​​Newly published documents reveal how China skirts forced labor scrutiny in Xinjiang

Lazy persons, drunkards, and “other persons with insufficient inner motivation” must be subjected to “repeated … thought education” to ensure they take part in state-sponsored “poverty alleviation” campaigns to pick cotton in China’s Xinjiang region, a previously unpublished internal government document ordered local cadres. If such efforts fail to produce “obvious results,” coercive measures should be taken, the July 2019 document, issued by the Poverty Alleviation Work Group in Kashgar (in Chinese, Kashi) prefecture’s Yarkand (Shache) county, advises authorities. By late 2019, authorities in Yarkand were compiling lists of the “unmotivated,” including individuals as old as 77 years, and proposing solutions for their “laziness,” which included sending them to other counties to labor in cotton fields. The documents were released in a report Tuesday by Adrian Zenz, senior fellow and director in China studies at the Washington-based Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation. They show that state efforts to compel Uyghurs into “poverty alleviation” measures – including labor transfers and seasonal labor – intensified in Xinjiang after 2018. In some cases, the documents mandated an increase of the “political status” of poverty alleviation work, and warned cadres of “severe” repercussions for not achieving outcomes. They also demonstrate that historical models, such as that used by the International Labor Organization, often fall short when used to evaluate state-sponsored coerced labor in areas including Xinjiang because they only account for commercial and not political exploitation, the report said. “If a government like a Western government wants to effectively combat Uyghur forced labor, these are the elements that they need to take into account and look at,” Zenz told RFA Uyghur in an interview. “State-sponsored forced labor is a whole-of-government, whole-of-society approach affecting an entire region, and not just … isolated pockets of forced labor that are detected here and there. It creates a whole regional systemic risk, a societal risk.” Linking forced labor to fighting terrorism By elevating poverty alleviation to a political task, rather than a purely economic one, Beijing has been able to tie forced labor to the eradication of terrorism, Zenz said. “You take them off the land where they might be free to do their own thing and they might have an idle season, so they may choose to work or to not work,” he said.  “But this perceived Uyghur idleness is seen as a national security risk and that’s why the drive in 2018 and 2019 to push Uyghurs into all kinds of work is seen as a matter of national security … and of course, this urgency creates a very strong level of coercion,” Zenz said. In Xinjiang, Beijing has leveraged a centralized authoritarian system to penalize noncompliance with its poverty alleviation campaign, said the report, entitled “Coercive Labor in the Cotton Harvest in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Uzbekistan.” Those penalties included the threat of internment and the detection of deviance through automated systems of preventative policing. “The resulting environments of ‘structurally forced consent’ are not necessarily immediately observable to outsiders, and may be challenging to assess through conventional means such as the ILO’s forced labor indicator framework, which was not designed to evaluate state-sponsored forced labor,” the report said. Legislative teeth Zenz called on the European Union to develop “effective legislation” that targets state-sponsored forced labor affecting an entire region and for the United States to continue to enforce the December 2021 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which requires American. companies that import goods from Xinjiang to prove that they have not been manufactured with Uyghur forced labor at any stage of production. Without the proper tools necessary for the international community to hold China accountable for such practices, “Beijing’s economic and long-term political aims in [Xinjiang] could mean that coercive labor transfers into cotton picking and related industries might persist for a long time to come,” the report warned. Andrew Bremberg, the president of the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation and former U.S. representative to the U.N., told RFA that steps taken by the United States and the international community to address forced labor in Xinjiang are “woefully insufficient” and have done little to change Beijing’s policies in the region. “The United States needs to help lead in this effort both on a bilateral basis, in terms of strengthening the enforcement of our own laws … [and] work[ing] with other countries to hold China accountable in multilateral settings like the International Labor Organization,” he said. “At the same time, we need to strengthen those organizations and entities with other countries to ensure that they better protect against state-sponsored forced labor.” The EU is currently reviewing proposed legislation that would allow for an import ban on products related to severe human rights violations such as forced labor. Bremberg welcomed the proposed legislation, but warned that such a rule must be constructed correctly if the EU wants it to have the desired effect. “If they try to only use forced labor indicators that the ILO has used in the past, it likely will not affect importations of products made by forced labor from Xinjiang, given the unique nature that state-sponsored forced labor poses,” he said. Bremberg said a strong response by the international community that includes boycotts of imports is needed to “make clear to China that their behavior, their actions violating individual rights, human rights … will not be allowed without consequence.” ‘Hidden from plain sight’ The Washington-based Campaign for Uyghurs issued a statement on Tuesday condemning the state-sponsored coercive labor practices outlined in Zenz’s report, which it said reveals the “sociocultural contexts and authoritarian systems that have created coercive labor environments in [Xinjiang], which are not easily captured through standard measures such as the ILO forced labor indicators.” The report “reveals the deeply embedded and systemic dynamics of coercion that have perpetuated environments of ‘structurally forced consent’ in [Xinjiang], leaving innocent Uyghurs powerless and at the mercy of China’s repressive state apparatus,” said CFU Executive Director Rushan Abbas. “These atrocities are hidden from plain sight, making them extremely difficult to detect and…

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Indonesia’s president condemns Myanmar attack, says push for peace will continue

Indonesia’s president says an attack on humanitarian workers in Myanmar’s eastern Shan state won’t deter his country in its efforts as this year’s ASEAN chair to try to bring peace to Myanmar. Joko Widodo, commonly known as Jokowi, was speaking in the Indonesian town of Labuan Bajo ahead of a three-day summit of the 10-member grouping which starts Tuesday. He confirmed that members of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) came under fire from an unknown group as they were “delivering humanitarian assistance” on Sunday but said “the shooting got in the way.” “This will not diminish ASEAN’s and Indonesia’s determination to call for an end to the use of force and violence. Stop the violence because civilians have become victims. Let us sit together and start a dialogue,” Jokowi said. Locals told RFA the convoy was also carrying officials from the Indonesia and Singapore embassies in Yangon.  It came under fire on Sunday morning on a road through Hsihseng township, according to residents who didn’t want to be named for safety reasons. They said the convoy was heading to the Hsihseng-based Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLO) Liaison Office to discuss assistance for internally displaced persons (IDPs) but was forced to turn back. Along with two officers from the Embassy of Singapore and two from the Embassy of Indonesia, there were three AHA Centre officials and several junta administrative workers, the locals said. The Pa-O National Organization (PNO), which is allied to Myanmar’s military regime, and the junta both have checkpoints near the  scene of the shooting. A PNO military affairs official who did not want to be named for security reasons, told RFA the shooting was carried out by five members of the Pa-O National Liberation Army, which is fighting for a democratic federal union system in Myanmar. “They were caught by the army when they fired and tried to run away,” said the official. “The incident happened in our PNO-controlled area. They invaded it and started shooting although there was no problem. I don’t know why they shot.” He said no one was injured although vehicle windows were smashed by bullets. RFA’s calls to the PNLO went unanswered Monday, however an official close to the organization who also declined to be named told RFA the PNLO would not have carried out the shooting. “The PNLO is working to help IDPs,” he said.  “Now they are calling for foreign diplomats and officials from the aid group to meet up to [discuss] that issue. It is impossible that the PNLO shot [the convoy].” Calls to the junta spokesperson for Shan state, Khun Thein Maung, went unanswered. RFA also called and emailed the embassies of Singapore and Indonesia in Yangon regarding the incident but received no reply The conflict in Myanmar is likely to be one of the main topics of the ASEAN Summit but junta leader Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing has not been invited to attend. However, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said Friday her country has been quietly engaging with the State Administration Council – as the junta regime is formally known –  along with Myanmar’s parallel  National Unity Government and Ethnic Armed Organizations in its role as ASEAN chair this year. She said the more than 60 engagements this year, which also included talks with the European Union, Japan, the United Nations and the United States, aimed to build trust “with non-megaphone diplomacy.” Referring to ASEAN’s five-point plan – agreed to by the junta in April 2021 and subsequently ignored by the country’s military leaders – President Widodo said Monday the 10-member group may struggle to get buy-in from the junta but he wasn’t giving up hope. “The situation in Myanmar is complex and Indonesia continues to push for the implementation of the five-point consensus. Various efforts have been made,” Jokowi said. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Mike Firn. Ahmad Syamsudin in Labuan Bajo contributed to this report. BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated news service.

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Myanmar junta targets health, education facilities to undermine shadow government

In the past six months, in addition to their increased targeting of civilians as part of its “four-cuts” strategy–denying the opposition access to food, finances, intelligence and recruits–the Myanmar military has made a concerted effort to target the shadow National Unity Government’s nascent civil administration and the provision of health and education. The April 11 air strike on a gathering for the opening of a NUG government office in Sagaing’s Pa Zi Gyi village, which coincided with the distribution of food for the Lunar New Year’s celebration, led to the death of at least 186 people.  A single plane dropped two 500-pound (227-kilogram). bombs, followed by attacks by helicopter gunships. Almost all the casualties were civilians or civil administrators, and included 40 children; the youngest was six months old.  While most of the shadow government’s limited fundraising is going towards its military efforts, it’s providing basic social services in some liberated zones. Of the 330 townships in the country, 23 have a NUG prosecutor’s office and 118 judges have been appointed to date.  The shadow government claims to have established 154 “Pakafwe” township governments and to be providing some degree of education in 95 townships, and limited health services in 198.  The room of a hospital in Hsaung Phway village, Pekon township, Myanmar, is seen after an airstrike by junta forces on April 25, 2023. Credit: Mobye PDF, KNDF The National Unity Government has long had popular legitimacy, evidenced in the daily flash mobs, acts of civil disobedience, or nationwide stay at home strikes, as seen during the anniversary of the coup or the Lunar New Year. The NUG has bolstered its legitimacy through the battlefield courage and tenacity of their People’s Defense Forces (PDFs).  But increasingly, the NUG will have to base their legitimacy on performance and the provision of social services. This is all the more important as the military’s government’s effective control is diminishing.  And for that reason the military has stepped up their attacks on the NUG’s and the various Ethnic Resistance Organizations’ (EROs) civil administration. Since the bombing of the NUG office in Pa Zi Gyi, the military has destroyed two NUG offices in Magway. It had only targeted one other NUG office in the past six months. Of the four, two were destroyed by air attacks. Targeting health care and public services The NUG’s provision of health care seems to be a case in point. In the six-month period from November 2022 to April 2023, I have documented 35 separate attacks on health care facilities, either directly controlled by the NUG or EROs, or in areas under their influence. Health care providers were amongst the first and staunchest supporters of the civil disobedience movement.  These attacks have led to the death of four, with 13 people wounded. In 17 attacks, the health care facilities were completely destroyed, while eight suffered major damage; the remainder had minimal damage. Fifteen of those attacks were from either air-dropped bombs, or rocket fire and machine gun attacks from helicopter gunships. Four health care facilities were damaged by artillery fire. The rest of the attacks on health care facilities were caused by ground forces or pro-regime militias.   A school bag lies next to dried blood stains on the floor of a school in Let Yet Kone village in Tabayin township in the Sagaing region of Myanmar on Sept. 17, 2022, the day after a junta airstrike hit the school. Credit: Associated Press Fourteen of the 35 attacks, or 40 percent, were in Sagaing, which has seen a disproportionate amount of violence, and four were  in neighboring Magway. Four occurred in Kayin, while the remainder were spread in Shan, Kachin, Tanintharyi, Kachin, and Kayah.  In the latest attack, a helicopter dropped a 500-pound (227 kilogram) bomb on a health clinic in Shan State, though the bomb failed to detonate. Only three people were wounded.  The military has also routinely targeted both the NUG’s education system and rural schools that are technically part of the state system but which are actively supporting and staffed by members of the Civil Disobedience Movement.  Since November 2022, it has either bombed, struck by artillery or destroyed by ground forces some 20 schools. Six were destroyed in Kayin and Sagaing states, each, with two in Kachin and Kayah, and one each in Mandalay, Magway, Tanintharyi, and Chin.  Unapologetic military The military has refused to concede that the targeting of health, educational and other social services represents a war crime. It often justifies the attacks by alleging that the PDFs were using the facilities for military purposes or that the militia members were receiving health care treatment. The military has been unapologetic in targeting those facilities. The executive director of the the pro-military ThayNinGa Institute for Strategic Studies in Yangon, Thein Tun Oo, justified the attack on Pa Zi Gyi and others like it, calling it “ordinary … from an anti-terrorism standpoint” and said, “No government of a country can accept a declaration of autonomy within its sovereign territory.” The attacks on the NUG’s civil administration also comes when the military has increased their own budget for the 2023-24 fiscal year by 51 percent, from $1.8 billion to $2.7 billion, to deal with the escalating war. Although the economy is no longer in freefall, the two percent growth in 2022 and three  percent growth predicted in 2023 has not made up for the 18 percent decline in 2021. Revenue collection remains down. Increased military spending is coming at the expense of public health and education, where enrollment and matriculation numbers are plummeting. A young waste collector paddles a polystyrene boat looking for plastic and glass to sell in Pazundaung Creek in Yangon, Myanmar, Jan. 14, 2023. Dozens of Myanmar citizens are taking to the murky creek waters after being unable to find work amid the post-coup economic crisis. Credit: AFP The NUG’s provision of health, education, and civil administration pose a threat as the regime acknowledges its own loss of control.  Senior Gen. Min Aung…

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For China’s ‘young refuseniks,’ finding love comes at too high a price

Linghu Changbing will be 23 this year. Even before the pandemic hit China, he was already starting to feel that the traditional goals of marriage, a mortgage and kids were beyond his reach.  “I had no time to find a girlfriend back in China, because I was working from eight in the morning to 10 at night, sometimes even till 11.00 p.m. or midnight, with very little time off,” said Linghu,  who joined the “run” movement of people leaving China in 2022. “I didn’t earn very much, so I couldn’t really afford to go out and spend money having fun with friends, or stuff like that,” he says of his life before he left for the United States.  “I had very little social interaction, because I didn’t have any friends, which meant that I couldn’t really pursue a relationship,” he said. “As for an apartment, I had no desire to buy one at all.” The situation he describes is common to many young people in China, yet not all are in a position to leave. They are part of an emerging social phenomenon and social media buzzword: the “young refuseniks” – people who reject the traditional four-fold path to adulthood: finding a mate, marriage, mortgages and raising a family.  They are also known as the “People Who Say No to the Four Things.” Three years of stringently enforced zero-COVID restrictions left China’s economic growth at its lowest level in nearly half a century, with record rates of unemployment among urban youth.  Refusing to pursue marriage, mortgages and kids emerged from that era as a form of silent protest, with more and more people taking this way out in recent years. ‘Far too high a price’ Several young people who responded to a brief survey by RFA Mandarin on Twitter admitted to being refuseniks. “I’m a young refusenik: I won’t be looking for a partner or getting married, I won’t be buying a property and I don’t want kids,” reads one comment on social media. People use mobile phones in front of a fenced residential area under lockdown due to Covid-19 restrictions in Beijing, May 22, 2022. Credit: Noel Celis/AFP “Finding love comes at far too high a price,” says another, while another user comments: “It’s all very well having values, or being sincere, but all of that has to be backed up with money.”  “It’s not that I’m lazy,” says another. “Even if I were to make the effort, I still wouldn’t see any result.”  Others say they no longer have the bandwidth to try to achieve such milestones.  “I’ve been forced back in on myself to the point where I feel pretty helpless,” comments one person. For another, it’s more of a moral decision: “I think the best expression I can make of paternal love is not to bring children into this world in the first place.” Similar comments have appeared across Chinese social media platforms lately, and have been widely liked and reposted. Marriage rates have been falling in China for the past eight years, with marriages numbering less than eight million by 2021, the lowest point since records began 36 years ago, according to recent figures from the Civil Affairs Ministry.  People are also marrying much later, with more than half of newly contracted marriages among the over-30s, the figures show. According to Linghu Changbing, who dropped out of high school at 14 and moved through a number of cities where he supported himself with various jobs, refuseniks are mostly found in the bigger cities with large migrant populations. Young people in smaller cities like his hometown are more likely to be able to afford a home, and will often marry and start families as young as 18. “In my experience, refuseniks seem to cluster mostly in the busier cities,” he says. “The more competitive a city, the more you will see this phenomenon.” Curling up, lying flat, running away and venting Shengya, a migrant worker in Beijing, has a similarly depressing view.  He spent two years doing nothing at his parents’ house, a phenomenon that has been dubbed “lying flat” on social media.  “I basically lay around at home the whole time,” he said. “I couldn’t get motivated to do anything. My dad asked me why I didn’t go out and get a job, and I told him: ‘The only point of a job would be to prevent starvation, but I already get enough to eat here, so what difference would it make?’” An employment agency in Shanghai. Credit: Reuters Linghu Changbing went through a very similar phase, until someone got him a job working overseas.  Looking back on that time, he says that China’s young refuseniks are similar to the rats in the Universe 25 experiments by ethologist John B. Calhoun in the 1960s, in which rats given everything they needed eventually stopped bearing young, leading the population to collapse.  “The marginalized rats gradually gave up competing at all, and suppressed their natural desires, leading to constant personality distortions,” he says.  “Lying flat” has entered the online lexicon as a way of describing the passive approach adopted by many young people in China, while “curling up,” also known as “turning inwards,” describes a personality turned in on itself from a lack of external opportunity for change.  While those who can join the “run” movement, leaving China to seek better lives overseas, others act out their frustrations in indiscriminate attacks on others, known on social media as “giving it your all,” or “venting.” For late millennials and Generation Z in China, curling up, lying flat and running away are the main available options, as not many young people have the wherewithal to leave the country and start a new life elsewhere. ‘A very heavy burden’ A Chengdu-based employee of an architectural firm, who gave only the nickname Mr. J, said he first came to the realization that he would be a refusenik during the rolling lockdowns, mass incarceration in quarantine camps and compulsory daily testing…

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Damning evidence emerges in Cambodian monkey smuggling case

Hidden camera footage has emerged showing what U.S. prosecutors say is clear involvement by a senior Cambodian official in running a research monkey smuggling operation. In the video, whose existence was first reported by RFA last year, former Cambodian Department of Wildlife and Biodiversity head Kry Masphal is seen facilitating an illicit drop-off of long-tailed macaques at a breeding facility in northern Cambodia, even offering advice on how to move the endangered species more efficiently. “Why don’t you make another road?” Kry is seen asking a worker. “If you make another road, this means [it’s] more safe for your smuggling.” The footage was filmed in 2019 by a confidential informant for U.S. investigators and submitted by prosecutors as evidence against Kry in a high-profile U.S. government smuggling case against him and other conspirators. It was obtained from the court by animal rights group PETA, which shared it with RFA. In aviator sunglasses and a buttoned-down blue checkered shirt, Kry carries himself in the video with a swagger a world apart from the nervous figure who sat in a Miami court two weeks ago listening to his lawyers fight to exclude the contents of his mobile phone from his upcoming trial. Kry was director of Wildlife and Biodiversity in Cambodia’s Forestry Administration at the time of his arrest at New York’s JFK airport in November 2022, where he was transiting on his way to a conference in Panama on the protection of endangered species. He has been charged with being party to a plot to launder wild-caught long-tailed macaques – a primate prized for medical research – from the jungles of Cambodia and Thailand into U.S. research laboratories. In part to conserve dwindling wild populations, but also to preserve the integrity of scientific findings, only captive-bred monkeys can be used in medical experiments. Also accused are Kry’s boss, Forestry Administration Director General Keo Omaliss and six individuals involved in the management of the Chinese-owned Vanny Group’s monkey farms in Cambodia. Kry has pleaded not guilty, while the Cambodian Ministry of Agriculture, which oversees the Forestry Administration, and the Vanny Group have both denied any improper activity took place. However, the video that has emerged among a mountainous pile of evidence against Kry contains damning proof of his involvement and acknowledges the illegal nature of the operation. Kry is seen helping to offload crates of monkeys from the back of a pickup truck at what prosecutors say is Vanny Group’s monkey farm in Pursat province. The person working with him asks how many monkeys Kry has brought with him “this time.” “Twenty-four,” Kry replies. “We cannot take more because many observers, we have to do [it] very quick and go very fast.” In a last-ditch attempt to avoid a trial, Kry’s lawyers – whose firm has been a registered lobbyist for the Cambodian government since January 2022 – have pushed for the case to be dismissed on the grounds that he was acting on orders from his government. For conservationists, the stratagem was a confirmation of their worst fears: that the poaching and laundering of wild-caught macaques from Cambodia was not the behavior of a few rotten apples but the de facto policy of the government. “This means that there is no safe, legitimate and legal supply of monkeys,” Lisa Jones-Engel, a primatologist with PETA, told RFA. “When you have somebody like Kry involved, working so out in the open, saying, ‘This is great for our smuggling.’ From a government official who signs on the dotted line?” “Kry is just another run-of-the-mill monkey juggler, there was nothing that distinguished him from every other person on that video,” she added. An RFA investigation last month showed the deep penetration of the primate industry into Cambodia’s ruling elite, from the immediate family of Prime Minister Hun Sen down through the relevant regulatory and enforcement bodies that are supposed to be policing the trade. Agriculture Minister Dith Tina did not immediately respond to a request for comment on why a public official might need to hide their activities from observers. Vanny has denied the U.S. prosecutors’ central allegation that wild monkeys were laundered through its farm and passed off as captive bred ones for export. However, in conversation with RFA earlier this year an employee at the farm said that in 2022 the practice became almost routine as demand, amped up by spiking prices, vastly outstripped legitimate supply. “There weren’t enough monkeys before because demand was so high, so we bought them from a nearby mountain,” the person said, not wanting to be identified for fear of retaliation. “If they had good eyes, a good body, good fur, then we exported them,” they added. “We have a lab to weigh them and do blood tests to see if they have diseases or not.” The unsealing of the indictment against Kry, Keo and Vanny’s management last November halted exports from the farm, the employee said. Prior to that, they added, the farm’s outbound shipments in 2022 regularly included between 100 and 200 “mountain monkeys,” in clear violation of international laws and regulations governing trade in the species. The employee was insistent that this was something that only took place in 2022. However, the U.S. prosecutors’ case alleges illicit activity to have taken place between December 2017 and January 2022. Kry’s case is due to go to trial in Miami in June.  Edited by Boer Deng.

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Data lacking on Asia’s electricity needs, report says

Asia urgently needs to improve the transparency of its power sector data, as over half of the region’s economies lack information regarding electricity generation, a report said Thursday. Some 24 of 39 economies in Asia have “poor” or “insufficient” power data, said the joint “Asia Data Transparency Report 2023” by Ember, a global energy think tank, and Subak, a climate non-profit.  “This means that there is little to no data about how the electricity needs of 684 million people are being met,” the report said. The Asia-Pacific is home to 80% of global coal generation, while power sector emissions in the region make up 62% of the total worldwide. Its electricity demand is increasing by about 5% per year, a rate twice as fast as the rest of the world. In Asia, many economies struggle to phase down coal power, as electricity demand has significantly impacted the region’s economic growth.  Decarbonizing the region’s power sector is crucial for limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees, Ember’s researchers said, concluding that poor data transparency is holding back the speed of the transition to clean power in Asia. The report said that China, despite being the largest electricity consumer in Asia and globally, only scored an “acceptable” rating due to “a lack of detailed data” and “inconsistent reporting.”  Among the top 10 power sector emitters, China led the world by three times more than the U.S., the second-biggest carbon dioxide emitter. In a report last month, Ember said China created the most CO2 emissions of any power producer in the world in 2022, with 4,694 million metric tons of CO2, accounting for 38% of total global emissions from electricity generation. Coal alone made up 61% of China’s electricity mix, though it was a 17 percentage points fall from 78% in 2000. However, in absolute terms, it is five times higher than at the start of this century. The report said that 24 out of 39 of economies in Asia have insufficient or poor data transparency regarding electricity generation. Credit: Ember Among Southeast Asian countries, Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, and Vietnam scored “poor” for data transparency, while Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar were rated “insufficient.” These countries had a long time lag for annual and monthly reports, with data too difficult to analyze. The Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore performed relatively better. Five countries with no data –  Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Papua New Guinea, and New Caledonia – were more concentrated in low to lower-middle-income countries. India, New Zealand, and Australia were found to be the best-performing countries regarding data transparency. “Three lower-middle income countries – India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh – scored higher than any other upper-middle income countries. They are showing that it is possible to improve data transparency and encourage others to follow suit,” Uni Lee, Ember’s Asia data analyst, said.    “Bangladesh provides daily generation data for each power plant and provides various metrics for the electricity market, including outage and day-ahead schedules through the central utility,” the report said. The research looking into data transparency for the power sector identified 74 official data sources across Asia-Pacific. The evaluation was based on six rating criteria: publishing lag, geographical granularity, fuel breakdown, time granularity, ease of access and additional data.  Open data informs evidence-based policymaking and plays a pivotal role in decarbonizing the power sector, said the report, the first-in-kind presenting a comprehensive regional picture of the availability of power sector data in Asia.   “Ideally, power sector data must be provided at hourly or fewer intervals … and made free to access without restriction in a machine-readable format,” the report recommended. “Data is essential for climate professionals to monitor, track and set clean power targets, as well as to develop innovative technologies for better grid flexibility and engage in evidence-based policymaking,” said Subak’s data cooperative associate, Justine White. Edited by Mike Firn.

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Reporting carries high costs for RFA journalists in authoritarian Asian countries

To mark the 30th anniversary of the UN General Assembly’s proclamation of World Press Freedom Day on May 3, 1993, Radio Free Asia is highlighting the plight of its journalists and bloggers who have been jailed or detained in several of the Asia-Pacific region’s authoritarian states. This year’s theme, “Freedom of expression as a driver for all other human rights,”  highlights the relationship between threats to media freedom, journalist safety, and increasing attacks on other key human rights. The concerns are valid, as the jailing of RFA reporters and bloggers, and their BBC and Voice of America colleagues, occurred in countries and territories that have experienced a decline in broader freedoms–if they had such liberties to begin with. Edmund Wan Edmund Wan Yiu-sing, known by his DJ name “Giggs,” was sentenced by a court in Hong Kong in October 2022 to two years and eight months in prison for sedition and money laundering, charges he confessed to in a plea deal. Prior to his February 2021 arrest, he hosted programs that reported and commented on Hong Kong and Chinese politics for D100, an independent online radio station. Wan also hosted a program for Radio Free Asia’s Cantonese Service from 2017 to 2020. Authorities charged that Wan hosted programs that “incited others to resist or overthrow the Chinese Communist Party” and “promoted Hong Kong independence,” the Hong Kong Free Press independent news outlet reported. Wan had pleaded guilty to one charge of seditious intent for on-air comments he made in 2020, and three charges of money laundering related to crowd funding transactions. In exchange, six other charges were left on file, which means they cannot be pursued without the court’s permission. The charges come under a law, created when Hong Kong was under British rule, that defines sedition as “intent to arouse hatred or contempt of the Hong Kong [government] or to incite rebellion, and cause dissatisfaction with it.” The sedition law was revived by the Hong Kong government during the 2019 protest movement and has been used to arrest pro-democracy activists.In addition to the time in prison, the court also ordered Wan to hand over HK$4.87 million (about U.S. $620,000) in assets. Yeang Sothearin Former Radio Free Asia Khmer news anchor Yeang Sothearin was taken into custody in November 2017, along with Uon Chhin, an RFA photographer and videographer. They were charged with “illegally collecting information for a foreign source” after RFA closed its bureau in the capital of Phnom Penh in September of that year amid a government crackdown on independent media. They were slapped with additional charges for illegally produced pornography in March 2018. If convicted of the first charge, they could face a jail term of between seven and 15 years. Yeang Sothearin and Uon Chhin are out on bail, but they remain in legal limbo after several courts have rejected a series of appeals. In October 2022, Cambodia’s Supreme Court returned Yeang Sothearin’s passport, allowing him to visit his ailing father and sister in Vietnam. Cambodia ranks 140 out of 180 in the 2022 Reporters without Borders (RSF) World Press Freedom Index, between Equatorial Guinea and Libya. After Cambodia’s emergence from decades of warfare in the 1990s, the country’s press had “flourished until the long-serving Prime Minister Hun Sen launched a ruthless war against independent journalism before the 2018 elections,” RSF said. Uon Chhin Former Radio Free Asia Khmer photographer and videographer Uon Chhin and RFA news anchor Yeang Sothearin were taken into custody in November 2017, amid a gathering crackdown on independent media by long-ruling Prime Minister Hun Sen. The pair were charged with “illegally collecting information for a foreign source” after RFA closed its bureau in the capital of Phnom Penh in September of that year. They were slapped with additional charges for illegally produced pornography in March 2018. If convicted of the first charge, they could face a jail term of between seven and 15 years. Yeang Sothearin and Uon Chhin are out on bail, but they remain in legal limbo and their media careers frozen after several courts have rejected a series of appeals. Cambodia ranks 140 out of 180 in the 2022 Reporters without Borders (RSF) World Press Freedom Index, between Equatorial Guinea and Libya. “Hun Sen went after the press mercilessly ahead of parliamentary elections in July 2018. Radio stations and newspapers were silenced, newsrooms purged, journalists prosecuted – leaving the independent media sector devastated,” said RSF.  “Since then, the few attempts to bring independent journalism back to life have drawn the wrath of ruling circles.”   Htet Htet Khine Htet Htet Khine, a former BBC television presenter, was sentenced in September 2022 to three years in prison with hard labor for “incitement” and “illegal association” for her reporting work. The face of BBC Media Action’s national television peace program Khan Sar Kyi (Feel It) from 2016 to 2020, which documented the impact of war on Myanmar society, the freelance journalist and video producer had been in detention in Yangon’s notorious Insein Prison awaiting trial since Aug. 15, 2021, when she was arrested with fellow reporter Sithu Aung Myint. Htet Htet Khine was arrested six months after the Feb. 1, 2021 military coup by junta security forces, one of some 150 journalists detained by junta authorities. Family members expressed concern over Htet Htet Khine’s well-being in prison amid the COVID-19 pandemic and the prospect of physical abuse by jailers. Veteran journalists told Radio Free Asia that her case underscored the fact that reporters face serious personal risk to carry out their work under military rule in Myanmar. Sithu Aung Myint A special court in Yangon’s Insein Prison in December 2022 sentenced veteran journalist Sithu Aung Myint to seven years in prison, which came on top of two earlier sentences totaling five years for allegedly inciting sedition in the army, meaning he will have to spend 12 years in prison. The sentence by a court set up by the junta that took power in a Feb. 1, 2021, military coup…

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Myanmar, neighbors including Thailand hold Track 1.5 dialogue without ASEAN members

Two years ago this week, ASEAN negotiated a five-point consensus with the Burmese military that had seized power in a February 2021 coup and arrested many leaders of Myanmar’s elected government. The consensus was a roadmap for ending violence and starting a political dialogue, but the generals never intended to abide by it. The consensus called for an immediate end to violence; a dialogue among all parties; the appointment of a special envoy from the regional bloc; the provision of humanitarian assistance by the Southeast Asian bloc; and a visit to Myanmar by the special envoy to meet with all parties.  The Burmese junta has since steadfastly ignored the consensus and waged a multi-front war against Myanmar’s civilian population. The toll has been horrific – more than 4,000 people have been killed while the regime has arrested more than 17,000 and more than 150 people have been tortured to death or died in government custody.  ASEAN continues in vain to use the five-point consensus as the basis for all talks. Other than refusing to give the junta a seat at its meetings, ASEAN has done little else except let down the people of Myanmar.  In this handout photo released by Myanmar Military, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, right, receives Wang Ning, Secretary of CPC Yunnan Provincial Committee of China in Nay Pyi Taw, April 4, 2023. Credit: Myanmar Military handout photo via AFP In March, Thailand did an end run around ASEAN when it held a Track 1.5 dialogue with a handful of like-minded member states and the junta. Those in attendance included the authoritarian states of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam along with China, India, Bangladesh and Japan.  Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore refused to attend and seemed genuinely angry at Thailand for having direct talks with the junta and denying Indonesia its prerogative as ASEAN’s 2023 chairman. Unbowed and unapologetic, Thailand argued that it was a Track 1.5 dialogue – meaning that government officials were present but not necessarily acting in their official capacity, along with a few non-governmental experts. But few bought that fig leaf interpretation, noting that Wunna Maung Lwin, the junta’s foreign minister, was clearly there in his official capacity, exactly as Bangkok had wanted. This week, India hosted the second Track 1.5 dialogue with Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Bangladesh, Vietnam and China. Indonesia attended as an observer in its capacity as chairman of the regional bloc. The Thais were smart to let the Indians take over to deflect criticism that Thailand was trying to do an end run around ASEAN. Instead, the April 25 meeting could be billed as a gathering of neighboring countries who were directly impacted by the quagmire as well as other states searching for a solution. Craving legitimacy Yet it was another opportunity to give the junta the international legitimacy it so desperately craves. It follows another failed attempt at diplomacy by former United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon.  Thailand sent its own foreign minister and special representative for Myanmar to meet with Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyidaw. All of these serve to normalize ties with a regime that should be ostracized by the international community.   Moreover, it’s hard to take seriously the idea that the neighboring countries are not in the junta’s corner. India, is much less a champion of democracy under the increasingly illiberal government of Narendra Modi, whose control over the eastern portion of the nation is tenuous. India also fears a failing junta being even more dependent on China – the last thing that New Delhi wants is a greater Chinese presence on another part of its border.  Bangladesh is hoping to exchange normalized ties for the return of thousands of Rohingya to their homes in Myanmar’s Rakhine state.  Thailand, meanwhile, sees itself as a political model for the junta to hold elections and maintain power.  Not hedging bets China is no longer hedging its bets and has doubled down on the junta to protect its economic interests, pipelines and Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects. Lately, China has been applying pressure on Ethnic Resistance Organizations that are actively supporting the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) or quietly arming its People’s Defense Forces over fears they might be tilting the balance away from Naypyidaw.  As it increases air attacks, Myanmar’s Air Force has violated the airspace of Thailand, Bangladesh and India. None have lodged diplomatic complaints, a clear signal to the NUG.  Reuters reported that a topic of discussion at the Indian 1.5 talks was the possible inclusion of the opposition government. That seems far-fetched as the junta has steadfastly refused to talk with its NUG leaders, officially labeling them “terrorists.” It seems far more likely that this was an attempt to dampen the international criticism of holding such a meeting. While the junta is bogged down in a multi-front war that it can’t win, it does have a theory of victory.  The military has increased attacks on civilians to terrorize them into submission. There have been more beheadings and mutilations, rape, and the razing of homes. And they have stepped up their air assaults. The military has given itself the means to do so, with a 50% increase in its budget for 2023. The junta has stepped up attempts to deprive the NUG of funding, including a recent threat of even incarcerating children for having a game on their phones whose proceeds go to support the NUG.  The military, having recently disqualified a number of political parties for not registering under the new election law or having communications with “terrorist organizations,” continues to make plans for “elections.” More than 1,200 members of the overthrown National League for Democracy party are in jail, while the military has seized properties of more than 600 NLD members. Finally, the junta seeks to peel away ERO support from the NUG either by offering side deals, allowing China to pressure them or simply letting the traditional mistrust with the NUG manifest.  Junta members believe that time is on their…

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Chinese visits to Myanmar sow influence, but may hinder interests

A slew of recent visits by top Chinese officials to Myanmar appears to be part of a bid by Beijing to counter U.S. influence on the nation, but rebel leaders warned that propping up the junta is a miscalculation, as there will be no stability while it remains in power. In the nearly 27 months since the military carried out a coup d’etat, China has been Myanmar’s staunchest ally. While most Western nations shunned junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing in the aftermath of the takeover and a violent crackdown on his opponents, Beijing stood by the general in Naypyidaw. While foreign investment has fled the embattled nation, Chinese investors have flocked there. And despite international sanctions leveled at the regime, trade between the two neighbors continues unabated. Support notwithstanding, Chinese officials have made multiple visits to Myanmar since the start of the year in what some analysts say is an influence peddling campaign by Beijing following U.S. President Joe Biden’s signing in late December of the National Defense Authorization Act, or NDAA, which will assist the country’s democratic forces. “China has increased its dealings with the military junta,” a China affairs expert told Radio Free Asia, speaking on condition of anonymity citing security concerns. “It seems to me that China is worried about the United States’ NDAA and Burma Act. That’s why it has tried to maintain its influence by having more dealings with the military leaders.” Among the provisions in the NDAA are programs designed to support those fighting the better-equipped military for democracy in Myanmar – including the country’s shadow National Unity Government, anti-junta People’s Defense Force paramilitary group, and various ethnic armies – with technology and non-lethal assistance. Slate of high-profile visits In the latest high profile visit, Peng Xiubin, the director of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China, traveled to Naypyidaw on April 16 and secretly met with former junta leader Than Shwe, who ruled Myanmar from 1992 to 2011, and Thein Sein, the president of the country’s quasi-civilian government from 2011 to 2016.  Reports circulated that following Peng’s visit, Min Aung Hlaing met with the two former leaders to discuss the political situation in Myanmar. Peng’s trip followed visits in February and March by Deng Xijun, China’s special envoy for Asian Affairs, who met with the junta chief on both occasions. Only two months earlier, the Chinese envoy convened a meeting with several ethnic armies from northern Myanmar across the border in southwestern China’s Yunnan province. In this photo combo, from left: former General Than Shwe, former President Thein Sein, and current Myanmar junta leader General Min Aung Hlaing. Credit: AFP Thein Tun Oo, the executive director of the Thayninga Institute for Strategic Studies, which is made up of former military officers, described the uptick in meetings between the junta and Chinese officials as a bid by Beijing to “balance U.S. influence” in the region. “The U.S is no longer the only country influencing the world,” he said. “Among such changes in world politics, Myanmar and China – which share a very long border – need to cooperate more closely. The bottom line is that China-Myanmar relations will continue to develop based on this.” RFA emailed the Chinese Embassy in Yangon to inquire about the frequency of visits by top Chinese government officials to Naypyidaw in recent months and Beijing’s position on the political situation in Myanmar, but received no reply. At the Chinese government’s regular press briefing held in Beijing on March 17, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin called Myanmar a “good neighbor,” adding that Beijing is closely following the situation there and hopes for a resolution through dialogue and consultation among all stakeholders. Interests tied to peace Chinese affairs expert Hla Kyaw Zaw told RFA that China will only be able to realize its interests in Myanmar if the country is at peace. “China can only continue its investments and projects … if Myanmar is at peace,” he said. “The reason why China wants Myanmar to be peaceful is for its own economic interests.” Among the China-backed megaprojects in Myanmar are the New Yangon City urban planning project, the Mee Lin Gyaing Energy Project in Ayeyarwady region, the Letpadaung Copper Mine in Sagaing region, and the Kyauk Phyu deep sea port and special economic zone in Rakhine state. According to ISP-Myanmar, an independent research group, there are 35 China-Myanmar economic corridor projects underway in Myanmar that include railways, roads, special economic zones, sea ports and urban planning projects. Than Soe Naing, a political analyst, agreed that Beijing’s relations with the junta hinge on the furtherance of its strategic interests. “I see China cooperating with the military junta only to continue to maintain, implement and expand its economic interests in Myanmar, such as the strategic Kyauk Phyu deep sea port project, which is a bid by Beijing to obtain access to the Indian Ocean,” he said. In this handout photo Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi, center is welcomed at Myanmar’s Nyaung-U Airport to attend a foreign ministers’ meeting of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism on July 2, 2022 Credit: Myanmar Military/AFP Than Soe Naing noted that China is trying to “divide the [ethnic armies] in northern Myanmar from the anti-junta resistance groups … under the pretext of peacemaking.” But he said that China is actually working to exploit Myanmar’s internal conflict by attempting to “hold all the keys to the situation.” No stability with junta Kyaw Zaw, spokesman for the National Unity Government’s presidential office, warned China that there will only be stability in Myanmar if the forces of democracy succeed in their fight against the junta. He said only with stability in Myanmar will China realize its economic goals in the country. “As long as there is a junta, Myanmar will not be at peace,” he said. “The junta will only terrorize the country with more violence and continue to torture the people. That’s why the country will remain destabilized under [the junta].” A lack of…

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Myanmar’s western Chin state pummeled by junta’s air force in April

Myanmar’s junta carried out 47 airstrikes, killing at least 19 people and destroying multiple religious buildings and civilian homes in Chin state in April alone, a rights group said Thursday. The campaign, which saw an average of nearly two bombs dropped on the western state each day this month, comes as the Chin National Front claimed new territorial gains in the region, suggesting the military has stepped up air operations amid an increasingly stymied ground offensive. Since April 1, Myanmar’s air force has dropped more than 80 bombs on Chin state, according to the Chin Human Rights Organization. The attacks killed 17 civilians and injured 34 others, the group’s managing officer Salai Man Hre Lian told RFA Burmese, as well as two members of the armed resistance. “Most of the injured were civilians, as well,” he said. The worst loss of life occurred on April 10, when the junta launched three airstrikes on Falam township in a single day, dropping six bombs near Var village at around 9:00 a.m., four near a high school in Webula at 11:00 a.m., and six near Ramthlo village at 4:00 p.m. Residents said the attack on Webula killed nine civilians, including the school headmaster and his wife and son, and injured four others. Six days later, fighter jets attacked Pan Par village in Mindat township, killing three people – including a child – and injuring seven others. The CNF confirmed that two members of the armed resistance were killed and four others injured when the junta launched an airstrike earlier this month on a base operated by the 4th Brigade of the Chin National Army in Tedim township, near Myanmar’s border with India. Houses destroyed following Myanmar military junta’s airstrike in Webula town, Chin state, on April 10, 2023. Credit: Citizen Journalist CHRO said that multiple buildings – including a Buddhist monastery, a Christian church and at least 20 civilian homes – were destroyed in the April strikes. The carnage in April followed a March 30 airstrike on Thantlang township’s Khuafo village that killed 10 civilians and injured 20 others, residents told RFA. According to the CHRO, nearly 10,000 civilians have been forced to flee their homes due to junta airstrikes so far this month. The group said the junta has launched nearly 200 airstrikes and dropped more than 350 bombs on targets in Chin state since the military orchestrated a Feb. 1, 2021 coup d’etat. The strikes have killed 38 people and injured nearly 100. Fighting back against the junta The April bombing campaign comes amid growing success by anti-junta forces on the ground in Chin, according to CNF spokesman Salai Htet Ni. On April 23, a People’s Defense Force paramilitary unit attacked a junta military convoy of 30 vehicles, including two armored cars, near Hakha township’s Chuncung village, touching off an intense firefight.  Despite the military’s advantage in equipment, the PDF was able to rout its opponent and prevent the convoy from continuing on to the seat of Hakha, Salai Htet Ni said. “All of the military vehicles were destroyed by the resistance forces,” he said, adding that around 30 junta troops remain stationed in Chuncung. “We now have control over 70 out of 100 territories in nine [of 19] townships in Chin state.” Families sit next to the coffins of victims of Myanmar military junta’s airstrike in Webula town, Chin state, on April 11, 2023. Credit: Citizen Journalist Given the success of anti-junta forces on the ground in Chin, the military has stepped up its air attacks, and villagers have responded by digging trenches and other crude defenses. “Every village has built bomb defenses, such as trenches, to protect against the junta’s airstrikes,” said a Hakha resident who, like other inhabitants of Chin villages RFA spoke to, declined to be named for security reasons. “But with such unexpected attacks as these, it’s been very difficult for us to set up effective defenses.” The military has yet to issue any statements regarding the April airstrikes and attempts by RFA to contact Thant Zin, the junta’s social minister and spokesman for Chin state went unanswered Thursday. A legal expert, who also spoke on condition of anonymity citing fear of reprisal, noted that Myanmar is a signatory to and should be held accountable under the Geneva Convention, which lays out international legal standards for humanitarian treatment during conflict. “[The convention] prohibits all armed forces from attacking non-military or civilian targets during times of war,” he said. “It also restricts armed forces from using highly destructive airstrikes and dropping bombs in civil wars.” One resident of Thantlang called the junta’s unprovoked aerial attacks “cowardly.” “I think the junta attacks villages to terrorize the people,” he said. “If they are truly brave, they would only fight the armed groups. Targeting innocent people like us is extremely cowardly.” Translated by Myo Min Aung. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.

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