Nearly 600 properties seized by junta over alleged ties to armed resistance

Myanmar’s junta has confiscated nearly 600 homes and other buildings owned by people it claims are members or supporters of the armed resistance, according to a report by independent research group the Institute for Strategy and Policy (ISP Myanmar). The report found that, between the military’s Feb. 1, 2021, coup and May 20 this year, authorities seized 586 properties, mostly from people who have alleged ties to the shadow National Unity Government (NUG), Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Committee of Representatives (CRPH), and anti-junta People’s Defense Force (PDF) paramilitary group — all of which the regime considers “terrorist organizations.” Several other confiscated properties belonged to people the military regime said had a role in bombings of junta targets, anti-coup protests, and the nationwide anti-junta Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Among the seizures were the homes of NUG acting President Duwa Lashi La and Prime Minister Mahn Winn Khaing Thann, the report said. The largest number of properties, 159, were confiscated from owners in embattled Sagaing region, where the military has faced some of the strongest resistance to date. Myint Htwe, a former lawmaker for the deposed National League for Democracy (NLD) party representing Ye-U township in the Sagaing Regional Parliament, called the military’s seizures “arbitrary” and illegal. “These confiscations are entirely arbitrary, according to the law,” the former MP, whose home was among those confiscated, told RFA’s Burmese Service. “The junta is a terrorist organization that has violated all the ethics of how soldiers should act and how civilians should be treated. I know they will never abide by the laws, and I don’t expect anything different.” According to ISP Myanmar’s findings, 373 properties, or nearly two-thirds of those seized, belonged to civilians. Another 147 properties belonged to lawmakers, while 66 were owned by the NLD or its members. Kyaw Htet Aung, senior researcher at ISP Myanmar, said the confiscations had taken an emotional, social and economic toll on the victims. “Especially, the family members and victims of home confiscations have had their lives disrupted and ruined,” he said. “When someone loses their home, they can live with relatives or shelter at a camp for internally displaced people,” he added. “But often it becomes difficult to maintain one’s regular social, economic, educational and medical activities after a home is lost. Owning a home is central part of one’s life.” Attempts by RFA to contact junta deputy information minister, Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, for comment on the confiscations went unanswered Wednesday. A photo shows the exterior of the home of Moe Ma Kha, a former NLD lawmaker for the Bago Regional Parliament, which was sealed off by junta authorities in Taungoo city on Feb. 12, 2022. Credit: Citizen journalist Targeting the NLD NLD Central Committee member Kyaw Htwe said the junta is illegally targeting members of his party. “The military regime is jealous of the NLD party for achieving landslide victories in every free and fair election. They know they cannot achieve a monopoly on power while the NLD is around, and that’s why they are targeting the party,” he said. “They destroyed the party headquarters, sealed party member’s homes, and arrested the party members. They even arrest and intimidate the family members of NLD members and supporters. They are taking away the rights of the people.” The junta says voter fraud led to the NLD’s landslide victory in the country’s November 2020 election but has yet to provide evidence for its claims. It has instead violently suppressed nationwide protests calling for a return to civilian rule, killing 1,909 people and arresting 14,046 in the 16 months since, according to the Bangkok-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. Most detainees from the NLD were charged for alleged crimes that carry heavy sentences, including rebellion, corruption, unlawful association and incitement. The NLD said in January that more than three-quarters of its members arrested by the junta remained in detention more than 11 months after the military seized power. Since the Feb. 1 coup, junta security forces have arrested hundreds of NLD members, including leader Aung San Suu Kyi and former President Win Myint. Political Analyst Than Soe Naing said the junta is using every means at its disposal to crush the resistance movement and drive away its supporters. “They intend to make NLD supporters and proponents of the NUG suffer and become homeless,” he said. “There are no laws or constitutional provisions that support such actions. The junta is now using unprecedented and inhumane tactics to suppress the resistance and its supporters.” Translated by Ye Kaung Myint Maung. Written in English by Joshua Lipes.

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China bans tattoos for minors, forbidding anyone from offering the service to teens

China’s State Council has issued a ban on tattoos for minors, banning any business, individual or organization from providing such services or encouraging young people to get tattoos. “No enterprise, organization or individual shall provide tattoo services to minors, and shall not coerce, induce or instigate minors to tattoo,” the June 6 directive, which takes immediate legal effect, said. “For immature minors, tattoos may be just a whim, something they do in pursuit of individuality, but the harm done is enormous and long-lasting,” the document said. It said that while similar bans already exist in some parts of China, including Shanghai and Jiangsu, different local authorities have different attitudes when it comes to regulating the behavior of children and teenagers. The directive overrules local law-making, requiring judicial and law enforcement agencies to comply with its provisions without exception. “Families and schools must actively guide minors to increase their awareness of tattoos and their adverse effects, so that minors can consciously and rationally refuse tattoos,” the directive said. “Service providers must improve their sense of responsibility and resolutely refrain from offering tattoo services to minors,” it said. Taiwanese youth worker Yeh Ta-hwa said teenagers typically get tattoos as a form of self-expression, and the new rules are a bid to exert greater control over young people’s freedom of expression in China. “Xi Jinping has been curbing people’s freedom of expression since he took office,” Yeh told RFA. “He has done so much to restrict the freedom of young people, including banning them from any form of religion under the age of 18, limiting their online gaming time and what content they can view.” “[All of this] shows that China’s control and monitoring of its citizens’ free will is getting tighter and tighter.” In some other countries, including the U.S., some European countries and democratic Taiwan, tattoo parlors are allowed to tattoo minors with parental consent. Paternalistic overreach? Yeh said tattoos were previously stigmatized in Taiwan, where they are closely linked in people’s minds with organized crime, but under the influence of indigenous peoples’ culture, they are now increasingly seen as an expression of culture, art and personal freedom. U.S.-based legal scholar Teng Biao said the law is highly paternalistic, putting the state in loco parentis. “This is an overreach, a paternalistic approach in which the government takes the place of the parents,” Teng said. “Tattoos aren’t particularly harmful, so the government is going too far, trying to control them.” “It would be better coming from the parents, through education and persuasion.” Taiwan-based dissident Zhou Shuguang said the Chinese government could fear that people will use tattoos to show allegiance to something other than the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), or use it as a form of political protest. “They probably fear that minors’ bodies will become taken over by various cultural symbols, making it harder for the CCP to brainwash them,” Zhou told RFA. “Cultural icons, cartoon characters and writing are all carriers of culture.” “Minors could be branded for life, with the symbols hard to erase,” he said. “The other thing they could be worried about is that people will use tattoos as tokens of recognition when forming groups, the thing that the CCP fears most, and has to break up.” Teng agreed. “For example, if someone gets the numbers 8964 tattooed on their body [a covert reference to the 1989 Tiananmen massacre], just putting those numbers together is going to be trouble,” he said. “China won’t allow those numbers to be posted online.” He said the move was part and parcel of China’s “patriotic education” program in schools. “Chinese education is actually a form of brainwashing, and these controls on minors’ freedom of speech by the entire education system is doing great harm to their minds,” Teng said. “There may be no bloodshed involved, but a lifetime of [psychological] harm instead.” Translated and edited by Luisetta Mudie.

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Kidnapping suspect fled to Vietnam to escape arrest

A suspect in the kidnapping of Vietnamese oil executive Trinh Xuan Thanh returned to Vietnam to evade a European Union arrest warrant, according to a Berlin-based journalist covering the case, while another reporter claimed he could have avoided arrest if he had stayed away from Europe for a few more months. The German Federal Prosecutor’s Office said last week that a Vietnamese national, identified as Anh T.L., was arrested in Prague and handed over to German authorities on June 1. He is accused of “spying and assisting in deprivation of liberty,” in connection with the abduction of Thanh in a Berlin park in 2017. Journalist Le Trung Khoa told RFA the suspect is Le Anh Tu, a Vietnamese resident of the Czech Republic.   Khoa said the German prosecutor’s office issued an indictment against him during the trial of another suspect, Nguyen Hai Long, in 2018. The indictment said that Le Anh Tu drove the minibus used to kidnap Thanh on July 23, 2017 and then sought refuge at the Vietnamese Embassy in Berlin: “Clearly, he was directly involved in the kidnapping because he was the driver of the car that was used during the illegal detention of Trinh Xuan Thanh. He witnessed the entire process from the time the kidnapping team picked up Lieutenant General Duong Minh Hung and other Vietnamese officers at a nearby hotel,” said Khoa. German journalist Marina Mai, who has also been covering the case, told RFA that Le Anh Tu would not have been arrested if he had arrived in Europe more than four months later: “Secret operations in Germany have a five-year statute of limitations,” she said. “Because the arrest warrant for Mr. Anh was effective from August 10, 2017, as far as I know, it would expire on August 10, 2022. So if Mr. Anh came to Europe four months later, he may not have been arrested. Now it has happened, I think there will be a second trial related to Trinh Xuan Thanh’s abduction to try him.” Meetings at the Borik Hotel It is claimed that Le Anh Tu drove another vehicle from the Czech Republic to the Borik Hotel in the Slovakian capital Bratislava where he met with Vietnam’s Minister of Public Security, To Lam. Khoa said that because Le Anh Tu was involved in almost the entire process of abducting and taking Trinh Xuan Thanh from Germany to the Czech Republic a trial will help clarify To Lam’s role and reveal whether or not former Slovak Interior Minister Robert Kaliňák was also involved in the kidnapping.  “In [Nguyen Hai Long’s] sentencing they clearly stated that To Lam was the one who organized this kidnap in Europe. However, at present, there is not enough real evidence to prosecute To Lam so I think they will do it step by step. Le Anh Tu’s arrest and extradition to Germany was a very important step because he [took part in] the meeting of the former Slovak Minister of Interior and To Lam at the Borik Hotel in Slovakia.” Vietnam’s Minister of Public Security met with then-Slovak Republic Interior Minister Robert Kaliňák at the hotel on July 26, 2017. The government then lent a plane to the Vietnamese to fly to Moscow from Bratislava. Some German and Slovakian media outlets speculated that Vietnam might have used the plane to take Thanh back to Vietnam. Robert Kaliňák denies being involved in the kidnapping plan. In December 2018, Slovakia decided to suspend an investigation of officials suspected of aiding Thanh’s return to Vietnam. At the time of the kidnapping the German foreign ministry condemned Vietnam’s abduction on German soil as “a flagrant violation of German law and international law, which we will never tolerate.” It imposed sanctions, including the suspension of its strategic partnership with Vietnam and expelled four Vietnamese Embassy employees and their families. German economic groups who want to do business with Vietnam have criticized the sanctions, according to Mai. She said their pressure persuaded the government to begin normalizing relations with Vietnam at the end of 2018.  “This does not mean that Germany is no longer interested in the Trinh Xuan Thanh case,” Mai said.  “Germany has recognized Vietnam’s release of Nguyen Van Dai to Germany, and also acknowledged that Vietnam did not execute Trinh Xuan Thanh. But the German government is still demanding the release of Trinh Xuan Thanh and his return to Germany.” “Vietnamese diplomatic passport holders are still not allowed to travel to Germany without a visa and Germany has not allowed Vietnam to appoint a liaison officer with the police and secret service in the Vietnamese embassy in Berlin since the kidnapping happened,” she added. Trinh Xuan Thanh is led by policemen to the courtroom at Hanoi People’s Courthouse on January 8, 2018. CREDIT: AFP Germany will ‘pursue it to the end’ According to Le Trung Khoa, Germany’s independent judiciary means it will investigate this case to the end, as evidenced by the fact that Le Anh Tu was arrested as soon as he returned to Europe: “Germany must, and will, pursue it to the end according to the independent judiciary, no matter what they ignore or like in Vietnam or say it will take a long time to pass.” In 2017, the German side made three requests to Vietnam in order to re-establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. The first was to ask Vietnam to return the status quo by returning Trinh Xuan Thanh to Germany. The second was to apologize for violating the law and sovereignty of Germany. The third was to promise not to repeat the crime. However, Vietnam has not complied with these requests. Marina Mai said the likelihood of Thanh being returned to Germany depends on whether the Hanoi government wants to stop violating international law.   “That can only happen if Trinh Xuan Thanh is returned to Germany,” she said.  “Germany is ready to issue a passport to Trinh Xuan Thanh. His family is living here.”  Vietnam unlikely to return Thanh any time…

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Myanmar’s junta uses identity documents as tools of genocide against Rohingya: report

Myanmar’s junta is using identity documents to carry out a genocide of the ethnic Rohingya community, much like the perpetrators of the Holocaust and Rwandan genocide, according to a new report, which calls on the U.N. Security Council to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The 63-page report entitled “Genocide by Attrition: The Role of Identity Documents in the Holocaust and the Genocides of Rwanda and Myanmar” and published Tuesday by the Southeast Asian rights group Fortify Rights, details how the junta is forcing Rohingya to obtain National Verification Cards (NVCs) that its authors say effectively strip them of access to full citizenship rights and protections. It also draws on case studies from the Holocaust and Rwandan genocides to demonstrate how authoritarian regimes use such documents to “systematically identify, persecute, and kill targeted populations on a widespread and massive scale.” “Perpetrators have long used identification documents in the commission of genocide,” said Ken MacLean, co-author of the report, senior advisor to Fortify Rights, and Clark University Professor at the Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, in a statement accompanying the release of the report. “Evidence from the Holocaust and Rwandan genocides show striking similarities with the ongoing erasure of the Rohingya identity in Myanmar by the junta.” The report found that identification cards such as those used during the Holocaust and Rwandan genocides contributed to “genocide by attrition,” which it defined as “the gradual destruction of a protected group by reducing their strength through sustained, indirect methods of destruction.” Such policies have long been in use in Myanmar and continue to play a role in the ongoing genocide of the Rohingyas, the report said, citing interviews with more than 20 Rohingya-genocide survivors, leaked junta documents, and a media analysis of junta-backed news outlets since the military’s Feb. 1, 2021 coup. It said that Rohingya in Western Myanmar’s Rakhine state described how the junta forces them to carry NVCs to prevent them from identifying as “Rohingya,” restrict their movement, and curtail their ability to earn a living, “creating conditions of life designed to be destructive.” Instead, they are made to identify as “Bengali” immigrants from Bangladesh in what the report said is a bid by authorities to exclude them from citizenship and ethnicity within Myanmar. The report cited the United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention’s findings that increased politicization of identity and discriminatory measures targeting protected groups are indicators in creating “an environment conducive to the commission of atrocity crimes,” noting that similar legal and administrative tools were used to facilitate the destruction of the Jewish and Tutsi populations, and are now being used against the Rohingya. “Rohingya continue to face existential threats under the military junta, an illegitimate regime responsible for far-reaching atrocities,” said John Quinley, senior human rights specialist at Fortify Rights and co-author of the report. “The ongoing denial of Rohingya ethnicity and citizenship are indicators of genocide. The [shadow] National Unity Government has committed to ensuring Rohingya citizenship and inclusion. The junta, however, is still using coercive measures to force Rohingya to identify as foreigners, erasing records of their existence.” Myanmar immigration officials hand over an identification document to a Rohingya woman at the Taungpyoletwei town repatriation camp in Rakhine state’s Maungdaw township, near the Bangladesh border, in a file photo. Credit: AFP Holding the junta accountable Fortify Rights said that while the connection between identification documents and international crimes is well-recognized, some U.N. officials, embassies, and others in Myanmar have failed to condemn the use of NVCs in targeting Rohingya. In some cases, the group said, they have even endorsed the documents as a solution to the group’s “statelessness.” The report’s findings demonstrate links between the NVC process and acts of genocide and should be a focus of investigations and legal proceedings, Fortify Rights said. The violations documented in Genocide by Attrition demonstrate links between the NVC process and genocidal acts and should be a focus of ongoing investigations and legal proceedings, said Fortify Rights. It called on U.N. member states to cut Myanmar’s junta off from access to arms, finances, and political legitimacy, and urged the U.N. Security Council to refer the situation in the country to the International Criminal Court (ICC). “The Myanmar military junta poses an undeniable threat to international peace and security,” said Fortify’s Quinley. “U.N. member states must wake up and act now to deny the junta the resources it craves and to hold it accountable for all of its crimes including genocide.” In 2016, a military crackdown forced some 90,000 Rohingya to flee Rakhine state and cross into neighboring Bangladesh, while a larger one in 2017 in response to insurgent attacks, killed thousands of members of the ethnic minority and led to an exodus of more than 740,000 across the border.  Human rights groups have produced a trove of credible reports based on commercial satellite imagery and extensive interviews with Rohingya about the operations in Rakhine state in 2017, including arbitrary killings, torture, and mass rape. Gambia has accused Myanmar’s military leadership of violating the 1948 Genocide Convention in Rohingya areas in a case it brought to the Hague-based International Court of Justice. The court is holding hearings to determine whether it has jurisdiction to judge if atrocities committed there constituted a genocide.

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Myanmar’s junta vows to proceed with high-profile executions

The court-ordered executions of four Burmese prisoners, including a deposed lawmaker and a prominent former activist sentenced to death for “terrorism,” will be carried out despite widespread international criticism, a junta official said Tuesday. Junta deputy information minister, Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, rejected the possibility for pardons in the four cases, which are part of a surge in death sentences under martial law in Myanmar. Since taking over in a coup last year, the military has transferred the authority to try cases of civilians to special or existing military tribunals, resulting in what rights groups say are summary proceedings with no chance of appeal. Former National League for Democracy (NLD) lawmaker Phyo Zeyar Thaw and 88 Generation leader Ko Jimmy were sentenced to death for violating the country’s Anti-Terrorism Law. Two other men — Hla Myo Aung and Aung Thura Zaw — were sentenced to death in Yangon region’s Hlaing Tharyar township on charges of murder. All four lost appeals of their cases last week. “The death penalty will be implemented,” Zaw Min Tun told RFA’s Burmese Service. “They will not be pardoned. We have finished the process all the way up through the appeals,” he added, when asked whether junta chief, Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, would consider staying their executions. Zaw Min Tun said the four men had been transferred to the custody of the junta’s Prison Department, which is now responsible for their cases. According to the junta, Phyo Zeyar Thaw and Ko Jimmy maintained contact with Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG), the Committee Representing the People’s Parliament (CRPP), and other organizations labeled “terrorist groups” by the military regime and had carried out “acts of violence.” The two men were sentenced to death by a military tribunal on Jan. 21. The four death sentences, as well 111 others that have been handed down by junta courts between the military’s Feb. 1, 2021, coup, and May 19 this year, have drawn criticism from legal experts and rights groups, who say the regime is threatening the public with unfair executions. The United Nations, Washington, Ottawa, and Paris have issued statements strongly condemning the decisions in the cases now proceeding to execution, although the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — of which Myanmar is a member state — has yet to respond. Thailand-based rights group Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), which claims junta security forces have arrested 14,032 people between the start of the coup and June 7 this year – 10,976 of whom it says remain in detention – issued a statement Monday calling on the U.N., ASEAN, and the rest of the international community to intervene in the cases. The junta’s Foreign Affairs Ministry recently responded to the statements by the U.N. and Western governments, accusing their authors of “condoning acts of terrorism.” Waging ‘psychological warfare’ Kyaw Htwe, a member of the NLD’s Central Executive Committee, echoed concerns that the junta is using the sentences as a warning to its opponents in an interview with RFA on Tuesday. But he said proceeding with the executions could ultimately harm the regime itself. “I think the junta is using the [threat of the] death penalty of the four men, including Ko Jimmy and Ko Phyo Zeyar Thaw, to wage psychological warfare against the armed resistance and the people,” he said. “They are testing the limits. They have crossed the line and made an irrational decision, which required presidential orders and involved several steps of appeal. If they stupidly implement this decision, they will face a strong response from the domestic and international communities.” Kyaw Htwe said the junta’s administrative, legislative and judicial decisions are all “illegal,” because it is an illegitimate government that seized power through force. However, he didn’t provide clarification on how the NLD intends to respond to the death sentences. NUG Human Rights Minister Aung Myo Min said the junta lacks the judicial authority to issue execution orders, which require an in-depth and transparent process to avoid wrongful convictions. “We cannot trust the junta’s tribunal, courts, and sentencing. They are murdering innocent civilians and view all democracy activists as the enemy,” he said. “[Proceeding with execution] is the wrong decision, both in terms of human rights and rule of law.” High-stakes bluff A Yangon-based attorney, who spoke to RFA on condition of anonymity, said he believes the execution orders are a bluff by the military regime as part of a bid to extract some sort of concession from the international community. “After reviewing all factors, I conclude that it is very unlikely they will carry out the execution order,” he said, adding that it is likely the junta wants to use the cases “as a bargaining chip for political reasons.” “Given the fact that the world is protesting these orders, and that the decisions are in violation of international and domestic laws, they will face severe consequences if they proceed.” However, political analyst Than Soe Naing told RFA that the junta, which the AAPP says has killed more than 1,900 civilians since the coup, has demonstrated over the past 16 months that it has little regard for the sanctity of human life. “They might reconsider if the international community appeals to them courteously,” he said. “Otherwise, I think they would actually hang Ko Jimmy and Phyo Zeyar Thaw, as they are little more than a group of thugs.” In its latest annual report covering the judicial use of the death penalty for the period January to December 2021, London-based rights group Amnesty International found that dozens of people were “arbitrarily sentenced to death” by Myanmar’s military tribunals, “several without the defendants being present, in what was widely perceived as a way to target political opponents and protestors.” The group said that prior to February 2021, Myanmar’s known death sentences were sporadically imposed for murder and usually commuted through mass pardons. However, the yearly average for the years 2017-2020 had remained lower than 10. The last execution in Myanmar — that of student leader Salai Tin Maung…

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Cambodia and China deny that Beijing is building secret facility at Ream Naval Base

China is not secretly building a military facility for its exclusive use inside a naval base Cambodia, a government spokesman said, dismissing a new report that detailed how both countries have been concealing a project that first gained U.S. attention in 2019. The Washington Post reported on Monday that China is building a new facility­–its second overseas military installation after a base in Djibouti–on the northern part of Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand, where Cambodia will host a groundbreaking ceremony on Thursday. The newspaper quoted a Chinese official in Beijing as saying that “a portion of the base” will be used by “the Chinese military.” The official denied it was for “exclusive” military use, telling the Post that scientists would also use the facility. Cambodian government spokesperson Phay Siphan echoed the Beijing official’s denial that it would be for exclusive Chinese military use. “There is no agreement or law saying that the construction is reserved for Chinese benefit exclusively,” he told RFA’s Khmer Service. He said the base remains open for visits from other countries, including the United States, but the Post report said Cambodian and Chinese authorities have worked hard to hide the Chinese presence in Ream, keeping the Chinese areas off limits to third-country visitors and altering their dress to avoid scrutiny. Ream base became the center of controversy in July 2019 after The Wall Street Journal cited U.S. and allied officials as confirming a secret deal to allow the Chinese to use part of the base for 30 years—with automatic renewals every 10 years after that—and to post military personnel, store weapons and berth warships. The reported deal, which would provide China with its first naval staging facility in Southeast Asia and allow it to significantly expand patrols on the South China Sea, was vehemently denied by Hun Sen, who said permitting foreign use of a military base in the country would “be in full contradiction to Cambodia’s constitution.” Last year, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman voiced concern about the Chinese military presence at Ream Naval Base during a visit to the country, citing Cambodia’s razing of two U.S.-constructed buildings on the base in 2020. After meeting with Prime Minister Hun Sen, she arranged for the U.S. Embassy to send its defense attaché for regular visits. Ten days later, the attaché arrived at the base, but he cut the tour short when he was not allowed full access, including to the sites of the two buildings. The U.S. had offered to renovate one of them, and the choice to destroy it suggested that Cambodia had accepted Chinese assistance to develop the base, a Pentagon report released last year said. A Cambodian official told RFA at that time that Cambodia never agreed to give the attaché a full tour, and that the U.S. had committed a breach of trust for asking more than what was agreed upon. Exiled political analyst Kim Sok told RFA that Cambodia and China are hiding the truth with their denials. “If any suspicions about the Chinese naval base are not resolved, Cambodia could face serious consequences—not only a diplomatic crisis in the form of pressure from the U.S.—but also it will lead to a security crisis. This will affect regional issues if there is no solution,” Kim Sok said. The base will bring more Chinese into Cambodia for purposes other than tourism or business, Cambodian-American rights activist and legal expert Theary Seng told RFA. “The Cambodian political situation is fragile, especially in terms of building good communication with the free world, because the ruling party dissolved its competitors to bolster the dictatorial regime. This has enabled China to [pounce on] the opportunity to increase its influence [in the region],” she said. Australia-based political scientist Carl Thayer said the semantics don’t change the situation. “Ream Naval Base is a Cambodian base on its own territory. Are they allocating a section that China can use? And if so, can Cambodians gain access to it without seeking prior permission?” he asked. “So Hun Sen says it’s not a base, it is a facility, and it’s still a base. Or [as] Shakespeare [said], ‘A rose by any other name would smell as sweet,’” added Thayer, an emeritus professor at the University of New South Wales in Australia. “A Chinese navy base in Cambodia, if it’s called a facility, it’s still a Chinese navy base,” he said. Translated by Samean Yun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.

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Refugees in Myanmar’s Chin state excluded from ASEAN humanitarian assistance plan

Nearly 100,000 internally displaced ethnic Chins in western Myanmar have called for help from civil society groups to avoid allowing the military junta to control distribution of humanitarian aid from Southeast Asian countries, saying their strife-torn region is not receiving assistance. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — a regional grouping that aims to promote economic and security cooperation among its 10 member states, including Myanmar — announced on Sunday that it would work with the military regime to distribute humanitarian aid to Myanmar. The number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Myanmar topped 1 million as of May 30 amid fighting and armed clashes across the country since the February 2021 military coup overthrew the democratically elected government, triggering civilian displacement and a humanitarian crisis, according to the U.N.’s refugee agency (UNHCR). Residents of Chin state have been strong opponents of the military since the takeover, turning the 36,000-square-kilometer (13,900-square-mile) territory into a battlefield. Nearly 90,000 local residents have been forced by the fighting to flee the area. In Chin state and Magway and Sagaing regions in Myanmar’s northwest, indiscriminate attacks by junta forces against civilians have resulted in numerous deaths and casualties, the torching of homes and villages, house searches, arbitrary arrests and detentions, UNHCR said. Restrictions on movement and transportation has led to shortages of food and goods in among IDPs and host communities in the region, the U.N. agency said. ASEAN’s promised aid will bypass ethnic Chin IDPs, according to the interim Chin National Consultative Council, Chin state’s leading political group, and the national Unity Government (NUG), the government in exile formed elected lawmakers and members of parliament ousted in the coup. ASEAN will provide assistance to Kayah and Kayin states, as well as to Magway, Sagaing and Bago regions, allowing a military junta-led task force to make decisions on how aid is delivered through the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management, said Salai Isaac Khin, chairman of the Interim Chin National Consultative Council (ICNCC). “We wonder if they had ignored us because they didn’t know the ground conditions,” he told RFA. “What’s the meaning of this? This is questionable. It’s like the people of Chin state, the most vulnerable people, have had their rights ignored.” ‘We’re so disappointed’ The states and regions that will receive the humanitarian aid have 50,000 IDPs due to post-coup fighting and violence, about 45% of the number of displaced people in Chin state, said the ICNCC and the NUG in a statement issued Sunday. Furthermore, over 30,000 IDPs from Chin state have fled over the border into India. RFA called ASEAN’s office in Yangon to ask why Chin IDPs were not included in the aid program, but no one responded. A spokesman for the Chin State Joint Defense Committee (CJDC) said it was disappointing that the state is being excluded from receiving ASEAN humanitarian assistance. “Almost the entire town of Thantlang in Chin state was burned down during the fighting,” he said. “In Falam, about 93 houses were turned into ashes. Thirty percent of the Chin people are war refugees. We’re so disappointed that our people have been left out of the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Program. It isn’t fair. We strongly oppose that this entire aid program is coming through the junta.” An aid worker assisting the Chin IDPs, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said ongoing fighting has made it difficult to travel between Thantlang and Hakha, and food and medical aid are badly needed. “Chin state is a mountainous region, and it’s very difficult to bring rice from the mainland,” he said. “We want to ask ASEAN whether it has ignored us because it doesn’t think that Chin state is involved in Myanmar politics,” the aid worker added. “Another thing is that ASEAN should meet and work with NGOs and international NGOs instead of with the junta.” Salai Charlie, who helps Chin refugees in Mizoram, India, told RFA that Christian groups and NGOs in India provided initial assistance to those fleeing the fighting but now have stopped. “Currently we are not receiving foreign aid,” he told RFA. “The Mizoram government is not helping us. The church in Mizoram, the NGOs and the wealthy in Mizoram have donated everything they could to help us. No one is helping us anymore. The rains have come, and we cannot work.” RFA could not reach junta spokesman, Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, for comment. Translated by Khin Maung Nyane for RFA Burmese. Written in English by Roseanne Gerin.

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Cantopop singer Tommy Yuen in court accused of ‘incitement’ under security law

Hong Kong police on Tuesday charged Cantopop singer and activist Tommy Yuen with “inciting hatred against the government” and “fraud” after he spoke out on social media against COVID-19 restrictions, and tried to raise money to assist a 19-year-old woman accused of “rioting.” Yuen, 41, appeared in court on Tuesday after police froze some H.K.$140,000 of his assets, charged with one count of “one or more acts of incitement” and one count of “fraud.” He had no defense lawyer present, and confirmed that he had withdrawn his application for legal aid, and would hire a private attorney instead. Yuen appeared in court with hair grown out to shoulder length, wearing a blue denim jacket, in apparently good spirits, waving to onlookers at the end of the hearing. He made no bail application, and will be remanded in custody until July 26. The charges against Yuen are based on posts he made to Facebook and Instagram between Sept. 26, 2021 and Jan. 21, 2022, which the prosecution alleged were “intended to provoke hatred or contempt for the government … or cause resentment or rebellion among Hong Kong residents.” He is also accused of using fraudulent means to raise funds for a 19-year-old defendant charged with “rioting,” a charge often used to target those present during the 2019 protest movement, or even its absent supporters. Meanwhile, secondary schools in Hong Kong are removing books deemed in breach of the national security law, the city’s Ming Pao newspaper reported. A list of books removed from the shelves of three school libraries obtained by the paper showed that more than 200 titles have disappeared from libraries because of fears they could breach the law. Targeting books Education bureau director Kevin Yeung said schools are responsible for ensuring that they don’t break the law. “Books are as important as textbooks and can influence the minds of young students,” Yeung told reporters. “The choice of books isn’t the sole responsibility of librarians; subject director, and even principals — the whole school — needs to get involved in this work,” he said. Bao Pu, publisher of the memoirs of late ousted premier Zhao Ziyang, one of the books on the list, said the book has little to do with national security. “When this book was published, I didn’t think it violated the laws of Hong Kong, nor did I think this book had anything to do with China’s national security,” Bao told RFA. “I believe that the books I published were all beneficial to readers and to China,” he said. But he added: “How they choose to self-censor is not my business and has nothing to do with me.” Bookburning Sociologist Chung Kim-wah described the removal of books as the modern version of book-burning. “The government doesn’t dare to actually draw up a list of banned books, so they are leaving the schools, teachers and library staff to try to guess what their superiors would think about them,” Chung told RFA. “This means that any works that might be regarded as objectionable or unfriendly by the government will be removed from the shelves,” he said. “It’s the safest way of controlling them, through intimidation,” he said. “It’s no different from burning books … it’s basically about control over the freedom of speech and expression.” Under guidelines published by the Education Bureau in February, schools are required to “establish/ strengthen the monitoring mechanism for regular review of learning and teaching resources (including their content and quality).” “Schools should ensure that the display of words or objects within the campus (including school buildings, classrooms and bulletin boards, etc.), such as books (including library collections), publications and leaflets does not involve contents that endanger national security,” the guidelines state. “Schools should also prohibit anyone from bringing objects to schools in contravention of the rules.” The national security law criminalizes speech and actions deemed to amount to secession, subversion, terrorism, or collusion with foreign powers, and enabled the setting up of a national security office under the direct control of Beijing to oversee the implementation of the law, as well as a Hong Kong headquarters for China’s feared state security police, to handle “special cases” deemed important by Beijing. It also bans speech or actions anywhere in the world deemed to incite hatred or dissatisfaction with the CCP or the Hong Kong government. Translated and edited by Luisetta Mudie.

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COVID test scandal topples two Vietnam Communist Party high officials

It’s always a sign when the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) calls for an emergency session of its Central Committee. Following a late May report by the Central Inspection Discipline Commission that detailed the wrong doing and bribe taking by the country’s Minister of Health and the Chairman of the Hanoi Party Committee, the Central Committee voted to expel the two men from the communist party. A third individual, the Deputy Minister of Science and Technology, but not a member of the Central Committee, was also expelled from the party. Expulsion from the party is in itself a major deal. Party investigators have four levels of discipline: reprimand, warning, demotion and expulsion. No longer protected by their elite party status, their legal jeopardy just went up a few notches. Now that the party’s inspection has concluded, they will now be passed on the prosecutors for trial and an almost certain conviction. While the investigation of Central Committee members is not unheard of (indeed two members of the 12th Politburo were expelled), this is an incredibly elite body of 180 members and 20 alternate members in a country of 100 million people. So what was the scandal about? This was no run of the mill corruption scandal involving payments to regulators or misuse of public funds. This was a through, year-long  investigation, a sign of how importantly the VCP is taking the scandal. One has to recall that in the first year of the pandemic, Vietnam was the international gold standard or response. They sealed their borders, imposed quarantines, waged a public health campaign, and rallied the population. But Vietnam soon faltered. The Delta and Omicron variants hit the country hard. Vietnam had been so successful in containing the virus that they failed to secure vaccines. Vietnam tried to develop four separate vaccines rather than concentrating its efforts on one or partnering with foreign firms. And following the 13th Party Congress in January 2021, a new leadership team was slow to find its footing. By May 2021, Ho Chi Minh City, the country’s economic engine was in lockdown. In February 2020, the elite Military Academy of Medicine and Viet-A received an $830,000 grant for a pilot project to produce. In a significant breakthrough, they developed an effective, accurate, and cost-effective test within a month and then quickly moved into commercial production. The Ministry of Health authorized the purchase of the kits at $21 apiece. But then the dodginess began. In April 2020, the Ministry of Science and Technology announced that the World Health Organizations had authorized the Viet-A test kit, with the expectation of massive sales overseas. Communist Party Chief Nguyen Phu Trong publicly awarded the company with a medal for its achievements in March 2021. Not only did the WHO not recognize the Viet-A test, they rejected it. That should have set off some alarm bells, but Viet-A made up for the loss of overseas sales by inflating the price at home. A 45 percent markup netted the firm some $175 million. Calls for investigations mounted in the latter half of 2021. And perhaps with the walls closing in, the company’s Chairman, Phan Quoc Viet, increased the bribes and kickbacks. By the time of his arrest in December 2021, he acknowledged paying bribes of over VND500 billion, roughly $22 million. His arrest was just the beginning: 21 people have been investigated and VND1.6 trillion in assets were seized. In March 2022, two senior colonels from the Military Medical Academy were arrested. The director of the Military Medical research Institute was arrested for embezzlement and abuse of power, while the head of the Equipment and Supplies Department was investigated for “violating regulations on bidding, causing serious consequences.” Both were expelled from the party.   In April, Lieutenant-General Do Quyet, director of Vietnam Military Medical University and his deputy, Major General Hoang Van Luong, were investigated for their institution’s role in the scandal. In May, authorities arrested the deputy head of the price management division of the Drug Administration of Vietnam. That month, the Central Committee’s Central Inspection Committee released their report that culminated with a recommendation for disciplinary actions against the Hanoi party chief Chu Ngoc Anh, who had previously been the Minister of Science and Technology, and current Health Minister Nguyen Thanh Long for their lax oversight and corruption within their ministries. A health worker waits amidst empty stools at a Covid-19 coronavirus vaccination centre for youths between the age of 12 to 17 in Hanoi, Nov. 23, 2021. Credit: AFP Does it Matter? Vietnam is a $271 billion economy, and growing quickly. Even by Vietnamese corruption scandals, the Viet-A scandal wasn’t that large. Yes, bribes were paid, but bribes are paid every day in Vietnam. But this scandal seems to have stung the leadership a little bit more. In part there was the direct link between the firm and the senior leadership. General Secretary Nguyen Pho Trong had egg on his face. But more importantly, Vietnam’s response to the pandemic was really quite exemplary. Even after the omicron wave rocked the country in mid-2021, they handled it well, and more importantly, had an extremely effective vaccine rollout. Vietnam’s handling of the pandemic was critical in keeping the economy humming. In 2020 as every other economy in Southeast Asia contracted, Vietnam,’s economy grew, though at a modest 2.9 percent. Growth slowed to 2.58 percent in 2021, but is set to grow rapidly in 2022. Public health is seen as essential to economic growth, especially as Vietnam seeks to benefit from decoupling from China and supply chain diversification. The scandal has also hit the vaunted Vietnam People’s Army, an institution that enjoys the highest levels of trust in the country. Vietnam has largely avoided the major kickback procurement scandals in their military modernization program that plagues many other countries. But it is far from immune to corruption. And one only has to look to Russia to see how pervasive corruption can hollow out a fighting force even after two decades of concerted…

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North Korea imposed ‘loyalty funds’ on trade officials in China amid missile tests

North Korea ordered trade officials stationed in China to pay U.S. $3,000 in so-called “loyalty funds” by the end of July, which some sources in China said was likely an effort to offset at least part of cost for ballistic missile tests over the weekend. The China-based trade officials are tasked with doing business with Chinese partners to earn foreign cash for their government, in some cases for leader Kim Jong Un’s personal slush fund. Occasionally the government will demand that they pay funds in addition to what their businesses earn for the government, effectively cutting into their own earnings. The call for loyalty funds usually coincides with important events, a North Korean trade official in the Chinese city of Dalian, in the northeastern province of Liaoning, told RFA’s Korean Service Monday on condition of anonymity for security reasons. “This is the third time the authorities have imposed a loyalty fund on us this year. The first and second time, though, trade had been partially open, so we could at least pay half of the fund,” the source said. “This time it is not easy because China is on complete lockdown due to the coronavirus,” said the source.” The North Korean economy is in shambles, partially because of the closure of the Sino-Korean border and the suspension of trade for essentially the first two years of the coronavirus pandemic. Earlier this year rail freight resumed, but it was quickly shut down due to new outbreaks of COVID-19 in China. With no trade, it is difficult for the officials sent overseas to pay their loyalty funds, and they have come to resent it, the official in Dalian said. “Trade officials are indignant that they keep imposing loyalty funds. We know through the internet that yesterday, once again, they tested ballistic missiles, this time eight from four locations,” said the source. “We are well aware that tens of millions of dollars are spent to launch a single missile. But how many ballistic missiles have been launched this year? I can’t quite understand the behavior of the authorities, who waste foreign currency on missile launches and forcibly impose loyalty funds on us.” South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the eight missiles were fired from four locations, including the Sunan area of Pyongyang into the sea east of the Korean peninsula. RFA sources estimate that North Korea has sent around 1,000 trade officials to China, meaning that the loyalty funds imposed this time should bring in around $3 million, far less than the estimated cost of Sunday’s missile test. Another trade official in Donggang, a port located close to the North Korean-Chinese maritime border, told RFA that the last time the government imposed loyalty funds, it was for a military parade in Pyongyang. That event later forced the government to acknowledge the virus after fever cases began to erupt among parade participants after they returned to their homes. “Trade officials cannot disobey orders from Pyongyang, so some of us have had to borrow money from our Chinese counterparts to contribute last time,” the second source said. “Because of that parade they ended up blocking train and maritime trade again, leaving us in debt. The complaints are pouring in because they are asking us to pay loyalty funds again,” the second source said. “They are squeezing more money out of us and wasting it on missile launches.” Translated by Leejin J. Chung. Written in English by Eugene Whong.

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