Myanmar Civil Disobedience Movement ‘losing steam’ amid junta crackdowns

Myanmar’s Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), a popular strike movement that at its peak brought the administrative machinery of the military regime to a halt, has lost more than one-third of its active members amid a crackdown by the junta, organizers and the country’s shadow government said Tuesday. Formed by doctors in Mandalay a day after the Feb. 1, 2021, coup, the CDM once boasted more than 360,000 members who chose to walk away from their state jobs and take part in peaceful anti-junta protests or other opposition activities in a bid to pry loose the regime’s grasp on power. The CDM captivated the international community for its effectiveness in the face of the junta’s violent repression and was even nominated for the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize. But Kyaw Zaw, a spokesman for the shadow National Unity Government’s (NUG) President’s Office, told RFA’s Myanmar Service that the number of active members in the CDM has dwindled significantly since the junta began to target them with a campaign of threats, arrest, and other forms of harassment. “CDM members have been arrested. They have endured many kinds of threats, and even torture in some cases. Furthermore, when CDM staff evade arrest, authorities detain their family members,” he said. “Many CDM members felt insecure to a point that they had to leave the movement.” Kyaw Zaw said the NUG estimates there are currently around 200,000 state employees still in the CDM, although “we don’t know exactly how many have left the movement.” The shadow government’s assessment suggests that the CDM has lost more than 150,000, or slightly more than 40%, of its peak membership. CDM sources told RFA that the junta also tries to lure CDM members away from the movement by making them offers that include reinstatement to their former jobs and guarantees that they will not be sent to prison. But they said those who refuse are often arrested on what they called “bogus charges” or can have difficulty earning a living due to policies such as a ban on hiring CDMs in the private sector. Hein Thiha, a senior CDM teacher from Magway region, said some of his colleagues had left the movement after receiving threats. “Your ability to participate can be different based on whether you are based in an area with a strong CDM or a weak CDM,” he said. “Where the CDM is strong, it is easier to operate. But it’s very difficult where the CDM is weak. Some people have reluctantly withdrawn from the CDM because of these pressures.” Hein Thiha said that, like many CDM employees, he has been struggling to make ends meet as a farmer since February 2021 with no source of regular income. Sit Min Naing, a CDM doctor, told RFA that public support for the movement appears to have shifted to the armed opposition since the NUG declared war on the junta in September and ordered allied prodemocracy People’s Defense Force (PDF) paramilitary groups around the country to attack military targets. “This support grew stronger and stronger, and now they seem to have forgotten about the CDMs,” he said. In its first annual report issued on April 16, the NUG said it had provided 229 million kyats (U.S. $190,000) in financial support to CDM staff. But NUG officials said at a press conference accompanying the release of the report that they had shifted the focus of their financial support to military expenditures and acknowledged that doing so had likely led to a decline in the number of CDM members. A Civil Disobedience Movement protest by education workers in Yangon, Feb. 19, 2021. Credit: RFA Former security forces joining movement One of the few civil servant groups to grow the ranks of the CDM in recent months is that of the country’s security forces, according to the People’s Embrace — a faction within the movement that is made up of former junta soldiers. CDM Capt. Lin Htet Aung told RFA that former members of the security forces who have joined the movement now number around 10,000, which he said is partly because they no longer want to be complicit in the junta’s killing of civilians. “We realize we are fighting against the population. We are killing people and they hate us. We don’t have the support of the people anymore,” he said. “We realize we are working to benefit the personal interests of the military leaders and not in the national interest. … This has led to a steady increase in deserters.” Lin Htet Aung said more people would leave the military and the police force if their security could be guaranteed. Meanwhile, relatives of members of the security forces told RFA that the junta has tightened restrictions inside the military and police force in a bid to dissuade potential deserters, including by restricting their access to friends and family. Junta deputy information minister, Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, dismissed claims that authorities have been targeting CDM staff. “In some cases, there have been terminations … but these actions were taken according to existing staff regulations,” he said. “However, in cases where [CDM staff] are found to have incited people during protests, they will be punished according to the law.” According to Thailand’s Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, there are around 100 CDM staffers serving prison sentences in Myanmar and at least 886 in detention. Myanmar-based political analyst Sai Kyi Zin Soe told RFA that the CDM will continue to lose members if they cannot be guaranteed personal and financial security. “After more than a year, we can say the CDM is losing steam,” he said. “This is because many employees in the CDM already must risk their lives for the movement. Things become untenable if they are also unable to earn enough to live.” Translated by Khin Maung Nyane. Written in English by Joshua Lipes.

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Hanoi’s heavy hand

Vietnam, a one-party communist state with low tolerance for public criticism or dissent that has jailed scores of journalists and bloggers, is moving to tighten content rules for social media. Amended laws will require platforms like Facebook and TikTok to remove content and services deemed illegal within 24 hours, block illegal livestreams within three hours of notice, and immediately remove content that endangers national security–or risk being banned in the country of 98 million people.

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A decade after activist’s death, rights groups in Cambodia press for answers

Cambodian environmentalists called for authorities to reinvestigate the 2012 murder of a forestry activist, who was slain while campaigning against illegal logging, a problem that has gotten worse in the decade since his killing.  Chut Wutty was shot to death on April 26, 2012 while investigating illegal logging in southern Cambodia’s Koh Kong province. He had been active in organizing communities to protect Cambodian forests against developers and campaigned against the government’s granting of land concessions in national parks and wildlife sanctuaries. A letter by the Khmer Student Intelligent League Association, signed by 28 separate civic society organizations, called on Justice, Interior and Defense Ministry officials and Koh Kong provincial authorities to “undertake a credible and thorough investigation to hold all those responsible for his murder to account.” An official investigation into Chut Wutty’s death was closed in October 2013 when a court in Koh Kong province abruptly ended its proceedings.  Student league President Keut Saray said he has little expectation that the authorities will bring any suspects in Chut Wutty’s murder to trial. “It is sad that we don’t hope to get justice, but as a nation for a person who sacrificed his life, the ministry shouldn’t ignore it,” he told RFA’s Khmer Service. “We will follow up with the investigation. Not for just a few weeks; we will follow up as long as we live. Today is more about having a chance to remember the hero who protected our forests. We need to lead and sacrifice to protect the forest,” he said. In another event that commemorated Chut Wutty, hosted by the Khmer Thavrak youth group, 10 young people adorned in white ribbons decorated their motorbikes with leaves. They attempted to ride to the Ministry of Environment and Justice, but authorities stopped them and confiscated their bikes. Chut Wutty’s son Cheuy Oudom Reaksmey, who is in Lowell, Massachusetts, for a ceremony to commemorate his father scheduled for May 1, told RFA that the authorities are trying to stop activists from commemorating Chut Wutty anniversary, including by showing a documentary about him. “We are implementing undemocratic laws. People are not allowed to walk in Phnom Penh anymore,” he said. Cheuy Oudom Reaksmey noted that Hun Sen once claimed he would behead himself if he failed to stop illegal logging. But preventing activists from holding public commemorations for the forestry activist raises questions about the prime minister’s commitment to protecting Cambodia’s forests, Cheuy Oudom Reaksmey said. “Why can’t we commemorate the hero who has already been murdered?” he asked. “We will continue to try to show the world to know that there has been no justice, even 10 years since his murder.” Cheuy Oudom Reaksmey urged the government to allow the forestry activists to patrol the country’s protected forests, an activity that is currently prohibited. Illegal logging will continue until there is a change in policy, and his father’s case will linger until there is a new government to investigate. “Justice can’t be rendered. I don’t have confidence in the court, which is not independent,” he said. Neither Phay Siphan, a spokesman for Hun Sen’s government, and Chhin Malin, a spokesman for the Ministry of Justice, could be reached for comment on April 26. Phay Siphan recently told RFA that the court already closed Chut Wutty’s case, but it might reopen the investigation if the family and NGOs submit more evidence. Illegal logging in protected areas of Cambodia is a major source of social instability and helps drive rapid deforestation, which is a problem across the entire Southeast Asian region. Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar and Thailand declined to sign a global pact at the COP26 summit in Glasgow in November to end and reverse forest loss by 2030, even while the region — home to around 15% of the world’s tropical forests — is among its major deforestation hotspots. Cambodia has lost 26% of its tree cover, equivalent to about 5.7 million acres, since 2000 according to satellite imagery. Translated by Samean Yun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.

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Beijing’s zero-COVID policy snags Lao exports to China via new railway

Costly and time-consuming customs-clearing procedures put in place as part of China’s zero-COVID-19 restrictions are making it difficult for Lao traders to export products via the new Laos-China Railway, Lao officials and people involved in cross-border trade said. Lao authorities have been negotiating with their Chinese counterparts and officials with the rail company for months in an effort to send more Lao goods by train to China, but to little avail, said a Lao transportation official, who declined to be named so he could speak freely to the media. The U.S. $6 billion high-speed railway has been in operation for four months. Chinese goods and produce are shipped to Laos daily, while Lao goods are rarely transported to China, and fresh produce is not carried at all. The Chinese government’s ongoing enforcement of its zero-COVID policy for containing the highly contagious virus through intensive testing and tracing and lockdowns has meant that all imported goods must be fully checked and limits on the kinds of fruits and vegetables that are allowed in, the Lao official said. “The Chinese government does not allow sending fresh products and is still enforcing zero-COVID-19 procedures,” he said. Another complicating factor is that the train is not ready to carry fresh agricultural products, though it is transporting Chinese machinery, electrical equipment and housewares from China to Laos, the official told RFA on Monday. “Most Lao produce, including bananas and watermelons, haven’t been transported by train to China yet because these agricultural products are perishable, and the train containers are too hot for them,” the official said. Only some dried agricultural products from Laos, such as rubber, cassava and soil from Laos, can be exported by land to China via the railway, he said. A manager of the Vientiane office of a Chinese company that offers shipping services to businesses via the new railway told RFA that the COVID restrictions in China take too much money and time to process for most shippers. “They are very strict about the shipping of fresh products, fruit and produce,” he said. “The import and export of goods and tax document declaration is pretty hard as strict measures to cope COVID-19 are still imposed.” RFA could not reach the Chinese Embassy in Vientiane for comment. But state-run China Radio International reported on April 12 that China continued to enforce the zero-COVID policy to prevent all means of the virus from entering the country, including through the import of produce. A freight train from China traveling along the Laos-China Railway stops at Vang Vieng station in Vientiane province, Laos, Dec. 4, 2021. Credit: RFA Rotten fruit A businesswoman in southern Laos who exports white charcoal to China, South Korea and Japan said she’d like to use the railway but the Chinese have made the process too difficult. As of now, she sends goods to her customers in other countries via ships that leave from a Vietnamese port. A truck driver in northern Laos, who provides shipping services to China, said it was still more convenient and faster to ship produce to China via truck, even though that process has also slowed. “Sending fruits via Laos-China railway is not easy or fast,” he said. “The process takes very long, and the fruits can go rotten if it is not sent to China on time.” It used to take truck drivers two to three days to reach China by road, but COVID-19 protocols at the border have led to huge traffic jams and added as much as three days to the journey, he said. “When we reach Laos-China border, there will be trucks from China to take fruits or produce from our trucks … because we cannot drive to the cities in China,” the driver said. “These days, it is very hard to drive to China, and the COVID-19 control is very strict, and I do not understand why,” he said. “There will be officials in white plastic suits who will drive the trucks of fruit and produce from us into mainland China.” Phithoun Sri-inngarm, director of Nongkhai province’s customs office, told RFA that the Laos-China Railway transports goods from China to Laos and Thailand, but not vice versa. “In the past four months, transporting goods from Thailand to China through Laos is still very little when compared to goods shipped from China to Thailand through Laos,” he said. “The main reason is the difficult process on the Chinese side.” On March 27, the first shipment of Thai fruit — 40 tons of durians in two containers and 20 tons of coconuts in one container — was transported from Rayong province, Thailand, via the Laos-China Railway to Chongqing municipality, according to a Thai media report that cited Somkiat Mansiripibul, the manager of Kaocharoen Train Transport Co., Ltd. In January, the first shipment of 1,000 tonnes of Thai rice was delivered to China via the Laos-China railway, Thai media reported. As of March 3, the Laos-China Railway had carried more than 1.7 million passengers — 1.6 million of whom travelled on the section of railway in China — and 1.1 million tons of goods, according to the Lao News Agency. Officials have expected the railway to cut the cost of transport through Laos by 30%-40% compared to travel by road, giving a boost to trade and investment in the impoverished, landlocked country. The railway has operated 350 international train journeys carrying over 250,000 tons of freight since the start of 2022, Lao News Agency reported. Translated by RFA’s Lao Service. Written in English by Roseanne Gerin.

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US vows to respond to any Chinese military base in Solomons

The United States voiced concerns Tuesday over a “complete lack of transparency” surrounding a new security deal between the Solomon Islands and China and vowed to respond to any attempt to establish a Chinese military base in the island nation. A draft copy of the security pact leaked onto social media in late March but neither party has made public the deal, reportedly signed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his Solomon Islands counterpart Jeremiah Manele. The deal has drawn expressions of deep concern from U.S. allies Australia and New Zealand that it could enable China to extend its military reach in the Pacific. It also prompted a hasty visit to the Pacific by two top U.S. diplomats. U.S. National Security Council Indo-Pacific Coordinator Kurt Campbell and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink led a U.S. delegation to Honiara late last week where they held a 90-minute “constructive and candid meeting” with Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare. Kritenbrink told journalists at a teleconference on Tuesday that the lack of transparency of the security agreement was “our fundamental concern.” “I think it’s clear that only a handful of people in a very small circle have seen this agreement, and the prime minister himself has been quoted publicly as saying he would only share the details with China’s permission, which I think is a source of concern as well,” the U.S senior diplomat said. “Of course we have respect for the Solomon Islands’ sovereignty, but we also wanted to let them know that if steps were taken to establish a de facto permanent military presence, power-projection capabilities, or a military installation, then we would have significant concerns and we would very naturally respond to those concerns,” Kritenbrink said. A file photo showing Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, Solomon Islands Foreign Minister Jeremiah Manele, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi at a signing ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China Oct. 9, 2019. Credit: Reuters. ‘Red line’ The assistant secretary of state declined to elaborate on possible responses to security implications caused by the new agreement but said that Prime Minister Sogavare gave the U.S. three specific assurances that “there would be no military base, no long-term presence, no power-projection capability.” In Washington, during a Tuesday hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Republican Sen. Mitt Romney called the agreement “alarming.”  In response, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said he shared the senator’s concern. He reiterated the assurances the U.S. delegation had gotten from Sogavare, adding: “We will be watching that very, very closely in the weeks and months ahead.” Sogavare’s words have done little to calm Solomon Islands’ neighbors. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison said that a military base would be a “red line” for Canberra. The Solomons occupies a remote but strategic location in the western Pacific, about 1,700 kilometers (1,050 miles) from the northeastern coast of Australia. Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), said: “I think now that the security agreement has been officially signed, there is little the U.S. or Australia can do to reverse it. The key question now is how fast will China move to establish a permanent presence, leading to a base, in the Solomon Islands.” “Australia and the U.S. can try to use diplomacy to convince the Sogavare government to not allow this base to be established quickly, or to constrain its size and function, but there is little chance that these efforts will succeed, as it’s clear that Sogavare has aligned with China,” Davis said. “They can also try to contain Chinese influence in the region further by ‘stepping up’ the ‘Pacific Step Up’ and making it more effective,” he said, referring to the Biden administration’s push to increase U.S. engagement in the region. He added: “This has greater chance of success given the regional concern about the agreement signed between Solomon Islands and China.” Norah Huang, associate research fellow at Prospect Foundation, a Taiwanese think tank, described the deal as “opportunism” by the Solomons prime minister. She said the best response might be “candid talks with the governing parties in private to walk it back or at least neutralize the deal.” “But Australia, the U.S. and New Zealand should be careful not to reward those who play opportunism,” Huang said. A file photo showing Australian Navy officers from the HMAS Canberra arriving at the Tanjung Priok port, as part of the military exercise Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2021, in Jakarta, Indonesia, Oct. 25, 2021. Credit: Reuters. Regional efforts Japan became the latest regional power to send a representative to the Solomon Islands to express concern over the security pact. According to Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi, the Solomons prime minister repeated assurances to Japanese officials on Tuesday that he had no intention of allowing China to build military bases in his country, Reuters reported. Davis at ASPI said the China-Solomons deal could presage a move by Beijing to extend its reach in the South Pacific. “I think the greatest risk is that China would choose to extend its influence into Papua New Guinea, where it already has substantial investment, and is openly talking about a ‘fishing facility’ at Daru Island, which could ultimately be the basis for a port that could support Chinese Coast Guard vessels,” he said. “The U.S. and Australia, as well as New Zealand, will now need to adjust their defense policies with the prospect of a forward Chinese military presence in the Southwest Pacific that certainly dramatically increases the military threat to the Australian eastern seaboard, but also severs the sea lane of communication between Australia and the United States,” the defense analyst said. ‘Too little, too late’ There have been calls in Australia’s political and defense circles to “prepare for war,” and Davis said there should be some review of Australian defense force posture, and greater investment into air, sea, and space capabilities across…

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China’s smaller cities also under lockdown as COVID-19 prevention drive hits Beijing

As a grueling lockdown in Shanghai continues to make world headlines, as many as 30 million people have been under similar measures for weeks under the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s zero-COVID policy elsewhere in China. A recent video posted by the Yitiao short video content producer featured interviews with residents of the southwestern border town of Ruili, which has been locked down on and off for weeks, prompting an estimated 200,000 people to leave town. The city is an important trading center for the China-Myanmar border, but has been locked down nine times, making a total of 160 days, since the pandemic began, in line with the official narrative that the biggest threat of COVID-19 transmission comes from outside China. As people flocked to stores and supermarkets fearing an imminent lockdown in Beijing, parts of which are already under lockdown or similar restrictions, residents of port and border cities have been living under some degree of restriction for months, they told RFA. A Ruili hotel employee surnamed Yang confirmed the report. “It’s true that the economy here is no good,” Yang said. “The city is often locked down because of the pandemic, and most of the traders have gone to other nearby cities like Longchuan, Pingjiang and Tengchong.” Yang said he would like to leave too, but is currently on a seven-day mandatory quarantine at home, and will need a negative PCR test before he can leave. A second Ruili resident said the border with Myanmar remains closed, with low occupancy rates in hotels. Asked about locals, the resident replied simply: “Everyone’s gone.” In the northeastern province of Heilongjiang, the border trading town of Suifenhe, on the Binsui railway close to the Russian border, is also locked down, a resident told RFA. According to Yitiao, Suifenhe was placed under lockdown in April 2020 after some cases were found to have been imported from Russia, and has been under lockdown since Jan. 25, 2022, with all delivery services, pharmacies and hospital clinics closed for business. A staff member sprays disinfectant at a cinema as the city starts to reopen after a Covid-19 coronavirus outbreak in Shenyang, in China’s northeastern Liaoning province, April 25, 2022. Credit: AFP Dozens of cities An employee who answered the phone at a restaurant in the town confirmed the report. “We’re closed. We’re not doing business. Since about March or April,” the employee said, adding that he expected the lockdown to lift soon, and businesses to open again. Residents of Dongxing in the southwestern region of Guangxi on the border with Vietnam have also reportedly been under similar restrictions since Feb. 23, 2022, which were only lifted on April 23. Media reports show dozens of smaller towns and cities are currently under partial or total lockdown due to rising COVID-19 cases, including Baotou in Inner Mongolia, Hangzhou, home to the headquarters of Alibaba, and Tangshan in the northern province of Hebei. A Caixin media report also listed Changchun, Handan, Quanzhou and many cities in Jilin, Shanxi, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu and Shaanxi as locked down, with more than 30 million people affected. U.S.-based current affairs commentator Tang Jingyuan said hard and soft lockdowns are being used interchangeably by local governments. “The boundary between the CCP’s notion of locked-down and semi-locked down cities, or between hard and soft city closures, is getting more and more blurred,” Tang said. Most seem to share a few features in common, however: residents are required to stay home unless they need medical treatment or are getting tested in one of the compulsory mass-testing operations. Schools are closed, businesses shut down, and roadblocks are put in place to minimize non-essential traffic on the roads. While Shanghai’s lockdown has been a major focus for Chinese state media and social media, much less is being written on any platform about the smaller cities. Block-and-delete operations Meanwhile, those in other cities are finding it harder and harder to read or watch content coming out of Shanghai, as government censors step up their block-and-delete operations. A directive issued by the CCP’s powerful propaganda department to media editors dated April 22 orders editors and censors to remove any reference to a hard-hitting short video featuring an audio montage of the voices of people during the Shanghai lockdown. “Will all channels please completely remove any copies of “April Voices” or screenshots from it, as well as any images deriving from it,” the directive, posted to the China Digital Times website and attributed to the Beijing Cyberspace Administration, said. A similar message was also attributed by CDT, which curates leaked propaganda directives under its Ministry of Truth section, to the Guangdong Cyberspace Administration. According to Tang Jingyuan said there has been little online complaint or protest regarding lockdowns outside Shanghai, which is home to a highly privileged and well-connected population. “Firstly, smaller and medium-sized cities don’t get much public attention anyway, and secondly, local governments may wield stronger control over content like that, so it’s hard for discontent to spread.” He said the factional battle lines within CCP ranks have found public expression in Shanghai. “There is both a public and a hidden struggle going on between their two models,” Tang said. “These very strong political factors have led to a high degree of non-cooperation throughout Shanghai, even publicly, which is pretty rare.” Authorities in Beijing reported 70 new cases of symptomatic COVID-19 during the past four days, and announced they would expand mass PCR testing across most of the city. Supermarkets were scrambling to restock after Monday‘s panic-buying, but residents said basic foodstuffs were still in short supply. In Shanghai, authorities continued to send residents who tested negative outside of the city, mostly to Hangzhou, sparking fear among local people. And media reports said Meng Qinggong, the deputy chief designer of China’s homegrown CR929 aircraft, died of a heart attack at his home on Sunday after attempts to save him were unsuccessful. Meng died after a long wait for an ambulance, which was hampered by current lockdown restrictions and couldn’t reach him in time, the reports said….

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Nearly 40 Buddhist clergy killed and 40 jailed since Myanmar coup

Nearly 40 Buddhist clergy have been killed, and 40 others jailed, since Myanmar’s military took control of the country in a coup last year, according to data compiled by RFA’s Myanmar Service.   The 38 monks and one nun were killed between Feb. 1, 2021 — the day the military seized power — and mid-April 2022, RFA found through analysis of junta press releases, local media reports and interviews with sources.   A recent statement by the junta claimed that 33 monks were killed, and seven others injured, in a single April 3 attack by prodemocracy People’s Defense Force (PDF) paramilitaries, a group the military regime has accused of terrorism. RFA was unable to independently verify the claims made by the junta.   RFA’s own records, based on sources and local media reports, show that at least five monks were arrested and killed by junta authorities for alleged links to PDF groups, while another 38 monks are being held in various prisons throughout the country.   Residents and Buddhist leaders from Mandalay region’s Madaya township told RFA that on April 3 a PDF unit killed a monk from the township’s Kin village for allegedly working as an informer for the military. In retaliation, they said, the military arrested the head of the area monastic school Pinnya Wuntha, who later died in detention after being interrogated by troops.   Than Lone, a member of the PDF in neighboring Mingin township, told RFA that with the exception of those with ties to groups such as the pro-junta Pyu Saw Htee militia, the PDF had never killed a Buddhist clergy member.   “We can boldly say that no PDF units have killed any civilians … as long as they were not Dalans (informers),” he said.   “No comrade would have done that kind of killing. We are all connected. We might get rid of Dalans or Pyu Saw Htee members, but no one else.”   Than Lone said that the PDFs were formed “to protect the public” from the military and said they “would never do anything that would upset the people.”   Another report on the alleged killing of a monk by the military was relayed to RFA on Sunday by residents of Thabyethar village in Sagaing region’s Wuntho township, who said troops shot and killed the village abbot after he tried to stop them from setting fire to area homes.   When asked by RFA about reports of the killing and arrests of Buddhist clergy, junta deputy information minister, Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, said that military has only arrested monks in rare circumstances.   “When it comes to arrests, the government rarely does that to monks,” he said. “In some places, so-called PDF terrorist fighters are operating under the guise of being monks. When we find out who they really are, we must take legal action.”   Zaw Min Tun did not comment on reports of the military killing monks.   Ma Ba Tha monks   Last month, a video went viral on social media in Myanmar purportedly showing monks with the hardline Ma Ba Tha group on a “tour” of several pro-junta villages in Sagaing in support of forming Pyu Saw Htee units. The video appears to show the monks helping to train people and delivering Buddhist sermons.   In one clip, Ma Ba Tha leaders known as “sayadaws” appear to be holding guns in their hands and telling residents that the PDFs are killing people and setting fire to villages.   Sources told RFA that the footage was filmed on Feb. 27 at the Yadanar Kan Myint Htei Monastery during a Pyu Saw Htee training camp graduation ceremony in Taze township’s Kabe village. They confirmed that pro-junta monks have been “carrying guns” and “taking part in some of the fighting” in the region.   A woman in Monywa region, speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, blamed the deaths of the 38 clergy and many other civilians on the country’s leading monks, who she said had failed to intervene and stop the military’s crackdown on opponents to its rule.   “I’m heartbroken that [they] didn’t stop the junta from committing violence and killings,” she said.   According to the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, authorities have killed at least 1,782 civilians and arrested nearly 10,300 others since the Feb. 1, 2021, coup, mostly during peaceful anti-junta protests.   Attempts by RFA to contact the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Group, a Yangon-based Buddhist monastic order, for comment on the reported killings went unanswered Monday.   Ashin Rajadhamma, a member of the Sangha Union in Mandalay, said true monks should not be engaged in weapons training or acting as informants for the military.   “National politics doesn’t call for monks to be involved in an armed struggle,” he said.   “Historically, the involvement of the monks [in politics] was nonviolent. We stand by doing the right thing. That’s why we express our wishes in a non-violent way. We take part in peaceful street protests. That’s how monks should be involved in national politics.”   Of the 38 monks RFA confirmed to be held in prison since the coup, most are from the regions of Mandalay, Sagaing, Bago, Tanintharyi, Ayeyawaddy, Magway and Yangon.   Among them are Thaw Bita (Alinga Kyeh) and Tay Zaniya (Mandalay Hill), two prominent monks with ties to the deposed National League for Democracy (NLD) party who were arrested on the day of the power grab. Thaw Bita was later sentenced to a two-year jail term by a prison court.   There are more than 500,000 Buddhist monks and 600,000 nuns in Myanmar, and while they are aligned in their veneration of the Buddha, their political interests vary. Some Buddhist clergy are outspoken proponents of democracy, while others support the junta for what they say is its protection of religious values.   Translated by Khin Maung Nyane. Written in English by Joshua Lipes.

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Malaysia contacts Myanmar’s shadow govt as ASEAN fails to implement 5-point consensus

Malaysia’s top diplomat has revealed he’s had contact with the Burmese shadow government, the first ASEAN country to acknowledge such an interaction, as activists lambasted the bloc on the anniversary of its failed five-point plan to restore democracy in Myanmar. Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah was responding Sunday to an open letter from a Southeast Asian parliamentarians’ group to the leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In it, they urged the bloc to “immediately and publicly meet with the NUG” – Myanmar’s parallel, civilian National Unity Government. “I have informally met [through virtual conference] the NUG Myanmar foreign minister and the NUCC chairman before the last ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat. Let’s meet and discuss,” Saifuddin said via Twitter, referring to a ministerial retreat that took place in a hybrid format in mid-February after being postponed from an earlier scheduled date amid reports of differences among member-states. Myanmar’s National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) includes representatives of the NUG, civil society groups, ethnic armed organizations, and civil disobedience groups. In the tweet, Saifuddin tagged the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR), the group that sent the open letter on Sunday, the anniversary of the day when Southeast Asian leaders and the Burmese junta chief, agreed during an emergency summit to a so-called Five-Point Consensus for action on post-coup Myanmar. Last October, Malaysia’s outspoken foreign minister had said he would open talks with the NUG if the Burmese junta kept stonewalling in cooperating with ASEAN’s conflict resolution efforts. RFA contacted the foreign ministry of Cambodia, this year’s ASEAN chair, for comment but did not immediately hear back. Meanwhile, Bo Hla Tint, the NUG’s special representative to ASEAN, questioned the Southeast Asian bloc’s seriousness in solving the Myanmar crisis. “They have failed to implement, during the past year, the basic point of the ASEAN Common Agreements – to end the violence. And then, they failed to comply with the second point – systematic distribution of humanitarian aid,” he told RFA. “I’d say the ASEAN leadership does not take seriously the policy or framework set down by the ASEAN leadership itself, if the leaders do not take any effective action [against the junta].” This aerial photo taken by a drone shows Bin village in Mingin, a township in Myanmar’s Sagaing region, after villagers say it was set ablaze by the Burmese military, Feb. 3, 2022. Credit: Reuters ‘A five-point failure’ In Malaysia, two analysts praised Saifuddin for breaking from ASEAN and initiating separate action. “Malaysia takes lead on call to review ASEAN’s approach to Myanmar (after a year of failed ASEAN five-point consensus), acknowledging informal meetings with NUG Myanmar,” Bridget Welsh, a political analyst with the University of Nottingham Malaysia, tweeted. Another analyst, Aizat Khairi, a senior lecturer at Universiti Kuala Lumpur, agreed. “Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah’s reaction to the APHR open letter is something refreshing,” he told BenarNews. The five-point agreement reached between ASEAN’s leaders and Burmese military chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing on April 24 last year included an end to violence, the provision of humanitarian assistance, an ASEAN envoy’s appointment, all-party dialogue, and mediation by the envoy. ASEAN has not succeeded in implementing any of these points, said Joshua Kurlantzick, senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, a Washington think-tank. “I think there is no doubt every part of [the consensus] has failed, and with Cambodia as the chair and the junta increasingly backed by China, there is no way the consensus will succeed, or that ASEAN will do anything at all serious about Myanmar,” Kurlantzick told BenarNews. “Suspend Myanmar from ASEAN until a return to democratic rule. … But ASEAN won’t do that.” He was referring to Beijing’s support for Naypyidaw at international forums, including at the United Nations, since Min Aung Hlaing toppled the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government on Feb. 1, 2021.   Under ASEAN’s long-standing policy that its 10 members take all decisions collectively through consensus, if one member-state opposes a proposed move, it is shelved. And not every ASEAN member is on board with stricter action against Myanmar other than barring junta representatives from attending top ASEAN meetings, analysts have noted. A “five-point failure” is what the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M), a group of independent international experts, calls ASEAN’s consensus. “The junta has not held to a single point of the five-point consensus. The agreement has failed and a change of course from ASEAN is needed,” SAC-M member Marzuki Darusman said in a statement issued Friday. In fact, since joining the consensus, Min Aung Hlaing has escalated the military’s attack on the people of Myanmar, and continued to target and detain political opponents, SAC-M said. Nearly 1,800 people, mostly pro-democracy protesters, have been killed by Burmese security forces, since the coup. BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated online news service.

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Vietnam says it discussed army games with Russia, not military drills

The Vietnamese Defense Ministry says that a meeting this month with Russia did not discuss a joint military exercise as reported Russian state media but an international military competition. Vietnam’s version of events published in the official military newspaper Sunday could be intended to distance Vietnam from bilateral military activities with Russia amid international condemnation of the war in Ukraine. Quan Doi Nhan Dan, the official mouthpiece of Vietnam’s armed forces, reported that on April 15 a Vietnamese delegation led by Maj. Gen. Do Dinh Thanh, commander of Vietnam Army’s Tank Force and Armored Warfare, took part in a virtual meeting with the Russian side to discuss Vietnam’s participation in the Army Games 2022. The International Army Games, dubbed the War Olympics, is an annual military competition hosted by Russia since 2015, usually at the end of summer. Participating armies compete in different events such as “tank biathlon,” infantry, anti-aircraft artillery and troop intelligence. China has been a regular participant of the games while Vietnam began taking part in 2018 together with nearly 30 other countries. Analysts say the Army Games aims to showcase the military prowess of Russia and other countries, as well as promote Russian weapons and technologies to prospective buyers. The report in Quan Doi Nhan Dan said the Vietnamese general had requested that his tank team be allowed to arrive early for training and familiarization “if the Army Games are to take place” this year. Bilateral military activities Russia is waging a full-scale war in Ukraine after invading its neighbor on Feb. 24. The invasion, widely condemned by the international community, has caused the largest refugee crisis in Europe since World War II. On April 19, Russia’s state media reported that Russia and Vietnam were planning to hold a joint military training exercise. The move was described by analysts as “inappropriate” and likely to “raise eyebrows” in the rest of the region. Russian state-run news agency RIA Novosti said the initial planning meeting for the military training exercise was held virtually between the leaders of Russia’s Eastern Military District and the Vietnamese army. The news came as the U.S. announced a May 12-13 summit in Washington with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, including Vietnam. Vietnam considers Russia a traditional ally and a “comprehensive strategic partner,” and has been supportive of Moscow despite international outrage over Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Earlier this month, Vietnam voted against a U.S.-led resolution to remove Russia from the U.N. Human Rights Council. Before that, Hanoi abstained from voting to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the U.N. General Assembly. Vietnamese army officials are usually very tight-lipped about international affairs, and the report in the official army newspaper could be viewed as a denial of involvement in bilateral military activities with Russia.

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Soaring unemployment in Myanmar follows junta rollback of labor rights

Thu Thu, a 37-year-old laborer living in Shwepyithar township on the outskirts of Myanmar’s commercial capital Yangon, has been trying to find work at one of the Industrial Zone’s garment factories for more than two weeks with no luck. Using a pseudonym, she told RFA’s Myanmar Service that she was unlawfully terminated from her job nearly a month ago and needs to care for her elderly parents and two daughters but said no one wants to hire a woman over the age of 30. “Before, under the [civilian National League for Democracy government], employers hired based on a person’s skills. Now, under junta rule, they tend to look at age and they reject me after they see how old I am on my ID card,” she said. “I am facing severe hardship trying to support my family. Sometimes, to speak truthfully, I even consider taking my own life.” She said she now works odd jobs to make ends meet but questioned how much longer she will be able to manage with few prospects of employment. Thu Thu is just one of around 1,000 laborers trying to find work in the Shwepyithar Industrial Zone, a key component of Myanmar’s U.S. $3.4 billion textile sector. According to the Confederation of Trade Unions of Myanmar, there are over 500,000 textile workers in the Yangon region alone. However, job opportunities – even in the country’s once bustling cities – are drying up. The International Labor Organisation (ILO) estimates that more than 1.6 million workers, or nearly 3 percent of Myanmar’s population of around 54 million, lost their jobs last year due to the coronavirus pandemic and the political upheaval that followed the Feb. 1, 2021 military coup. According to the Myanmar Garment Factory Entrepreneurs Association, only 504 of 759 factories in Yangon are currently operating. Those workers in the Shwepyithar Industrial Zone who still have their jobs said they receive a fixed wage of 4,800 kyats (U.S. $2.60) per day and can no longer work for overtime pay because electricity shortages prevent their factories from operating at full capacity. Other baseline worker benefits have also disappeared in the wake of the coup. Garment worker Su Su Aung told RFA that since the takeover, factory owners have stopped providing medical leave to their employees and instead require that they sign documents agreeing to have their status downgraded following any absences. “We used to be able to take impromptu leave for sickness or take medical leave, but we can no longer do that. If we take leave for a day or two because of an emergency, they reduce our pay grade or skip our bonuses,” she said. “We never experienced these kinds of conditions before. When we appealed to them to keep the old policies in place, they threatened us and said no one would listen to our complaints, so we are forced to work under these conditions.” Workers arrive at a factory in Yangon, in an undated photo. Credit: RFA Reforms rolled back A garment factory worker of seven years’ experience, who declined to be named citing fear of reprisal, said years of labor rights reforms under the NLD government were rolled back seemingly overnight by the coup. “Employers have become more self-centered. There is no rule of law, so they can do whatever they want, knowing that the workers will keep silent because we need the money,” she said. “They think they are entitled to hire and fire people whenever they want. It’s like a living hell for us. We can only hope that someone will emerge who can make our lives better.” Zin Wai Aung, a volunteer who assists workers, said he is receiving an increasing number of complaints about getting fired. “We get two or three cases each day – most of them are for being terminated from work. Many workers get unpaid time off for 20 days and are to come back to work for ten days on regular basis. They no longer have full-time jobs, but they aren’t getting fired either,” he said. “In addition, we have seen many workers getting fired unlawfully, for complaining to their manager or requesting leave or holidays.” Workers arrive at a factory in Yangon, in an undated photo. Credit: RFA An owner of a garment factory that employs nearly 250 people told RFA that workers deserve someone to stand up for them in negotiating their rights. “It is normal to see disputes between workers and employers. We are trying to resolve them on both sides and things are getting better,” he said. But the owner added that after the coup, the labor situation in Myanmar “returned to square one,” leaving workers little protection of their rights. Workers who spoke to RFA echoed the owner’s sentiments, noting that the unions which represented them in disputes under the NLD government had largely disbanded after the takeover because they were being targeted by the military regime. Late last month, the ILO said it plans to investigate whether Myanmar is following conventions its government agreed to on the formation of worker unions and banning forced labor, but the junta has objected to the announcement. Translated by Ye Kaung Myint Maung. Written in English by Joshua Lipes.

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