EXPLAINED: Why are there questions about foreign judges in Hong Kong’s high court?

A decision by Hong Kong’s top court in August to uphold the convictions of seven of Hong Kong’s most prominent pro-democracy activists, including newspaper publisher Jimmy Lai, has not only raised fears for freedom of the press but also questions about the role of foreign judges. One of the quirk’s of Hong Kong’s system negotiated when Britain handed it back to China in 1997 was foreign judges in the judiciary. They have long been upheld as a testament to the commitment to the rule of law. But criticism is growing that they legitimize an administration that fails to uphold values of political freedom and freedom of expression. Chris Patten, the last British governor of Hong Kong, made a pointed remark after the Hong Kong court’s August ruling, describing the verdict as one that “revealed the rapidly deteriorating state of the rule of law in Hong Kong.”   “This unjust verdict is further compounded by the involvement of Lord Neuberger, a former head of Britain’s Supreme Court, in this decision,” he said. David Neuberger is a British judge who served as the president of the British Supreme Court from 2012 to 2017. After his retirement, Neuberger participated in Hong Kong’s judicial system as part of the Court of Final Appeal, or CFA, which has the power of final adjudication and the ability to invite judges from other common law jurisdictions to join the court when necessary.  He said in August his role as a judge in Hong Kong was to decide cases that come before him according to the law. A man (bottom R) waits at a traffic light outside the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong on March 31, 2022. (Isaac Lawrence/AFP) Why does Neuberger sit at the CFA? Hong Kong’s CFA was established on July 1, 1997, as part of the city’s legal framework under the Basic Law, which serves as its mini-constitution. The CFA replaced the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London as Hong Kong’s highest court after the end of British colonial rule. The Basic Law set out the city’s judicial system, which includes the CFA, the High Court, District Court, magistrates’ courts, and other specialized courts. It also ensured that Hong Kong’s common law system would continue. Cases in the CFA are heard by the chief justice, three permanent judges chosen by the chief justice, and a non-permanent judge who can be from Hong Kong or another common law jurisdiction. They are also selected by the chief justice. Under the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, an overseas non-permanent judge must be a judge or a retired judge of a court of unlimited jurisdiction in either civil or criminal matters in another common law jurisdiction. They should also ordinarily reside outside Hong Kong. There are no restrictions on the type of cases an overseas judge may preside over. Government officials and legal figures in Hong Kong often cite the presence of overseas judges as proof of international confidence in the independence of Hong Kong’s judiciary.   As of Sept. 11, there were seven overseas non-permanent judges at the CFA.  A supporter of media mogul Jimmy Lai, founder of Apple Daily, holds signs as his prison van leaves the Court of Final Appeal, in Hong Kong, China, Dec, 31, 2020. (Tyrone Siu/Reuters) What are the recent debates? The engagement of overseas judges has come under public scrutiny, particularly after some resignations following the implementation of a Beijing-imposed national security law in June 2020. The United States, Britain and other countries have criticized the law under which many Hong Kong residents have been prosecuted for dissent and media outlets shut. Only judges nominated by the city’s chief executive can sit on national security cases but the list of nominees is not made public, media has reported. The Hong Kong government said that any judge, regardless of nationality, was “eligible for designation” under the national security law, but in the small number of national security law cases that have reached the top court, no overseas judge has sat. A pro-establishment barrister and government adviser, Ronny Tong, questioned whether the city needed judges who owe their allegiance to other countries. They should not preside over national security cases, particularly if they came from countries “hostile to China or Hong Kong,” he said.  Social media critics question the foreign judges’ “luxurious” lifestyle. They are flown into Hong Kong on an ad hoc basis, enjoying first class travel and a generous salary for their visits, which typically last 29 days, media critics said. A statue of Lady Justice at the Court of Final Appeal is pictured, in Hong Kong, China, Sept. 5, 2023. (Tyrone Siu/Reuters) What are the foreign judges’ positions? Some of foreign judges who have stepped down since 2020 have questioned their roles under an administration that they say no longer respects basic rights and freedoms. In 2020, senior Australian judge James Spigelman cited the impact of the National Security Law as he stepped down. Two years later, U.K. Supreme Court justices Robert Reed and Patrick Hodge resigned following concerns raised by the British government. Other British judges, Jonathan Sumption and Lawrence Collins, resigned in June.  Collins cited the “political situation in Hong Kong” in a brief statement about his departure, while Sumption wrote in the Financial Times that Hong Kong was  “slowly becoming a totalitarian state”. “The rule of law is profoundly compromised in any area about which the government feels strongly,” Sumption said, adding that it was “no longer realistic” to think that the presence of overseas judges could help sustain the rule of law in Hong Kong. A spokesperson for Hong Kong’s judiciary said in June that its “operation will not be affected by any change in membership of the court”. Hong Kong’s government rejects any suggestion that the courts are subject to political pressure. It says the national security law, introduced after mass protests in 2019, was necessary to ensure the stability that underpins the financial hub’s prosperity. Edited by Mike Firn.  We are…

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Sluggish property revenues hit Hong Kong fiscal reserves

Read RFA coverage of this topic in Cantonese. Falling revenue from land auctions — once a mainstay of the city’s fiscal strength — has hit Hong Kong government coffers hard in recent months, resulting in a spike in the fiscal deficit and dwindling fiscal reserves. Government expenditure between April and July topped HK$242.6 billion (US$31 billion), with revenue at just HK$90.1 billion (US$11.5 billion) over the same period, resulting in a cumulative year-to-date deficit of HK$135.4 billion (US$17.4 billion), the government said. The government reported a budget deficit of about HK$100 billion (US$12.8 billion) for the fiscal year that ended in March 2024, almost double its earlier estimate. The latest figures from April through July suggest it could be on track for an even larger hole in public finances in the fiscal year ending March 31, 2025. Hong Kong reported a budget deficit of HK$257.6 billion for the 2020-21 fiscal year, the largest deficit in 20 years, reflecting huge government expenditures during the early years of the COVID-19 pandemic. Apartment blocks at Oi Man housing estate, May 8, 2024, in Hong Kong. (Dale De La Rey/AFP) But the deficit, which analysts say is mostly the result of reduced revenues from land auctions and recently cut stamp duties, hasn’t disappeared since then, largely due to a flagging property market and a post-lockdown economic slump. Fiscal reserves stood at HK$599.2 billion (US$76.8 billion) as of July 31, their lowest level in 14 years. However, the figures have taken into account proceeds and payouts on recent government bond transactions, the government said in an Aug. 30 statement. Fiscal obligations Hong Kong is obliged under its constitution, the Basic Law, to avoid deficits by keeping spending within revenue limits, yet the city has reported four deficits in the past five years. “The government has slowed down the supply of land to give the market time, but the Hong Kong property market is facing structural changes,” Joseph Ngan, former finance channel chief at i-CABLE News, wrote in a recent commentary for RFA Cantonese. “The effect of the stimulating measures at the beginning of this year has now worn off, and real estate prices have seen further downward pressure in recent months,” Ngan wrote. “This has impacted developers’ willingness to invest in land, and will eventually mean a huge fiscal deficit.” The situation has left some government departments charged with managing affordable housing and cultural assets in dire financial straits, including the Housing Authority, which runs the city’s public housing estates, and the Urban Renewal Authority, which spearheads urban redevelopment and refurbishment projects. Hong Kong apartment buildings, May 15, 2024. (Dale De La Rey/AFP) Such departments are now in need of fresh injections of capital, analysts said. The Housing Authority, which relies on public housing rentals and the sale of premium-free Home Ownership Scheme housing as its main income, is in a similar situation.  Revenue in recent years has been lower than expected, leaving the body with an operating surplus that shrank from HK$12.6 billion (US$1.6 billion) in 2023 to HK$2.6 billion (US$330 million). Public rental housing revenue is expected to move into the red this fiscal year, with a projected deficit of around HK$2.143 billion (US$276 million) next year.  Housing construction promised At the same time, the Hong Kong government has pledged to speed up construction of more than 10,000 subsidized housing units within the next five years, boosting annual construction expenditure by HK$10 billion (US$1.2 billion) to HK$40 billion (US$5 billion).  The authority has tried to staunch the losses by slashing discounts to its affordable Home Ownership Scheme private sector apartments from 62% last year to just 30% this year, but the move has made it harder to sell the apartments in what was already a difficult market. Financial commentator Simon Lee said the authority was forced to sell off some of its public housing assets in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997. “The Housing Authority was the first to be affected when the real estate market froze during the 1997 financial crisis,” Lee said. “Public housing rentals can carry on when the market is strong, but Hong Kong is tied into the public policy model of real estate subsidies.” He said the government also holds a stake in train and subway operator MTRC, and subsidizes it to build housing and other developments on its land, and around stations. A worker walks past a large advertisement photo of a property project of the China Evergrande Group outside its local headquarters in Hong Kong, Oct. 4, 2021. (Vincent Yu/AP) Meanwhile, the Urban Renewal Authority has been issuing bonds in a bid to raise enough funds. “Exorbitantly high construction costs and high interest rates, coupled with high prices for previously acquired land … have put considerable pressure on the [Urban Renewal] Authority,” Joseph Ngan told RFA Cantonese’s Free to Talk Finance show. “The reversal in the real estate market has left a lot of property-related public bodies under tremendous pressure,” he said. Bond sale The Urban Renewal Authority’s recent triple-tranche HK$12 billion (US$1.5 billion) senior bonds offering under its US$3 billion Medium Term Note Programme will help to fund its capital expenditure on urban renewal projects and for general corporate purposes, the authority said in an Aug. 21 statement. The offering was well-received by a diverse group of high-quality local and overseas investors, including banks, asset managers, corporations, insurance companies, hedge funds, central banks, official institutions, family offices and private banks.  It had a peak combined orderbook of over HK$22.8 billion (US$2.9 billion), representing an oversubscription rate of around 2 times, the statement said. The bond sale came after the authority suffered its first loss in nine years in 2022/23, totaling more than HK$3.9 billion last year. Projected construction costs this year will run to HK$64.3 billion (US$8.2 billion), but current cash reserves are only HK$18 billion (US$2.3 billion). The authority has also been allowed to borrow up to HK$25 billion (US$3.2 billion) under government guarantees. Translated by Luisetta Mudie. Edited by…

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Vietnam defense minister Phan Van Giang visits US to boost ties

Updated Sept. 10, 2024, 07:03 a.m. ET. Vietnam’s minister of national defense Phan Van Giang is in the U.S. to bolster bilateral security cooperation amid rising tensions in the South China Sea. Vietnam is among the states that claim at least part of the waterway and it has been seeking to strengthen its maritime capabilities, including with purchases of defense technologies and equipment. Giang’s trip is his first official visit to the U.S. since he took office in April 2021. Hanoi and Washington upgraded their relations to the top tier of comprehensive strategic partnership in September 2023, during a visit by U.S. President Joe Biden to Vietnam. Yet their security and defense cooperation, deemed highly sensitive as the two countries fought each other in the past, remains limited and has focused mainly on the legacies of the Vietnam War, such as searching for American soldiers missing in action and decontamination of areas affected by toxic chemicals. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin (R) welcomes Vietnamese Defense Minister Gen. Phan Van Giang (L) to the Pentagon in Washington, Sept. 9, 2024. (AP Photo/Kevin Wolf) Gen. Giang and his counterpart, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, had a meeting on Monday at the Pentagon, during which they “underscored the importance of working together to overcome war legacies,” according to a summary provided by the Department of Defense. They also “discussed opportunities to deepen defense cooperation, including on defense trade, industrial base resilience, and information sharing,” the department said without providing  further details. Shopping list According to the U.S. government, from 2016 to 2021, it authorized US$29.8 million – a relatively small amount – in defense articles to Vietnam via direct commercial sales. The Defense Department also has more than $118 million in active foreign military sales to Vietnam, mainly of trainer aircraft. This budget would be greatly expanded if Vietnam decided to procure more U.S. equipment, analysts say. “Defense equipment suppliers and subcontractors can expect increased demand for naval combatants, aerial defense, intelligence systems, and surveillance and reconnaissance equipment,” the U.S. government’s International Trade Administration said in its commercial guide. “Maritime security and air defense is where Vietnam has the biggest need, but I would expect Vietnam would start with maritime security first, as this dovetails with U.S. expectations,” said Alexander Vuving, a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii “But there is no clear-cut distinction between maritime security and air defense. For example, aircraft, radars and missiles are essential in both,” Vuving told Radio Free Asia. RELATED STORIES Closer Vietnam-US ties not based on Beijing issues, says conference Vietnam hosts its first international defense expo Vietnam mulls law that may open market to foreign arms firms US Defense Secretary Austin Meets in Hanoi With Vietnamese Officials The United States and Vietnam signed in 2015 a so-called Joint Vision Statement on defense relations – their most important document setting out defense cooperation, in which maritime security was highlighted. The U.S. has given the Vietnam coast guard two Hamilton-class cutters – a third one is scheduled to be delivered in the near future – as well as tactical drones and patrol boats. Veteran regional military watcher Mike Yeo said that coast guard cutters “would be an obvious item” on Hanoi’s shopping list. “But another possibility is the approval for transfer of subsystems to Vietnam such as jet engines for Korean FA-50 light attack planes should Vietnam decide to buy them,” Yeo said.  “Vietnam hasn’t bought the FA-50 yet but it seems like a logical choice going forward and as the engine used is a U.S. design an export clearance will be needed for any buyers,” he added. Not targeting China The United States lifted its lethal arms embargo on Vietnam in 2016, enabling it to procure U.S. equipment but “it will depend mainly on Vietnam’s needs and the prices,” said Vuving. Vietnam’s defense budget has not been made public, but could be about $7.8 billion in 2024, according to GlobalData. It remains dependent on cheaper Russian arms and equipment but there are efforts to diversify supplies with a major defense expo in Hanoi in 2022 and a second one slated for this December. Before the meeting with Gen. Giang on Monday, Secretary Austin said his department had accepted an invitation to the event that is due to be attended by defense suppliers from dozens of countries including Russia, India, the United Kingdom, Israel and France. Vietnam’s big neighbor China did not attend the first Vietnam Defense Expo and has yet to confirm its attendance at the second. A visitor looks into the U.S. Excelitas’ Merlin-LR Image Intensifier weapon-mounted sight during a defense expo in Hanoi on October 2, 2019. (Nhac Nguyen/AFP) Hanoi is always cautious not to antagonize Beijing while deepening ties with Washington, insisting that any effort to modernize its military is purely for self-defense and not aimed at any  country. “China will watch Vietnam-U.S. relations very closely,” said Vuving. “Beijing is unhappy with any progress in U.S.-Vietnam relations.”  Edited by Mike Firn. Updated to clarify Phan Van Giang’s schedule. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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Rebel army captures major Myanmar navy training base

Read coverage of this story in Burmese. Insurgents in western Myanmar have captured an important military training base after a month of fighting, the rebel army said in a statement, dealing what is likely to be a severe blow to the embattled military. .Arakan Army troops seized the Central Naval Diving and Salvage Depot between Thandwe township’s Maung Shwe Lay and Kwin Waing village in Rakhine state on Thursday, said the ethnic minority insurgent force battling for self-determination.  The Arakan Army, or AA, said the facility was the last naval base held by junta forces in Thandwe township, and it was defended on a “huge-scale” by the junta’s air force and navy as well as more than 1,200 soldiers, including many new graduates from the base. “More than 400 junta soldiers were killed during our attack, and junta weapons, ammunition and equipment were seized,” the AA said in  its statement.  Radio Free Asia was not able to independently verify that toll and the junta main spokesperson, Major Gen. Zaw Min, Tun did not respond to requests for comment.  The AA posted pictures of its fighters standing by a diving boards at the training center. The base is a major navy training facility and its loss will be of huge significance for the military, said Pe Than, a former member of parliament for the Arakan National Party, which in the past had affiliations with the AA. “Losing such a base will affect training as well as fighting. They’ve destroyed the navy and weakened the army, like cutting a man off at the waist,” he said. He said the Danyawaddy Naval Base in Kyaukpyu township, to the north of Thandwe, was the navy’s last facility in Rakhine state. “The military is like a bird with one wing now,” he said. Arakan Army forces after capturing the junta’s Central Naval Diving and Salvage Depot in Rakhine State on Sept. 5, 2024 (Arakan Army Information Desk) The loss of the base will not only dent the junta’s morale and reputation but also bring in more resources for the AA through the control of goods coming through a nearby port, he said. The AA said it expected junta retaliation against civilians in the area. Human rights investigators say junta forces have been increasingly attacking civilian targets as they lose ground to insurgent forces in different parts of the country. The military denies attacking civilians. The Arakan Army, which launched a new offensive against the military in November, controls nine townships in Rakhine state and one in neighboring Chin state, and is battling to take full control of three other townships.  Junta forces have launched crackdowns in the north of the state, near the Bangladesh border, and across the neighboring Ayeyarwady region after AA gains in the south of the state. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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EXPLAINED: The (worrying) popularity of caterpillar fungus

By now the army of scavengers has retreated from the high hillsides of the eastern Tibetan plateau, their bounty in hand. Harvest season for yartsa gunbu (དབྱར་རྩྭ་དགུན་འབུ།), or caterpillar fungus, typically runs from May to July, when winter snows have receded and thousands of rural, ethnic Tibetans can prospect for what’s also known as “soft gold.”  It’s hard to overstate the importance these few weeks hold for the people who climb the steep slopes. Collecting caterpillar fungus —  which is used to treat a variety of ailments — can account for as much as 90% of a rural family’s annual income.  But high demand has spurred overharvesting, making it harder to find the fungus in its natural environment. Climate change poses another challenge. Warmer temperatures on the high plateau are reducing the length of winter, a critical time for yartsa gunbu. Now a new threat is emerging, sources inside China say: artificial varieties designed to fill the gaps between supply and demand, in the form of either cultivated fungi or fake products altogether. Although Chinese authorities have tried to regulate the sale of cultivated fungus, interviews with Tibetans and online videos that attract tens of thousands of viewers say imposters have infiltrated the market. “It will definitely jeopardize the lives of thousands of Tibetan herders and farmers whose income depend on the wild yartsa,” said Lobsang Yeshi, who has practiced traditional Tibetan medicine at Men-Tsee-Khang in Dharamshala, India, for the past 20 years.  A local resident pulls out a caterpillar fungus west China’s Qinghai province May 12, 2007. (Simon Zo/Reuters) What is caterpillar fungus and where does it come from? Yartsa gunbu translates to “summer grass, winter bug.” The Ophiocordyceps sinensis – its scientific name – releases spores that sink underground and infect the larvae of ghost moths, so called for the white color of males. The yartsa gunbu takes over, commandeering the caterpillar’s nervous system, consuming its organs and finally, in spring, emerging from its head as a brown stoma at altitudes of greater than 13,000 feet (4,000 meters). Its methods have drawn comparisons to the fungus that stars in the HBO hit zombie series, “The Last of Us.” Harvested intact, it’s about the length of a little finger and shaped like a caterpillar with a stem attached.  Yartsa gunbu is found primarily in the Himalaya mountains and the Tibetan plateau. The Yushu Tibetan Autonomous prefecture in Qinghai province, east of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, is a particularly good place to look. Thousands of its residents set up makeshift camps from which they hike into the thin air. The annual harvest is reportedly around 300 million fungi that can cost $7 a pop or more, leaving a multi-billion dollar market.  A jar of caterpillar fungus on sale at a herbal medicine shop in Queens, New York, Aug. 23, 2024 (Lobsang Gelek/RFA) What is caterpillar fungus used for? Yartsa gunbu has been used in Tibetan and Chinese traditional medicine to treat heart, liver and lung ailments. More recently, it acquired a reputation for improving sexual stamina in men and women. (“Himalayan Viagra” is another moniker.) Studies have shown possible benefits, though scientists say more clinical research is needed. Users consume yartsa gunbu by brewing it with hot water similar to how tea or herbal infusions are prepared, or chewing it as it comes. Some put it in soups and other recipes. Lesser specimens are ground into powders. Why are people growing a fungus ?  Pluckers like to pick the fungus before it releases spores, limiting its ability to reproduce and leading to its population decline. China has encouraged the development of cultivated yartsa gunbu, and one company has reportedly solved the puzzle, synthetically growing the O. sinensis fungus found in the wild.  But some individuals are trying to cultivate fungus varieties on their own. That, fungus traders say, has undercut prices and, because the buyer’s remain suspicious of its medicinal properties, consumer confidence, several sources told RFA.  In Guangzhou, a major market, “there is a hesitancy of customers in buying because of too much artificial fungus in the market,” one trader said. A Tibetan living in Qinghai province said prices have dropped nearly 20% this year.  In New York, a retailer said he can still sell a single piece of wild fungus for $14, but “there are a lot of fake and cultivated yartsa” undercutting the business, he said. “Nowadays, people are selling thousands of artificial yartsa online per day, as well as in shops, jeopardizing the original yartsa business,” he said. Studies have shown that cultivated fungus can replicate the chemical compounds of natural varieties, though there are differences.  A local resident displays a few caterpillar fungus, Qinghai province, China, May 12, 2007. (Simon Zo/Reuters) What is China doing to protect the market? Chinese authorities seem to be aware of the financial risks to some of their poorest populations.  In April, the Chinese government in Qinghai, tried to control the artificial plantation of yartsa gunbu. But a trader in Nagchu, Tibet Autonomous Region, an area that historically has been among the best for finding wild yartsa gunbu, said enforcement has been lax. “Chinese authorities have come out with a lot of rules saying that the artificial fungus is banned,” the trader said. “But the on-ground reality is that the Chinese authorities are not strictly monitoring or stopping the sale of artificial fungus. And this is making it tough for us to sell the real fungus.”  Lobsang from RFA Tibetan contributed to this article. Edited by Jim Snyder and Boer Deng. Check out our reports Author: Investigative Journalism Reportika

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South Korea, Japan ‘ready to stop North Korea hiding behind Russia’

Leaders of South Korea and Japan said they would maintain their readiness to stop North Korea hiding behind Russia in its provocative acts, Kim Tae-hyo, South Korea’s deputy national security adviser, said on Friday. Kim was speaking after South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida met for talks in Seoul that included ways to deepen cooperation, even as Kishida prepares to step down at the end of the month. Kishida arrived for a two-day visit and talks with Yoon, their 12th summit in about two years. It was their last summit, as Kishida will not seek reelection as prime minister and leader of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party after three years in the job. During the summit, Kishida called for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula through a “unification doctrine” that Yoon announced last month, which focuses on expanding North Koreans’ access to external information and proposes establishing an official dialogue channel between the two Koreas to discuss various issues. Yoon, in his opening remarks at Friday’s summit, said it was important to maintain the positive momentum in relations with Japan. He added that the two countries have a chance to raise their relations to another level when they mark next year’s 60th anniversary of diplomatic ties and that working with Kishida on improving relations was the most meaningful development since he became president. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida attend a meeting at the Presidential Office in Seoul, South Korea, Sept. 6, 2024. (Lee Jin-man/Pool via Reuters) Relations between the two U.S. allies have been fraught for years because of South Korea resentment of Japan’s behavior during its occupation of Korea before and during World War II. But Yoon and Kishida have been able to build a close relationship as a result of Yoon’s decision last year to resolve a long-standing dispute regarding Japan’s wartime mobilization of Koreans for forced labor by compensating victims without contributions from Japanese firms. The two leaders have since resumed a “shuttle diplomacy” of holding meetings on the fringes of international conferences and visiting each other as needed. Their restored relations have also substantially enhanced trilateral security cooperation with the United States, as all three of the allies warily watch North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and the missiles to carry them.  RELATED STORIES Seoul, Beijing, Tokyo reaffirm Korean Peninsula denuclearization commitment Tokyo, Seoul target North Korea-Russia arms deal with sanctions Yoon, Kishida aim for better ties; island issues may constrain South Korea has been trying to bolster cooperation with regional partners in response to deepening military ties between North Korea and Russia.  On Wednesday, Yoon met New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon. They condemned North Korea’s nuclear weapons development and its military cooperation with Russia, including the North’s export of ballistic missiles to Russia in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions. Yoon and Luxon denounced Russia’s war against Ukraine, while pledging to support Ukrainian sovereignty and its efforts to secure a just and lasting peace, according to a joint statement. Edited by Mike Firn. 

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Experts: North Korea’s Chinese-made soccer uniforms might violate sanctions

Read a version of this story in Korean.  North Korea’s national soccer team will kick off the third round of Asian qualifiers for the 2026 World Cup on Thursday, but their Chinese-made uniforms might be part of a sanctions violation, experts told Radio Free Asia. Chinese sportswear maker Inlang Sports posted on social media last week that the North Korean team would be wearing uniforms bearing Inlang’s logo for the first time in Thursday’s match vs Uzbekistan in Tashkent. The company in January held a ceremony to announce that they had agreed to sponsor North Korean men’s and women’s soccer, and supply uniforms, but this arrangement could be in violation of sanctions intended to deprive Pyongyang of cash and resources that could be used in its nuclear and missile programs. “Money transfers and joint ventures would likely be a sanctions violation,” Aaron Arnold, a Senior Associate Fellow at the U.K.-based Royal United Services Institute’s Centre for Finance and Security, told RFA Korean.  “You could also feasibly argue that the uniforms are prohibited under the luxury goods ban, but that could be a stretch.” UN Security Council Resolution 2270 defines sports equipment as “luxury goods,” but Alastair Morgan, the former ambassador of the United Kingdom to North Korea, explained to RFA how the uniforms might not count. A friendly football match between the national teams of North Korea and Jordan. (Jordan Football Association) “The PRC … might argue that a sponsorship arrangement does not necessarily involve the supply of goods though it might do so, and/or that items of clothing are not ‘recreational sporting equipment,’” he said, using an acronym for the People’s Republic of China. “Depending on the nature of the financial transactions involved, and whether the DPRK recipient was a designated entity, there might conceivably be other violations.” Inlang’s sponsorship of the team also could mean that the North Korean uniforms could be sold to the outside world. Inlang did not respond to RFA queries regarding possible sanctions violations. This is not the first time that North Korean soccer has caused sanctions concerns.  In the 2022 Qatar World Cup Asian qualifier match between South Korea and North Korea held in Pyongyang in 2019, the South Korean national team instructed its players not to exchange uniforms after the match due to the possibility of violating sanctions against North Korea. Should the North Korean team qualify for the World Cup, it would be Inlang’s debut at the tournament. In the 2022 Qatar World Cup, 13 teams wore Nike kits, seven went with Adidas, and 6 wore Puma. Six different makers outfitted the remaining six teams. Nike is also the current sponsor of the Chinese national team. In 2010, the last time North Korea qualified for the World Cup, the team wore uniforms made by Italian firm Legea.  Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong.

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North Korea may have executed officials over flood damage: spy agency

North Korea is suspected of executing a number of officials held responsible for devastating floods this year and South Korea’s spy agency said it was “monitoring signs” to try to determine what had happened. The agency’s announcement came a day after a South Korean broadcaster reported that up to 30 officials in flood-hit regions of North Korea had been shot to death.  Heavy rains in July flooded large areas along the Amnok River in North Korea’s North Pyongan, Jagang and Ryanggang provinces with some South Korean media outlets reporting that more than 1,000 people were killed or were missing.  At that time, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said that he would punish officials for the damage, which a South Korean government ministry said appeared to be an attempt by Kim’s to dodge blame for the disaster. Since then, Kang Pong Hun, the chief secretary of the Jagang Provincial Committee of the North’s ruling party, and other senior officials, including Public Security Minister Ri Thae Sop, were dismissed from their posts over the flood damage, according to North Korea’s state-media. The South’s National Intelligence Service, or NIS, said Kang was possibly among the executed officials. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visits a flood-affected area near the border with China, in North Pyongan Province, North Korea, in this undated photo released July 31, 2024 by North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency. (KCNA via Reuters) NIS’s announcement came a day after South Korea’s TV Chosun cited an unidentified South Korean government source as saying North Korean officials deemed responsible for the flood disaster had likely been executed. “We understand late last month, 20 to 30 officials in the affected region were shot to death, including Kang Pong Hun” TV Chosun quoted the official as saying. Since the disaster, the North’s state media have featured Kim leading flood relief efforts, emphasizing his concern for the victims, but it has given no details of casualties.   South Korea said that there was a high possibility of casualties given that North Korea was reporting the rescue effort in such detail. A resident of the northwestern province of North Pyongan told Radio Free Asia Korean, on condition of anonymity for security reasons, that residents affected by the flood were forced to watch propaganda videos that portrayed Kim as a hero and were told they must avoid showing even a hint of sadness on their faces.  Another resident told RFA Korean that soldiers mobilized to rebuild flood-hit towns were stealing food and other supplies because they have been given none by the government, upsetting residents. RELATED STORIES Sent to flood-ravaged areas, North Korean soldiers steal supplies, townspeople say North Korean flood victims who lost their homes or families told not to show sadness State media shows North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un leading flood rescue North Korea reportedly declined a rescue offer from China, and did not respond to a South Korean offer of aid.  But the North’s official Korean Central News Agency reported in August that Russian President Vladimir Putin offered humanitarian assistance to help North Korea cope with flood damage in another sign of expanding relations between the two nations. Russia’s state-run Tass news agency carried a similar report, saying that Putin told Kim in a message: “You can always count on our assistance and support.” Edited by Mike Firn. 

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How secure is Hun Manet’s year-old premiership in Cambodia?

On Aug. 22, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet marked his first anniversary in office by personally receiving dozens of Khmer artifacts returned to Cambodia by the United States. The ceremony at his Peace Palace was dripping with symbolism.  “Why did these Khmer statues leave Cambodia? Because we were divided,” he declared. “However, now, their return symbolizes our reunion. On the first anniversary of [his government], we have maintained stability, peace, and prosperity for the people. Today, we celebrate as a unified nation, free from war and division.” However, just a week earlier, the Cambodian Interior Ministry had ordered police to tighten security around Phnom Penh, instructing provincial leaders to do the same, citing a group allegedly plotting a Bangladesh-inspired “color revolution.”  There is unease in the country over tensions with neighboring Vietnam over the Funan Techo Canal, the Hun dynasty’s legacy project, which could threaten Vietnam’s rice-growing heartlands.  In this photo released by Agence Kampuchea Press (AKP), Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet, front, prays before a statue with Culture and Fine Arts Phoeurng Sackona, right, during a ceremony for the return of artifacts in Peace Palace in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Thursday, Aug. 22, 2024. (AKP via AP) The public is also concerned about the implications of the Development Triangle Area, an old agreement involving Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam that has become a new point of contention in anti-Cambodian People’s Party circles.  Despite the government’s efforts to frame this as a purely economic zone, old prejudices persist, with some Cambodians viewing Hun Manet’s government as unpatriotic, much like they did his father’s.  Hun Sen, who ruled from 1985 until he handed power to his son last year, was often accused of being a puppet of Vietnam and later China, accused of selling off Cambodian land to the highest foreign bidder. On the surface, despite concerns about the recent Bangladesh revolt, Hun Manet and his family appear secure. They control almost every significant political and social institution, and the economy continues to provide jobs and food for the people. Hun Sen meticulously planned last year’s transition, implementing a “generational succession” in which key political and civil service families passed power down to their sons or relatives.  Shrewd transition strategy This strategy was shrewd, as many authoritarian governments have succumbed to fratricide during leadership transitions. By allowing the political families that matter to keep their patronage and corruption networks, no one lost wealth or influence, thus ensuring stability during the changeover. The Hun family remains first among equals, the ruling house within Cambodia’s political aristocracy. They control nearly every important institution except two: the navy, run by the Tea family, and the national police, overseen by the Sar family.  Hun Sen secured the presidency of the Cambodian Senate earlier this year, making him the acting head of state – a position that grants him the institutional power to intervene if his son’s government faces a crisis.  To further consolidate power, he enacted constitutional amendments last year to weaken the National Assembly and appointed a loyalist, Khuon Sudary, as its president. Additionally, he installed a family ally as army chief, succeeding Hun Manet, while another son, Hun Manith, heads military intelligence and now serves as deputy army chief.  People carry small Cambodia national flags and banners during the groundbreaking ceremony of the Funan Techo Canal in Kandal province, Aug. 5, 2024. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) Another son, Hun Many, who leads the country’s largest youth movement, was appointed minister of the Civil Service last year, ensuring the Hun family’s control over the bureaucracy. Hun Sen intends to remain CPP president for life, with Hun Manet running the party’s youth wing.  Hun Sen has also  brought the rowdy but powerful business tycoons into line through the Cambodia Oknha Association he formed last year and presides over.  The monarchy, while independent, lacks political interest, with King Norodom Sihamoni staying out of politics and the Queen Mother, the power behind the throne, now 88 years old. Moreover, Hun Sen, Hun Manet, and their allies dominate the Royal Council of the Throne, the body responsible for selecting the next king. In this feudal-like political system, the Hun family has appeased other influential families by allowing them to keep their patronage networks while consolidating its power across almost every key institution.  Ordinary Cambodians’ concerns No family from this First Estate can rival the Huns. They also enjoy the support of the economic barons, the oknhas, and other business elites who finance the political aristocracy.  That leaves the Third Estate, the ordinary Cambodians. Hun Sen needed to rig last year’s general elections—and the two prior—to secure his son’s ascent to power.  Repression has persisted under Hun Manet’s rule. The opposition has been neutralized, and civil society has been either silenced or co-opted. Hun Manet’s government has successfully distributed patronage to the middle classes, whose loyalty might have shifted toward a political alternative, if one was ever to exist again. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet (C, front) cuts the ribbon at the launching event of the Kampot Multipurpose Port in Kampot province, Cambodia, June 6, 2024. (Ly Lay/Xinhua via Getty Images) The government continues to deliver basic needs.  While the recent revolution in Bangladesh alarmed the Hun family, Cambodia does not face similar conditions. The country’s garment industry, which many expected to collapse during the COVID-19 pandemic, has instead rebounded and is once again driving economic growth.  Cambodia’s tourism industry has also recovered in terms of visitor numbers, though revenue remains about two-thirds of pre-2020 levels. There has been progress in the tech and service sectors, though the construction industry and related sectors, like brickmaking, have declined.  Typically, young women worked in garment factories while young men found jobs on construction sites, so the loss of construction jobs could have posed a threat to the government. However, many young men have returned to agriculture, which is thriving, especially with increased exports to China. Read more RFA commentaries COMMENTARY: Cambodia’s Hun Dynasty stakes reputation on the Funan Techo Canal COMMENTARY: Elite power…

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Propaganda News Network of China

The Global Media Propaganda Network

China’s international media presence plays a pivotal role in amplifying its reach and reinforcing its soft power propaganda network globally. State-run media outlets like China Global Television Network (CGTN) and Xinhua News Agency broadcast in multiple languages, targeting diverse audiences worldwide. For instance, CGTN offers channels in English, Spanish, French, Arabic, and Russian, ensuring China’s narratives reach a broad spectrum of viewers. Additionally, CGTN’s specialized channels, such as CGTN Turk and CGTN Hausa, operate on popular social media platforms like Facebook and X, further expanding their influence. Xinhua News Agency, dubbed “The World’s Biggest Propaganda Machine” by Reporters Without Borders, is a cornerstone of this strategy. It operates globally, providing content in multiple languages while subsidizing coverage costs to ensure widespread dissemination of Chinese viewpoints. Xinhua’s CNC World, a 24-hour English-language news channel, is designed to offer a favorable view of China, countering foreign media narratives. Moreover, China’s media outlets are available across numerous cable and satellite providers worldwide, making channels like CCTV-4 and CGTN accessible in various regions. This global media network allows China to strategically influence international perceptions, particularly in countries with significant Chinese-speaking populations and in regions where China’s economic interests are strong. For instance, the Global Times, another Chinese state-run outlet, receives significant traffic (average 104.6K monthly organic visits) from countries like India (30%), the United States (27%), and Australia (7%), illustrating the global reach of China’s media apparatus. China Daily, another key player in China’s international media strategy, further amplifies the country’s global soft power. With an organic traffic of 44.8K monthly visits, it reaches a significant audience, particularly in Western and Asian countries. The majority of its readership comes from the United States, accounting for 43% of the traffic, followed by India (9%), Australia (7%), Singapore (6%), and Malaysia (5%). China Daily publishes content in English, making it accessible to a global audience and allowing China to shape international perspectives on various issues. Through these extensive media channels, China effectively promotes its political and cultural narratives, aligning global content with its ideological goals and enhancing its soft power influence on the world stage. Propaganda by Xinhua: Key Examples Xinhua News Agency, as China’s largest and most influential state-run news organization, has been at the forefront of disseminating propaganda that aligns with the Chinese government’s narratives on various contentious issues. During the 2017 Doklam standoff, Xinhua released a satirical video titled “Seven Sins of India,” which portrayed India in a derogatory manner, sparking accusations of racism and anti-Indian sentiment. In 2019, during the Hong Kong protests, Xinhua’s biased portrayal of the protests as violent and illegitimate led to Twitter banning state-sponsored media from ad purchases. Xinhua’s role in spreading propaganda became even more evident during the COVID-19 pandemic, where it downplayed the virus’s threat and emphasized China’s response while ignoring early cover-ups and public discontent.  Additionally, Xinhua has been involved in promoting disinformation during the Russian -Ukraine war by supporting pro-Kremlin narratives through digital ads on Facebook. These examples underscore Xinhua’s role in advancing the Chinese government’s propaganda efforts on a global scale. CGTN and Its Role in Chinese Propaganda China Global Television Network (CGTN) is a key player in the Chinese government’s global media strategy, acting as the international arm of China Central Television (CCTV). Controlled by the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party, CGTN broadcasts in multiple languages and aims to promote China’s narratives to a global audience. Over the years, CGTN has been embroiled in various controversies, including the detention of Australian journalist Cheng Lei on national security grounds and its dissemination of disinformation regarding COVID-19. The network has also faced criticism for its biased coverage of significant geopolitical events, such as the 2019 Hong Kong protests, the Russian -Ukraine war, and the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant discharge. These incidents highlight CGTN’s role in spreading Chinese state propaganda, often facing pushback from international regulators. For instance, the United States designated CGTN as a foreign mission, and the UK revoked its broadcasting license in 2021 due to concerns over editorial independence and political control. CGTN’s YouTube Network and Its Global Reach CGTN’s YouTube network is a significant component of its international media presence, leveraging the platform to reach diverse audiences across the globe. The main CGTN channel boasts 3.14 million subscribers, making it the flagship of the network. Other regional and language-specific channels, such as CGTN Africa with 884K subscribers and CGTN Español with 530K subscribers, highlight CGTN’s tailored approach to different markets. The network also includes specialized channels like CGTN Sports Scene (175K subscribers) and CGTN Documentary (9.5K subscribers), further expanding its reach and influence. With content available in multiple languages, including Arabic (588K subscribers) and French (457K subscribers), CGTN’s YouTube channels play a crucial role in disseminating content that aligns with China’s global narratives, making it a vital part of the country’s soft power strategy. Channel Name Subscriber Count CGTN 3.14M CGTN Europe 448K CGTN America 707K CGTN Africa 884K CGTN Documentary 9.5K CGTN Arabic 588K CGTN Global Watch 6.04K CGTN BIZ 2.58K CGTN Sports Scene 175K CGTN Podcasts 3.23K CGTN Global Business 8.14K CGTN Français 457K CGTN UN 193 CGTN Español 530K CGTN на русском 289K The CGTN Soft Power Network with the Subscriber Count Here is a case study of two of its prominent YouTube Channels: YouTube Channel: CGTN Arabic  CGTN Arabic, formerly CCTV-Arabic, is an Arabic-language television channel under the China Global Television Network, a subsidiary of China Central Television. The channel serves as a propaganda arm of the Chinese government, disseminating content that aligns with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) agenda. It aims to shape perceptions of China in the Arabic-speaking world, often countering Western narratives and promoting a sanitized image of China, including controversial areas like Xinjiang. Key Propaganda Themes 1. Propaganda to Whitewash Xinjiang’s Image: 2. Promoting China’s Global Influence: 3. Bashing Western Media and Policies: 4. Promoting Chinese Culture and Economic Achievements: 5. Positive Spin on Controversial Issues: Community Engagement In recent years, CGTN Arabic’s community posts have frequently bashed…

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