South Asia Archives - Page 23 of 100 - Investigative Journalism Reportika

Nguyen Phu Trong left Vietnam’s Communist Party ripe for strongman rule

Editor2 years ago015 mins

On July 19, the Vietnamese Communist Party announced the death of its general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong. The previous day, it announced that Trong, 80, ostensibly the most powerful politician in the country, had been relieved of his duties for health reasons. He had missed several key meetings in recent months, and even when he did attend, he appeared shaky and unwell. He suffered a stroke a few years ago but seemingly bounced back. However, his near-unprecedented third term in office has been cut short. To Lam, the public security minister and promoted to state President last month, will now assume Trong’s duties. Having led the party since 2011, Trong attempted to reinvigorate an institution that, by the early 2010s, had become bogged down by individual rivalries, profit-seeking, and self-advancement. A man rides past a poster for the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in Hanoi on Jan. 22, 2021. (Nhac Nguyen/AFP) Corruption was so rampant the public was mutinous. Ideology and morality had fallen by the wayside. Pro-democracy movements threatened its monopoly on power. The private sector was not just fantastically wealthy, but desired more political power. But in what condition does Trong leave the institution he sought to fix? Externally, its monopoly on power is safer. It has increased repression of activists and democrats while appeasing the public through its high-profile takedown of the corrupt. The private sector has been constrained, too, so poses no threat to the party’s political authority. The economy has insulated the party from any meaningful repercussions from the West over human rights. ‘Blazing Furnace’ Within the Communist Party, however, Trong leaves behind a mess. Lam, as public security minister, and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, artfully used Trong’s signature “Blazing Furnace” anti-corruption campaign to advance their own interests, effectively purging anyone who might rival them for Trong’s job in 2026. More Politburo members have been sacked than at any time in memory. Two presidents have “resigned” in as many years. The Politburo is now filled mostly with military personnel and securocrats, the only two factions – and sometimes rivals – left with power. Lam, if he does formally become acting general secretary, which the Politburo will have to vote on, is in a prime position to maintain the job in 2026. One imagines he has very different ideas about the nature of the Communist Party than Trong. Early in the anti-corruption campaign, Trong remarked that he did not want to “break the vase to catch the mice.” That metaphor implied that tackling corruption should shield a delicate Communist Party, not smash it to pieces. Vietnam’s President To Lam, front right, and Cambodia’s Defense Minister Tea Seiha, back right, pay their respects in front of honor guards at the Independence Monument in Phnom Penh on July 13, 2024. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) However, in his quest to rid corruption from a corrupt institution, he eroded almost every check the Communist Party of Vietnam had to prevent a supreme leader figure from rising to the top. Trong violated the three major “norms” that the party introduced in the early 1990s. Politburo members were expected to retire at 65, and individuals could only occupy the most senior positions for a maximum of two terms. More importantly, no one person could hold at the same time two of the four most powerful positions: General Secretary, State President, Prime Minister, and Chair of the National Assembly. This “four pillar” (tu tru) system created a form of succession plan. Regular reshuffles and a separation of powers amongst the political elite would prevent the Communist Party from tilting towards dictatorship. Shattering the norms The norms created a structure in which politicians could fight over policies, often brutally, but without the entire apparatus collapsing because of division. There could be a regular rotation between different factions and geographic networks, meaning no one group was ascendant for too long. Hanoi called this “democratic centralism.” Of course, it’s not democracy, but it’s a form of pluralism that, in theory, had prevented the party from descending into dictatorships like North Korea, Cuba, or China under Xi Jinping. Trong broke every one of these rules. Between 2018 and 2021, he held the posts of party general secretary and state president simultaneously, the first person to do so since 1986. (Lam seems likely to repeat that.) Trong passed away during his third term as party chief, the first leader since Le Duan to have that record. He not only constantly had the party flout retirement-age limits for himself – he should have stepped down in 2021, if not earlier – but such exemptions have been handed out like confetti during his tenure. Vietnam’s Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong addresses a press conference after the closing ceremony of the Communist Party of Vietnam 13th National Congress in Hanoi on Feb. 1, 2021. (Manan Vatsyayana/AFP) At the same time, his anti-graft campaign has centralized power among an increasingly small number of Politburo members. Provincial party politics have been purged and constrained to give more power to the central party apparatus. The party dominates the government. The public security ministry is all-seeing. This was always going to happen. How else do you clean up an uncleanable organization in which power flows up and discipline is enforced only by those above you? The campaign increases the necessity of one section of the party to maintain power indefinitely. Who designates what is the true morality and which cadres are truly moral? Well, a certain clique of the party running the anti-corruption campaign In one speech on the theme, Trong urged the party to “strengthen supervision of the use of the power of leading cadres, especially the heads, push up internal supervision within the collective leadership; make public the process of power use according to law for cadres and people to supervise.” The purge is designed to enforce the view that no one has absolute power above the party. Anyone who uses the power must serve the…

A palm reading: Japan’s navigation plan for Pacific waters

Editor2 years ago2 years ago07 mins

The triennial meeting of the Japanese Prime Minister with the leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum – referred to as PALM – is normally not much of an attention grabber. But this year’s meeting, which has just concluded in Tokyo, makes it clear that Japan is looking to significantly ramp up its presence in the region. This comes on the back of increased bilateral engagement – think new embassies in Kiribati and Vanuatu – and a reinvigorated QUAD with a focus on resource and burden sharing among the membership of the strategic security partnership (Australia, India, Japan, USA). The joint declaration from this their tenth meeting, known as PALM10, with its associated action plan sets out what we can expect from Japanese engagement with the Pacific over the next three years. The use of the seven pillars of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent as a structure for future engagement is notable. The Blue Pacific concept was developed by Pacific nations as a home-grown framing to address their challenges. Other partners have inserted the term Blue Pacific into announcements and documents. However, this takes the recognition of the Pacific’s own framework to another level. It is particularly significant given that Japan’s former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe coined the term Indo-Pacific, which many in the Pacific islands region have resisted. Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum Baron Waqa (L) and Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida shake hands during the opening session of the 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM10) in Tokyo on July 18, 2024. (AFP) PALM10 sees a move to an “All Japan” approach to working with Pacific partners. Whilst several Japanese agencies are referenced in the outcome documents, the most notable is the prominence of the Japanese Self-Defense Force in future engagement. Japan’s military impacts in the Pacific islands region are well known and loom large in the regional memory. While the PALM10 action plan references the continuation of activities related to World War II, such as retrieval of remains and clearance of unexploded ordnance, new activities will see the Japanese presence in the region take on a markedly military aspect. This will add to what is an already crowded environment in which defense diplomacy has been increasing in recent years. However, Japan’s use of this strategy has been relatively limited until now. The PALM10 action plan refers to increased defense “exchanges” to consist of port calls by Japanese Defense Force aircraft and vessels. This may not be as easy to achieve as Tokyo officials might like. At the same time as PALM10 was in session in Tokyo, Vanuatu’s National Security Advisory Board refused a request for a Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force vessel to dock in Port Vila. The reasons for the refusal remain unclear. Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (C) speaks during the opening session of the 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM10) in Tokyo on July 18, 2024. (AFP) Other examples of increased use of the JSDF are the provision of capacity building to Pacific personnel for participation in peace-keeping operations and inclusion of a Self-Defense Unit in disaster relief teams to be deployed to Pacific island countries at their governments’ request. At the end of the Action Plan are items for “clarification.” Included in the list (of three) for Japan to clarify are two that continue this push for increased defense diplomacy. They are: a proposal to accept Pacific cadets into the National Defense Academy of Japan and to use the Japan Pacific Islands Defence Dialogue to foster “mutual understanding and confidence building.” The JPIDD has met twice, most recently earlier this year. We are now into the Pacific meeting season and in six weeks the 53rd Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting will convene in Nuku’alofa, Tonga. Japan is a longstanding dialogue partner of the forum. The ongoing review of regional architecture includes revisions to how dialogue partners are selected and accommodated. What was discussed and agreed at PALM10 will play a role in determining where at the Blue Pacific table Japan will sit.

To Lam: The man with the golden steak is now leading Vietnam

Editor2 years ago2 years ago08 mins

In the West, he may be best known for eating a gold-covered steak while his countrymen survive on an average of about US$10 a day. But in Hanoi, Vietnam’s new top leader To Lam has for years been seen as an operator whose decades in politics long paved the way for his ascent. On Thursday, that climb reached a new zenith after Vietnamese state media announced that Lam, 67, would take over the duties for Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. It comes less than two months after Lam was elevated to the Vietnamese presidency – a move that put him in pole position for the general secretary job, the most powerful in the country. Vietnamese President To Lam attends a press briefing with Russian President Vladimir Putin (not pictured), at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 20, 2024. (Minh Hoang/Pool via Reuters) The son of a Vietnamese police colonel, Lam began his career in public security in 1979. He joined the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1981, eventually rising to become the minister for public security – the country’s top security official – in 2016. In 2019, he was awarded the rank of general by then-president Trong. Security czar In his capacity as security minister, he focused on internal politics and counter-intelligence – areas that may well have helped him to later cement his political powers. The stint was not without controversy. In 2017, Lam was accused of being involved in the kidnapping of Trinh Xuan Thanh, a fugitive oil executive and former provincial official, in Berlin. Thanh later returned to Hanoi through Slovakia. The government denied kidnapping but the case led to a temporary rift in diplomatic relations between Germany and Vietnam. But it would fit a larger pattern of alleged transnational repression and quashing of dissent overseen by Lam. His term as security minister saw the arrests and suspected kidnappings of journalist critics, including RFA blogger Truong Duy Nhat, who disappeared in Thailand in 2019 but is now in jail in Vietnam serving a 10-year sentence. Golden steak and ‘Onion Bae’ In 2021, Lam was involved in another controversy after he was caught on video eating a piece of gold-plated steak at a luxury restaurant in London. A video clip of the general being fed a US$2,000 steak by celebrity chef Salt Bae went viral, causing a public outcry at home. This was followed by a draconian crackdown, including the arrest and jailing of a noodle-seller nicknamed “Onion Bae” who had dared to ridicule Lam by posting a parody of the incident to social media. He remains in jail. Lam subsequently ramped up anti-corruption crackdowns that saw off potential rivals within the party in what critics have said were clearly politically motivated investigations. Vietnamese President To Lam, left on red carpet, and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, right on red carpet, review the guard of honor at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 20, 2024. (Minh Hoang/AP) Lam’s enthusiastic implementation of this so-called “Burning Furnace” campaign led to the sacking of half a dozen senior ministers and Politburo members within the span of months beginning in 2022. Yet Lam and Trong, the ally he succeeds, are also said to have questionable hidden interests. In May, the Tiếng Dân newspaper revealed that a younger brother of To Lam, To Dung, was the chairman of the construction and real estate firm Xuan Cau Group, noting that the company had been conspicuously absent from any investigation even as it has won projects worth billions of Vietnamese dong with little oversight. Private man Little else is known about the private life of Vietnam’s new top man. He does not appear to have ever given any remarks to Western media and nothing in English has been written of his immediate family, though Vietnamese reports say he has been twice married, first to Vu Hong Loan, the sister of a Vietnamese police major general and currently to Ngo Phuong Ly. He appears to have several children. One daughter was revealed to have graduated from London’s prestigious School of Oriental and Asian Studies, or SOAS, in 2023. On the global stage, Lam has made clear his endorsement of the so-called “Bamboo diplomacy” Hanoi has undertaken to balance its relations between East and West. In June, he welcomed Russian President Vladimir Putin, weeks after his swearing in as president, calling him “comrade” and hailing a successful visit. Hanoi saw visits from Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden within the previous nine months. Whether his caretaker role becomes a more permanent one, there seems little likelihood that Lam would veer from the established path. At his presidential swearing-in in May, he promised to “continue to strengthen the party’s capabilities, its ruling power and combat prowess.” He may well be looking to strengthen the same in himself. Edited by Malcolm Foster.

Myanmar anti-junta activists accused of assassination plot die in custody, group says

Editor2 years ago2 years ago04 mins

Two members of an anti-junta group accused of trying to kill Myanmar’s junta leader died after being tortured during interrogation, a spokesperson for the group told Radio Free Asia. Seven people were arrested on June 8, allegedly in possession of two 107 mm rockets and launchers, near the site of a bridge opening ceremony attended by the junta leader, Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. Two more suspects were rounded up the following day, and another rocket was seized. Another four people were detained several days later in connection with the plot, junta-controlled media reported. The Yangon-based Dark Shadow urban guerrilla group said four of the people arrested were its members and two of them died after being tortured. ‘Comrade Shein Myint Mo Aung and Comrade Zaw Gyi died during the interrogation. Although we don’t know exactly what date they died, they died at Ba Yint Naung Military Interrogation Center,” said the spokesperson, who declined to be identified for fear of reprisals. “The other two Dark Shadow members, Myo Thein Tun and Ye Zaw Tun, have been out of touch with their families and we don’t know whether they are dead or are still alive.” Members of urban guerrilla groups were arrested by junta forces for allegedly plotting to kill junta leader Min Aung Hlaing, according to the junta-controlled newspaper, Myanma Alin on June 17, 2024. (Myanmar Military) The other nine people arrested, who are members of other guerrilla groups, are believed to be still in custody. RFA called the Yangon region’s junta spokesperson, Htay Aung, to ask about the suspects but he did not respond by the time of publication. RELATED STORIES Myanmar guerrilla groups claim responsibility for bombings Junta deploys first round of military recruits to Myanmar’s frontlines Drafting of women underway in Myanmar, despite junta claims to the contrary According to information released by junta-controlled newspaper Myanma Alin on June 17, the plot was foiled when informers told police the group was aiming to fire three 107 mm rockets at Yangon region’s Thanlyin Bridge No. 3 during its opening ceremony. Myanmar had been in turmoil since the military ousted an elected government led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi in early 2021 with many young democracy supporters taking up arms in a bid to end military rule after troops crushed protests. As of Thursday, more than 5,400 civilians have died due to extrajudicial killings, public crackdowns on protests and attacks by land and air across the country, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, . Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn.

‘People’s court’ issues arrest warrant for Xi Jinping

Editor2 years ago010 mins

A citizens’ tribunal has issued a symbolic arrest warrant for Chinese President Xi Jinping after issuing a nonbinding verdict that he committed crimes of aggression against Taiwan, crimes against humanity in Tibet, and genocide against Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The Court of the Citizens of the World — a “people’s court” dedicated to universal human rights and based in The Hague, the Netherlands — issued the arrest warrant on July 12 after four days of hearings, which included expert witness testimonies and victim accounts. Members of the China Tribunal included Stephen Rapp, former U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues; Zak Yacoob, a retired judge who served on the Constitutional Court of South Africa; and Bhavani Fonseka, constitutional lawyer and human rights lawyer and activist in Sri Lanka. RELATED STORIES Uyghurs mark 2 years since ‘genocide’ finding Uyghur Tribunal finds China committed genocide in Xinjiang Uyghur Tribunal wraps up in London with eye on December ruling on genocide allegations Uyghur Tribunal determination could change paradigm for China relations: experts Experts and witnesses detailed widespread human rights abuses in Tibet and Xinjiang, including intrusive surveillance, repression, torture and restrictions on free expression and movement, as well as what they described as efforts to eradicate their distinct cultural and religious identities. Some witnesses were survivors of mass detention camps in Xinjiang, where torture and the forced sterilization of Uyghur women occurred. Though the unofficial body has no legal powers, its proceedings highlighted the plight of aggrieved parties and provided a model for prosecution in international or national courts under the principle of universal jurisdiction. The court said it “obtained sufficient legal grounds” for Xi’s arrest on the charges laid out against him and called on the international community to support its decision, though it is unclear how governments will react. Judge Zak Yacoob (L) speaks with presiding judge Stephen Rapp during the China Tribunal at the Court of the Citizens of the World, in The Hague, the Netherlands, July 12, 2024. (Court of the Citizens of the World via YouTube) “The tribunal’s core findings are of significant importance, revealing the extent of human rights abuses committed by the Chinese state,” said a report by JURIST, a nonprofit news organization that highlights rule-of-law issues around the world. There was no immediate response from the Chinese government. Former prisoners speak Former Tibetan political prisoners, including Dhondup Wangchen and Tenpa Dhargye, recounted the torture they experienced in Chinese jails and the impact of China’s repressive policies in Tibet. Tibetan filmmaker and human rights activist Jigme Gyatso, also known as Golog Jigme, who has been jailed by Chinese authorities on at least three occasions, highlighted Xi Jinping’s efforts to completely eradicate the use of Tibetan language and culture. He also outlined what he said was the systematic torture and persecution of political prisoners after their release and the coercive control of Tibetans’ movements in greater Tibet. Gulbahar Haitiwaji, a Uyghur former internment camp detainee who now lives in France, testified before the tribunal about being chained to beds and tortured in Xinjiang. She told Radio Free Asia that she felt immense excitement when called upon to testify, seeing it as a crucial opportunity to speak for the hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs who endured China’s concentration camps. “Back then, while in the camp, I often wondered if there was any justice in the world capable of punishing those responsible for our people’s suffering,” she said. The Chinese government tried to dissuade some Uyghurs from providing testimony in The Hague. Abdurehim Gheni, a Uyghur activist who now lives in the Netherlands, said Chinese police contacted him via Telegram, a WeChat-style communication app banned in China, as recently as two days before he was scheduled to appear before the court. The police also had his brother leave voice messages telling him not to attend the hearing, he said. Judges Bhavani Fonseka (L) and Zak Yacoob (C) and presiding judge Stephen Rapp hold court during the China Tribunal at the Court of the Citizens of the World in The Hague, the Netherlands, July 12, 2024. (Court of the Citizens of the World via YouTube) Gheni recounted that his brother said: “Do not do anything against the government. If you return here, the government will be lenient on you. We can also go there to see you.” The tribunal reported that it faced attempts to shut it down in the form of a phony cease-and-desist order, and said a spy disguised as a legal volunteer provoked staff and other volunteers to resign, JURIST reported. ‘First meaningful step’ Abduweli Ayup, a Uyghur rights activist and researcher based in Norway, who also testified at the China Tribunal, said the verdict holds significant importance for Uyghurs. “It’s the first meaningful step to stop the Uyghur genocide,” he said. “The court has completed the accusation against the perpetrator and judged at the trial. The verdict implicates the criminal, Xi Jinping. He should be arrested and punished,” he said. In December 2021, an independent, nonbinding Uyghur Tribunal in London found that China committed genocide against Uyghurs in Xinjiang and that Xi Jinping shared primary responsibility for the atrocities. Though the panel had no state backing or power to sanction China, its conclusion added to the growing body of evidence at the time that Beijing’s persecution of Uyghurs constituted a crime against humanity that deserved an international response. In February 2023, the Court of the Citizens of the World issued an indictment against Russian President Vladimir Putin for the crime of aggression in Ukraine and called for his arrest. A month later, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Putin along with Maria Lvova-Belova, Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights, for alleged war crimes involving accusations that Russia had forcibly taken Ukrainian children. Additional reporting by RFA Mandarin. Translated by RFA Uyghur and RFA Tibetan. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Joshua Lipes.

China’s Communist Party set to open key policy meeting amid economy worries

Editor2 years ago08 mins

Top members of the ruling Communist Party of China will gather Monday to discuss ways to lift the world’s second-biggest economy out of its post-COVID slump and reduce dependence on technology from its geopolitical rival, the United States. The four-day, closed-door meeting, chaired by President Xi Jinping, is expected to unveil tax system revisions and other debt-reduction measures, steps to deal with a massive property crisis, and policies to boost domestic consumption, policy advisers have said. Previous third plenum sessions of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee – more than 300 full and alternate members – have unveiled policy initiatives for the next five to 10 years. Some have announced significant shifts. Residential buildings under construction by Chinese real estate developer Vanke in Hangzhou, in eastern China’s Zhejiang province, March 31, 2024. (AFP) The 1978 plenum launched Deng Xiaoping’s historic economic reform and opening policies, while the 1984 event confirmed the reform direction in the face of resistance. The 1993 gathering pledged a recommitment to market economic reforms after the clampdown following the Tiananmen massacre. The 12 years of the Xi Jinping era have put the brakes on market reforms as Xi consolidated power in the party, analysts said. Xi’s third plenum 2013 “laid out a series of economic reforms, most of which have not succeeded, most of which have not been carried through,” said Barry Naughton, the So Kwan Lok Chair of Chinese International Affairs at the University of California San Diego. “So everyone is very curious and puzzled to see what this new third plenum is going to bring,” he told Radio Free Asia Mandarin. The previous plenum, 2018, saw Xi further consolidate power with the scrapping of presidential term limits. Interventionist policies This plenum, normally held once every five years, was expected last autumn but delayed without explanation until this month. Yu Jie, a senior research fellow on China at Chatham House, a British think tank, said the plans to be unveiled in coming days “are unlikely to be policies eagerly waited and favored by private enterprises and global investors.” Instead of stimulus measures to boost growth, expect “further government intervention to channel economic resources into the strategic and innovation sectors and to guarantee minimum social welfare to the poor,” she wrote on the Chatham House website. RELATED STORIES Chinese police target dissidents, petitioners ahead of plenum China’s jobless struggle amid economic slump China to hold long-delayed plenary meeting to boost embattled economy The Communist Party will introduce two economic slogans during the plenum: “New quality productive force” describing making the Chinese economy a leader in technological innovation, and “new national system” of stronger centralized control allocating capital and resources to sectors with strategic significance,” Yu wrote. “The underlying emphasis here is not on the economy but on geopolitics,” she added. Chinese state media have tried to create an upbeat mood for the secretive gathering Jingxi Hotel in Beijing. “Entering July, Chinese people’s expectations will be running high,” according to a June 30 commentary in the Global Times newspaper, predicting “a holistic package of new reform plans” that is expected from the meeting. “After more than 40 years’ reform and opening-up, Chinese policymakers are becoming both astute and experienced in managing a giant economy like China’s,” it said. Tech war over consumption Naughton said, however, Chinese firms and people are not very bullish. “It’s quite clear that the expectations and household understandings of the economy have deteriorated dramatically since 2022. People have a hard time getting jobs. People’s income growth is slower and they feel much less confident about it,” he told RFA. The International Monetary Fund has said China’s economy is set to grow 5% this year, after a “strong” first quarter, but other economists warned the recovery has been imbalanced in favor manufacturing and exports over consumption. “Xi Jinping clearly wanted the majority of the state’s resources and the majority of the state’s attention to be focused on this technological war with the United States, to wean China off the dependence on technology that has been dominated by Americans,” Naughton said. “He doesn’t care about the rate of growth of consumption of the Chinese people,” he added. An employee counts Chinese yuan banknotes at a bank in Hefei, Anhui province, Nov. 11, 2010. (Reuters) Ahead of the conclave, China is ramping up its “stability maintenance” system, which kicks into high gear targeting those the authorities see as potential troublemakers ahead of top-level meetings and politically sensitive dates in the calendar. Authorities across China are targeting dissidents and petitioners ahead of next week’s key meeting of the ruling Communist Party, placing them under house arrest or escorting them out of town on enforced “vacations,” Radio Free Asia reported this week. Several high-profile activists including political journalist Gao Yu, rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang and political commentator Zha Jianguo have been targeted for security measures ahead of the third plenary session of the party’s Central Committee, a person in Beijing familiar with the situation who asked not to be named for fear of reprisals said. Reporting by Ting I Tsai. Editing by Paul Eckert.

Is Kim Jong Un taking his luxury yacht out for vacation?

Editor2 years ago08 mins

Is North Korean leader Kim Jong Un taking a family vacation? Satellite imagery shows that the Kim family’s 80-meter (262-foot) cruise ship – complete with a waterslide and an Olympic-sized swimming pool – is out at sea. Some experts say Kim’s recent public appearance on land makes it very unlikely that he was on board but others said he may have been. According to satellite photos taken June 27 and July 5 by Planet Labs, an American commercial satellite imaging company, the luxury cruise ship was identified as sailing off North Korea’s east coast near Wonsan, Kangwon province. Kim is known to use this ship for recreational activities with his family or to entertain foreign VIPs. A luxury cruise ship reserved exclusively for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was recently identified as sailing between the ship repair dock at Wonsan Port and the exclusive Kalma Villa. The distance between the marina and Kalma Villa is about 4.5km (2.8 miles). Wonsan Villa can be seen across from Kalma Villa. (Google Earth, image production – Bruce Songhak Chung) Bruce Songhak Chung, a researcher at the South Korea-based Korean Institute for Security and Strategy who analyzed the satellite photos, told RFA Korean that it is likely that either Kim himself, or his family, took the cruise ship to the family villa on the Kalma peninsula. “Only North Korean leaders and their families exclusively use luxury cruise ships,” he said. “As the summer vacation season approaches, it is presumed that General Secretary Kim may have visited a private villa in Wonsan to spend the summer with his wife Ri Sol Ju and daughter Kim Ju Ae.” Chung noted that there was no way to tell whether Kim was on board, but that he might have been, considering that he had just finished leading an important meeting of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party’s Central Committee. The plenary meeting lasted from June 28 to July 1, and on July 2, Kim visited factories and other government institutions with government officials. This makes it less likely that he was on board on June 27. Related stories Trappings of North Korean leader’s lavish lifestyle visible by satellite North Korean leader Kim Jong Un builds luxury villas over grandfather’s old home N Korean leader receives a luxurious car gift from Putin: state media The cruise ship may have been on a test voyage in the earlier image, ahead of Kim’s vacation, said Cho Han-Bum, a researcher at the South Korea-based Korea Institute for National Unification. He also noted that Kim was not with his wife Ri Sol Ju or daughter Kim Ju Ae during his public appearances. “It is possible that Kim Ju Ae, Ri Sol Ju and other families have already gone on summer vacation,” said Cho. “Therefore, there is a possibility that Chairman Kim Jong Un, who finished the plenary meeting, completed local guidance and joined his family.” Getting around sanctions Currently, North Korea has a total of four luxury cruise ships – with lengths of 50, 55, 60, and 80 meters (164-262 feet) – for Kim’s exclusive use. These cruise ships were obtained in the 1990s, during the rule of his father and predecessor, Kim Jong Il, before sanctions were imposed. The sanctions, enacted after North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, are meant to deprive Pyongyang of cash and resources that could be funneled into its nuclear and missile programs. They are also intended to prevent the Kim family and other North Korean elites from getting their hands on luxury goods. But they still trickle in. Recently, Kim Jong Un imported luxury cars, including a Russian-made Aurus Senat and a German-made Mercedes-Benz Maybach. A large 80-meter-long luxury cruise ship equipped with a water slide and an international-standard swimming pool, and a 60-meter-long cruise ship are moored at the ship dock in Wonsan, Kangwon province. Normally, private cruise ships are managed at this marina. (Google Earth, image production – Bruce Songhak Chung) The recent surge in the value of the U.S. dollar against the won has made food prices in North Korea rise and has negatively affected the economy in general, but the Kim family continues to live the high life, said Cho. “The problem with international sanctions against North Korea is that they have an effect on the entire national economy, but do not affect the upper class,” he said. “They import as many luxury goods as they want using various agents or aliases.” He said sanctions are unable to target only the country’s leadership. “As public sentiment deteriorates, it may lead to a weakening of Chairman Kim Jong Un’s support base, but the current sanctions against North Korea are not enough to prevent the Kim family from living a luxurious life.” Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong.

Interview: White House ‘extremely concerned’ about closer Russia-North Korea ties

Editor2 years ago016 mins

Mira Rapp-Hooper is the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania at the White House National Security Council, or NSC. During this week’s NATO Summit in Washington, she spoke with RFA Korean’s Lee Sangmin, touching on points related to increased cooperation between Russia and North Korea, following Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea last month. The summit included representatives from the Indo-Pacific Four, or IP4, an informal grouping of South Korea, Japan, New Zealand and Australia, and Rapp-Hooper said that it was important to include those countries in discussions with NATO, especially considering that the partnership between North Korea and Russia concerns security in both the North Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific. The interview has been edited for length and clarity. RFA: So how much are you concerned about the recent deepening relationship between Russia and North Korea? Rapp-Hooper: We are extremely concerned about the relationship between Russia and North Korea. Of course, we have been for about a year as that relationship has grown closer and closer, and it has become clear that both Russia and North Korea are exchanging extremely worrisome forms of support with one another. On the one hand, of course, we know that the (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) has been providing Russia with millions of rounds of ammunition, as well as missiles that have been used on the battlefield in Ukraine to devastating effect fueling Russia’s war machine, and taking the lives of innocent civilians, all over the conflict. And that’s deeply disturbing. But one of the things that is also very troubling about this relationship is the fact that we know that Russia is probably providing the DPRK with technical assistance, sophisticated forms of support for some of its military programs. But those forms of cooperation are much harder to track. So while we know what the DPRK is giving to Russia, we know less than we would like to about what Russia is giving to the DPRK. And that is something that should concern not only the countries of the Indo-Pacific who care about peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and beyond. Mira Rapp-Hooper, Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania, National Security Council, at the Asia Center in Washington, Sept. 13, 2023. (U.S. Institute of Peace via Flickr) But countries in Europe are increasingly understanding that this relationship affects them, too. Now, of course, this has all become more prominent recently because of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang, when the two countries released a declaration that looks very much like an alliance treaty. But really, what this does is capture something that we knew the whole time, which is the fact that this is not just a marriage of convenience where these two powers are cooperating so that Russia can get help in its war against Ukraine. There is political buy-in at the highest levels, from both of these governments. The piece of optimism that I would offer today, however, is that it is not just the ROK, the United States and Japan who are worried about this problem. We have very good trilateral cooperation amongst the three of us to share intelligence and to coordinate our policy actions. But part of what you’re seeing here at NATO today is that all of our NATO allies also care about this problem, because Russia has brought DPRK technology to Europe in the form of ballistic missiles being used on the battlefield in Ukraine. So we’ve never seen our European allies more engaged in DPRK issues, more wanting to cooperate, to address, and limit, this relationship. And we are hopeful that that cooperation will have a stabilizing effect in the face of all of this destabilizing behavior. RFA: In what ways can NATO and its allies counter cooperation between North Korea and Russia? Rapp-Hooper: Well, there are, you know, certain areas where cooperation, unfortunately, is quite difficult to affect. We know that many of the shipments that take place between DPRK and Russia take place within their territorial seas or over rail lines. So there’s very few options for the international community there. But there are other areas, where we do cooperate, and we will continue to do so. And that relates to things like financial sanctions that may run at the heart of their cooperation, and other measures that we can take, such as intelligence sharing, information sharing that might allow one country to be more empowered to limit this cooperation wherever they can. There is also, of course, the role that we all play diplomatically, not just in putting pressure on both Pyongyang and Russia, but on additional countries, who might be able to take action to try to limit this relationship. The world is, of course, watching (the People’s Republic of China, or PRC) and the question looms large, what Beijing will do about this relationship, given that it is so destabilizing and not in China’s interests either. But we’ve yet to see a clear answer to that question. RFA: What kind of a role can China play in dealing with North Korea issues? Rapp-Hooper: That’s really up to China. In the past, the PRC has long played a role on the Korean Peninsula. Obviously, it is a key continued trading partner of Pyongyang and a longtime political partner. There is obviously a very close political relationship as well, between Beijing and Moscow – which is its own cause for concern. But there’s no doubt that if Beijing was interested in doing so, it could play a stabilizing and responsible role, to encourage in particular, the worst (aspects of the) DPRK-Russia cooperation to come to an end. But again, all eyes are on Beijing to see if it will make that choice. RFA: Why is it significant that the IP4 are participating in the NATO Summit? Rapp-Hooper: Our IP4 partners in the (Republic of Korea, or ROK), Japan, Australia and New Zealand have been at the last three NATO summits. And…

Interview with Rinzin Namgyal on Life, Tibet and the Dalai Lama

Editor2 years ago2 years ago021 mins

Interview with Rinzin Namgyal associated with FNVA on life in India, Tibet, Dalai Lama and peaceful struggle of Tibetans around the world.

Ethnic rebels close in on 2 towns in Myanmar’s Rakhine state

Editor2 years ago05 mins

Ethnic minority rebels fighting to take over western Myanmar’s Rakhine state reported on Friday advances in two areas where its forces have been making significant gains against the military junta that seized power in a 2021 coup. The Arakan Army, or AA, fighting for self-determination of the state’s predominantly Buddhist ethnic Rakhine population, said its fighters captured the last junta base on the outskirts of Thandwe town, the headquarters of the Infantry Battalion 55 base, on Tuesday, although junta troops still occupied the town center. Thandwe is about 250 km (155 miles) northwest of Myanmar’s biggest city of Yangon, and near one of Myanmar’s main beach resorts. The AA has captured 10 townships in Rakhine state and neighboring Chin state, since late last year, part of a series of setbacks for the embattled junta. RELATED STORIES MSF aid group withdraws from Myanmar’s west, citing violence and restrictions Fleeing fighting in Rakhine, Rohingya pay to be smuggled to Bangladesh ‘Neither hospitals nor doctors’ for 10,000 displaced in Myanmar In the north of Rakhine state near the border with Bangladesh, about 350 km (217 miles) northwest of Thandwe, the AA announced that its forces had seized the Ma Gyi Chaung Border Guard Camp on Thursday and was pressing junta forces at Border Guard Post No. 5 and and in nearby Maungdaw town. The insurgents said this week its forces had killed more than 750 junta soldiers in those two main battle zones. Radio Free Asia was not able to independently verify the toll but residents of both regions have been reporting heavy fighting for weeks. RFA tried to contact the junta’s main spokesman, Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, for information but he did not respond. The Myanmar junta’s Thandwe-based Infantry Battalion 55 was captured by the Arakan Army at 9:45 a.m. on July 9, 2024. Photo taken on July 10, 2024. (Arakan Army Information Desk) Since the AA warned residents to leave Maungdaw on June 16, more than 5,000 people have fled to Bangladesh, which is across a border estuary, said one town resident who declined to be identified for security reasons. “There are at least 80 to 100 Rohingya people fleeing to Bangladesh [every day],” he said. “Boats from Bangladesh come to pick them up.” Despite fighting in Maungdaw town, Bangladesh authorities have forced at least 12 refugees back into Myanmar, residents said. The Bangladesh Embassy in Yangon did not respond to RFA’s request for comment. More than 700,000 members of the mainly Muslim Rohingya minority fled to Bangladesh in 2017 after the Myanmar military launched a crackdown against Mjuslim insurgents. Two residents of Maungdaw town were killed in the latest heavy weapons fire and 13 were wounded, residents said. The AA did not give any update on casualties, either among junta forces or its own, but said 30 junta soldiers and border guards fled into Bangladesh during fighting on Thursday. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn.

Category: South Asia