- contact@ij-reportika.com
Category: East Asia
Tibetan singer arrested for song lamenting Dalai Lama’s absence
“In this land where the Victorious One is absent, Leaders exist, but false ones. The Tibetans are bereft of direction, Like a deer lost in the midst of a fog…” A Tibetan performer who sang these lyrics, publicly yearning for the Dalai Lama and blasting Chinese leaders as “false,” was arrested in early February in China’s Sichuan province, two sources with knowledge of the situation said. Gyegjom Dorjee, in his early 30s, sang “Tearful Deluge of a Sorrowful Song” alongside other artists at concert on Jan. 15, as part of pre-Losar, or Tibetan New Year, celebrations, said the sources on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal. The song alludes to life under Chinese government rule, likening Tibetans to “birds confined in a cage.” The use of “Victorious One” refers to the Dalai Lama, seen by Beijing as a separatist. Even carrying a picture of the leader of Tibetan Buddhism is considered a crime. In a video of Dorjee’s performance, an audience of more than 100 Tibetans can be seen clapping and cheering uproariously at the end of his two-minute song. But nearly a month later, Dorjee was summoned to a police station in Khyungchu county, or Hongyuan in Chinese, in Ngaba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, and subsequently arrested, the sources said. Since then, his whereabouts remain unknown, they said. “The Chinese government said his song had political connotations and raised concerns about its lyrics,” the first source told Radio Free Asia. Security threat Tibetan artists like Dorjee, who peacefully express disagreement or discontent with China’s policies in the Tibetan Autonomous Region or Tibetan-populated areas of Chinese provinces, are branded by Chinese authorities as dangers to “national security” or “social stability.” In particular, Tibetan writers, artists and singers who advocate for Tibetan national identity and culture or voice criticism of China’s governance often face detention. An activist holds a placard showing a portrait of late Tibetan singer Tsewang Norbu, who, according to Tibetan rights groups, self-immolated during a protest in Lhasa, capital of western China’s Tibet Autonomous Region, on Feb. 25, 2024. (Sam Yeh/AFP) A nomad with a passion for singing and engaging in traditional Tibetan cultural performances, Dorjee often has been called upon to perform at local events and festivals, the first source said. Following his arrest, Dorjee’s family tried to get information about the charge and his whereabouts from the Khyungchu police station, but police turned them away without providing it, said the second source. “They were told Dorjee was being interrogated because of the provocative nature of his lyrics and thoughts, and that there were ‘political problems’ with his song lyrics and ideology,” he said. ‘Red-faced ones’ Dorjee’s lyrics also made references to “this place of inequities/injustice” and the discrimination suffered by the “red-faced” ones, using an old epithet used to describe Tibetans. “The song expresses the common grievances held by the Tibetans against Chinese rule and criticizes the repressive policies of the Chinese party-state,” the Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy said in a statement. “In the current climate of heightened repression, local Tibetans have little to no avenues to exercise basic human rights including the right to freedom of expression or peaceful dissent,” it said. Some Tibetan artists have taken their protests against the Chinese government to an extreme. In 2022, Tsewang Norbu, a well-known contemporary Tibetan singer, set himself on fire in front of the iconic Potala Palace in Lhasa to demonstrate his opposition to Chinese policies in Tibet. Radio Free Asia later learned that Norbu’s act was an attempt to draw attention to his grievances, and that he succumbed to his injuries. Edited by Tenzin Pema for RFA Tibetan, and by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.
Uyghur activist moved to safe location after perceived threat in Paris
A Uyghur activist living in Paris has been moved to a secure location after a group of unidentified men appeared on her doorstep last week and called for her to let them in, according to the president of the European Uyghur Institute. On the morning of May 8, eight unidentified people emerged from a black van with tinted windows outside the Paris home of Gulbahar Jelilova, a Uyghur businesswoman from Kazakhstan who spent 18 months in a Xinjiang internment camp, said Dilnur Reyhan, president of the institute. At the time of the incident, Jelilova was away from her apartment, but neighbors told her the unidentified people repeatedly buzzed her unit — though the bell does not list her name, Reyhan said. They also called her cell phone several times. As the group gathered in front of the building, Reyhan posted a photo on X, saying Jelilova was “terrified” by their presence. “Gulbahar herself saw the Chinese men when she reached the turn leading to her house and took a photo of them. She was scared and called me,” Reyhan told Radio Free Asia. “Their decision to ring the doorbell may have been intended to intimidate her, to send a message, or perhaps they had a specific purpose,” she said, adding that the car resembled “vehicle used for kidnappings.” A May 8, 2024 post on X by Dilnur Reyhan, president of the European Uyghur Institute, shows men and women dressed in black standing near a van outside the residence of Gulbahar Jelilova. (@DilnurReyhan via X) Reyhan said she called the police, who arrived and were told by the group they had come to see a Japanese rock garden they heard was in the building. She said “trusted sources” later reported all eight were Chinese nationals and that her group was helping prepare a court complaint against the group. RFA could not confirm their identity or nationality. Reyhan said such acts of intimidation had grown more common, and that she herself had been regularly followed by a car in recent months. Jelilova could not be reached, and the French police did not respond to requests for comment from Radio Free Asia. ‘Tomorrow this could be me’ Gulbahar Haitiwaji, a Uyghur detained in China’s “re-education” camps for two years but who now lives in France said the incident at Jelilova’s apartment had unnerved many. “Because China is so ruthless, in the back of my mind I always think that one day they’ll bring about harm towards me,” she said. “For example, yesterday it was Gulbahar, tomorrow it could be me.” Related Stories Former Xinjiang Internment Camp Detainee Honored With ‘Hero of the Year’ Award Tibetan, Uyghur protesters greet Xi Jinping in Paris Pro-Beijing ‘thugs’ tormented Xi protesters, activists say The incident took place one day after Chinese President Xi Jinping wrapped up his two-day state visit to France, his first stop on a three-country European visit. His arrival was greeted by several protests from Tibetan, Uyghur and Chinese activists – including Jelilova. While such demonstrations have in the past been met, sometimes violently, with pro-Beijing counter-protests, there was little sign of that in Paris. But at a May 5 protest at Madeleine Square, which is located close to the French president’s residence, Uyghur activists were met by a small group of French-speaking counter-protesters. A video posted to Facebook shows about eight young men, all wearing masks and none of whom appear to be of Chinese descent, holding up letter-sized photos of World Uyghur Congress President Dolkun Isa with a mark across his face. As the crowd of protesters approach them, they shout “liar” and “they are bulls–ing us” in French, before running away as police pursue them for unknown reasons. Isa told RFA that he suspected the protests were the “result of the Chinese government’s arrangements, funding, or organization.” The Chinese Embassy in Paris did not respond to requests for comment by the time of publication. Translated by RFA Uyghur. Edited by Abby Seiff and Malcolm Foster.
Manila accuses Beijing of island building in South China Sea
The Philippine coast guard has sent ships to monitor what Manila suspects to be China’s illegal island building in the South China Sea, the Presidential Office said. The office of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said in a statement that since April, the coast guard vessel BRP Teresa Magbanua had been operating near Sabina Shoal, known in the Philippines as Escoda Shoal, to keep a watch on China’s “supposed illegal activities.” Sabina Shoal is a low-tide elevation in the Spratly Islands, well inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) but also claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam. It is only 75 nautical miles (140km) from the Philippine island of Palawan. An EEZ gives the coastal state exclusive access to natural resources in the waters and in the seabed. Philippine coast guard spokesman Jay Tarriela said in the statement that crushed corals had been dumped on the reef – an indication of land reclamation. However, the suspected island building appeared to be at an initial stage, he said. Tarriela also said that besides the BRP Teresa Magbanua, two more coast guard vessels had been deployed on a rotating basis to monitor the area. “We are alarmed by this,” said Jonathan Malaya, assistant director general of the Philippine National Security Council. Malaya told a press conference on Monday that similar “crushed corals” were detected earlier on Sandy Cay, another group of low-lying reefs near Philippines-occupied Thitu island, also known as Pag-asa island. “These were crushed corals and it was obvious that they came from another place,” Malaya said. Suspected dumped corals on Sabina Shoal (Philippine Coast Guard) The Philippines in March launched a scientific research mission on Sandy Cay, prompting China to protest. Beijing has yet to respond to the latest allegations regarding Sabina Shoal. Monitoring procedure Tarriela explained in a post on the social platform X, formerly Twitter, that the Philippine coast guard had implemented a “standard operating procedure” to inspect Sabina Shoal for any dumped crushed corals. After more than three weeks of monitoring, the coast guard discovered that “crushed corals were dumped and it is highly likely that the maritime features were altered.” The force has released some photo evidence of the damaged corals. “We must stay vigilant and not lose sight of the illegal activities and aggressive behavior exhibited by China in Escoda (Sabina) Shoal,” Tarriela wrote in his post. “Not only does this pose a threat to our sovereignty, but it also causes significant damage to our marine environment,” the coast guard spokesman wrote. Sabina Shoal. (Google Maps) In a report released last December, the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) and the China Ocean Institute – both based in the United States – said that competing states in the South China Sea had caused “the largest active man-made reef destruction in human history.” The organizations named China as the most egregious actor by far, having wiped out roughly 4,648 acres (19km2) of reefs in four years between 2013 and 2017. Most destruction was due to dredging and landfill to construct infrastructure on artificial islands. Beijing carried out most of its island building activities during that period and by 2022 had fully militarized the three largest reefs – Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross. Jason Gutierrez in Manila contributed to this report. Edited by Mike Firn.
Chinese police harass family members of US-based content creators
Chinese authorities are stepping up pressure on the family members of U.S.-based YouTubers and other creative professionals in a bid to censor the content they make on American soil, according to recent video statements and interviews. “I really never imagined the police would come after me because I migrated along with my entire family,” YouTuber Qiqi, who goes by one name, said in a video posted to her channel on April 25. “But now the police have gone and gotten in touch with relatives on my mother’s side of the family.” “They couldn’t get a hold of me, so they went after my mother instead, which is the same thing,” she said, adding that the order to find her relatives had come down from the provincial level of government. “I’m not going to say exactly who because the police are probably watching this.” Qiqi’s video comes amid growing concern over Beijing’s “long-arm” law enforcement targeting overseas activists and students, as well as YouTubers who post content that is critical of the Chinese Communist Party and its leader Xi Jinping. “They kept calling my mother in the middle of the night, harassing her, calling again and again,” Qiqi said. She said the police — who want her to shut down her YouTube channel and delete all of her videos — needn’t bother calling any more. A cyclist prepares to be checked by police officers at a checkpoint near Tiananmen Square in Beijing, June 4, 2020. (Ng Han Guan/AP) “A big part of the reason I left China was that I wouldn’t be able to speak freely until I got out,” she said. “So why do you think I’ll listen when you try to pursue me overseas?” Repeated attempts to contact Qiqi online went unanswered by the time of writing. Common problem Veteran U.S.-based journalist and YouTuber Wang Jian said the Chinese authorities often pursue and harass Chinese migrants overseas, or put pressure on their relatives back home. “Actually, it’s not just YouTubers, but journalists, dissidents, human rights lawyers and anyone critical of the Chinese authorities have this problem,” Wang said. “But YouTubers are more likely to get to the critical point where someone [in the Chinese government] feels hurt by what they do.” He said the aim in contacting people’s relatives was to show them that they aren’t free from possible reprisals, even if they live overseas. A woman looks at a propaganda cartoon warning local residents about foreign spies, in an alley in Beijing on May 23, 2017. (Greg Baker/AFP) “[It means] you have a weakness, so be careful what you say,” Wang said. “You can’t express your thoughts freely — the Communist Party has been doing this since it was founded.” One of the videos police wanted Qiqi to take down was a Jan. 14 upload in which she discussed whether President Xi Jinping really would give the order to invade Taiwan. Complaints from people operating as part of Beijing’s United Front overseas influence campaign are believed to have been behind the removal of at least two satirical YouTube channels taking aim at Xi in recent years. ‘Drink tea’ Meanwhile, a group of rights activists who are currently making a small-budget satirical film taking aim at the Chinese government in Los Angeles said police back in China have hauled in a number of their family members back home to “drink tea,” a euphemism for questioning or a dressing-down. Wang Han, who is directing the movie “The Emperor Vs. the Three Evils,” said the police had managed to track down family members of all of the crew. “The police kept on calling the home of [one actor], telling [his parents] not to let him take part in this,” Wang said. “The police keep trying to contact me as well.” Wang said freedom of expression should be a universal human right that he and the rest of the crew aren’t willing to let go, however. “People in China should have the right to express themselves freely, but if we can’t do that in China, then at least we should get to do that in the United States,” he said. Translated by Luisetta Mudie. Edited by Malcolm Foster.
Episode 6: Songs, (alleged) spies, and the curious case of Wang Shujun
“It’s go time!” says Amy as she tries her best impression of Eugene to start off the show. Podcast Free Asia We answered our first listener comment from a youtube user who took issue with our account of an Asia Fact Check Lab story about U.S. President Jimmy Carter discussing the One China policy, which recognizes China but only acknowledges China’s stance on Taiwan. This was way back in episode 1! We welcome all feedback, even negative feedback… and of course, we made our rebuttal. The Rundown This episode’s rundown was music themed! The Vietnamese Service reported about Vietnamese pop singer Dam Vinh Hung, who got in hot water for wearing a military-themed costume accentuated with medals that looked like those issued by the South Vietnamese during the Vietnam War, the faction that lost and was considered the enemy of the faction that won and set up the current government. Hung revealed that the medal in question had the words “HIGH QUALITY GARMENT” on it and therefore was obviously not a replica of any South Vietnamese medal, but another medal he wore said “Marine Semper Fi,” which is the motto of the U.S. Marines. Whoops. Hung did however say that he would never wear this costume again, so as not to offend anyone. The Korean Service reported about a new music video in North Korea that praises leader Kim Jong Un as the country’s “Friendly Father.” Eugene revealed that he is a stan of the vocalist Kim Ryu Kyong, even if she is singing an over the top propaganda song. The video is also over the top with so many dolled-up apparently average North Koreans singing Kim’s praises that it has entertainment value for reasons its makers perhaps did not anticipate. Another interesting aspect of the video is that it contains some expensive musical instruments and equipment that may be violations of sanctions. So it is possible that part of the purpose of this video is for North Korea to thumb its nose at the world, showing that it can get around sanctions. How It’s Made We talked to Tara McKelvey and Jane Tang from RFA’s Investigative team about a their report on Wang Shujun, a pro-democracy activist from New York who is accused of spying for China. Wang allegedly met with Chinese intelligence agents and passed them information about Chinese dissidents located in the U.S. Through the discussion we learn that Wang is a very interesting character and that this case could serve as a precedent for other so-called “disposable assets” who may have been unwittingly serving as spies, possibly without their own knowledge. BACK TO MAIN
Police arrest 3 Cambodian opposition party members
Cambodian authorities arrested three opposition party members on Thursday — one leader from a new party and two members of an older party — ahead of a range of elections on May 26, activists told Radio Free Asia. Sun Chanthy, 44, president of the National Power Party, formed last year, was questioned by police after being arrested at Phnom Penh International Airport upon his return from Japan, where he addressed Cambodian supporters. Charged with incitement, he was detained at Phnom Penh Municipal Police headquarters. Chea Mony, vice president of the National Power Party, traveled with Sun Chanthy to Japan and witnessed the arrest, saying it had to do with upcoming provincial, municipal, district and Khan council elections. Chea Mony said that during the visit to Japan, Sun Chanthy did not make political statements that would have disrupted Cambodia’s social order or national security. “There was no effect on national security according to accusations by the court,” Chea Mony told Radio Free Asia. “The council election is coming. We don’t need to explain, [but] this is a threat ahead of the election.” “This is a repeated action to scare the pro-democrats,” he said. “The party doesn’t have any plans to incite anyone.” New party The National Power Party was formed in 2023 by breakaway members of the Candlelight Party, the main political organization opposing the government under the ruling Cambodian People’s Party, or CPP. The CPP has ruled the country since 1979, often arresting political opposition members on politically motivated charges ahead of elections to ensure its own politicians retain power or win new seats in contested areas. In response to the arrest, the National Power Party issued a statement calling on the government of Prime Minister Hun Manet to release Sun Chanthy without any conditions and to restore political space so that the party can participate in the democratic process. Adhoc staffers Ny Sokha, (foreground, C), Yi Soksan, (rear C) and Nay Vanda arrive at an appeals court in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, June 13, 2016. (Heng Sinith/AP) In the arrest warrant issued on May 7, Chreng Khmao, prosecutor of the Phnom Penh Municipal Court, ordered police to bring Sun Chanthy to the internal security office of the Phnom Penh Municipal Police before May 23 for questioning on the “incitement” charge. But the warrant didn’t mention what Sun Chanthy said during his Japan visit that brought about the charge. The Ministry of Justice issued a statement saying authorities arrested Sun Chanthy for incitement to provoke social chaos because he blamed the government of being biased and discriminatory with the distribution of poverty cards for the poor and that he twisted information. Candlelight Party members arrested Also on Thursday, police arrested two members of the Candlelight Party in Kampong Cham province — Dum Khun, second deputy head of Ampil commune in Kampong Siem district in Kampong Cham province, and Sim Sam On, commune councilor of Ampil — said former Candlelight Party leader Ly Kim Heang. They are being detained by Kampong Cham provincial police, she said, adding that authorities have not yet told their families the reasons for their arrest and have not allowed them to see the two men. The Candlelight Party issued a statement saying that the arrests constituted a threat aimed at eliminating legitimate political activities, and called for their release. Since the beginning of 2024, more than 10 members of the Candlelight Party have been detained by authorities, including six officials from Kampong Cham province. Ny Sokha, president of Adhoc, Cambodia’s oldest human rights group, warned that the government’s reputation would deteriorate and that it would face more pressure from the international community if it continued to arrest opposition party members. “This will affect the government’s reputation on the world stage,” he said. Translated by Yun Samean for RFA Khmer. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.
China’s third aircraft carrier completes first sea trial
Satellite imagery shows China’s third aircraft carrier Fujian has returned to Shanghai Jiangnan Shipyard after completing an eight-day maiden sea trial. In a Planet Labs image from May 9, 2024, obtained by Radio Free Asia, the Fujian was seen moving back to its berth at Jiangnan, where it was built and fitted out over the last six years. During the sea trial that began on May 1, the carrier tested its propulsion and electrical systems and other equipment, and “achieved the expected results,” according to China Military Online. It will conduct follow-up tests according to established plans, the People’s Liberation Army’s news outlet said. “If previous experience is any guide, we can expect three to five months of sea trials to ensure the integrity of the hull and propulsion systems,” said Robert Farley, a senior lecturer at the University of Kentucky. “If everything goes well, Fujian could begin flight operations this year,” Farley said, adding that it could take a year or more for the aircraft carrier to “actually be operational.” Sailors assigned to China’s third aircraft carrier Fujian conduct maiden sea trial in an undated photo. (China Military Online) Fujian will likely host Shenyang J-15 fighters, as well as the next generation J-35s, JL-10 trainer jets and the new Xian KJ-600 fixed-wing AEWC (airborne early warning and control) aircraft. The airplanes would be launched from the carrier’s deck by a modern system called Catapult Assisted Take-Off Barrier Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR) that so far has only been used by the U.S. and French navies. It is the first Chinese aircraft carrier equipped with CATOBAR. China’s first two flattops – Liaoning and Shandong – use a ski jump-style launch system. The CATOBAR system is able to launch more and heavier aircraft than the ski jump system. At 80,000 tons, Fujian is of the same size as a U.S. Nimitz-class carrier but smaller than the new Gerald R. Ford carrier of 100,000 tons. “Even after commissioning the Chinese will still have lots to learn, so we can expect Fujian to operate at a slower pace than a U.S. supercarrier, even given the differences in size,” said Farley. However, at the end of this process China will have “a very advanced carrier, probably more advanced and capable than the carriers currently operated by France or the United Kingdom,” the maritime affairs expert told RFA. Strategic platform The Chinese navy released a number of photographs and a nearly eight-minute video showing the Fujian’s movements during the sea trial. Chinese experts were quoted by the Global Times as saying that the successful maiden voyage “has laid a solid foundation for future test voyages, and marks a concrete step toward its commissioning” into the navy. The fleet of three aircraft carriers would boost the navy’s combat capability and serve as strategic platforms to safeguard China’s sovereignty, they said. China’s third aircraft carrier moving back to berth at Jiangnan Shipyard, Shanghai, on May 9, 2024. (Planet Labs) China already has numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, compared with the U.S.’s 293 ships and submarines. It also has the largest coast guard fleet in the world, besides a powerful maritime militia. A report by the U.S. think-tank Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments said that in addition to its three aircraft carriers, China may build another two in the next 10 years. “No one would ever go through the process of learning CATOBAR operations just to build one carrier, so I expect that we’ll see at least one more ship of Fujian’s type,” Farley said. Edited by Mike Firn.
INTERVIEW: Former North Korean diplomat on the drawbacks of being elite
Ryu Hyun-woo was North Korea’s acting ambassador to Kuwait when he defected to South Korea in 2019. As one of the elites in North Korea, he had rights and privileges that ordinary citizens do not. But at the same time, he and others like him were under even more scrutiny than the average citizen, he says. Ryu lived in an apartment complex in Pyongyang where all of his neighbors were high-ranking North Korean officials. In an interview with RFA Korean, Ryu explained that life as an elite is like already having “one foot in hell” because of the constant surveillance their lives are under, and how easily they are discarded if the leader needs someone to take the blame. The interview has been edited for length and clarity. RFA: Can you tell us a little bit about your background? Ryu: I was born in Pyongyang. I graduated from the Pyongyang Foreign Language Institute and Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies, majoring in Arabic. I then joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and worked there for over 20 years. After working as a diplomat in Syria and Kuwait, I came to South Korea in September 2019. I have settled in and I am living well in South Korea. RFA: When you were in North Korea, you lived in and exclusive area of Pyongyang, correct? Do all the elites live in the same area? Ryu: The administrative district name is Uiam-dong, Taedonggang district, Pyongyang. This place is also called Eundok village, and it is the residence of many officials. There are six major buildings in the residence. The generals of the North Korean People’s Army live in four of the buildings. One building is for high-ranking officials in the Central Committee. The remaining one is where high-ranking officials of the administrative department live. RFA: We often hear about North Korea’s chronic shortages of electricity. Did the elevators on these buildings cut out from time to time like they do for everyone else living in apartments? Ryu: You’re right. North Korea has a poor power supply system. Because of it, the elevator sometimes stops working. However, there are times when it operates normally. For example, during commuting hours, it is guaranteed. Nevertheless, the electricity often drops even during commuting hours. My house was on the 4th floor. Oh Guk Ryol, the head of the operations department, lived on the 5th floor, and Director Kim Yang Gon lived on the 3rd floor. The former head of the United Front Work Department and Oh Guk Ryol came down from the floors above, and my father-in-law (Jon Il Chun, the former head Office 39, the secretive organization that manages the slush funds of the Kim family) and I would get on to the elevator. As we were going down, Kim Yang Gon got on. Then just as the elevator was going down to the second floor, it suddenly stopped. I was the youngest of everyone there, so I had no choice but to open the escape hatch on the ceiling of the elevator. It’s like a vent. I climbed up to the third floor and I saw something that looked like a latch that opens the elevator door. I opened the door with it, contacted the management, and rescued the other officials in the elevator. The electricity situation was so bad. RFA: Can living in that area of Pyongyang be seen as a matter of pride for its residents? Ryu: It can be interpreted as having a lot of trust and high loyalty. However, there are pros and cons. Once you enter this place, you are subject to wiretapping, stalking and strong surveillance. You can’t say anything inside your house. For example, wasn’t Chief of Staff Ri Yong Ho shot to death? It was because he was at home making slanderous remarks about Kim Jong Un with his wife. He was purged and disappeared. My mother-in-law kept pointing to her mouth whenever I tried to complain about something. She told me to be quiet and not to say anything because they listen to everything. To that extent, they wiretap 24 hours a day. That’s why there is a different way to share thoughts. My in-laws would wake up around 5:30 in the morning. I would wake up around 6 o’clock. Then we go for a jog or walk together. That’s the time my father-in-law would ask me questions and I would also talk to him. For example, while I was in Syria, I heard a South Korean refer to my father-in-law as ‘Kim Jong Il’s safekeeper,’ so I passed that on to my father-in-law. RFA: You told your father-in-law about something that came out in the South Korean media? Ryu: I told my father-in-law that in South Korea, he is referred to as ‘Kim Jong Il’s safekeeper.’ My father-in-law laughed. I told him those things, secret things that should not be caught by wiretapping. We exchanged stories like that while taking a walk or in a place where wiretapping does not work. Ryu Hyun-woo (right), who served as North Korea’s acting ambassador to Kuwait in 2019, escaped from North Korea and has now settled in South Korea, in a frame grab from an interview with RFA Korea. (RFA) RFA: Was there ever any frightful incident you witnessed while living there? Ryu: The household we were closest to was Park Nam Ki, director of the Planning and Finance Department of the ruling party of North Korea. Do you remember the currency reform in 2009? (That was when North Korea introduced new versions of its paper currency, but allowed the people to exchange only a certain amount of their old currency, thereby wiping out most people’s savings.) As a result of that incident, Park Nam Ki was shot to death in January 2010. In February of the same year, Park Nam Ki’s entire family members went to a political prison camp. I remembered it was around 1 or 2 o’clock in the morning. There was a truck from…
The Techo Funan Canal won’t end Cambodia’s dependency on Vietnam
First it was the Ream Naval Base. Now it’s the Techo Funan Canal. Could the planned $1.7-billion waterway that will cut through eastern Cambodia – which will be built, funded and owned by a Chinese state firm – be used by Beijing to attack or threaten Vietnam? Phnom Penh denies this and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet reportedly had to assuage the Vietnamese leadership of this concern during a visit last December. Sun Chanthol, a Cambodian deputy prime minister and the former minister of public works, recently said he also tried to mollify Hanoi’s concerns about the project, formally known as the Tonle Bassac Navigation Road and Logistics System Project. The United States has been more vocal than Vietnam in raising concerns over the Ream Naval Base in southern Cambodia, which China is extensively refurbishing and where China appears to have stationed some vessels for the past few months. Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet wave in Hanoi, Dec.11, 2023 during Manet’s visit to boost bilateral relations between the two Southeast Asian nations. (Hau Dinh/AP) But Hanoi’s worries about the Techo Funan Canal have leaked out in drabs from within Vietnam. Last month, an academic journal article by two researchers at the Oriental Research Development Institute, part of the state-run Union of Science and Technology Associations, warned that the Cambodian canal might be a “dual-use” project. “The locks on the Funan Techo Canal can create the necessary water depths for military vessels to enter from the Gulf of Thailand, or from Ream Naval Base, and travel deep into Cambodia and approach the [Cambodia-Vietnam] border,” they argued in a study that was republished on the website of the People’s Public Security Political Academy. Geopolitical implications One ought to be skeptical. China having access to the Ream Naval Base is one thing— it is a military base. It makes sense for Beijing to want to station and refuel its vessels on the Gulf of Thailand, effectively encircling Vietnam. But if China was thinking of attacking Vietnam, wouldn’t it be simpler for the Chinese navy to follow Cambodia’s coastline to Vietnam? Beijing presumably wouldn’t want its vessels to be stuck in a relatively narrow Cambodian canal. But if you can imagine Cambodia allowing the Chinese military access to its inland waterways to invade Vietnam, why not imagine Phnom Penh allowing the Chinese military to zip along its (Chinese-built) expressways and railways to invade Vietnam? If you are of that mindset, then Cambodia’s road or rail networks are just as much of a threat, or perhaps more so, as Cambodia’s naval bases or canals. Two Chinese warships, circled, are seen at Cambodia’s Ream naval base on April 18, 2024. (Planet Labs) Nonetheless, the canal has geopolitical implications for Vietnam. Cambodia exports and imports many of its goods through Vietnamese ports, mainly Cai Mep. The Funan Techo Canal, by connecting the Phnom Penh Autonomous Port to a planned deepwater port in Kep province and an already-built deep seaport in Sihanoukville province, would mean that much of Cambodia’s trade no longer needs to go through Vietnam. Phnom Penh can justifiably say this is a matter of economic self-sufficiency. “Breathing through our own nose,” as Hun Manet put it. Phnom Penh reckons the canal will cut shipping costs by a third. Cambodia has a dependency on Vietnam’s ports. If Cambodia-Vietnam relations turned really sour, such as Phnom Penh giving the Chinese military access to its land, Hanoi could close off Cambodia’s access to its ports or threaten to do so, effectively blocking much of Cambodian trade – like it did briefly in 1994. Remove that dependency, and Vietnam has less leverage over Phnom Penh’s decision making. Mekong River projects Even the environmental concerns around the canal are about geopolitical leverage. Vietnam is justified in fearing that Cambodia altering the course of the Mekong River—after Laos has been doing so for two decades—will affect its own already at-risk ecology. Fears are compounded by the lack of publicly available environmental impact assessments over the canal and the fact that the Mekong River Commission, a regional oversight body that is supposed to assess the environmental impact of these riparian projects, has become a feckless body for dialogue. Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and China’s President Xi Jinping, following a meeting at the Government Office in Hanoi, Dec. 13, 2023. (Nhac Nguyen/Pool Photo via AP) Hanoi is no doubt concerned about its own position since it hasn’t been able to get Phnom Penh to openly publish those impact assessments. This further compounds Vietnam’s sense of weakness for having failed for more than a decade to limit how its neighbors go about altering their sections of the Mekong River, with highly deleterious impacts on Vietnam’s environment and agricultural heartlands. Clearly, Phnom Penh isn’t for turning on the canal project. Just this week, Hun Manet applauded apparent public support for the scheme as a “huge force of nationalism”. Phnom Penh is making this a sovereignty issue, thus making criticism a matter of state interference, a way of silencing dissent in Southeast Asia. It’s not all bad news for Vietnam, though. The Financial Times noted that, according to Vietnamese analysts, even if the Techo Funan Canal goes ahead, “Hanoi retains leverage over Cambodia” because ships carrying more than 1,000 tonnes would still rely on Vietnamese ports. Cambodia could get around this by using smaller vessels. That would be less profitable but still doable. By my calculation, Cambodia’s exports to Vietnam have grown by more than 800% over the last six years, from $324 million in 2018 to $2.97 billion last year. In the first quarter of this year, Vietnam bought 22 percent of Cambodia’s goods. Exports certainly give leverage. No other single country is queuing up to start buying a fifth of Cambodia’s products. Trade dependency In fact many of these Cambodian exports are re-exported by Vietnam to China, so Phnom Penh might think it can cut out the Vietnamese middleman. But it cannot. Arguably, Cambodia’s…
China sends 300 workers to deep sea port project in Myanmar’s Rakhine state
China has sent more than 300 technicians and workers to a deep sea port project in western Myanmar’s Rakhine state amid intense fighting between the military and ethnic rebels, according to residents. A ship carrying the crews, along with heavy machinery and food, docked at Maday Island in Rakhine’s Kyaukphyu township on the evening of April 28, the residents told RFA Burmese, after receiving permission from the junta to work on the project in the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone, or SEZ. The deployment comes after six months of clashes in Rakhine between junta troops and the Arakan Army, or AA – part of an alliance of three ethnic armies that have pushed the junta back in the western and northern parts of the country. Experts say the ethnic army victories mark a turning point in the war that began soon after the junta took control of the government in a February 2021 coup d’etat. The Kyaukphyu SEZ’s deep sea port complex is a key Chinese-led venture for which Beijing had requested heightened security. The project was approved in 2023 by the junta and attempts to recruit locals for work have been met with controversy and distrust. A resident of Kyaukphyu who, like others interviewed in this report, spoke on condition of anonymity due to security concerns, told RFA that some of the Chinese nationals who arrived on the ship are now residing in hotels in the township. “Both the workers who were already there and those who recently arrived travel to Maday Island in the morning and return to the city in the evening using hovercrafts,” he said. “The ship that arrived carried Chinese experts, including engineers responsible for the power lines and water systems.” The Myanmar military’s Danyawaddy Naval Base near Thit Poke Taung village in Kyaukphyu township, Rakhine state, seen here in Jan. 26, 2023. (Airbus) Residents said the ship departed from Maday Island on the morning of April 30. Attempts by RFA to reach Hla Thein, the junta’s attorney general and spokesperson for Rakhine state, for additional information about the deployment and the status of the project went unanswered. China and Myanmar signed an agreement to implement the Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port Project and SEZ in November 2020, under the National League for Democracy government, which was deposed months later in the military coup. On Dec. 26, 2023, the two nations signed another agreement specifically for the deep sea port project during a meeting in Naypyidaw. Despite the agreements, residents say the project has yet to be fully implemented. The deep sea port project is a joint venture between the neighboring countries, with Myanmar contributing 30% of the investment and China providing the remaining 70%. The port is expected to include 10 wharfs capable of docking container ships. Developing a war zone Kyaukphyu township has been at the forefront of fighting in recent months between the military and the AA, which in November ended a ceasefire that had been in place since the coup. Since then, the ethnic army has taken control of eight of Rakhine state’s 17 townships, as well as one township in neighboring Chin state. Clashes and exchanges of territory occur on a near daily basis in the state. On Thursday evening, the AA captured the pro-junta Border Guard Police Command, at which some 600 junta troops were stationed, and two pro-junta Border Guard Force camps in Maungdaw township, residents told RFA. The AA first attacked the police command on April 25, and the capture ended a week of fighting, residents said. “Hundreds of border guard troops” retreated from the police command to Shwe Zar ward in the town of Maungdaw following the seizure, they added. A day earlier, the AA captured two military outposts in the Mayu mountain range near the Myanmar-Bangladesh border where around 100 junta troops were stationed, according to sources close to the Rakhine rebel group. The seizure ended a nearly three-week bid by the AA for control of the camps, they said. Residents said Friday that the Rakhine state capital Sittwe – a city of 100,000 people with typically crowded beaches and markets – has become “a ghost town,” as the AA captured nearby towns in recent months. Those who lack the funds to relocate face a shortage of commodities and skyrocketing prices, while some are starving, they said. Junta troops have tightened security in the city since April 10, when AA chief Major Gen. Twan Mrat Naing urged residents of Sittwe and Kyaukphyu to flee to his army’s controlled territories. A jetty for oil tankers is seen on Maday island, Kyaukphyu township, Rakhine state, Myanmar in this October 7, 2015 file photo. (Soe Zeya Tun/Reuters) Meanwhile, the AA and junta forces are in a fierce fight for control of Rakhine’s Ann township, which is the base of military’s Western Command, as well the townships of Buthidaung and Thandwe townships. The latest developments follow the AA’s March capture of Ramree township, which shares Maday Island with Kyaukphyu township. A resident who has closely watched the progress of Chinese projects in the region told RFA at the time that the AA had assumed control of most of the areas within the Kyaukphyu SEZ and said the ethnic army would likely have a say on how Chinese development proceeds. Protecting Chinese interests Zachary Abuza, a Southeast Asia analyst at the National War College in Washington – who writes commentaries regularly for RFA – said that despite assurances to Beijing by both the military and the AA that they would protect its interests in Myanmar, China’s decision to deploy workers and technicians to the Kyaukphyu SEZ is “putting [them] in harm’s way.” “They’re both giving assurances for the protection of Chinese interests, but they’re still very much in competition over the control of Kyaukphyu,” he said, noting that “fighting has increased” around the township seat in recent weeks. “Right now, the Arakan Army is in fairly solid control of most of northern Rakhine … [and] is going to have to move…
