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Category: South Asia

Why Laos’ Communists cannot do anti-corruption

Editor017 mins

Corruption is often seen as a byproduct, a quirk, of a political system. But in many authoritarian states, it is actually the modus operandi.  Consider what binds a political structure together. How do you make sure that lowly officials in the provinces listen to their masters in the capital? How do you instill the sense that everyone is working together for the same cause, that all participants aren’t just a bunch of self-interested, warring individuals? One way is through terror. Officials listened to Joseph Stalin, the Soviet dictator, and his Politburo because they feared for their lives.  Another is through a common sense of purpose. This could be ideological. Everyone works towards the same goals because they believe they are creating a better world. Or it could be existential, such as everyone pulling together during wartime. Or it could be transactional, as we see in meritocracies, with everyone accepting the norms and hierarchies of the political structure because doing so means they stand a chance of advancing up the political ladder.  Cambodia’s King Norodom Sihamoni, front center, and members of Cambodia’s government pose with newly elected members of parliament during the opening ceremony at the National Assembly building in Phnom Penh on Aug. 21, 2023. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) However, another method is through corruption, what some academics would call “rent-seeking”. Low-ranking officials in the provinces pay heed to their superiors in the capital because they are all part of vast patronage networks. Low-ranking officials are loyal to their patrons in return for financial benefits and promotion, while the higher-ranking patrons in government are able to get others to follow their policies because they control the fortunes of those lower down the hierarchy.  Moreover, corruption provides something of a common purpose, a common understanding, amongst all levels of the political structure. Everyone knows how the game is rigged and that they have to pay fealty to those who control the most important patronage networks in order to advance up the hierarchy. Indeed, graft instills a sense of loyalty.  When harmonized, as in Cambodia, a rent-seeking system ensures that all political grandees have just enough access to financial rewards and that graft is spread somewhat equitably so that there are no major internal frictions.  That begs the question of how anti-corruption campaigns can work in authoritarian states that previously had rent-seeking systems. Vietnam is a good example. Before 2016, the Communist Party of Vietnam held its hierarchy together in large part through corruption.  This was partly because of the decentralization that occurred in the 2000s, which made it much more difficult for the central party apparatus to control what was happening in the provinces and districts. More importantly, ideological factors that had previously held the Communist Party together began to fade.  Rent-seeking cadres By the early 1990s, when Hanoi made peace with Beijing, Vietnam was for the first time in half a century unthreatened by a foreign power. No longer could the CPV compel internal cohesion within its ranks through rally-around-the-flag appeals to cohesion and unity At the same time, because the Vietnamese government became more professionalized, it meant bringing in non-communist officials.  This, added to the public’s disinterest in socialist ideals, especially after the capitalist reforms in 1986, meant that communist ideology no longer functioned as a way to bind the political structure together. And the CPV was no longer the sole arbitrator of nationalism. In the early 2000s, a popular strain of nationalism emerged among the public that accused the party of being unpatriotic for selling Vietnamese land to foreign (mainly Chinese) investors, which culminated in the momentous Bauxite protests of 2009.  Amid these social changes, a new generation of rent-seeking apparatchiks emerged – personified by Nguyen Tan Dung, who became prime minister in 2006 – who cast aside ideology and nationalism and instead embraced graft as a way of building their own personal power and binding the splintering party apparatus. This led to a reaction, however, from the more ideological factions of the party, led by Nguyen Phu Trong, who became party chief in 2012.  Vietnam’s Communist Party general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, left, gestures as he arrives at the National Assembly in Hanoi on Jan. 15, 2024. (Nhac Nguyen/AFP) However, it was only when he defeated Dung in the 2016 National Congress that Trong launched his anti-corruption campaign. Even then, dismissing or jailing the corrupt was only one side of the coin. Far more important, as Trong has acknowledged, has been his so-called “morality campaign”. Since 2016, he has reinstated socialist ideology and ethics as the defining factor of party membership.  To be promoted now, an official must at least rhetorically profess fealty to socialism and demonstrate a clean, hard-working lifestyle. At the same time, Trong has re-centralized power, taking away authority from the provincial officials and giving it to his small clique in Hanoi, which is one reason why he has struggled to find a successor, given that he has now cloaked his own position in so much power — perhaps the most since 1986 — that it has become even more precarious and existential if the CPV selects an unfit successor.  So what about next-door Laos?  Similar to Vietnam, it embraced decentralization in the 1990s, stripping the apparatchiks in Vientiane of some of their authority. Given its geography, the central party apparatus in Laos has always been unable to fully control what local officials do. Its capitalist reforms in the late 1980s also stripped socialist ideology as a common cause within Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP). In fact, the LPRP has long been less ideological than its Vietnamese counterpart.  Anti-corruption failure Nationalism, too, has disappeared. Indeed, the growing anti-Chinese chorus of Laotians has led many to regard the LPRP with disdain, believing it has allowed foreign businesses to destroy the environment and made Laotians second-class citizens.  Unlike in Vietnam, however, anti-corruption efforts have failed in Laos.  When he became prime minister in 2016, Thongloun Sisssoloth vowed to unleash a vast anti-graft campaign, but it had…

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Ford vans seen in Kim Jong Un’s entourage

Editor04 mins

North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency released at least two photos of vans used in Kim Jong Un’s motorcade that appeared to be made by Ford Motor Co., suggesting that Pyongyang has again evaded U.N. sanctions. One Feb. 29 photo of a groundbreaking ceremony shows Kim walking on a red carpet lined with soldiers at attention with the black passenger vans in the background.  Another shows the four of the vans bearing the Ford logo on the front driving behind a luxury black sedan.  The vehicles appear to be fourth generation Ford Transit vans that have been manufactured in North America since 2021. The photos didn’t show any passengers in the vans. A 2013 U.N. sanctions resolution bans the import of luxury cars into North Korea. Another U.N. resolution in 2017 banned the import of all means of transportation. But it’s widely believed that luxury goods are still being smuggled into North Korea. Two black Ford Transit vans are seen in the background during North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s visit to air force headquarters on Dec. 1, 2023. (KCNA)   T.R. Reid, director of corporate and public policy communications for Ford, told Radio Free Asia that Ford “fully complies” with sanctions against North Korea and other countries, and “doesn’t provide products or services in, to or through agents of the country.” “How these vehicles were procured for use in and brought to North Korea is unknown,” he said. In January 2023, a vehicle presumed to be a Mercedes-Benz Maybach GLS 600 belonging to Kim was revealed in images from North Korea’s Korean Central Television.  And at the end of last year, Kim and other top North Korean officials were seen arriving at Party Central Committee headquarters in a Mercedes-Benz S-Class car. Allowing the Ford vans to be photographed was a demonstration by Kim that he can still access luxury items from all over the world, said Bruce Bennett, a senior researcher at the Rand Institute. “American things like a Ford. German things, like a Mercedes,” he said. “He’s basically demonstrating his power and access that his people can get around all of these sanctions.” Translated by Jisoo Kim. Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster.

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Exclusive: Kim Jong Un is now ‘Great Comrade,’ no longer ‘Great Leader’

Editor07 mins

North Korea’s supreme leader Kim Jong Un has received a new title, “Great Comrade,” signaling that the leadership wants to emphasize his achievements over his predecessors, father Kim Jong Il and grandfather Kim Il Sung, residents told Radio Free Asia. The shift from “Great Leader” to “Great Comrade” occurred sometime this month, as the country circulated a five-point oath – shared exclusively with RFA Korean – that must be sworn by all North Koreans to pledge their loyalty. The oath, sent to all organizations and institutions in the country, is read by officials at various events, including holidays and national anniversaries, and repeated by the people, said a North Korean resident who requested anonymity for security reasons Each of the five parts of the oath contains the title “Great Comrade.” The promise commits the speaker to “support and defend” Kim Jong Un “politically and ideologically,” and pledges that they will remain “loyal and obedient” to his sole leadership “at all costs,” and will only follow the “Mt. Paektu bloodline,” which refers to the Kim Dynasty. National founder Kim Il Sung and the ruling Kim family is said to have strong connections to Mt. Paektu, the tallest mountain on the Korean peninsula and a sacred peak in Korean mythology. The oath goes on to say the speaker is armed with the “revolutionary ideology of Great Comrade Kim Jong Un” and commits them to “vigorously participate in the construction of socialism,” and fight against anti-socialism. It concludes by pledging to dedication “to the final victory of the Juche revolution and National Unification.” Juche is North Korea’s founding ideology of self-reliance. Elevating his status The five points are preceded by a singular statement about working towards the socialist theory known as “Great Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism” – but after that, neither Kim’s father nor grandfather are mentioned. The lack of emphasis on Kim’s predecessors suggests that the government wants to elevate his status above them, according to Jiro Ishimaru of the Osaka-based Asia Press, a news outlet that specializes in North Korea. The cover of the oath administered to all North Korean residents. (RFA) “In the past there were consistent messages saying that we should not forget the leadership of Grand Marshal Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and carry out their instructions,” Ishimaru said.  “But in this oath, these messages have almost disappeared. It refers to ‘Great Comrade Kim Jong Un’ and only mentions that Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism is to be maintained,” he said. “It certainly seems like a lot has changed.” The new oath places unique emphasis on Kim Jong Un, whereas previously the government included adherence to the ideologies of the predecessors to project a sense of continuity to enhance the perception of his legitimacy, Cheong Seong-chang, the director of the Center for Korean Peninsula Strategy at the Sejong Institute, told RFA.  “In the past, they expressed their stance to inherit the ideology and policies of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. But there are many differences between Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il’s policies and Kim Jong Un’s policies,” he said. “This oath basically puts Kim Jong Un’s instructions and guidance forward as the absolute standard. So, it seems that Kim Jong Un’s leadership is firmly rooted now.” Dropping national unification  Recently, the North Korean government has reversed its official stance on reunification, and no longer considers it a priority. This makes the fifth clause of the oath, which mentions national unification, obsolete. Experts therefore believe that this oath was written in 2021 or earlier. A resident of North Korea who requested anonymity for safety reasons said that instructions were given to officials to skip the part about national unification when reading the oath.  Experts expect that a revised version of this oath will be circulated soon to reflect the shift away from the South, which in recent months North Korea has defined as its “primary enemy.”  Additionally, Pyongyang has ended economic cooperation with Seoul, and has stopped using language that considers Koreans on both sides of the DMZ as belonging to the same race of people.  Translated by Claire Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.

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Tibetans in India march in solidarity with those arrested in dam protest in China

Editor07 mins

Tibetans and Buddhist leaders in northern India on Wednesday participated in a march to show their solidarity with Tibetans in southwestern China’s Sichuan province arrested for peacefully protesting the planned construction of a dam.  Similar solidarity rallies were held in London and other cities the same day. The large Buddhist community in Ladakh – in Jammu and Kashmir – expressed concerns that the dam project will submerge several significant monasteries with ancient murals that date back to the 13th century.  The Regional Tibetan Youth Congress, which organized the march and rally, said Buddhists there were concerned about the humanitarian situation and the violation of cultural and religious rights stemming from the expected impact of the dam on several monasteries and villages near the Drichu River. On Feb. 23, police arrested more than 1,000 Tibetans, including monks and residents, of Dege county in Sichuan’s Kardze Autonomous Tibetan Prefecture, who had been protesting the construction of the Gangtuo Dam, meant to generate electricity. If built, the power station could submerge monasteries in Dege’s Wangbuding township and force residents of at least two villages near the Drichu River to relocate, sources told RFA.  Rigzin Dorjey, president of the youth wing of the Ladakh Buddhist Association Leh, said there is an urgent need to address the ongoing human rights abuses and environmental destruction perpetrated by China’s communist government.  He underscored the interconnectedness of global Buddhist communities and the shared responsibility to stand in solidarity with Tibetans in their struggle for justice, freedom and dignity. ‘Collective commitment’ Lobsang Tsering, vice president of the Regional Tibetan Youth Congress of Ladakh, said the rally serves as “an expression of solidarity and support for Tibetans facing challenges and oppression in Dege county.” “It symbolizes a collective commitment to standing up against oppression, promoting human rights and preserving Tibetan culture and identity in the face of adversity,” Tsering said.  Tenzin Peldon, who participated in the march in Ladakh said while Tibetans everywhere usually gather to raise their voices against China on politically significant dates such as March 10, known as Tibetan Uprising Day – which commemorates the thousands of lives lost in the 1959 uprising against China’s invasion and occupation of their homeland – it is crucial that they come together during dire situations like the one being faced by Tibetans in Dege to collectively speak up against China’s oppression.  “I urge all Tibetans in exile not to give up hope and to continue to raise awareness on online platforms about the plight of Tibetans in Dege county,” she said.  Other protests were held in Bir village and Clement town in India, and in London, where Tibetans demonstrated outside the Chinese Embassy to show their support for the Dege county protesters, demand the release of the detainees, and call for an immediate halt to the dam construction. “Risking arrest and torture, Tibetan residents of Kham Derge [Dege county] have shared images and videos of the protest with the outside world,” the Tibetan Community UK said in a statement. “They want the international community in the free world to know about their plight and to raise their voice.” Authorities released about 40 of the arrested monks on Feb. 26 and 27, RFA reported on Tuesday. Chinese authorities released about 20 monks each on Monday and Tuesday, said the sources who spoke on condition of anonymity for safety reasons.  Also on Wednesday, Human Rights Watch called on Chinese authorities to immediately release the detained Tibetan monks. “The Chinese authorities have long been hostile to public protests, but their response is especially brutal when the protests are by Tibetans and other ethnic groups,” said Maya Wang, the group’s acting China director, in a statement.  “Other governments should press Beijing to free these protesters, who have been wrongfully detained for exercising their basic rights,” she said. Translated by Tenzin Dickyi and Tenzin Pema for RFA Tibetan. Additional reporting by Pelbar for RFA Tibetan. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.

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Junta troops beat Myanmar man unconscious during interrogation

Editor04 mins

Junta troops have arrested at least 10 young people from Myanmar’s delta region, beating one unconscious during questioning, locals told Radio Free Asia on Wednesday. The youths, from three villages in Ayeyarwady region, were accused of involvement in political activities, residents from Kyonpyaw township said, citing sources close to the police station. On Sunday, soldiers arrested a man from Kyee Taw Yoe village who goes by the name Freddy. Following Freddy’s arrest, around 10 youths from Nyaung Kone and Kyar Inn villages were rounded up.  A Kyonpyaw township resident who wished to remain anonymous for security reasons told RFA the youths were thought to be connected to Freddy, who was tortured by the police. “There was a young man who was arrested in Kyonpyaw on Feb. 25. He was the first to be arrested. He is still under investigation and in Ah Htaung police custody,” said the local. “We found out that the young man was unconscious because they beat him during the interrogation. After that, more than 10 people were arrested on political suspicion.” Some other young people from the area have fled as a result of the arrests, he said. RFA called Ayeyarwady region’s junta spokesperson Khin Maung Kyi to learn more about the arrests, but he did not answer calls. In October, 20-year-old Kyonpyaw local Soe Paing Oo died during interrogation after being accused of communicating with resistance forces.  Days earlier, he was awarded cash and a certificate  for his surrender in a junta ceremony.  On Jan. 6, at least seven locals were arrested in connection with the murder of two village administrators, Than Min Aung and Ngwe Thein in Kyonpyaw township’s Ma Gu Yoe village, locals said.  The township in eastern Ayeyarwady has faced some of the nation’s heaviest recruitment efforts, even before junta leader Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing announced on Feb. 10 plans to enforce the People’s Military Service Law.  Junta troops demanded 10 recruits per village in January, threatening to burn down houses if their quota was not met.  Relying on surrendered resistance fighters and retired military personnel, troops also attempted to bolster numbers in December. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Mike Firn.

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US official expresses concern over crackdown on Tibetans protesting dam

Editor07 mins

An American official expressed deep concern about the arrest of over 1,000 Tibetans protesting a dam project in central China that would destroy several Buddhist monasteries, saying the United States “stands with Tibetans in preserving their unique cultural, religious, and linguistic identity.”  Tibetan advocacy groups condemned China’s actions, calling for the immediate release of those detained. On Feb. 23, police arrested more than 1,000 Tibetans, including monks and residents, in Dege county in Kardze Autonomous Tibetan Prefecture, who had been peacefully protesting against the dam, which would also force two villages to be relocated, sources told Radio Free Asia.  Over the weekend, police began interrogations, beating some detainees so badly that they required medical attention, sources told RFA.  Uzra Zeya, U.S. under secretary for civilian security, democracy and human rights and U.S. special coordinator for Tibetan Issues, said on X on Feb. 25 that she was deeply concerned by reports of the “mass arrests of Tibetans protesting the construction of a dam that threatens displacement of villages & destruction of monasteries.” “China must respect human rights & freedom of expression and include Tibetans in the development & implementation of water and land management policies,” she tweeted.  “These centuries-old monasteries are home to hundreds of Tibetan Buddhist monks and contain irreplaceable cultural relics,” she wrote. “The U.S. stands with Tibetans in preserving their unique cultural, religious, and linguistic identity.”   ‘Wiping out culture and religion’ The arrests “should be a reminder to the world of how brutal daily life under China’s occupation is for the Tibetan people,” a  statement issued Monday on X from the International Campaign for Tibet by its president, Tencho Gyatso. “China tries to hide its forced relocation of Tibetans, its destruction of their environment, and its attempts to wipe out their culture and religion,” the statement said. Saying the protesters demonstrated “incredible courage,” Gyatso said they needed the support of the international community.  “We call on the Chinese government to free these Tibetans at once,” she said. “We also call on the U.S. and other governments to step up pressure on China to end its vicious occupation of Tibet.” Chinese authorities arrest Tibetan monks during a protest against a dam project on the Drichu River in Dege county, southwestern China’s Sichuan province, Feb. 22, 2024. (Image from citizen journalist video) Four Tibetan NGOs based in Dharamsala, India, home to the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, issued a statement of solidarity with the Tibetan community in Dege county. They said that the displacement of Tibetan communities is “not new phenomena,” just one of many examples. “The continued disregard for the rights and well-being of Tibetans in the face of such development projects is unacceptable and demands immediate attention from the international community,” said the statement by the Tibetan Women’s Association, National Democratic Party of Tibet, Regional Tibetan Youth Congress and Students for a Free Tibet.  Environmental disruption The four groups went on to say that the construction of the dam not only threatens the local Tibetan community but also poses a risk to the fragile ecosystem of the Tibetan plateau.  “Any disruption to Tibet’s rivers and a diversion of the rivers could have far-reaching consequences for the environment, biodiversity, and livelihoods of millions of people downstream,” they said.  William Nee, research and advocacy coordinator at Chinese Human Rights Defenders, or CHRD, told RFA that his organization was concerned about the situation of the detainees, whether they are being maltreated and if they have sufficient food.  RFA reported earlier that authorities told those who were arrested to bring bedding and food, suggesting they would not be released soon. CHRD was also concerned whether authorities were giving those arrested access to relatives and lawyers, and whether they were being detained according to Chinese Criminal Procedure Law.  “But beyond that, there are also concerns about the livelihood of the potentially affected communities by the dam and whether this has been taken into consideration,” Nee said. “And also the cultural rights, given that this might impact monasteries – some having ancient murals going back to the 13th century.”    Khenpo Sonam Tenphel, speaker of the Tibetan parliament-in-exile, tweeted on X that Tibetans worldwide condemned the crackdown.  “We urge China to promptly release those detained and to cease the dam construction,” he tweeted. “It is crucial for China to acknowledge the peaceful protests of Tibetans, addressing their concerns about preserving historic monasteries and safeguarding their homes.” Translated and edited by Tenzin Pema. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.

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Vacation is over for Cambodian strongman Hun Sen

Editor013 mins

Every politician, especially one whose chokehold over a country lasted nearly four decades, needs some time off. Hun Sen, who handed over the prime ministership of Cambodia to his eldest son last summer, has had his feet up for the past seven months.  Not that he’s been idle; he’s still president of the ruling party and head of the King’s Privy Council, and has occasionally intervened to publicly chide his son for some mistakes. But after the Senate elections on Feb.  25, he’ll be coronated as the new Senate president.  The position will make him acting head of state when King Norodom Sihamoni is out of the country, as he often is for health checkups in China. With Cambodia now a Hun family fiefdom, you’ll have Prime Minister Hun Manet as head of government and Hun Sen as de-facto head of state.  What does it matter, you may ask, since Hun Sen is already all powerful? But the question contains the answer.  Clearly, Hun Sen doesn’t think of himself that way or else why would he want the Senate presidency? Indeed, he stated on the day that he resigned as prime minister last July that he would become Senate president, so clearly this had been decided when the ruling party was crossing the T’s on its vast succession plan in 2021 and 2022.  Moreover, it’s not a risk-free move. It means the current Senate president, Say Chhum, has to retire. This has the added benefit of pensioning off another graying ruling party grandee and one who some think controls a rival faction within the party.  Say Chhum had agreed to resign last year, perhaps safe in the knowledge that his family’s patronage networks are now in the hands of his son Say Sam Al, the land management minister.  But for those in the party (and there are some) angry that the CPP has become a family-run affair, the Hun duo as heads of government and state won’t sit well. Hun Sen stated last July during his resignation speech that by becoming Senate president, “I will not intrude into the responsibilities of the new prime minister,” but it certainly appears that may to some.  Cambodia’s Prime Minister-designate Hun Manet, center, and incoming cabinet members pose for a group photo at the headquarters of the Cambodian People’s Party in Phnom Penh, Aug. 10, 2023. (Kok Ky/Cambodia’s Government Cabinet via AFP) Moreover, it seemingly goes against the spirit of the party’s generational succession scheme in which the aging “first generation” CPP leaders (Hun Sen included) were supposed to retire from frontline politics and give formal powers to the “second generation”, even if the elders still called the shots behind the scenes. So why not give the Senate presidency to a younger, “second generation” politician?  Given that the CPP took years to meticulously plot this succession process – so it cannot be that they were stuck in making a decision about who would become Senate president and Hun Sen was the easiest option to fill the void – the only logical conclusion is that Hun Sen wants the Senate presidency because he thinks he needs it. First, it will allow him to travel abroad on state visits or welcome visiting leaders in an official capacity, which he hasn’t been able to do since August.  Despite having been the world’s longest-serving head of government, he never gained acceptance as a world’s statesman, certainly not one spoken of with the same reverence as Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore. The Senate presidency might give him another decade or so to attempt to claim such a mantle. Second, according to some, it gives him official diplomatic immunity, which may come in handy at some point in the future. Third, and while one ordinarily ought to avoid psychoanalyzing politicians, it’s probable that Hun Sen detests being away from frontline politics and not being able to make public displays of his power, so maybe it’s the case that he is taking the Senate presidency simply because he can.  Institutional capture Now 71, he has been a senior politician since the age of 27, and he never seemed the type to enjoy retirement nor to shy away from publicity. Hun Sen is never happier than when delivering a three-hour monologue to a crowd of bussed-in workers. But he’s had few opportunities to do so since August, although that’s partly because he has wanted to give his son the limelight. As Senate president, he will have a captive audience (in more ways than one) again.  Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the Senate presidency gives him yet more institutional power to intervene if something was to go wrong with his son’s government – or, indeed, if there was ever a putschist attempt against Hun Manet.  Remember that Hun Sen has repeatedly said he would return as prime minister if any major crisis befouled the government; the insinuation being that his vacation from the premiership may be temporary. For the best part of a decade, the Hun family has been on a long march through the institutions, wary that some of its rivals may also be on their own such project.  Today, he has the King’s ear as head of the Supreme Privy Advisory Council. He controls the powerful but unruly (and quick to disgruntlement) business tycoons, the oknha, as president of the newly-formed Cambodian Oknha Association.  He’s also president of some other CPP-linked “uncivil society” groups. Through constitutional reforms in 2022, he greatly weakened the power of the National Assembly to reprimand ministers or the prime minister, and in 2023 he helped make the loyal but politically weak Khuon Sudary the new president of the lower chamber of parliament. These steps gave even more power to the CPP over personnel choices.  Cambodian People’s Party President Hun Sen, left, addresses supporters in Phnom Penh as his son Prime Minister Hun Manet, right, listens during a ceremony marking the 45th anniversary of the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime, Jan. 7, 2024. (Tang Chhin…

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China’s diplomatic reach dominated global index

Editor03 mins

China has the world’s farthest-reaching diplomatic network, according to a new study, closely followed by the United States. It has a bigger diplomatic footprint than its larger economic rival in Africa, East Asia and the Pacific islands, according to the Lowy Institute’s 2024 Global Diplomacy Index released Sunday. It also has a bigger presence in East Asia, following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Washington’s reach is more extensive in Europe, North and Central America and South Asia, with the same number of diplomatic posts as Beijing in the Middle East and South America, the survey found. China’s expansion has come at the expense of Taiwan, as China courts lower income nations with offers of infrastructure, economic and administrative assistance.  In January, Nauru switched diplomatic allegiance from Taipei to Beijing. The move by the tiny Pacific country reduced Taiwan’s diplomatic allies to 12 nations, including the Vatican, Paraguay and Eswatini. The index showed a rapid growth in diplomatic missions in the Pacific islands, seen as key geopolitical allies by the world’s two leading superpowers. “The Global Diplomacy Index shows that governments continue to invest in diplomacy to project power and achieve their interests,” said Ryan Neelam, the director of the Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Program at the Lowy Institute. “The ongoing rivalry between the United States and China is reflected in the superpowers’ dominance in the 2024 rankings, while geopolitical competition has propelled Asia and the Pacific into focus.” The index was launched in 2016. This year, it covers the diplomatic networks of 66 countries and territories in Asia, the Group of 20 nations and members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Data was collected between July and November last year. Edited by Taejun Kang.

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INTERVIEW: How the West has been misreading China for years

Editor019 mins

Frank Dikötter, author of the “People’s Trilogy” about China under of Mao Zedong, has been chair professor of humanities at the University of Hong Kong since 2006. He recently published “China After Mao,” in which he argues that claims that the Chinese Communist Party has significantly changed direction in the post-Mao era are a misreading by those outside the country who “live in a fantasy world.” He told RFA Mandarin in a recent interview that Chinese leaders have been very consistent in their messaging on political reform, and their economic goals and determination to maintain their dictatorship at all costs. The interview has been edited for length and clarity. RFA: What is the difference between the Mao era and the post-Mao era? Dikötter: So, what have [Chinese leaders] been telling us? A very simple story: China is in the process of “reform and opening up.” So, there will be economic progress, and with economic change there will be political progress. China will become first a capitalist country and then a democracy. Of course, what has happened is the exact opposite. If you read the documentation carefully, you find out that never at any one point did Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Jiang Zemin, all the way up to today, never did a single leader ever say, “We want a capitalist system.” They all said the exact opposite, that they would uphold the socialist road. It is in the Constitution.  People take pictures in front of portraits of, from left, the late Chinese chairman Mao Zedong and former Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and current president Xi Jinping at an exhibition in Beijing, Sept. 26, 2019. (Wang Zhao/AFP) All along, they were very clear about what they wanted. They wanted to reinforce the socialist economy. So what is a socialist economy? [It’s] not necessarily something that you have under Mao. A socialist economy is one where the state has or controls the means of production. Money, labor, fertilizer, energy, transportation, all these are the means of production. They all belonged to the state. Today the money belongs to state banks. The land belongs to the state. Energy is controlled by the state. Large enterprises are controlled by the state. That was their goal, and they achieved it. Workers are seen near pumpjacks at a China National Petroleum Corp oil field in Bayingol in northwestern China’s Xinjiang region, Aug. 7, 2019. (Reuters) The second point is democratization. At no point did anyone say they wanted to have a separation of powers. On the contrary, Zhao Ziyang said very clearly back in 1987 that China would never have the separation of powers. Xi Jinping also made that very clear. But nobody in the West heard them, because they didn’t want to hear it. RFA: Has everyone misjudged the Chinese Communist Party? Dikötter: There is a profound failure on the part of a great many people, politicians, experts and scholars outside China to simply listen to what all of these leaders said very clearly and also to read and understand what’s been happening. The failure is reasonably straightforward. It is a refusal to believe that a communist — a Chinese communist — is a communist. Delegates attend the closing ceremony of the 20th Chinese Communist Party’s Congress at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Oct. 22, 2022. (Noel Celis/AFP) The truth is that the origins of the People’s Republic of China are not in the Tang Dynasty, not in the Song Dynasty, not in the Ming or the Qing. They are in 1917, when Vladimir Lenin seizes power and establishes a communist system. That is what inspired China after 1949. That was the system behind it. So, if you do not understand that China is communist, if you keep on saying it’s not really communist, that they pretend to be communist, you will never understand anything. RFA: Will China ever have a true democracy? Dikötter: In the People’s Republic, you have a dictatorship, but they call themselves a democracy. They have no elections, but they say they have free elections. So what is an election in the People’s Republic? If you vote for the person they tell you to vote for. They give you a list one, two, three names. You can you can pick one of these three. That’s it. That’s an election. People walk along a street in the Dongcheng district of Beijing, Dec. 3, 2023. (Pedro Pardo/ AFP) RFA: You devote an entire chapter in your book to the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, but you don’t go into the rights and wrongs of it. Why not? Dikötter: The Tiananmen massacre is … the most important moment after 1976. The 200 Chinese tanks that entered Beijing in June 1989 crushed Chinese people. That’s really quite extraordinary. It’s important because it shows that the party had an iron determination to retain its monopoly on power.   RFA: Do you believe that the Chinese people want democracy? Dikötter: Nobody knows what people in China want, for a very simple reason — they can’t vote. … If you do not have freedom of expression, if you cannot express your opinion at the ballot box, then we simply don’t know. You don’t know what people think in a dictatorship.  But it’s probably safe to assume that a system based on the separation of powers, including freedom of the press and a solid judicial system, would probably be beneficial, for instance, for the economy. … This is basically a modern economic model based on debt. You spend to create the illusion of growth. Then you spend more. My feeling is that there may be people in the People’s Republic of China who are probably thinking about whether this is really a successful system or not. That’s all we can say. Police detain a person in downtown Hong Kong on the 34th anniversary of the 1989 Beijing’s Tiananmen Square crackdown, near where the candlelight vigil is usually held, June 4, 2023….

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China arrests more than 1,000 Tibetans protesting Chinese dam project

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Police on Friday arrested more than 1,000 Tibetans including monks from at least two local monasteries, in southwestern China’s Sichuan province after they protested the construction of a dam expected to destroy six monasteries and force the relocation of two villages. The arrested individuals – both monks and local residents – are being held in various places throughout Dege County in Kardze Tibetan Prefecture because the police do not have a single place to detain them, said the sources who requested anonymity for safety reasons. The sources said that those arrested have been forced to bring their own bedding and tsampa – a staple food for Tibetans that can be used to sustain themselves for long periods. One source said that the fact that police are asking Tibetans to bring their own tsampa and bedding indicates that they will not be released anytime soon. On Thursday, Feb. 22, Chinese authorities deployed specially trained armed police in Kardze’s Upper Wonto village region to arrest more than 100 Tibetan monks from Wonto and Yena monasteries along with residents, many of whom were beaten and injured, and later admitted to Dege County Hospital for medical treatment, sources said. Citizen videos from Thursday, show Chinese officials in black uniforms forcibly restraining monks, who can be heard crying out to stop the dam construction.  After the mass arrests, several Tibetans from Upper Wonto village who were employed in other parts of the country returned to their hometown to visit the detention centers. They were demanding the release of the arrested Tibetans. However, they too got arrested by the authorities. The Chinese Embassy in Washington hasn’t commented on the arrests other than in a statement issued Thursday that said the country respects the rule of law. “China protects the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese nationals by the law,” the statement said. Massive dam project The arrests followed days of protests and appeals by local Tibetans since Feb. 14 for China to stop the construction of the Gangtuo hydropower station. On 14th February at least 300 Tibetans gathered outside Dege County Town Hall to protest the building of the Gangtuo dam, which is part of a massive 13-tier hydropower complex on the Drichu River with a total planned capacity of 13,920 megawatts.  The dam project is on the Drichu River, called Jinsha in Chinese, which is located on the upper reaches of the Yangtze, one of China’s most important waterways.  Local Tibetans have been particularly distraught that the construction of the hydropower station will result in the forced resettlement of two villages – Upper Wonto and Shipa villages – and six key monasteries in the area  – Yena, Wonto, and Khardho in Wangbuding township in Dege county, and Rabten, Gonsar and Tashi in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, sources told RFA. Sources on Friday also confirmed that some of the arrested monks with poor health conditions were allowed to return to their monasteries.  However, the monasteries – which include Wonto Monastery, known for its ancient murals dating back to the 13th century – remained desolate on the eve of Chotrul Duchen, or the Day of Miracles, which is commemorated on the 15th day of the first month of the Tibetan New Year, or Losar, and marks the celebration of a series of miracles performed by the Buddha. “In the past, monks of Wonto Monastery would traditionally preside over large prayer gatherings and carry out all the religious activities,” said one of the sources. “This time, the monasteries are quiet and empty. … It’s very sad to see such monasteries of historical importance being prepared for destruction. The situation is the same at Yena Monastery.”  Protests elsewhere Fueled by outrage over the destruction of cultural sites and alleged human rights abuses in Derge, Tibet, Tibetan communities across the globe have erupted in protest. From Dharamsala, home to the Dalai Lama, to rallies outside Chinese embassies in New York and Switzerland, demonstrators are raising their voices. Kai Müller, head of the International Campaign for Tibet, condemned China’s “ruthless destruction” of Tibetan heritage, while Human Rights Watch highlighted the difficulty of obtaining information due to China’s tight control. These protests underscore the simmering tensions between the Tibetan people and the Chinese government, with concerns ranging from cultural erasure to potential threats to regional water security. Read about the entire struggle for Tibet and of His Highness Dalai Lama: https://ij-reportika.com/his-holiness-dalai-lama-and-the-tibetan-cause/

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Investigative Journalism Reportika © March 2022 by Ij-Reportika is licensed under CC BY 4.0