US urges China to push Iran to pressure Houthis over Red Sea attacks

U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has asked Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to use Beijing’s influence on Iran to push it to stop the Houthis in Yemen from attacking Red Sea trade routes. The appeal came during two days of meetings in Bangkok between the pair, according to a senior Biden administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity according to rules set by the White House. Over 12 hours, the pair also discussed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Myanmar’s civil war, North Korea, Israel’s war with Hamas, the South China Sea, fentanyl and artificial intelligence, the official said. It was their first meeting since Oct. 26, when Wang visited Washington in the run-up to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to San Francisco in November for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, during which he also held direct talks with U.S. President Joe Biden. The official said the meeting was meant to build on the commitments made during that summit, including to reinstate military-to-military talks and to stem illicit Chinese exports of precursors for fentanyl, which has been called a leading cause of death for American adults. A working group on counternarcotics would be established on Tuesday and both Military-Maritime Consultative Agreement Meetings and talks about regulating artificial intelligence would be held in the Spring.  “The two sides are committed to continuing these strategic channels of communication,” the official said, adding there would be “a telephone call between the two leaders at some point in the coming months.” Diplomatic telephone On the apparently widening conflict in the Middle East that began with the attack on Israel by Hamas on Oct. 7, the White House official said Sullivan had pressed Wang to use Beijing’s influence on Iran to push it to end attacks by Houthis on trade ships transiting the Red Sea. The Houthis’ latest attack took place Friday and this time directly targeted a U.S. warship, the USS Carney, which was patrolling the area to try to prevent further attacks in the lucrative trade route. Both Hamas and the Houthis have been labeled “proxies” of Iran by the United States, with Tehran not viewed as having direct control of either group but being accused of funding and training both. The Houthis, meanwhile, are accused of targeting trade ships off Yemen’s coast in response to Israel’s invasion of Hamas-controlled Gaza. As a major trading nation, China had its own interests in stopping the attacks on the Red Sea route and had the ability to pressure Iran as one of the biggest buyers of its oil, the White House official said. “We would characterize both the economic and trade relationship as giving Beijing leverage over Iran to some extent. How they choose to use that, of course, is China’s choice,” the official said. “Iran’s influence over the Houthis, and the Houthis’ destabilization of global shipping, raises serious concerns not just for the U.S. and China but for global trade,” they added. “There should be a clear interest in China in trying to quiet some of those attacks.” The civil war in Myanmar was also discussed by Sullivan and Wang, building off talks between Sullivan and Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin on Friday, during which the official said Sullivan “stressed the importance” of getting humanitarian aid into Myanmar. However, the official said the United States was less hopeful about China’s assistance in pushing North Korea to end its growing nuclear weapons program or its recent provision of ballistic missiles to Russia. “I’m not sure I would characterize anything recently as constructive,” the official said, adding the United States still hoped China would come round to helping “bring us back to the path of denuclearization.”

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Fate of junta officers unclear following surrender to rebels in Myanmar’s Shan state

Speculation is swirling over the fate of six brigadiers-general from the Burmese military following their surrender of a strategic Shan state city to ethnic rebels earlier this month in a humiliating setback to the ruling junta. The six were commanding officers deployed in the junta’s Kokang regional command center at Laukkai, the largest base in northern Shan state near the Chinese border. The base was overrun on Jan. 4 by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, or MNDAA, prompting 2,100 soldiers in the facility to lay down their arms. Soldiers and family members were permitted to leave by the rebels. Sources close to the military told RFA Burmese that on Jan. 6, the six generals were flown by helicopter to the Northeast Regional Military Command headquarters, and later sent to the capital Naypyidaw.  The sources spoke on condition of anonymity due to security concerns. AFP, citing an unnamed military source, said the six generals had been taken into custody. The Irrawaddy online news journal on Tuesday cited unnamed “junta sources” as saying that three had been sentenced to death, and three jailed for life. The sources said the six had been charged under military law for “shamefully abandoning” their posts. RFA could not immediately confirm the sentences. AFP on Tuesday quoted the junta spokesman Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun as saying there was “no sentence for the six brigadier-generals yet.” The officers were identified as Brigadiers-General Moe Kyaw Thu, the head of Laukkai headquarters; Tun Tun Myint, the acting chief of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone; and Zaw Myo Win, commander of the 55th Division; and Aye Min Oo, Thaw Zin Oo, and Aung Zaw Lin – the heads of Operation Centers 14, 16, and 12, respectively. Sentences may have repercussions Analysts said that stiff sentences for the generals could have major repercussions within the military. Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington and an adjunct at Georgetown University, called the reported sentences “extremely draconian,” adding that, if true, they are “likely to cause an enormous backlash within the senior officer corps,” particularly if they were simply following orders from Naypyidaw. Regardless, he said, “no amount of scapegoats will make up for the SAC’s gross incompetence in managing the economy and war effort,” using an acronym for the official name of the junta, the State Administration Council. This photo taken on Dec. 10, 2023 shows members of the Mandalay People’s Defense Forces on patrol amid clashes with Myanmar’s military in northern Shan State.(AFP) Former Captain Aung Myo Khat, who now advises Myanmar’s resistance forces as part of the anti-junta Civil Disobedience Movement, agreed that the officers had likely surrendered on Naypyidaw’s orders, and that dealing with them had become a delicate situation for the junta. “If the soldiers who retreated learn about [the junta leadership] taking such action against their commanders, there may be a rebellion,” he said. “On the other hand, if no action is taken, battalion commanders and officers … in all parts of Myanmar may also follow in their footsteps and surrender. So, I think [junta leaders] are in a dilemma.” Than Soe Naing, a political commentator in Myanmar, said that regardless of who ordered the surrender, it was “a result of [the junta’s] mismanagement.” “Now there are lots of complaints about [mismanagement] in the army, and soldiers have lost confidence,” he said. “The idea that they cannot win the battle and therefore have to launch a suicide attack or surrender is dominating [the mindset of junta troops] in the entire Northeast region, and its spreading.” Leadership facing criticism The MNDAA claims that the seizure of Laukkai resulted in the largest surrender by the military during Operation 1027, an offensive it began in late October as part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armies, along with the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army. Since its launch, the alliance has reportedly captured 15 cities in northern Shan state, seized control of more than 200 military camps, and prompted the surrender of some 4,000 junta troops. Myanmar’s military chief Min Aung Hlaing makes a speech during a defense and security council meeting in Naypyidaw, Jan. 31, 2023. (Provided by Myanmar Military Information Team/AFP) Nearly three years since its February 2021 coup d’etat, the military’s control of Myanmar is “rapidly diminishing,” Zach Abuza said, noting that there are growing calls for junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to step down. “There will be schisms within the military leadership between those who are interested in negotiating a political settlement and those who feel that the military hasn’t been sufficiently resolute in crushing the dissent,” he said. Min Aung Hlaing has faced increasing criticism over his handling of Operation 1027 and for allowing Myanmar’s once-strong military to appear weak under his watch. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Mat Pennington.

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Bhutan ‘open for business’ as voters choose former PM Tobgay to rebuild economy

“Bhutan is open for business,” wrote Prime Minister-elect Tshering Tobgay on X, after the people of the tiny Himalayan kingdom returned him to power in parliamentary elections this month. Analysts say Tobgay’s two-thirds majority win indicates the 800,000 people of Bhutan are pinning their hopes on an experienced hand to rebuild the economy, reverse an ongoing migration crisis, and strengthen ties with the landlocked nation’s two neighbors, India and Tibet, amidst ongoing border negotiations with China.  The victory by Harvard-educated conservation advocate Tobgay, 58 – who served as Bhutan’s second democratically elected prime minister between 2013 and 2018 – comes as the country faces “unprecedented challenges” that are prompting it to tailor its famed “Gross National Happiness”(GNH) policy to one that takes into account its economic needs.  Tobgay’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP) – which promised to leverage GNH in its efforts to turn Bhutan into a developed nation – won 30 of the 47 National Assembly seats, while its rival Bhutan Tendrel Party (BTP) won the remaining 17 seats in Bhutan’s fourth general elections since its 2008 transition from an from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy, with a bicameral elected parliament. Bhutan’s Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay with his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi before their meeting at Hyderabad House in New Delhi, India, July 6, 2018. (Altaf Hussain/Reuters) Bhutan’s GNH index was first conceptualized in 1972 by the King Jigme Singye Wangchuk as a “holistic approach” to sustainable development and a more important measure of growth than gross domestic product. Since then, the country’s leaders have promoted and the model — which emphasizes good governance, sustainable development, cultural preservation and promotion, and environmental conservation — widely regarded as Bhutan’s soft power export to the world.  However, concerns about the economy and record high youth unemployment levels of 28.6%, which have forced young Bhutanese to emigrate in large numbers for better job opportunities, have weighed on this election, with both parties citing economic growth as a key priority. The PDP has said it believes that “…GNH should continue to be the springboard to enhance peace, prosperity, and happiness for all Bhutanese in our collective journey to become a developed nation.”  “The PDP has the experience of having worked as the opposition in the first democratic government and as the ruling party in the second. So, it has exposure to different aspects of governance,” said Dasho Kunzang Wangdi, Bhutan’s former chief election commissioner, who set up and ran the country’s first democratic elections in 2008.  “We are hopeful their efforts will be geared towards not only reviving but also giving an added fillip to economic growth and balancing that with the need to ensure the general well-being of the people of Bhutan,” he added. Balancing happiness and growth Tobgay – who detailed an ambitious 12-point economic transformation plan to turn Bhutan into a developed nation by 2047 – is expected to lead the implementation of a 15 billion ngultrum (US$181 million) economic stimulus plan and drive initiatives to attract foreign direct investment, improve ease of doing business, and boost export and tourism levels.   “Our nation’s economy is teetering on the brink of collapse. With an average growth rate of just 1.7% in the past five years, our economy is at its worst in our recent history,” said Tobgay in his party’s manifesto, titled ‘A Contract with Bhutan.’ “The next five years are crucial for us to rebuild – get our economy back on track, enable private businesses to thrive, increase job opportunities, revitalize our education and healthcare systems, uplift the poor, empower our public servants, transform agriculture, and boost national revenue generation,” Tobgay added. He also plans to accelerate Bhutan’s hydropower and renewable energy generation, while bolstering the country’s private sector through the establishment of special economic zones and the privatization and divestmens of state-owned enterprises to boost capital markets.  Tobgay’s office did not immediately respond to Radio Free Asia’s request for comment on his program. A Bhutanese man looks at posters of candidates on the eve of polling to the upper house National Council in Samdrup Jonkhar, Bhutan, April 22, 2013. Bhutan ended more than a century of absolute monarchy with its first parliamentary elections in 2008. (Anupam Nath/AP) Tobgay’s approach represents “a pragmatic tailoring of the GNH concept to what the world needs today,” Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy, an associate fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, a Washington, D.C. think tank. “Bhutan knows that it cannot be isolated from the rest of the world and the rest of the economy, and that’s why this whole special economic zone has been proposed. And I think that is a classic example of how Bhutan tailors its GNH concept with its economic growth and economic need,” he told Radio Free Asia. Bhutan has been gradually boosting the communications and information technology sector since the early 2010s, and the move to set up the SEZs intends to draw investment and sustainable development through service-intensive projects such as resorts and IT parks, rather than industrial projects, Shivamurthy said. “There’s a massive expectation from the new government. I think people have voted for this new government for the very reason that they know this party… and expect that this experienced party will offer them solutions rather than a new party coming in and trying to start from scratch,” he added.  Namgay Pem, a Bhutanese citizen who cast her vote at the Lingmu-Toedwang Constituency in Punakha District, one of the 20 dzongkhags or districts comprising Bhutan, echoed that sentiment. “The interventions that the government brings in should not compromise the happiness and well-being of the citizens, and that GNH, which is the main philosophy, should guide all the developmental and economic developments in the country,” she said. Relations with India and China The election was closely watched by India, against the backdrop of Bhutan’s ongoing border negotiations with China – an issue of strategic concern for India, which has faced border disputes and skirmishes with its northern neighbor.  In October, Bhutanese Foreign Minister Dr Tandi Dorji visited…

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The Myanmar military’s air superiority is slipping away amid sanctions and opposition attacks

One of the most important setbacks for Myanmar’s military since an opposition alliance launched Operation 1027 last October has been the loss of three different aircraft: two jet trainers and an Mi-17 heavy-lift helicopter. An Mi-35 attack helicopter was also lost in 2023.  The Myanmar military should have total air superiority.  For the first two years of the conflict, the opposition National Unity Government’s (NUG) best air defense was doxing Air Force pilots – publishing their addresses, as part of an assassination campaign. Gradually, the NUG’s People’s Defense Force militias began to erode the junta’s air superiority by effectively deploying armed drones.  Significantly, we’re now seeing Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs) begin to deploy air defenses, at a time when the junta has become even more dependent on air attacks. That increased tempo of operations requires more maintenance on overworked airframes. Fighters of anti-junta Mandalay People’s Defense Forces prepare a drone with an explosive-drop amid clashes with Myanmar junta forces in northern Shan State, Dec. 11, 2023. These military junta losses matter for three reasons. First, while not small by regional standards, the Myanmar Air Force (MAF) certainly does not have excess capacity. At the top end, it has some 31 SU-29s and four  recently delivered SU-30s from Russia.  The recently delivered seven JF-17s multi-role fighters, jointly produced by China and Pakistan, are reportedly already grounded due to cracks in their airframes and other maintenance issues.  Airworthiness questions On paper, Myanmar has approximately 40 other jet fighters, but these are old, Chinese-produced knock-off Russian jets from the 1990s. They are well beyond their service life.  The MAF is thought to have 20 Nanchang Q-5s, the Chinese version of the MiG-19, down from the 36 it imported from 1994-2001. It also has some 21 Chengdu J-7s, a Chinese produced MiG-21. That’s down from some 60 that it had purchased from 1990-1999.  It’s unclear how many of these fighters are still airworthy.  Myanmar’s military has relied on its 18 Russian-built Yak-130 trainers for much of its combat operations. Since the February 2021 coup, Myanmar has taken delivery of some six Guizhou JL-9 jet trainers, referred to as FTC-2000G, which have a spotty performance and safety record.  A fighter of anti-junta Mandalay People’s Defense Forces pilots a drone near the frontline amid clashes with Myanmar junta forces in northern Shan State, Dec.11, 2023. (AFP Photo) The MAF also flies an unknown number of Chinese K-8 trainers that can be used for ground support. Second, we should also assume that given sanctions on the Singapore-based companies that have been the key importers of spare parts, the overall lack of foreign exchange available to the junta, and other supply chain issues, including those caused by Russia’s war in Ukraine, that around 20% of the aircraft are probably not operational.  In December 2023, the sanctioned director of Sky Aviator and two others were caught trying to  smuggle 508,925 Singapore dollars (US $382,380) in cash out of that city-state. Sky Aviator, which has an office in Singapore, had a large contract to purchase spare parts for the air force. Another sanctioned firm, Sky Royal Hero Company Limited, has the contract for the maintenance and spare parts for servicing the Russian jet fighters.  For nearly three years, the MAF has been flying at increased tempos without the scheduled maintenance they require.  Airstrikes ramping up The military’s promised counter offensive has not materialized. Over 4,000 troops have surrendered since Operation 1027 began, and well-documented recruitment issues mean the military does not have a sufficient number of troops to launch ground offensives across the multiple battle zones, which has forced them to rely on long range artillery and air strikes. An independent research firm documented 336 airstrikes in December 2023, alone, with nearly half against the Three Brotherhood Alliance, the group of ethnic armies behind Operation 1027.. The loss of one of their 12 already over-taxed heavy lift helicopters is another important setback for the military’s counter-offensive. One of their tactical advantages has been air mobility and resupply, especially given their loss of key roads. Although the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) claims to have shot down the Guizhou JL-9/FTC-2000G on Jan. 17, there is little evidence to support this, Video footage that shows the plane falling from the sky, without smoke or any other sign of hostile fire, indicates likely engine failure. Myanmar Air Force Jet fighters drop bombs during military exercises in Ayeyarwady delta region, Feb. 2, 2018. (Lynn Bo Bo/Pool via AP) That leads to the third implication: The MAF is losing aircraft to hostile fire.   While the military claims that it was a technical malfunction that brought down a K-8 trainer, Karenni forces claim to have shot it down.  The KIA claims to have shot down an Mi-17 transport helicopter, killing all six crew members on Jan. 3.   Both helicopters and the trainers, especially when they are being used for ground attacks, are vulnerable to small arms fire.  Eyes on Beijing But these developments also beg the question: What weapons are being used to down the aircraft? The only ethnic armed group that is known to have shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles (known as MANPADs) is the United Wa State Army (UWSA).  Until very recently, the UWSA has sat out the conflict, neither supporting the junta nor joining the NUG. It recently declared its neutrality in the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s Operation 1027, though it did receive two townships from them.  A man looks on at homes destroyed after air and artillery strikes in Mung Lai Hkyet displacement camp in northern Kachin state, Oct. 10, 2023. (AP Photo) Though the UWSA has quietly sold weapons to other ethnic armies and the NUG, it has, to date, refrained from selling MANPADs.  Has that changed? And if so, why now? It was long believed that they would not sell the weapons for fear of angering China. So did China approve the transfer, or are the groups now willing to incur Beijing’s wrath?  The KIA claims that they shot down the Mi-17…

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What role did China play in a rebel group’s victory in northern Myanmar?

When the Three Brotherhood Alliance of rebel groups in Myanmar started a campaign against junta forces in the northern part of the country they chose a slogan designed to win support from a fourth potential ally: China. “Wipe out the scammers, rescue our compatriots,” the group declared in the message.  China, which shares a border with Kokang, a region in Shan state in northern Myanmar, had expressed increasing frustration with organized crime rings that had been allowed to operate in the area by junta-aligned forces. An estimated 120,000 people are being held in Myanmar against their will. Chinese nationals have both been trafficked by these groups and fleeced by them.  The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army – which along with the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army make up the Alliance – had tried and failed twice before to retake the region. This time, however, Kokang’s capital of Laukkai fell into rebel hands on Jan. 4.  Since then, China has played a clear role in mediating a truce between the two sides. But the initial success of the rebel campaign has led analysts to speculate that it had, in fact, received Chinese backing.  China’s leaders may have sought to kill “two birds with one stone,” according to Deng Yuwen, a political commentator and former journalist  – strengthening China’s position in the region while removing the destabilizing threat presented by the scam compounds. “The Chinese government can use the scamming operations as a way to secretly support local forces … and control the area that way,” Deng said.  “They solve the scamming problem and cultivate bold agents of the Chinese state at the same time,” he said, meaning China believes the new leaders of Kokang will better reflect its interests.  Chinese police arrest Chinese nationals allegedly involved in online scamming operations in Myanmar, Dec. 10, 2023. (Kokang officials) A ‘king’ and a coup Kokang has long been in China’s orbit, and many of its residents are ethnically Chinese. In the mid-20th century, Kokang served as a base for Myanmar communists.  With the collapse of the Communist Party of Burma in 1989, local warlord Peng Jiasheng – whose nickname was “the king of Kokang” – switched his allegiance to the junta. The military granted the region autonomy and allowed Peng to keep his military presence in the area, though China remained an important patron.  In 2009, Peng was ousted in a coup led by his second-in-command, Bai Suocheng, who consolidated his family’s control over the state. Bai allowed government troops to be stationed in Kokang for the first time while residents were granted Myanmar nationality.  Bai offered sanctuary to criminal groups in return for huge payouts that also benefited the junta. Eventually, massive, organized scam operations began to thrive in Kokang. China pushes back Last year, the Chinese government appeared fed up. In August, it took part in a joint operation with Myanmar and Thailand targeting the scam centers. Over the intervening months, more than 40,000 Chinese nationals were arrested in Shan state for involvement with online scams, according to data collected by RFA.  A number of powerful Kokang business people were arrested at a trade fair in China in October, and in November, Beijing issued arrest warrants for a well-connected Kokang politician and three family members on allegations of masterminding an online scam ring.  China’s Ministry of Public Security issued arrest warrants for 10 people, including the former chairman of the Kokang self-administered region, Bai Suocheng [top row, first left], his son Bai Yingcang [top row, second left] and his daughter Bai Yinglan [top row, third left]. (The Kokang) On Dec. 10, China’s Ministry of Public Security put out another wanted list, naming 10 individuals in connection with the scams, including Bai Suocheng, his grown children and a few junta officials. The move not only showed Beijing’s growing impatience with Myanmar’s handling of the scam rings, but signaled that China favored leaders in Kokang more closely aligned with its national interests. The prince’s plans After he had been dethroned as the king of Kokang, Peng Jiasheng resurfaced as the leader of the MNDAA, fighting Myanmar forces on occasion without significant success. When he died in 2022, his son, Peng Denren, took over and immediately made plans to reclaim control of his father’s lost territory. The Alliance launched “Operation 1027” – so-called for the on Oct. 27, 2023, date – offensive against Myanmar military strongholds in northern Myanmar. Even though the Alliance remained outnumbered by government troops, the rebel forces scored several significant victories early on. Its soldiers have since seized more than 300 military bases, around a dozen towns, and won control of several key trade routes with the neighboring Chinese province of Yunnan. Members of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army walk past a Myanmar military base after seizing it during clashes near Laukkaing township in Myanmar’s northern Shan state, Oct. 28, 2023. (Kokang Information Network/AFP) Suspicion over ‘foreign’ experts Myanmar’s junta chief in November claimed that the ethnic-minority armed groups were getting outside assistance, according to a report by Agence France-Presse.  He said the rebels had been using “drones with advanced technology” to attack junta positions and were aided by “foreign drone experts,” although he didn’t specify which country they came from. Li Jiawen, a spokesman for the MNDAA, denied the offensive was aided by the Chinese. “The situation we have today is the result of nearly 70 years of tyranny by the junta,” Li said. Even China’s tacit approval of the operation is important, Yun Sun, the director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, said in an interview with RFA. “The biggest support that China has lended to this organization is to not stop them,” she said.  Rebel forces were able to retreat over the border to avoid junta artillery barrages. China allowed the flow of money and goods in Shan state that helped to sustain the rebels to continue, Sun said.  And there was likely a psychological…

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Cambodians need consumer rights NGOs in an era of scams and scandals

Long gone is the heyday of Cambodia’s civil society, which a decade ago was the most vibrant and rumbustious in Southeast Asia.  The authoritarian Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), in power since 1979 and now firmly in control of a one-party state, saw it as a threat and has systematically crushed the public sphere since 2013. Some NGOs still exist and are performing brave work, but they have been greatly defanged and are petrified of lawsuits or dissolution by the ruling party.  Despite decades of tens of millions of dollars being pumped into Cambodia’s NGO sector, mainly from foreign governments, there has never been an association created that specifically represents the interests of consumers. There is apparently an NGO registered as the Cambodian Consumer Association, but it has no website and good luck trying to find out anything about its activity.  Leader of Cambodian People’s Party Hun Sen and his son Prime Minister Hun Manet release pigeons during a ceremony to mark the 45th anniversary of the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime in Phnom Penh on Jan. 7, 2024. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) Consumers International, a global organization for consumer groups, has no affiliate in Cambodia, according to its website. “Without consumer protection associations,” a report on Cambodia stated, “there will be an imbalance of bargaining power between consumers, and producers and sellers of products and services. As a result, consumers’ rights are not fully protected.”  Indeed, on the one hand, consumption is increasing and habits are changing. Household final consumption expenditure rose to $18.1 billion in 2021, up from around $10 billion in 2011 and just $3.3 billion in 2001, according to World Bank figures. Cambodia’s e-commerce sector, difficult to regulate, is expected to surge in value to $1.78 billion in 2025, more than double what it was worth in 2020.  ‘Scam-state’ Yet, there remain major concerns about the quality of products being sold, especially by traders on Facebook, and other consumer protection issues. Certainly not helping the situation, Cambodia has gotten a damaging reputation as a country of scammers—a “scam-state”, if you like. More and more Cambodians are also becoming consumers of government services, including the expanding healthcare sector, and contributors to the state through growing taxation collection.  On the other hand, business groups, foreign corporations and the country’s powerful tycoons, many of whom have married into the political aristocracy, are increasingly calling the shots. A Cambodian protest against a controversial law regulating non-governmental organizations in Phnom Penh, July 24, 2015. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) Hun Manet, who took over as prime minister from his long-serving father in August, has pitched himself as a friend to the capitalist class. His young government spent months preparing for its first Government-Private Sector Forum in November, at which Hun Manet stressed: “Today’s forum is also a testament to the close cooperation and culture of dialogue between the government and the private sector to jointly address the problems and concerns of investors in order to promote private sector development in Cambodia”.  The claim made by the CPP throughout the decades is that economic freedom is more important than political freedom. Yet rather unequal freedom when one side (the businesses and producers) has vast institutional power and the ear of the premier, yet there are no comparable groups defending the interests of consumers.  Cambodia only adopted a Law on Consumer Protection in November 2019, and the commerce ministry created a National Programme on Consumer Protection last year. A lengthy report published in late 2021 by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, titled Law in the Digital Age: Protection of Consumer Rights, noted that the “actual implementation of [the Law on Consumer Protection] in promoting and protecting consumer rights is questionable.”  Southeast Asian examples Chapter Seven of this report, titled “Legal and Practical Considerations for Establishing a Consumer Association in Cambodia,”  is an interesting read on this topic. The report recommended that “civil society and nongovernmental institutions need to play an outstanding role as check and balance agents in overseeing consumer rights promotion and protection in both traditional and electronic commerce. Civil society and NGOs shall urge, support, and join the establishment of consumer associations in different sectors to ensure that consumer rights to safety, rights to information, rights to choose, rights to be heard of concerns, and rights to redress are guaranteed.” Cambodian security officers detain protesters in prisoner uniforms as they demonstrate against a controversial law regulating non-governmental organizations outside the National Assembly building in Phnom Penh, July 26, 2015. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) There are good examples across Southeast Asia. One is the Consumers Association of Singapore, a non-profit, non-governmental organization. It runs comparison websites that provide consumers with information on prices charged by companies for everyday necessities and energy. It operates an Accredited Businesses List so that consumers can check if companies are reputable. Importantly, consumers can also submit complaints on its websites which are then investigated.  Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, there is also the Federation of Malaysian Consumers Associations, the Myanmar Consumers’ Union, a Foundation for Consumers in Thailand and a Coalition for Consumer Protection and Welfare in the Philippines.  An overarching “Consumers Association of Cambodia” would be a welcome addition to the public sphere and, with the right funding, including from foreign donors, could engage in the same roles as the Singaporean counterpart. Yet, more targeted associations would also be needed.  Using public money One area could be in tax. In 2013, domestic tax revenue was just $900 million, or around $60 per capita. By 2022, it had spiked to $3.45 billion, or $206 per capita. As such, most Cambodians have become taxpayers as well as consumers of government services in recent years. The National Social Security Fund, a national healthcare insurance, has expanded rapidly in recent years and  Hun Manet vows to expand it further. State expenditure has increased from $409 million (13 percent of GDP) in 2013 to $7.9 billion (27 percent of GDP) in 2022. Yet there remains no “Taxpayers Alliance of Cambodia”. Such an association would lobby the government to…

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Time is not on Myanmar junta’s side, almost 3 years after coup

In his televised New Year’s address to the country, Myanmar’s junta leader Min Aung Hlaing vowed to prioritize economic growth in 2024, apportioning all the blame for the country’s sharp economic contraction on the opposition his coup ousted almost three years ago.   Min Aung Hlaing made no mention of the military’s setbacks since the Three Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armies in northern Myanmar launched their offensive on October 27, 2023. And while the losses, which include over 30 towns and the surrender of over 3,000 troops are real, the continued economic crisis remains the junta’s single largest vulnerability. Smoke rises from a burning Myanmar military compound amid clashes with armed group Ta’ang National Liberation Army in northern Shan State, Dec. 13, 2023. (AFP Photo) The economy has shrunk by 10-12 percent since the Feb. 1,  2021 coup that deposed the National League For Democracy-led government.  In a recent report, the World Bank predicted the country would only see 1% growth in 2024, given the “broad-based slowdown across productive sectors including agriculture, manufacturing, and trade.”  Over half the population is living beneath the poverty line, while the World Bank found that 40% of surveyed families saw a decline in income in 2023 compared to 2022. The kyat currency has lost half of its value since the coup and it now appears that the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta is formally known, has given up any hope of controlling it.  Forex woes In early December 2023, the Central Bank of Myanmar announced that it would no longer fix the exchange rate, allowing the currency to trade at market prices.  This was a tacit acknowledgement that the gap between the official rate of 2,100 kyat per U.S. dollar  and black market rate of 3,500 kyat per greenback was too large to ignore, and that the regime no longer had foreign exchange reserves to prop up the declining kyat.  The shortage of dollars also portends a further energy crisis. Electric black- and brown-outs have been common throughout the country, even in Naypyidaw. And shortages of gasoline and diesel increased in late-2023.  Fighters of Ta’ang National Liberation Army search a building after running over a compound belonging to Myanmar junta military in Shan State, Dec. 12, 2023. (AFP Photo) The SAC had subsidized energy imports by making dollars available to politically-connected energy importers at below market rates in order to ensure a steady supply of fuel. The junta no longer can afford that.  In late December, there were reports of tankers refusing to unload in Yangon’s Thaliwa port until they were paid, indicating a dire shortage of dollars. The regime has been encouraging border trade with China and Thailand, which is conducted in Chinese yuan or Thai baht. But the loss of key border areas is hampering that.  While SAC forces still control the border city of Muse, which handles almost 90% of border trade with China, the Three Brotherhood Alliance now controls the Mile 105 Trade Zone as well as a host of smaller border crossings, such as Chin Shwe Haw. Muse and Lashio are the only towns in northern Shan State that are still under junta control. Ethnic armies on the march The Three Brotherhood Alliance – Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta’ang National Liberation Army – now controls almost all towns along highways 3 and 34, to the border.  Ta’ang National Liberation Army forces captured a military camp as far west as Nawnghkio, which is only 15 miles from Pyin Oo Lwin, home of the Defense Services Academy, though the Air Force has intensified airstrikes to retake the town.  Among advances by other ethnic armies, Karenni forces now control much of the state including the trade routes to Mae Hong Son in Thailand. The Karen National Union has been consolidating its position along the Thai border.  Fuel prices, delays at the border and increased transportation costs resulted in some $500 million in lost border trade in the two months following the launch of Operation 1027 in northern Shan State. Border trade accounts for 40% of exports and 21% of imports.  Myanmar Now, citing Commerce Ministry figures, found that exports to Thailand and China in the last 9 months of 2023 fell by $178 and $157 million, respectively. Residents of an improvised neighborhood gather to receive rice distributed by the World Food on the outskirts of Yangon, May 21, 2021. Over half the population in Myanmar live beneath the poverty line. (AFP Photo) Sector after sector have been hit hard.  In late November, the SAC stopped supplying fuel to industrial estates, calling on factory owners to negotiate their own energy purchases. In the key garment sector, 271 of 817 factories (33%) have shut down since the coup – due to shortages of foreign exchange to pay for raw materials, high energy prices, and the loss contracts and foreign investor unease with the human rights situation. Even Chinese-owned firms are closing. For those still employed, wages are stagnant and being eaten up by inflation, which remains high at 29%. Prices of staples, including rice, eggs, and cooking oil, have soared.  The junta refused to increase the minimum wage for workers, instead offering a 1,000-kyat (US$0.20) daily allowance. The current minimum wage was set in 2018. Myanmar Kyat notes are seen in a donation coffer at a Buddhist pagoda in Yangon, April 17, 2017. (Roberto Schmidt/AFP) The agriculture sector has been impacted by changing weather patterns and shortages of imported fertilizers and pesticides. While the cost of production has soared for farmers, in mid-September 2023, the junta imposed price ceilings on wholesale rice trade to stabilize prices for urban consumers. U.S.-imposed sanctions on the Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank and Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank, which were responsible for most of the U.S. dollar transactions, have crippled foreign trade. Singapore’s United Overseas Bank has been quietly closing Myanmar-linked accounts, further hampering their international transactions. In December 2023, three Myanmar nationals, including Kyaw Min Oo, the CEO of Sky Aviator, were…

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Counting underway in Taiwan’s pivotal presidential election

Voting has ended and counting is underway in Taiwan’s presidential election, a ballot that will shape its future relationship with China and stance on independence and stability. Polls opened at 8:00 a.m. at nearly 18,000 locations, from the island’s south to its capital Taipei and closed at 4 p.m with votes immediately being counted and reported to the election authorities soon after. The result for Saturday’s election should be clear by late evening when the losers concede and the winner gives a victory speech. At stake is the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait between the Chinese mainland and the self-governed island, claimed by Beijing as its own, but equally important are bread-and-butter issues. Key candidates in the presidential race are: Vice President Lai Ching-te of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Hou Yu-ih of the Beijing-favored Kuomintang (KMT) and Ko Wen-je of Taiwan’s People’s Party (TPP). Former physician and mayor of Tainan, Lai, known for his support of Taiwan independence, aims to continue President Tsai’s policies of maintaining Taiwan’s de facto independence amidst heightened tensions with Beijing. Facing challenges like slow wage growth and high housing costs, Lai’s DPP, once an opposition to the KMT’s rule, now faces criticisms of being the establishment. “Today is a glorious day, great weather to vote. I encourage everyone to go vote, demonstrate the vigor of Taiwanese democracy,” said Lai after casting his vote in his hometown of Tainan. “Let Taiwan continue to move forward.” Hou from the KMT, a former police officer and mayor of New Taipei City, represents a “Taiwanese flavor” in politics, which his party believes could help attract a broader voter base beyond its traditional supporters; he advocates for dialogue with Beijing under the “1992 consensus” to reduce cross-strait tensions. However, the viability of this consensus is in question since Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2019 interpretation aligned it with a stringent “one China principle,” echoing the increasingly restrictive model seen in Hong Kong. “I am very happy to see people voluntarily come out to vote early in the morning. This demonstrates a very important voting behavior of Taiwanese democracy in the electoral process – where democracy is used to select the most ideal president, vice president and legislators,” said Hou after voting in New Taipei City. “More importantly, no matter how chaotic the election process is, everyone must unite after the election.” Ko, a former surgeon turned politician, founded the TPP four years ago, focusing on domestic issues like energy and housing, after a surprising victory in Taipei’s mayoral race as an independent. While the TPP isn’t strong enough to dominate the legislature, Ko aims to position it as a parliamentary power broker, advocating for a coalition with the KMT and offering a “third choice” to voters, with policies aligning more closely with the KMT’s stance on China. Asked by journalists how he felt after casting his ballot in Taipei, Ko said:”Keep a normal mind, finish what one needs to finish every day, and plan for the next stage after each is completed.” An official of a polling station holds up a ballot slip, as vote counting for the presidential elections commences, at a high school in New Taipei City on January 13, 2024. (Sam Yeh / AFP) Just hours before the polls got underway China continued to assert its presence in the region. Taiwan’s defense ministry said eight People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft and six PLA Navy vessels were detected around the island as of 6 a.m. local time, with one aircraft entering Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone. Some voters may be dissuaded from supporting independence-leaning candidates by China’s military threats, but the United States has pledged support for whichever government forms. A White House official said on Wednesday that U.S. President Joe Biden will send an “unofficial” delegation of former officials to Taiwan following the presidential elections. Aside from tensions with China, the Taiwan election is also predominantly determined by domestic concerns. In November 2023, Taiwan’s statistics bureau reported its GDP growth forecast as 1.42%, the lowest since 2008. Taiwan is grappling with soaring housing prices, ranked among the highest globally, while its wage levels were among the lowest compared to other developed economies, according to March figures. The outcome of the elections will also impact the security and economy of neighboring countries like Japan and South Korea. Taro Aso, the former Prime Minister of Japan, recently warned that China’s territorial claims on Taiwan could lead to a dire crisis for Japan, necessitating Tokyo’s intervention in the Taiwan Strait during any conflict to protect its citizens. Additionally, a Bloomberg Economics report released on Tuesday indicated that South Korea’s GDP would face the second-largest drop, after Taiwan, if a war were to break out between China and the democratic island. A woman casts her vote in the presidential election at a polling station in a temple in New Taipei City on Jan. 13, 2024. (Alastair Pike/AFP) Experts who spoke to Radio Free Asia said they believe maintaining the status quo is considered the safest approach regardless of the outcome of the elections.  Despite Beijing’s ongoing threats to use force to reclaim Taiwan, there’s little belief in an immediate invasion by China, they said, citing several factors at play: Taiwan’s determination to maintain its freedom and identity, the relations between Washington and Beijing, and the U.S.’s commitment to protecting Taiwan’s interests. Above all, the economic cost of a conflict could be devastating for the region and the world. For one, Taiwan is the leading global producer of the most advanced semiconductors.  Beyond the presidential and vice presidential elections, there are also 113 legislative seats up for grabs. More than 83% of the total population, or approximately 19.55 million voters, are eligible to cast their ballot. In 2020, DPP President Tsai Ing-wen and her running mate Lai won over 8.17 million votes, or 57.13% of the total, to defeat Han Kuo-yu and Chang San-cheng of the KMT. Additionally, a majority of seats was gained by the DPP in the…

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China helps world achieve record renewable energy growth

China’s “extraordinary” acceleration in renewable energy capacity propelled 2023 to witness the fastest global growth rate in over twenty years, the International Energy Agency (IEA) said in a new report on Thursday. The world’s annual additions to renewable electricity generation capacity soared by nearly 50%, reaching approximately 510 gigawatts (GW) – marking the 22nd consecutive year of setting new records in renewable capacity growth, the Paris-based IEA said in its Renewables 2023 report.  According to the report, China’s deployment of solar PV (photovoltaic) in 2023 increased by 116%, matching the global total of 2022, while its wind power installations increased by 66% compared to the previous year. The report predicted that the next five years will see the fastest growth yet, but warned the lack of financing for emerging and developing economies is a vital issue. The current expansion of renewable power has made the COP28 goal of tripling global capacity to at least 11,000 GW by 2030, which more than 130 governments agreed to during the climate change conference last month in Dubai. China, India, and Indonesia did not join the pledge due to its accompanying anti-coal stance and the more demanding goal of doubling the average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements to 4%. “Onshore wind and solar PV are cheaper today than new fossil fuel plants almost everywhere and cheaper than existing fossil fuel plants in most countries,” IEA’s executive director Fatih Birol said. “For me, the most important challenge for the international community is rapidly scaling up financing and deployment of renewables in most emerging and developing economies, many of which are being left behind in the new energy economy.” “Success in meeting the tripling goal will hinge on this.” This infographic shows renewable electricity capacity growth by country/region between 2005 and 2028. (IEA) Under existing policies and market conditions, global renewable power capacity is expected to grow to 7,300 GW by 2028, with renewables overtaking coal to become the largest source of global electricity generation by early 2025, according to IEA projection. The growth trajectory is about 2.5 times its current level, which is still short of the tripling goal by 2030. Asia-Pacific progress report The world’s second-biggest economy, China, has a renewable energy capacity to triple the previous five years’ increase of 2,000 GW in the next five years, making up 56% of the global increase, IEA said. From 2023 to 2028, China will add almost four times more renewable capacity than the European Union and five times more than the US, the second and third-largest growth market.  According to IEA’s forecast, the world’s renewables “powerhouse” is expected to reach its national 2030 target for wind and solar PV installations – 1,200 GW – this year, six years ahead of schedule. By 2028, almost half of China’s electricity generation will come from renewable energy sources. A solar farm operates next to Donggou village near Shijiazhuang city in northern China’s Hebei province, Nov. 10, 2023. (Ng Han Guan/AP) Apart from China, the rest of Asia will see renewable capacity grow by 430 GW by 2028, a 73% increase from 2022 levels, with India driving half of the regional growth and ASEAN adding 14%.  India is projected to add 205 GW by 2028, doubling its 2022 capacity, and is poised to become the third-largest global market for renewables.  The 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is expected to increase renewable capacity by a combined 63 GW by 2028, IEA said. Southeast Asia has the potential to offer one of the highest global renewable growth possibilities, the IEA said, but would require “more ambitious renewable energy targets and prompt implementation of long-term, transparent, and competitive support policies.” In major Southeast Asian economies such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand, regulations and policy support gaps hinder renewable energy growth and project development. The overcapacity of young, contract-bound fossil fuel power plants, particularly coal and gas, impedes the transition to renewable energy by financially disincentivizing utilities from investing in new renewable projects.  Vietnam’s rapid solar PV boom, with installations reaching 20 GW in 2019-2020, has led to challenges in integration, with a pressing need for more investment in transmission and distribution infrastructure. Last year, Vietnam and Indonesia signed into the Just Energy Transition Programme in a shift towards reassessing and potentially retiring older conventional plants, aided by international financial support to alleviate government budget pressures. Edited by Mike Firn and Taejun Kang.

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