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Category: East Asia
Southeast Asia remains world rice bowl as pockets of region suffer crop disasters
Rice crops in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar have taken a hit from flooding and conflict this year, casting a shadow on a mostly sunny outlook for Southeast Asia’s output of the key grain as the region deals with other potential longer term supply troubles, farm officials and researchers say. Poverty and hunger are stalking some rural communities in peninsular Southeast Asia, also called Indochina, as a result of lost crops, hitting populations still struggling to recover from lost income and other fallout from widespread economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, the poorest Southeast Asian nations, are not major players in rice production in a sector dominated by Thailand and Vietnam, which lead the world in exports of the grain. Southeast Asia accounts for 26 percent of global rice production and 40 percent of exports, supplying populous neighbors Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as Africa and the Middle East, according the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization. But their harvest shortfalls have to be made up from other suppliers, and any serious deterioration in rice output could have ripple effects on import-dependent countries in Asia. The challenge is more acute at a time of deepening worries over food security and rising food prices in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has removed those countries’ key grain exports from global supplies. A man transports bags of rice in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Oct. 17, 2019. Credit: AFP Cambodia’s National Committee for Disaster Management reported early this month that floods inundated some 770 villages in 22 provinces, including Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Pursat, Siem Reap, Kampong Thom and Preah Vihear. More than 150,000 hectares of rice paddies were flooded more than 100,000 families were affected by the floods, a committee official told local media. Banteay Meanchey farmer Voeun Pheap told RFA that floods destroyed more than four hectares of his farm and brought immediate hardship to his family as it wiped out his crop and the hope of paying off what he borrowed to plant. “I couldn’t make much money, I lost my investments, and I am in debt,” he said. In Laos, an agriculture and forestry official in Hua Phanh province told RFA that flooding in two districts had wiped out rice crops and left 200 families with no harvest to eat or sell. “Sand is covering the rice fields all over due to heavy rain, which destroyed both rice paddies and dry rice fields,” he said, speaking on condition of anonymity for safety reasons. “Families that have been affected will go hungry this year. The damage is so enormous that villagers will have to seek food from the forest or sell other crops that were not affected,” the official added. People reach out to buy subsidized rice from government officials in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, March 27, 2008. Credit: AFP Fear, fighting leave fallow fields More than 18 months after a military coup toppled a popular civilian government and plunged Myanmar into political and military conflict, the country of 54 million faces security threats to its rice supply on top of the environmental and economic problems faced by its neighbors. “I am too afraid to leave my home,” said Myo Thant, a local farmer in the town of Shwebo in the Sagaing region, a farming region in central Myanmar that has been a main theater of fighting between ruling army junta forces and local militias opposed to army rule. “I can’t fertilize the fields and I can’t do irrigation work,” he told RFA “The harvest will be down. We will barely have enough food for ourselves,” added Myo Thant. Farmers groups told RFA that in irrigated paddy farms across Myanmar, planting reduced due to the security challenges as well as to rising prices for fuel, fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides. Growers are limiting their planting to rain-fed rice fields. “Only 60 percent of (paddy) farms will grow this year, which means that the production will be reduced by about 40 percent,” Zaw Yan of the Myanmar Farmers Representative Network told RFA. Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing, the Myanmar junta chief, told a meeting August that of 33.2 million acres of farmland available for rice cultivation, only 15 million acres of rainy reason rice and 3 million acres of irrigated summer paddy rice are being grown. Brighter regional outlook This year’s flooding has caused crop losses and concern in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, but so far it doesn’t appear to have dented the regional outlook for the grain, thanks to expected big crops and surpluses in powerhouse exporters Thailand and Vietnam. World stocks have been buoyed by India’s emergence as the top rice exporter of the grain. In this June 5, 2015 photo, workers load sacks of imported Vietnam rice onto trucks from a ship docked at a port area in Manila, Philippines.Credit: Reuters Although Myanmar is embroiled in conflict and largely cut off from world commerce, Cambodia exported 2.06 million tons of milled and paddy rice worth nearly $616 million in the first half of 2022, a 10 percent increase over the same period in 2021, the country’s farm ministry said in July. Laos was the world’s 25th largest rice exporter in 2020. A report released this month by U.S. Department of Agriculture saw continued large exports from Thailand and Vietnam likely into 2023, offsetting drops in shipments of the grain from other suppliers. While the USDA has projected that Southeast Asia’s rice surplus will continue, a research team at Nature Food that studied rice output in Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam suggested the region might lose its global Rice Bowl status. The threats include stagnating crop yields, limited new land for agriculture, and climate change. “Over the past decades, through renewed efforts, countries in Southeast Asia were able to increase rice yields, and the region as a whole has continued to produce a large amount of rice that exceeded regional demand, allowing a rice surplus to be exported to other countries,” the study said. “At…
Chinese sportswear brand apologizes after fashion likened to Japanese WWII uniforms
Chinese sportswear brand Li-Ning has apologized after some of its latest fashion clothing sparked public anger in China over a perceived resemblance to Japanese World War II military uniforms. The company, founded by retired Olympic gymnast and billionaire Li Ning, made the statement after being deluged with complaints that its “Chasing Dreams Airport Collection” of down khaki parkas, hats and hoodies looked like vintage Japanese uniforms. Some items from the Sept. 20 fashion shoot were slammed as copies of Japanese war-time clothing, with users posting photos side-by-side for comparison. The company described the collection, which included hats with earflaps commonly associated with Japanese uniforms, as being inspired by “ancient Chinese helmets.” “Li-Ning sincerely apologizes for the perplexity and doubt caused by some of the products in its Chasing Dreams collection, the design and appearance of which have sparked online discussions in recent days,” the company said in a statement on its official Weibo account. “The Chasing Dreams collection took aviation as its theme, finding inspiration in the clothing worn by pilots, to show how humanity continues to search the skies for its dreams,” the statement said. “The inspiration from the pilot hat that sparked the most discussion came from an ancient Chinese helmet,” Li-Ning said. “We will continue to listen carefully to people’s feedback and suggestions.” The statement didn’t appease everyone on Weibo, however. “Shouldn’t the very first words be an apology?” @Big_head_girl_one commented, while @I_met_you_in_my_dream said it was an unacceptable response from a native of Nanjing, whose elderly population still remember the 1937 Nanjing Massacre, in which the International Military Tribunal for the Far East estimated at least 200,000 murders and at least 20,000 cases of rape. “As a native of Nanjing, I can’t accept this … because I keep hearing the older generation talk about their experiences in that year,” the user wrote. “I’m never buying Li-Ning again,” added @warm_winter_sun_cf566, while @small_windy_mud commented: “Speechless.” Trolls at work? Others, however, thought the complaints were far-fetched, and the work of trolls. “It’s like people who can’t tell the difference between a Nazi [swastika] and a Buddhist [manji] criticizing Buddhists for using Nazi symbols,” @Yuanxi_21711 commented, while @half_a_catty_and_eightyli said the clothing looked nothing like Japanese uniforms. “This isn’t a standard Japanese flight suit — the shape and color are different,” the user wrote. “Is Li Ning being trolled by his opponents?” Ho Tsung-hsun, chairman of the Taiwan Citizen Participation Association, said the “fragility” of online comments were linked to Beijing’s authoritarian brand of nationalism. “This isn’t the first time this has happened and it won’t be the last,” Ho told RFA. “If they hadn’t apologized, their business and public image could be affected.” “This is a dictatorship, and its people are so fragile.” Translated and edited by Luisetta Mudie.
Top Vietnamese leader heading to China on Sunday to meet Xi
Vietnam’s top leader Nguyen Phu Trong will travel to China on Sunday to visit President Xi Jinping, the first foreign leader to do so since Xi’s re-election to a third five-year term last weekend. The two countries have had territorial disagreements in the South China Sea but are generally considered allies. The two men are expected to discuss strengthening ties and underscore their will to cooperate on a variety of issues. The three-day visit will also be Trong’s first trip abroad since he suffered a stroke in 2019. Xi’s re-election last Sunday at the Chinese Communist Party’s national congress signals that there will be little change in China’s foreign policy, and it is an opportunity for Vietnam to reaffirm that it has no intention to counter China by allying with a third nation, such as the United States, Vu Xuan Khang, an International Security Ph.D. candidate at Boston College, told RFA’s Vietnamese Service. “Despite territorial disagreement in the [South China] Sea, the Communist Party of Vietnam attaches significance to its comradeship with the Communist Party of China and hopes that the two sides can maintain their good relationship in the future,” said Khang. China, meanwhile, extended the invitation to make sure the Asian neighbors continue their dialogue and avoid unnecessary misunderstandings, Khang said. “China doesn’t want to have conflicts with Vietnam as the Taiwan issue is way more important,” he said. China may use the meeting to draw Vietnam closer and deter Hanoi from getting too close to Washington, Nguyen The Phuong, a marine security expert, told RFA. Vietnam needs China more than China needs Vietnam, especially when it comes to economic issues, said Phoung. But he said Xi chose Trong to be the first leader to visit since the end of the congress as a gesture to show that China does value the relationship. Containers are transferred from a truck to cargo ship at the international cargo terminal of a port in Hai Phong city, Vietnam, Aug. 12, 2019. Vietnam’s import-export activities heavily depend on China, says researcher Nguyen The Phuong. Credit: AFP “Recently, Vietnam’s relations with western countries, especially with the U.S., have improved rapidly,” he said. “From China’s perspective, letting Vietnam freely get closer to western countries is also a strategic threat.” Beijing has several tools at its disposal to prevent Hanoi from falling into Washington’s orbit, Phoung said. “Economically, Vietnam’s import-export activities heavily depend on China, especially in terms of raw material imports and border trade,” he said. “Therefore, by creating economic pressure only, China would already be able to send the message that Vietnam should not go too far.” Additionally, China would be able to put pressure on Vietnam by increasing military presence in the South China Sea. It can also persuade the Vietnamese Communist Party that a closer relationship can help maintain the party’s power, Phoung said. Ironing out disagreements The two countries have also tangled over the Mekong River, as China has built a series of dams in the Upper Mekong that have adversely affected Vietnam and other downstream countries in Southeast Asia. But the visit will likely seek to avoid any overt conflicts as the two sides try to smooth over relations, a researcher who requested anonymity for safety reasons told RFA “Vietnam will perhaps not mention the Mekong very much. However, it will try to put forth the Eastern Sea issues to resolve differences through negotiation by the two countries,” he said, using the Vietnamese term for the South China Sea. Phuong said these issues would be secondary to maintaining their harmonious relationship. “If mentioned at all, the two sides would still emphasize dialogue and cooperation and not promote an image of insurmountable challenges in Vietnam-China relations,” said Khang. Instead, the two sides will likely play up strategies for building the party and fighting corruption. They may have differences in foreign policy, “but the two countries have many things in common when it comes to domestic policy,” he said. These commonalities include the mechanism of party leadership, state management, a socialism-oriented market economy, and economic development based on export and foreign investment, Khang said. Translated by Anna Vu. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
Protests spread in Lhasa over COVID-19 restrictions
Protests over COVID-19 restrictions in the Tibetan capital Lhasa spread to at least four different areas of the city Thursday, prompting “scuffles” with authorities in some cases, sources told Radio Free Asia, as ethnic Chinese migrant workers demanded permits to return home from the region. RFA was able to confirm that many of the protesters were ethnic majority Han Chinese migrant workers who likely obtained permission to reside in Lhasa for jobs that pay daily wages. Sources in the city, who spoke on condition of anonymity out of security concerns, said that the migrant workers have been demanding that local authorities issue them permits to return to their homes in eastern China because they have been unable to earn a living during the nearly three months of lockdown in the city. In footage from one video obtained late on Wednesday, a man claiming to be a police officer pleads with protesters in Mandarin Chinese to return to their homes, and tells them their concerns have been relayed to senior officials. “Please return to your homes. Why? If you [don’t] go back and block up this area, what might happen? You’ll infect each other,” the apparent officer says. “We’ve already reported to the higher ups, okay? Please go home.” “We understand your pain. We’re going to make a report soon,” he goes on to say. ”Please everybody understand, we will report to the relevant authorities.” On Wednesday, RFA Tibetan reported that scores of people had taken to the streets in what appeared to be Chengguan district’s Chakrong area, in eastern Lhasa, as well as the Payi area of the city, based on video obtained by sources in the region. By Thursday, protests had spread to include the districts of Lhalu and Kuang Ye, sources told RFA, with newly obtained video footage showing crowds growing more restless. In one such video, protesters appear to engage in a yelling and shoving match with authorities, while in another, a group of people appear to push a large iron gate off of its hinges. Trying to contain Sangay Kyab, a Tibet expert based in Spain, told RFA that Chinese authorities likely did not resort to violence to crack down on the protests in Lhasa because they were related to COVID-19 restrictions, and because Beijing doesn’t want the situation to escalate. Sakar Tashi, a Belgium-based China and Tibet watcher, took it a step further, suggesting that authorities wouldn’t have responded as peacefully to a protest held exclusively by Tibetans. “Han people in Lhasa protested against the epidemic control policy. Tibetans are also involved,” he wrote in a post to Twitter. “Most who led & participated were Han – if it were Tibetans, it would have been bloodily suppressed long ago.” RFA was able to contact an officer with the Lhasa Public Security Bureau who insisted that no protest had taken place over the past two days. “There was no gathering, assembly or protest,” he said. “Everything is in an orderly manner. We did not arrest anyone.” When asked how many people were able to obtain permits to leave the region, the officer replied that “anyone who meets conditions can receive permits and leave Tibet freely.” When pressed further about the status of the protests, the officer said that “everyone is fine, everyone went home.” Other sources inside the city appeared more wary about discussing the incidents, including some who had provided RFA with updates on Wednesday. However, accounts provided to RFA by some Lhasa residents on Thursday appeared to confirm the officer’s explanation of events. Residents said that protesters dispersed after authorities agreed to process applications for Chinese migrant workers to return to their homes outside of the region. RFA was unable to independently verify whether such an arrangement had been made. COVID-19 restrictions Reports of the protests in Lhasa – believed to be the largest in the city in more than a dozen years – came days after the government of the Tibet Autonomous Region issued an Oct. 24 statement announcing that a harsh COVID-19 lockdown in Lhasa would be “loosened.” The lockdown in Lhasa began in early August as COVID-19 numbers there and throughout China continued to climb. Lhasa residents have said on social media that the lockdown order came without enough time to prepare, leaving some short on food, and making it difficult for those infected with the virus to find adequate treatment. Despite Monday’s announcement by authorities, residents of Lhasa told RFA on Thursday that the lockdown remains in effect and claimed even more stringent measures were being implemented. One video obtained by RFA appears to be taken inside a bus full of people who the narrator says are Tibetans being rounded up and taken to an undisclosed location. “Look, they are taking all these people who aren’t even sick,” a man’s voice says, urging viewers to “please share this on Douyin,” referring to a popular video-hosting website in China. Chinese state media had reported more than 18,000 cases of COVID-19 infection as of early October, with at least 60,507 people now held in quarantine in conditions described as harsh by sources inside the Tibet Autonomous Region. In a Sept. 26 statement, the Central Tibetan Administration – the Dharamsala, India-based Tibetan government-in-exile – said Chinese authorities are holding Tibetans in quarantine camps without adequate food, water or medical care. Camp managers have routinely placed infected persons with others still uninfected, resulting in a further spread of the virus, it said. Formerly an independent nation, Tibet was invaded and incorporated into China by force more than 70 years ago, following which the Dalai Lama and thousands of his followers fled into exile in India and other countries around the world. Beijing has accused the Dalai Lama of fomenting separatism in Tibet. Translated by Kalden Lodoe, Rita Cheng and Chase Bodiford. Written in English by Joshua Lipes.
Laos to grant honorary citizenship to foreigners who invest US$1.5 million
Laos will allow foreign nationals to acquire honorary citizenship if they donate and invest roughly U.S. $1.5 million, but critics worry that the program could result in a massive land grab by wealthy Chinese investors. According to Decree No. 14 issued in September, honorary citizens are exempt from visa requirements for entering and exiting the country and may live in Laos permanently. Additionally, they will be able to buy land on state-owned property for a set duration and they can lease public and private land, the Laotian Times reported. To become an honorary citizen, investor applicants must donate $500,000 towards the country’s socio-economic development, and also invest $1 million before they apply, the report said. The stated purpose of the program is to bring in foreigners with knowledge and expertise to help Laos develop. But this will likely mean that Chinese investors will buy up land and leave Lao people with fewer places to live and less access to natural resources, said a resident of the capital, Vientiane, who asked not to be identified for safety reasons. “It’s not right, what they are doing,” the source said. “If someone has money they can buy anything, including land and other things. But the Lao people are poor, and after a while the people will not have any land to grow crops.” The decree would allow investors to purchase unlimited amounts of land, a source from the northern province of Luang Prabang told Radio Free Asia. “We already have a lot of Chinese investors here in our country as it is,” the second source said. “When they come to get their land concession, it affects rural villagers. They won’t have land to grow rice to feed their families any longer.” China is Laos’ largest foreign investor and aid provider, and its second-largest trade partner after Thailand. Growing resentment Reports have increased in recent years of growing resentment in Laos over Chinese business presence in the country, over Chinese casinos and special economic zones linked to human trafficking and crime, and over the often high-handed treatment of Lao workers by their Chinese bosses. But a government official pointed out that the program is not only available to Chinese citizens. “It is open to all foreigners who have the money to invest,” the official, from the Lao Ministry of Justice, told RFA. “We do not choose what nationality to give the honorary citizenship to. They can be Thai, Chinese or Vietnamese,” the official said. “All have the same right to get honorary citizenship from the government.” An honorary citizen has some, but not all, of the rights of a full-fledged Lao citizen, a second official said, particularly that honorary citizens can gain concession to use land but cannot own it. But since all land in Laos is owned by the state, residents can be forced off their land with little or no compensation as they are pushed out to make room for development projects. RFA was not able to determine exactly how honorary citizenship differs from full-fledged citizenship. The honorary citizenship program has both positives and negatives, a law professor from Lao National University told RFA. “The good point is that it will allow foreign investors to more easily invest in our country,” he said. “But the bad point is that in the future there will be many foreign investors coming to Laos, and this could force Lao people to move out from their rural villages.” Several other countries in the region offer either permanent residency or citizenship to those who invest in large amounts. Singapore grants permanent residency to foreign nationals who invest at least $2.5 million, while South Korea will grant it to those who invest $5 million, or who live in the country for three years after investing more than $500,000. In both countries, permanent residents can become citizens after living in the country for a specific period of time. The “Cambodia My Second Home” program, meanwhile, allows foreign investors to acquire a visa with a five-year path to citizenship with an investment of $100,000 or more. Cambodian law also allows for investors to bypass minimum residency requirements with an investment of about $312,000. Similar programs exist in Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia. In Cambodia, some have been able to bribe their way to obtain immediate citizenship. Independent news outlet VOD reported last month that interior ministry official Oknha Duong Ngeap admitted in court to taking $120,000 each from Chinese and Taiwanese clients in exchange for granting them Cambodian citizenship. Translated by Sidney Khotpanya. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
Xi Jinping’s extended term as supreme leader sparks warning to China’s ethnic groups
Xi Jinping’s third term in office as Chinese Communist Party supreme leader will likely mean more suffering for ethnic minority groups in China, exiled activists warned in recent forums and interviews with RFA. Xi’s regime, which is already engaged in a program of mass incarceration of Uyghurs and mass surveillance and police controls in Xinjiang and Tibet, will continue to pose a grave threat to minority groups, exiled Uyghur rights activist and businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer told a recent forum in Taiwan. If the international community doesn’t try to resolve the issue of Uyghurs, Tibetan and other ethnic minority groups, “Chinese atrocities” could have a global impact, Kadeer told the forum analyzing the global threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party under Xi, who removed presidential term limits in 2018, and could now rule indefinitely. She said in a recorded message to the forum that “the most dangerous time” was right now, and called on “ethnic minorities oppressed by the Communist Party” to unite to resist it. Unlike previous versions, Xi’s political report to the opening session of the 20th National Congress on Oct. 16 made no mention of “regional autonomy for ethnic minorities,” a phrase that had appeared in his reports to the 18th and 19th party congresses. Before Xi took power, the Chinese government was criticized for widespread rights violations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Tibetan Autonomous Region, but still paid lip service to the notion of autonomy, and allowed the use of the Tibetan and Uyghur languages to teach children in schools, along with a limited degree of religious activity. Kelsang Gyaltsen, who represents the Tibetan government-in-exile on the democratic island of Taiwan, said Xi was at least still talking about “accelerating the development of ethnic minority regions” back in 2012, as well as “equality, solidarity, mutual assistance and harmony.” By 2017, he had added the phrase “forging a national consciousness” and “the sinicization of religion,” two policies that were to give rise to a nationwide crackdown on Muslims, Christians and Tibetan Buddhists, as well as a ban on minority languages as a teaching medium in schools. The ban on Mongolian prompted street protests and class boycotts by students and parents across the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, which borders the independent country of Mongolia, prompting a region-wide crackdown by riot squads and state security police in the fall of 2020. Tibetan, Uyghur and Korean-language teaching is also being phased out of schools in ethnic minority areas, local parents and teachers have told RFA. Kelsang Gyaltsen [left], who represents the Tibetan government-in-exile on the democratic island of Taiwan, says ‘national unity’ programs have led to forced intermarriage between majority Han Chinese and Tibetans. A similar policy has targeted Uyghurs in Xinjiang, RFA has reported. At right is Dawa Cairen, director of the Tibet Policy Research Center. Both were attending the forum this past weekend in Taiwan. Credit: Xia Xiaohua ‘National unity’ and ‘Forging a sense of community’ Chinese writer and historian Wang Lixiong described one aspect of the “sinicization of religion” in Xinjiang in detail following a research trip to the region. In a commentary for RFA’s Mandarin Service published on Tuesday, he cited a sign at a rural school listing “23 manifestations of illegal religious activities.” Traditional Uyghur marriage ceremonies, Quranic study groups, “printing and distributing religious propaganda,” and proselytizing Islamic religious beliefs were among the actions listed, along with “accepting foreign religious donations” and organizing pilgrimages to Mecca outside of government-backed package tours. “You can imagine how religious believers would feel, caught in such an endless web,” Wang wrote. “The janitor told me that teachers were required to gather in school four days a week, even during vacation, to study politics, mainly anti-separatism,” he said. “Political study now takes up more of their time than studying for professional purposes.” Kelsang Gyaltsen said “national unity” programs have led to forced intermarriage between majority Han Chinese and Tibetans. A similar policy has targeted Uyghurs in Xinjiang, RFA has reported. “Forging a sense of community” means abolishing ethnic identity and autonomy, he told RFA in a recent interview, adding that “strengthening exchanges” refers to the erasure of distinct ethnic identities. “The Constitution and the Ethnic Region Autonomy Law clearly stipulate the protection of the rights and interests of ethnic minorities, but Xi Jinping’s report to the 20th party congress didn’t mention it,” he said. Signs suggest policies to continue Tseng Chien-yuen, an associate professor at Taiwan’s Central University, said Xi likely avoided mentioning it due to widespread international criticism — including at the United Nations — of China’s policies in ethnic minority areas. “Of course he daren’t mention it; it is his flaw and a stain [on his regime],” Tseng told RFA. “There is a major conflict between the party-state system and regional ethnic autonomy, which has worsened during Xi’s tenure, with concentration camps and ethnic minority groups stigmatized for their beliefs and cultural differences, or accused of terrorism,” he said. “I can’t see any indication that he is reviewing [those policies].” Other observers agreed that while Xi said little explicitly about ethnic policies, nothing about this year’s party congress indicates that there will be a loosening of restrictions currently in place in regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang. Kunga Tashi, a U.S.-based Tibet and China analyst, told RFA that Xi’s speech “included nothing that signals positive changes for Tibet in the near future,” while Ilshat Hasan, the executive vice chairman of the World Uyghur Congress exile group, noted that Xi’s elevation of loyalists to China’s inner circle of policymakers “is not a good sign for the world or for Uyghur people.” Kelsang Gyaltsen said the treatment of Tibetans, Uyghurs and ethnic Mongolians should also serve as a warning to democratic Taiwan. “Now that Tibet, Xinjiang and Mongolia are all being tightly controlled, none of those promises [of autonomy] are worth the paper they’re written on,” he said. “If Taiwan falls under the control of the Chinese Communist Party, like Tibet and Xinjiang … it won’t…
Military jets bomb concert in northern Myanmar, killing at least 50
Military jets bombed a concert northern Myanmar commemorating the founding of an ethnic political group on Monday, killing at least 50 civilians and wounding 100 more, according to residents. It was believed to be the deadliest single airstrike since the military seized power in a February 2021 coup. The attack came just days ahead of a special meeting of foreign ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, in Indonesia to discuss growing violence in Myanmar, one of its members. The bombing was the latest explosion of violence in fighting over the past 20 months between the military and pro-junta militias and rebel groups scattered across the country. It was strongly condemned by the United Nations, Western governments and human rights groups. “The junta dropped four bombs in the middle of a crowd where a thousand people were celebrating,” said Col. Naw Bu, a spokesperson for the Kachin Independence Organization, or KIO, which was marking its 62nd anniversary at the concert, which featured several Kachin celebrities, some of whom were killed. “It is really concerning that the junta intentionally dropped bombs on an area that was not only not a battlefield, but a place where we were celebrating together with many civilians,” he said. A month ago, two military helicopters killed more than a dozen civilians, including seven children, at a school in Sagaing region, further to the north, in what was previously thought to be the bloodiest airstrike since the coup. The attack occurred at the Anan Par Training Ground, about two miles outside of Hpakant township’s Kan Hsee village, residents told RFA’s Burmese language service. The training ground is under the control of the 9th Brigade of the Kachin Independence Organizatin’s military wing, the Kachin Independence Army, or KIA, which has been fighting the government off and on for decades in a bid for greater autonomy. Among those killed in the attack were KIA soldiers, Kachin celebrities, and civilians, residents of Hpakant said Monday. A Kachin artist, who declined to be named, said at least nine Kachin celebrities who attended the concert were among the casualties. Musicians Aurali Lahpai, Galau Yaw Lwi (a.k.a Yungwi Shadang), and Ko King were killed, while Zaw Dain, a veteran actor and the former chairman of the Kachin Artist Association was injured, he said. The Associated Press reported that as many as 80 people were killed, citing KIO members and a rescue worker. RFA was unable to independently verify the death toll or the identities of the victims. Blocked Access A member of a Hpakant-based relief group, who declined to be named for security reasons, told RFA that providing assistance to the wounded wasn’t possible because junta forces had blocked off the road leading to the site of the attack. “We cannot go there to provide any relief help,” he said. “Junta forces have blocked several gates to make sure no one can travel to the area,” Other local relief groups said that although they had requested permission to travel to the Anan Par Training Ground from General Ko Ko Maung, the head of the junta’s Northern Military Command, they had not been cleared to go as of the evening on Monday. The area is located around 15 miles outside of Hpakant. Win Ye Tun, the junta’s Minister for Social Affairs and the spokesperson for Kachin state, told RFA that he hadn’t received details about the airstrike, but said he is assembling a team to provide assistance. “I haven’t received any specific information about civilians being killed. I heard some news, but it’s an ongoing battle,” he said. “I am currently networking resources to help. We can’t just take off to go there and help immediately. After the fighting is over and when it is safe to go there, I will follow up.” In this photo provided by a citizen journalist, a victim of the Myanmar junta’s airstrike, aimed at a Kachin gathering receives treatment in Hpakant township, northern Kachin state, Myanmar, Oct. 24, 2022. Credit: Citizen journalist International condemnation The attack prompted a statement on Monday from the U.N. office in Myanmar condemning what it said appeared to be an “excessive and disproportionate use of force by security forces against unarmed civilians,” adding that reports suggested “over 100 civilians may have been affected.” The statement said that those injured should be “availed [of] urgent medical treatment,” calling such airstrikes “unacceptable” and demanding that those responsible be held to account. Stéphane Dujarric, the spokesperson for U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, said Monday that Guterres had expressed “deep concern” over reports of the airstrikes in Kachin state. “We reiterate our call for the immediate cessation of violence and all those who were injured need to be given urgent medical treatment as needed,” he said. A statement jointly issued by the U.S. Embassy in Yangon, EU member states, Norway, Switzerland, and the U.K., said Sunday’s attack “underscores the military regime’s responsibility for crisis and instability in Myanmar and the region and its disregard for its obligation to protect civilians and respect the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.” Phil Robertson, deputy head of Human Rights Watch’s Asia-Pacific Division, went further, calling the strike a “war crime.” “It is outrageous and unacceptable that they have attacked a group of civilians,” he said, adding that the junta knew there was an entertainment event taking place at the site and suggesting the airstrike was “retaliation” against the KIA for its resistance to military rule. “It shows how completely bankrupt, both morally and ethically, this Myanmar military junta is,” he said. “It’s a clarion call for the U.N. Security Council to finally act … to stop the military junta from these kinds of atrocities against their own people.” The concert area following an airstrike targeting a Kachin gathering by the Myanmar junta in Hpakant township, northern Kachin state, Myanmar, Oct. 24, 2022. Credit: Citizen journalist Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government suggested that the military had violated the Geneva Conventions with the latest attack on civilians and…
Interview: ‘History is something you want to be on the right side of’
Since its founding in 1986, the Elie Wiesel Foundation for Humanity has striven “to combat indifference, intolerance and injustice through international dialogue and youth-focused programs that promote acceptance, understanding and equality.” In late January, the human rights organization ran a full-page advertisement in The New York Times calling for a boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing unless China ended its persecution of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Now, the foundation has added grantmaking to its lineup of activities, focusing on funding advocacy for the Uyghurs. The foundation expects to award about U.S. $250,000-$500,000 early next year to two groups, each representing one of its focuses, as determined by relevant advisory committees, according to the Jewish Insider. The funding is significant in that it is coming from ab influential Jewish organization at a time when majority-Muslim countries joined China in voting down a measure for the members of the U.N. Human Rights Council to conduct debate on a U.N. report that China’s atrocities against Uyghurs may “constitute crimes against humanity.” Adile Ablet of RFA Uyghur recently spoke with Elisha Wiesel, the foundation’s chairman of the board and son of late Holocaust survivor and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Elie Wiesel, about the grantmaking activities and what the foundation hopes to accomplish with its focus on the Uyghurs. The following interview has been edited for length and clarity. RFA: The Jewish Insider reports that the Elie Wiesel Foundation is considering supporting the Uyghur cause now that the organization is becoming a grantmaker. Why? Wiesel: One of the things we’re doing with the Elie Wiesel Foundation today is we’re pivoting from running direct programs, which is what the foundation used to do. It used to host conferences. It used to be [active] particularly in Israel, with Ethiopian Jews who had arrived. We decided we could have a bigger reach and have more partner organizations that we could help supply funding to. We can also supply some of our time and our thoughts. We can help use my father’s name to achieve good in the world. We thought a lot about this path that we’re embarking on [in terms of] the hats my father wore during his lifetime. He was so many things to so many people. My father was a teacher, a philosopher, a refugee, a student. And we said, maybe what we can do is for every different type of role that my father played, we can eventually open up a line of grantmaking and partnership. When we thought about where to start, my view and the board’s view were that the two most important roles father played were that of an activist and a teacher, so these are the two lanes that the foundation is starting with. Once we decided what that activism would be, the question then became which cause do we want to attach ourselves to in the beginning as we as we start this? For me, there’s really no cause that is as compelling as the Uyghur cause, which has a lot of properties that fit the way my father approached the world. Look at the size and the scope of the atrocities that are occurring [to] the Uyghur people — the mass imprisonment of a million Muslims, family separations, the concept of going to jail just because of who you are rather than something that you did. These are terrible human rights violations, and they are being perpetrated by a major actor on the world stage. One of the things to know about my father is that he was not afraid of speaking truth to power. It’s very hard to imagine getting the Chinese government to change course and doing something more humane, but it’s not impossible. We were inspired as we looked at the Soviet Union which was treating Soviet Jews in a certain way, but many people thought you never were going to be able to change it; the best you can hope for is that you can help a few people by reaching out to people in power, but to try to achieve something on a massive scale just wouldn’t happen. My father disagreed. He disagreed with many important people, and he worked with students in this country to build a movement from the ground up. There were many great leaders there who ultimately had great impact with the Soviet Union. That’s why I think the Elie Wiesel Foundation is inspired by big projects that seem impossible — ones that seem really difficult, but ones that we feel are very important. RFA: What do you expect to achieve with the organizations that the foundation works with? Wiesel: The goal is ultimately to have an impact, but how you measure impact is very difficult. Is anything that we fund in this first year and our activist players’ focus on the Uyghurs going to change the world and move it upside down in one year? I think we’re more humble than that. One of the things that my father said about the Holocaust was that it was important for the people who were suffering to feel heard and know that people cared, even if the world couldn’t do anything about it. One of the things that hurt the most was that there was a sense that the world didn’t care. If we can do anything to raise the stature of the story, and if we can find a partner organization to work with that, it would make the Uyghurs’ suffering more a part of our daily consciousness so that the Uyghurs feel heard. Then they would say, “OK, maybe the world isn’t fixing everything right away for us, but at least we haven’t been forgotten. At least, we know that somebody is thinking about us.” Even that for us would be a very significant accomplishment. Our approach is a humble approach. [Part of] the way that we think about it is that we don’t know what the right answer is. We don’t know what the…
China’s Xi Jinping gets third term, packs ruling committee with loyal ‘minions’
China’s ruling Communist Party leader Xi Jinping began a third five-year term in office on Sunday, packing the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee with his close political allies, in a consolidation of personal power not seen in Beijing since the personality cult surrounding Mao Zedong. The first plenary session of the party’s 20th Central Committee re-elected Xi to the post of general secretary, breaking with decades of political precedent by granting him a third term after his predecessors were limited to two. Former Shanghai party chief Li Qiang has succeeded outgoing economic reformer Li Keqiang as Xi’s second-in-command and therefore most likely candidate for premier, while Xi stalwarts Zhao Leji and Wang Huning remain in the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee. They have been joined by newly promoted former Beijing party chief Cai Qi, former party general office director Ding Xuexiang and former Guangdong party chief Li Xi, all of whom were formerly members of the Politburo. New members of the Politburo Standing Committee, front to back, President Xi Jinping, Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, and Li Xi arrive at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Sunday, Oct. 23, 2022. (AP Photo/Ng Han Guan) Xi also revealed an all-male politburo for the first time since 1997, following the retirement of former vice premier Sun Chunlan. No woman has ever sat on the Politburo Standing Committee. All but Li Xi have previously worked under Xi as he made his way up through party ranks, either in Zhejiang or Shanghai, and were promoted after that point, indicating that it was his favor that propelled their careers. The party congress also amended the Communist Party’s constitution to enshrine Xi and his personal brand of political ideology as a “core” leader, giving Xi free rein to take China in whichever direction he chooses, analysts told RFA. No obvious successor Former 1989 student protest leader Wang Dan said there is nobody with enough of their own political capital to serve as an obvious successor to Xi. “It’s obvious looking at the line-up that Xi will also want a fourth term,” Wang told Radio Free Asia. “He has made no arrangement whatsoever for a successor.” “There won’t even be a fourth term: he’s going to do this until he dies,” he said. Xi himself was clearly identified as a successor to president Hu Jintao, under whom he served as vice president for five years before taking the reins of the party at the 18th congress in 2012. Xi’s third term as president will likely be confirmed at the National People’s Congress annual session in March 2023. A screen shows live news coverage of China’s President Xi Jinping speaking after introducing China’s new Politburo Standing Committee, at a restaurant in Foshan city, in China’s southern Guangdong province on October 23, 2022. (Photo by JADE GAO / AFP) Chinese political commentator Chen Daoyin said Li Qiang forms the cornerstone of Xi’s power in the new leadership line-up. “It could be said that Xi Jinping has absolute trust in him, and that Li Qiang is absolutely loyal to Xi Jinping,” Chen told RFA. “This absolute loyalty manifests itself in his absolute implementation of Xi’s political line.” “Li Qiang has been widely criticized internationally for the damage he caused with the Shanghai lockdown, but his unwavering implementation of Xi’s zero-COVID policy reflects his loyalty,” he said. Protests at home and abroad Xi’s smooth transition to an unprecedented third term in office has been marked by rare public protest, including against his zero-COVID policy, both at home and overseas. On the eve of the congress, a lone protester dubbed “Bridge Man” unfurled a banner with anti-Xi slogans on a highway overpass before quickly getting carried off by police. Chinese authorities were quick to shut down social media accounts circulating images of the banner, but photos and videos of the incident got wide attention among Chinese living overseas. In London, more than 1,000 protesters braved torrential downpours to march to the Chinese Embassy on Sunday, using the slogan “Not my president!” and showing placards with Xi crowned as emperor, to protest the beating of fellow activist Bob Chan by Chinese consular staff in Manchester on Oct. 16. One protester carried a sign on their back and head that read “To CCP: Don’t pull my hair,” protesting the involvement in the melee of Chinese Consul General Zheng Xiyuan, who said he thought it was his duty to pull Chan’s hair, as he had “insulted my leader” with a cartoon poster of Xi Jinping. A protester in London wears a devil mask of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s face in this Oct. 23, 2022, photo. (Credit: RFA London Correspondent Amelia Loi) A protester who gave only the surname Auyeung, who was wearing a satirical devil mask of Xi Jinping’s face, said he was there out of anger over the Oct. 16 attack. He said the protests, as well as the summary removal of a reluctant Hu Jintao from the rostrum at the CCP 20th party congress in Beijing on Saturday, had showed the world that Xi still faces “huge opposition.” Similar protests took place in a number of other British cities on Sunday. “Digital totalitarianism” But analysts said the new line-up means Xi is highly likely to continue with the highly authoritarian style of government already developed during his past 10 years at the helm. “This is digital totalitarianism with Chinese characteristics,” Chen Daoyin said. “He will have far greater enforcement powers than during the Mao era … [and can] achieve a state of total and absolute control and security.” “[China’s more aggressive] ‘wolf warrior’ foreign policy is unlikely to change,” he said. Feng Chongyi, an associate professor at the University of Technology in Sydney, agreed. “Cai Qi, Li Qiang, Ding Xuexiang and Wang Huning are all basically his stenographers,” Feng said. “They have no ability or experience when it comes to running the country.” “Their main selling point is that they execute Xi’s orders at all costs,” Feng said,…
Outside of China, concern exceeds optimism as Xi Jinping begins third term as ruler
The Chinese Communist Party wrapped up its 20th National Congress at the weekend, granting an unprecedented third five-year term to CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping. Xi, 69, is set to have his term as state president renewed by the rubber-stamp National People’s Congress in March. RFA asked experts on key aspects of China for their impressions of the congress and expectations of Chinese policies as Xi enters his third term after already a decade at the helm of the world’s most populous nation. China-U.S. relations and foreign policy Oriana Skylar Mastro, Center fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University and author of The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime: The bottom line is, the next five years is undoubtedly going to be more rocky for U.S.-China relations and for other countries with security concerns in the region. The issue is not that Xi Jinping really has nailed down the third term. It wasn’t the case that his position was so precarious that he couldn’t be aggressive before. However, it was unlikely that he was going to take moves to start some sort of conflagration that would extend into the party Congress. So the party Congress did serve as a restraint in so far as it was useful to wait until afterwards to take any more aggressive actions against Taiwan, for example. But the reason it didn’t happen previously is largely based on China’s military capabilities. Xi Jinping has been relatively clear since he took power in 2013, where his goals were in terms of promoting territorial integrity, is trying to define that and resolving a lot of these territorial issues, enhancing their position in Asia to regain their standing as a great power. The rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and a dominant position in Asia of which it had previously been decided not only by Xi, but by strategists, analysts and pundits ever since. [Former President Barack] Obama mentioned in his State of the Union that he wouldn’t accept the United States as number two. It had already been decided that there was going to be conflict with the United States if China wanted to be number one in Asia. And so Xi Jinping has been on a trajectory, China has been on a trajectory that’s been relatively consistent, that includes an improvement in military capabilities and thus a heavier reliance on those capabilities to achieve their goals over time. So with the frequency and intensity of competition and conflict, the general trend is that it increases over time. Denny Roy, Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Hawaii and author of Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security: At least two messages from the CCP’s 20th Party Congress bode ill for China-U.S. relations. The first is that a shift in the international balance of power creates an opportunity for China to push for increased global influence and standing. This is a continuation of a reassessment reached late in the Hu Jintao era, and which Xi Jinping has both embraced and acted upon. There is no hint of regret about Chinese policies that caused alarm and increased security cooperation among several countries both inside and outside the region, no recognition that Chinese hubris has damaged China’s international reputation within the economically developed world, and no sense that damage control is necessary due to adverse international reaction to what has happened in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Instead, Beijing seems primed to continue to oppose important aspects of international law, to resist the U.S.-sponsored liberal order, and to extoll PRC-style fascism as superior to democracy. This orientation portends continued if not increasing friction with the United States on multiple fronts, both strategic and ideological. Secondly, while the Congress expressed optimism about China’s present course, it evinced increased pessimism about China’s external environment, especially what Chinese leaders call growing hostility from the United States. Not long ago, PRC leaders perceived a “period of strategic opportunity” within which China could grow with minimal foreign opposition. Increasingly, however, PRC elites seem to believe that alleged U.S. “containment” of China will intensify now that the power gap between the two countries has narrowed and China has become a serious threat to U.S. “hegemony.” PRC efforts to undercut U.S. strategic influence, especially in China’s near abroad, will continue. Beijing will try to draw South Korea out of the U.S. orbit, and may wish to do the same with Japan and Australia, although in those cases it may be too late. Beijing will continue to try to establish a Chinese sphere of influence in the East and South China Seas, while laying the groundwork for possible new spheres of influence in the Pacific Islands, Africa and Central Asia. Human rights William Nee, Research and Advocacy Coordinator at China Human Rights Defenders: To some extent, the 20th Party Congress will not see any dramatic break from what is happening thus far–and that’s exactly the problem. China is experiencing a human rights crisis: human rights defenders are systematically surveilled, persecuted, and tortured in prison. There are crimes against humanity underway in the Uyghur region, with millions of people being subjected to arbitrary detention, forced labor, or intrusive surveillance. The cultural rights of Tibetans are not respected. And now, Xi Jinping’s ‘Zero-COVID’ policy is wreaking havoc on China’s economy, and particularly the wellbeing of disadvantaged groups, like migrant workers and the elderly. But there have been no signs whatsoever that the Communist Party is ready to course correct. Instead, after the 20th Party Congress, we will see a new batch of promotions, with these Communist Party cadres more indebted to Xi Jinping’s patronage for their positions of power. In other words, Xi Jinping will have created an incentive structure in which these sycophantic ‘yes men’ will only repeat the ‘thoughts’ of the idiosyncratic leader to prove their loyalty. This makes it even more unlikely that Xi or the Communist Party will even see the necessity…
