economic issues due to demographic shifts. Li’s report offered little details on structural reforms which some analysts said are crucial to address fundamental problems. Externally, China’s foreign trade will face a severe situation, commerce minister Wang Wentao said at the press conference. Echoing the complexity and unpredictability of the external environment, People’s Bank of China Governor Pan Gongsheng stressed that the central bank will leverage on monetary policies and intensity macro-control policies to ensure stability. “China’s monetary policy toolbox is still rich [with tools at our disposal], and there is still sufficient room for monetary policy [adjustments],” Pan said, adding that the bank will keep the yuan basically stable. Edited by Mike Firn and Taejun Kang.
Junta imposes martial law in rebel-controlled Shan state townships
Myanmar’s junta has declared martial law in three northern Shan state townships seized by ethnic rebels during an ongoing offensive, prompting concern from residents who fear the military is planning a push to retake the areas. The junta has declared martial law in more than 60 townships across the country, including in Sagaing, Magwe, Tanintharyi and Bago regions, as well as in Chin state. The designation has been used as a justification by the military to impose heavy punishments on residents on the basis of suspicion alone. Observers say the junta had refrained from declaring martial law in Namhsan, Mantong and Namtu townships in northern Shan state with the hope the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, would join a ceasefire agreement. The declaration, announced Monday, is an indication that negotiations have stalled, they said. The TNLA, the Arakan Army, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army together make up the ethnic Three Brotherhood Alliance, which in October launched an offensive known as Operation 1027 against the military in northern Shan state, which borders China. Less than two months after the start of Operation 1027, the TNLA captured Namsan, Mantong and Namtu, on Dec. 15, 22 and 28. Since then, the ethnic army’s top leadership has regularly conducted public meetings with what they say is an emphasis on a “community-based governance system” in the townships. In Namtu, municipal, healthcare and electricity services have been restored, according to residents, and inhabitants who fled earlier fighting have mostly returned home. While the TNLA remains the de facto leadership in the three townships, the junta’s imposition of martial law technically transfers their administrative and judicial oversight to the commander of the military’s Northeastern Command, based in the region’s largest town Lashio. Residents told RFA Burmese that the declaration of martial law came “just as the situation began to stabilize,” and said they now fear renewed clashes between the military and the TNLA. “We are now under TNLA governance, and the junta no longer exists here,” said a resident of Namtu who, like others interviewed for this report, spoke on condition of anonymity due to security concerns. Now that martial law has been declared, it’s as if they could attack us whenever they want.” All three townships are within 160 kilometers (100 miles) of the Northeastern Command, the resident noted, which “adds to our unease.” “We may need to prepare trenches and bomb shelters once again,” she said. ‘Even less secure’ A resident of Namsan told RFA that while the situation in her township wasn’t safe before, “now it feels even less secure.” “The use of airplanes to drop bombs and the indiscriminate use of heavy weaponry add to our concerns,” she said. “While some people have not yet returned to their homes, others have just come back.” An official from the TNLA news and information department told RFA that the junta’s declaration of martial law in the three townships was no surprise. “That’s just what they do,” he said. “During the height of fighting, the junta declared martial law in [eight northern Shan state] townships … now, post-battle, announcing martial law in these three townships aligns with their strategic approach.” On Nov. 12, as Operation 1027 reached a crescendo, the junta declared martial law in the townships of Lashio, Kutkai, Kunlong, Hsenwi, Namhkam, Muse, and Chinshwehaw, as well as in Laukkai, in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone. A curfew remains in effect in the townships, with movement restricted between the hours of 6 pm and 6 am. The Three Brotherhood Alliance captured 16 cities in Shan state, including Muse and Chinshwehaw, as part of the offensive before agreeing to a ceasefire in China-brokered talks with junta representatives on Jan. 11. An ex-military official later said it was not sustainable and less than a week after the agreement, both sides were accused of violating it in a skirmish. Last week, the two sides met again in the Chinese city of Kunming for talks that focused on reopening parts of the border with China that had been shut down during the fighting and preserving the ceasefire. ‘It’s clear they’ve given up’ But a political commentator and former military officer told RFA that peace in northern Shan state remains tenuous. He said that while the junta had been holding out hope that the TNLA would join Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, or NCA, the declaration of martial law in the townships under its control indicates that the military leadership no longer sees that as an option. “[The junta was] indecisive from the beginning, and even was vacillating [on how to deal with the TNLA],” he said. “Now, it’s clear that they’ve given up trying [to bring them into the NCA].” The NCA was introduced in 2015 to end years of fighting over minority rights and self-determination. Since then, some 10 ethnic groups have signed the agreement. Ta’ang National Liberation Army troops pose after capturing a Myanmar junta camp in Mantong on Dec. 23, 2023. (PSLF/TNLA News and Information Department) The junta’s declaration of martial law in Namhsan, Mantong and Namtu follows a Jan. 28 declaration in the Shan state townships of Mongmit and Mabein. The two townships had earlier been seized by the Kachin Independence Army. The latest declaration brings to 13 the number of townships under martial law in Shan state. Township captured The imposition of martial law on Namsan, Mantong and Namtu came amid reports on Tuesday that the Arakan Army, or AA, had captured Ponnagyun township in western Myanmar’s Rakhine state, where it continues to battle the military despite the Three Brotherhood Alliance ceasefire in Shan state. In a statement, the AA claimed that Ponnagyun is under its “complete control” after 13 days of fighting, from Feb. 21 to March 4, culminating in the capture of the military’s Light Infantry Division 550 base there on Monday. It said its fighters had seized “several bodies” of junta troops, including that of junta Tactical Commander Col. Myo Min Ko Ko, Light Infantry Battalion 208 Commander Col….
Authorities urge ‘stability’ amid restrictions on Tibetans due to dam protests
Chinese officials have told local ethnic Tibetans and monastic leaders in Sichuan province to maintain stability following the arrest of more than 1,000 protesters over a hydropower dam, and made clear that the project would continue, two Tibetans with knowledge of the situation said. If built, the Gangtuo Dam power station on the Drichu River could submerge several monasteries in Dege’s county’s Wangbuding township and force residents of at least two villages near the river to relocate, sources earlier told RFA. “Chinese officials have held meetings in the Wonto village area where they ordered local Tibetans to comply with the government’s plans and regulations and called for the leaders of the local monasteries to mobilize the locals to toe the party line,” said one source who hails from Dege and now lives in exile. On Feb. 25, Dege County Party Secretary Baima Zhaxi visited Wangbuding and neighboring townships to meet with Buddhist monastic leaders and village administrators, during which he called for “stability” and urged residents to comply with regulations or else be “dealt with in accordance with the law and regulations,” according to a local news report. “As the stability maintenance period in March and the national Two Sessions approach, we must implement detailed stability maintenance measures to promote continued harmony and stability in the jurisdiction,” Zhaxi was quoted in the report as saying. The Two Sessions refers to China’s annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, being held this week in Beijing. “We must continue to carry out the investigation and resolution of conflicts, risks and hidden dangers, and effectively resolve conflicts and disputes at the grassroots level, and nip them in the bud,” Zhaxi said. Zhaxi’s visit comes ahead of Tibetan Uprising Day on March 10, a politically sensitive date that commemorates the thousands of Tibetans who died in a 1959 uprising against China’s invasion and occupation of their homeland, and the flight of their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, into exile in northern India. Keep building Zhaxi also visited the dam construction site and told the leaders of the coordination team to adhere to their work orders and make arrangements for “the next step of work,” according to a local Chinese government announcement. Zhaxi told residents about “the great significance and necessity of the construction of hydropower stations” and indicated that the government would “protect the legitimate interests of the masses to the greatest extent.” “Abide by the law, express your demands in a legal, civilized and rational manner, and do not exceed the bottom line,” Zhaxi told locals during the on-site visit, according to the same news report. “Otherwise, you will be dealt with in accordance with the law and regulations.” Tibetans in exile hold a rally in Amsterdam to support dam protesters in Dege county, southwestern China’s Sichuan province, March 1, 2024. (Netherlands Tibetan Community) On Feb. 23, police arrested more than 1,000 Tibetans, including monks and residents in the county in Sichuan’s Kardze Autonomous Tibetan Prefecture, who had been protesting the construction of the dam, meant to generate electricity. Authorities continue to heighten security restrictions in Dege county on the east bank of the Drichu River, called Jinsha in Chinese, and in Jomda county of Qamdo city in the Tibet Autonomous Region on the west bank of the river, said the sources who both live in exile and requested anonymity for safety reasons. Strict surveillance Residents are forbidden from contacting anyone outside the area, the sources said. Chinese officials continue to impose strict digital surveillance and tight restrictions on movement in Wangbuding after rare video footage emerged from inside Tibet on Feb. 22 of Chinese police beating Tibetan monks, before arresting more than 100 of them, most of whom were from Wonto and Yena monasteries. Since then, authorities have carried out wide-scale rigorous interrogations of the arrested Tibetans, even as information from inside Tibet has been harder to come by amid a crackdown on the use of mobile phones and social media and messaging platforms to restrict communication with the outside world, sources said. The protests began on Feb. 14, when at least 300 Tibetans gathered outside Dege County Town Hall to protest the building of the Gangtuo Dam, part of a massive 13-tier hydropower complex with a total planned capacity of 13,920 megawatts. Over the past two weeks, Tibetans in exile have been holding solidarity rallies in cities in the United States, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Australia and India. Global leaders and Tibetan advocacy groups have condemned China’s actions, calling for the immediate release of those detained. Last week, Chinese authorities released about 40 of the arrested monks on Feb. 26 and 27, RFA reported. Additional reporting and editing by Tenzin Pema for RFA Tibetan. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.
Australia pledges new funds for maritime cooperation as ASEAN summit begins
Updated March 04, 2024, 03:05 a.m. ET. Canberra will invest $64 million Australian dollars (US$41.8 million) over the next four years, including A$40 million in new funding, to expand maritime cooperation with Southeast Asia, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong said on Monday. Wong made the pledge at a forum on the sidelines of the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit 2024 in Melbourne, which will celebrate 50 years of partnership between Australia and the regional bloc. The summit is being held against a backdrop of increasingly assertive posturing by China in the South China Sea and the intensifying civil war in Myanmar, both of which are likely to be high on the agenda. Wong said the new funds for maritime cooperation would contribute to security and prosperity within the region. “What happens in the South China Sea, in the Taiwan Strait, in the Mekong subregion, across the Indo-Pacific, affects us all,” she said in her keynote address Monday. She said the “region’s character” was under challenge and that no country must dominate. “We face destabilizing, provocative and coercive actions, including unsafe conduct at sea and in the air and militarisation of disputed features,” Wong said, without singling out a specific nation. China asserts sovereignty over almost all of the South China Sea, through which trillions of dollars in trade passes each year, putting it at odds with the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, and Taiwan. In 2016, an international tribunal refuted the legal basis for nearly all of China’s expansive maritime and territorial claims in the waterway. It said that Beijing’s insistence on holding “historic rights” to the waters were inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS. Beijing has never recognized the 2016 arbitration or its outcome. Speaking at the same forum, Philippines Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo said the rule of law and especially UNCLOS was the fundamental starting point for maritime cooperation in the region. “The shared stewardship of the seas and oceans in the region behooves us to unite in preserving the primacy of international law so we can ensure equitable and sustainable outcomes for all,” he said. “It also calls for us to stand firmly together in opposing actions that contradict or are inconsistent with international law.” The Philippines under the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has taken a stronger stance in dealing with Beijing on the South China Sea. Marcos has also pursued warmer ties with the United States, a traditional ally, reversing the policies of his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte. In recent months, tensions between Manila and Beijing have led to numerous run-ins, including the China Coast Guard’s alleged harassment of Filipino vessels delivering provisions to troops at its military outpost on Ayungin (Second Thomas) Shoal in the South China Sea. On Monday, the Philippine Coast Guard deployed a patrol vessel to Benham Rise, a huge resource-rich underwater plateau off the eastern coast of the archipelago, amid reports of Chinese research vessels there. The 83-meter (272 foot) long BRP Gabriela Silang will also visit the northern Batanes islands, near Taiwan, the coast guard said. Benham Rise, which is part of the Philippines’ extended continental shelf, does not fall within Beijing’s “nine-dash line” territorial claims in the South China Sea but that has not stopped China from conducting surveying missions in the area. Camille Elemia in Manila contributed to this report. BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated online news organization. Updated to include Monday’s developments in the South China Sea.
Why Laos’ Communists cannot do anti-corruption
Corruption is often seen as a byproduct, a quirk, of a political system. But in many authoritarian states, it is actually the modus operandi. Consider what binds a political structure together. How do you make sure that lowly officials in the provinces listen to their masters in the capital? How do you instill the sense that everyone is working together for the same cause, that all participants aren’t just a bunch of self-interested, warring individuals? One way is through terror. Officials listened to Joseph Stalin, the Soviet dictator, and his Politburo because they feared for their lives. Another is through a common sense of purpose. This could be ideological. Everyone works towards the same goals because they believe they are creating a better world. Or it could be existential, such as everyone pulling together during wartime. Or it could be transactional, as we see in meritocracies, with everyone accepting the norms and hierarchies of the political structure because doing so means they stand a chance of advancing up the political ladder. Cambodia’s King Norodom Sihamoni, front center, and members of Cambodia’s government pose with newly elected members of parliament during the opening ceremony at the National Assembly building in Phnom Penh on Aug. 21, 2023. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) However, another method is through corruption, what some academics would call “rent-seeking”. Low-ranking officials in the provinces pay heed to their superiors in the capital because they are all part of vast patronage networks. Low-ranking officials are loyal to their patrons in return for financial benefits and promotion, while the higher-ranking patrons in government are able to get others to follow their policies because they control the fortunes of those lower down the hierarchy. Moreover, corruption provides something of a common purpose, a common understanding, amongst all levels of the political structure. Everyone knows how the game is rigged and that they have to pay fealty to those who control the most important patronage networks in order to advance up the hierarchy. Indeed, graft instills a sense of loyalty. When harmonized, as in Cambodia, a rent-seeking system ensures that all political grandees have just enough access to financial rewards and that graft is spread somewhat equitably so that there are no major internal frictions. That begs the question of how anti-corruption campaigns can work in authoritarian states that previously had rent-seeking systems. Vietnam is a good example. Before 2016, the Communist Party of Vietnam held its hierarchy together in large part through corruption. This was partly because of the decentralization that occurred in the 2000s, which made it much more difficult for the central party apparatus to control what was happening in the provinces and districts. More importantly, ideological factors that had previously held the Communist Party together began to fade. Rent-seeking cadres By the early 1990s, when Hanoi made peace with Beijing, Vietnam was for the first time in half a century unthreatened by a foreign power. No longer could the CPV compel internal cohesion within its ranks through rally-around-the-flag appeals to cohesion and unity At the same time, because the Vietnamese government became more professionalized, it meant bringing in non-communist officials. This, added to the public’s disinterest in socialist ideals, especially after the capitalist reforms in 1986, meant that communist ideology no longer functioned as a way to bind the political structure together. And the CPV was no longer the sole arbitrator of nationalism. In the early 2000s, a popular strain of nationalism emerged among the public that accused the party of being unpatriotic for selling Vietnamese land to foreign (mainly Chinese) investors, which culminated in the momentous Bauxite protests of 2009. Amid these social changes, a new generation of rent-seeking apparatchiks emerged – personified by Nguyen Tan Dung, who became prime minister in 2006 – who cast aside ideology and nationalism and instead embraced graft as a way of building their own personal power and binding the splintering party apparatus. This led to a reaction, however, from the more ideological factions of the party, led by Nguyen Phu Trong, who became party chief in 2012. Vietnam’s Communist Party general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, left, gestures as he arrives at the National Assembly in Hanoi on Jan. 15, 2024. (Nhac Nguyen/AFP) However, it was only when he defeated Dung in the 2016 National Congress that Trong launched his anti-corruption campaign. Even then, dismissing or jailing the corrupt was only one side of the coin. Far more important, as Trong has acknowledged, has been his so-called “morality campaign”. Since 2016, he has reinstated socialist ideology and ethics as the defining factor of party membership. To be promoted now, an official must at least rhetorically profess fealty to socialism and demonstrate a clean, hard-working lifestyle. At the same time, Trong has re-centralized power, taking away authority from the provincial officials and giving it to his small clique in Hanoi, which is one reason why he has struggled to find a successor, given that he has now cloaked his own position in so much power — perhaps the most since 1986 — that it has become even more precarious and existential if the CPV selects an unfit successor. So what about next-door Laos? Similar to Vietnam, it embraced decentralization in the 1990s, stripping the apparatchiks in Vientiane of some of their authority. Given its geography, the central party apparatus in Laos has always been unable to fully control what local officials do. Its capitalist reforms in the late 1980s also stripped socialist ideology as a common cause within Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP). In fact, the LPRP has long been less ideological than its Vietnamese counterpart. Anti-corruption failure Nationalism, too, has disappeared. Indeed, the growing anti-Chinese chorus of Laotians has led many to regard the LPRP with disdain, believing it has allowed foreign businesses to destroy the environment and made Laotians second-class citizens. Unlike in Vietnam, however, anti-corruption efforts have failed in Laos. When he became prime minister in 2016, Thongloun Sisssoloth vowed to unleash a vast anti-graft campaign, but it had…
