More than 5,000 evacuees in Myanmar’s Ayeyarwady region prepare for cyclone to hit

More than 5,000 people have arrived in Labutta township over the past few days, amid warnings that a fierce tropical cyclone is bearing down on Myanmar’s western coast, aid groups helping the evacuees told RFA Wednesday. They said evacuees arrived from the nearby villages of Pyin Sa Lu, Sa Lu Seik and Kwin Pauk and have been put up in monasteries and friends’ homes. One local social assistance group official, who didn’t want to be named for security reasons, told RFA that although monasteries have been providing food it is not enough. “There are places where cyclone evacuees gather to get food [but] there are 400 to 500 evacuees in each monastery or monastic school,” the official said. RFA called the junta spokesperson and social affairs minister for Ayeyarwady region, Maung Maung Than, to ask what was being done to feed and house evacuees and minimize casualties if the cyclone is severe but no one answered. Junta Deputy Information Minister Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun told regime-controlled newspapers Monday that 118 disaster shelters have been built in Ayeyarwady region and 17 more were under construction. He said relief materials had been arranged for 6,000 people in six townships in the region. According to a report by Myanmar’s Department of Meteorology at 7 a.m. local time Wednesday, a Depression in the Bay of Bengal was likely to turn into a Very Severe Cyclonic Storm by Friday morning. The department forecast the storm would make landfall at Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh, Kyaukpyu in Myanmar’s western Rakhine state and the northern Rakhine coast. It warned people to beware of strong winds, heavy rain, flash floods and landslides and issued a warning to flights and shipping near the Myanmar coast. A tropical cyclone is a rapidly rotating storm which has a diameter of between 200 and 1,000 kilometers (124 to 621 miles) and brings violent winds, torrential rains and high waves. Cyclones are named by the U.N. World Meteorological Organization in order to avoid confusion when there is more than one in the same region simultaneously. If winds reach a certain speed, this storm will be named Cyclone Mocha after a port city in Yemen. Myanmar has been hit hard by severe weather conditions in the past. More than 138,000 people died when Cyclone Nargis hit the country in May 2008.  It was the world’s third most deadly meteorological disaster of its time according to the WMO Atlas of Mortality and Economic Losses from Weather, Climate and Water Extremes (1970-2019). About 80,000 people died in Labutta township alone, according to local authorities. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Mike Firn.

Read More

​​Newly published documents reveal how China skirts forced labor scrutiny in Xinjiang

Lazy persons, drunkards, and “other persons with insufficient inner motivation” must be subjected to “repeated … thought education” to ensure they take part in state-sponsored “poverty alleviation” campaigns to pick cotton in China’s Xinjiang region, a previously unpublished internal government document ordered local cadres. If such efforts fail to produce “obvious results,” coercive measures should be taken, the July 2019 document, issued by the Poverty Alleviation Work Group in Kashgar (in Chinese, Kashi) prefecture’s Yarkand (Shache) county, advises authorities. By late 2019, authorities in Yarkand were compiling lists of the “unmotivated,” including individuals as old as 77 years, and proposing solutions for their “laziness,” which included sending them to other counties to labor in cotton fields. The documents were released in a report Tuesday by Adrian Zenz, senior fellow and director in China studies at the Washington-based Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation. They show that state efforts to compel Uyghurs into “poverty alleviation” measures – including labor transfers and seasonal labor – intensified in Xinjiang after 2018. In some cases, the documents mandated an increase of the “political status” of poverty alleviation work, and warned cadres of “severe” repercussions for not achieving outcomes. They also demonstrate that historical models, such as that used by the International Labor Organization, often fall short when used to evaluate state-sponsored coerced labor in areas including Xinjiang because they only account for commercial and not political exploitation, the report said. “If a government like a Western government wants to effectively combat Uyghur forced labor, these are the elements that they need to take into account and look at,” Zenz told RFA Uyghur in an interview. “State-sponsored forced labor is a whole-of-government, whole-of-society approach affecting an entire region, and not just … isolated pockets of forced labor that are detected here and there. It creates a whole regional systemic risk, a societal risk.” Linking forced labor to fighting terrorism By elevating poverty alleviation to a political task, rather than a purely economic one, Beijing has been able to tie forced labor to the eradication of terrorism, Zenz said. “You take them off the land where they might be free to do their own thing and they might have an idle season, so they may choose to work or to not work,” he said.  “But this perceived Uyghur idleness is seen as a national security risk and that’s why the drive in 2018 and 2019 to push Uyghurs into all kinds of work is seen as a matter of national security … and of course, this urgency creates a very strong level of coercion,” Zenz said. In Xinjiang, Beijing has leveraged a centralized authoritarian system to penalize noncompliance with its poverty alleviation campaign, said the report, entitled “Coercive Labor in the Cotton Harvest in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Uzbekistan.” Those penalties included the threat of internment and the detection of deviance through automated systems of preventative policing. “The resulting environments of ‘structurally forced consent’ are not necessarily immediately observable to outsiders, and may be challenging to assess through conventional means such as the ILO’s forced labor indicator framework, which was not designed to evaluate state-sponsored forced labor,” the report said. Legislative teeth Zenz called on the European Union to develop “effective legislation” that targets state-sponsored forced labor affecting an entire region and for the United States to continue to enforce the December 2021 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which requires American. companies that import goods from Xinjiang to prove that they have not been manufactured with Uyghur forced labor at any stage of production. Without the proper tools necessary for the international community to hold China accountable for such practices, “Beijing’s economic and long-term political aims in [Xinjiang] could mean that coercive labor transfers into cotton picking and related industries might persist for a long time to come,” the report warned. Andrew Bremberg, the president of the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation and former U.S. representative to the U.N., told RFA that steps taken by the United States and the international community to address forced labor in Xinjiang are “woefully insufficient” and have done little to change Beijing’s policies in the region. “The United States needs to help lead in this effort both on a bilateral basis, in terms of strengthening the enforcement of our own laws … [and] work[ing] with other countries to hold China accountable in multilateral settings like the International Labor Organization,” he said. “At the same time, we need to strengthen those organizations and entities with other countries to ensure that they better protect against state-sponsored forced labor.” The EU is currently reviewing proposed legislation that would allow for an import ban on products related to severe human rights violations such as forced labor. Bremberg welcomed the proposed legislation, but warned that such a rule must be constructed correctly if the EU wants it to have the desired effect. “If they try to only use forced labor indicators that the ILO has used in the past, it likely will not affect importations of products made by forced labor from Xinjiang, given the unique nature that state-sponsored forced labor poses,” he said. Bremberg said a strong response by the international community that includes boycotts of imports is needed to “make clear to China that their behavior, their actions violating individual rights, human rights … will not be allowed without consequence.” ‘Hidden from plain sight’ The Washington-based Campaign for Uyghurs issued a statement on Tuesday condemning the state-sponsored coercive labor practices outlined in Zenz’s report, which it said reveals the “sociocultural contexts and authoritarian systems that have created coercive labor environments in [Xinjiang], which are not easily captured through standard measures such as the ILO forced labor indicators.” The report “reveals the deeply embedded and systemic dynamics of coercion that have perpetuated environments of ‘structurally forced consent’ in [Xinjiang], leaving innocent Uyghurs powerless and at the mercy of China’s repressive state apparatus,” said CFU Executive Director Rushan Abbas. “These atrocities are hidden from plain sight, making them extremely difficult to detect and…

Read More

As of deadline, 18 parties apply to compete in Cambodia’s July election

Cambodia’s  National Election Committee said Monday that 18 parties have officially declared their intent to participate in the country’s July 23 general elections, when more than 9.7 million voters will decide who will represent them in the national assembly. Monday was the deadline for applications, and the committee said that 11 of the 18 applications have been approved, while some of the other applications are still under review. Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party is expected to dominate in the election, but the upstart main opposition Candlelight Party performed relatively well in last year’s commune elections and could make some noise in July.  The ruling party, however, controls all 125 seats in the assembly because Hun Sen had the Supreme Court dissolve the previous opposition party in the runup to the 2018 election. Deadline registration The Grassroot Democrat Party submitted its application on the last day, nominating 166 full and reserve candidates in 12 constituencies including the capital. Of these candidates, 36 are women and 20 are relatively young, the party’s president Yeng Virak told RFA’s Khmer Service.  Yeng Virak, who is himself vying for a seat representing Phnom Penh, said that the reason why the party is contesting few constituencies is because the party maintains a position of not wanting to split the ballot.  The party is still waiting for National Election Commission approval. RFA could not reach commission spokesman Hang Puthea for comment as of May 8. Fairness required Sam Kuntheamy, the executive director of the Neutral & Impartial Committee for Free and Fair  Elections in Cambodia, an elections watchdog, told RFA that some political parties failed to list candidates for the seventh term because they face budget constraints and a restrictive political environment. However, he believes that the exercise of civil and political rights is key to ensuring that the election process is free, fair and just, so that stakeholders must compete fairly and in accordance with the law. “For all stakeholders, especially political parties, we want them to organize the operation of their political parties appropriately and smoothly, because it is close to the election campaign period,” he said. “We in the civil society also want to observe.” The National Election Committee announced that the official number of eligible voters in the upcoming elections is 9,710,655 and there will be 23,789 polling places nationwide. Translated by Sok Ry Sum. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.

Read More

Indonesia’s president condemns Myanmar attack, says push for peace will continue

Indonesia’s president says an attack on humanitarian workers in Myanmar’s eastern Shan state won’t deter his country in its efforts as this year’s ASEAN chair to try to bring peace to Myanmar. Joko Widodo, commonly known as Jokowi, was speaking in the Indonesian town of Labuan Bajo ahead of a three-day summit of the 10-member grouping which starts Tuesday. He confirmed that members of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) came under fire from an unknown group as they were “delivering humanitarian assistance” on Sunday but said “the shooting got in the way.” “This will not diminish ASEAN’s and Indonesia’s determination to call for an end to the use of force and violence. Stop the violence because civilians have become victims. Let us sit together and start a dialogue,” Jokowi said. Locals told RFA the convoy was also carrying officials from the Indonesia and Singapore embassies in Yangon.  It came under fire on Sunday morning on a road through Hsihseng township, according to residents who didn’t want to be named for safety reasons. They said the convoy was heading to the Hsihseng-based Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLO) Liaison Office to discuss assistance for internally displaced persons (IDPs) but was forced to turn back. Along with two officers from the Embassy of Singapore and two from the Embassy of Indonesia, there were three AHA Centre officials and several junta administrative workers, the locals said. The Pa-O National Organization (PNO), which is allied to Myanmar’s military regime, and the junta both have checkpoints near the  scene of the shooting. A PNO military affairs official who did not want to be named for security reasons, told RFA the shooting was carried out by five members of the Pa-O National Liberation Army, which is fighting for a democratic federal union system in Myanmar. “They were caught by the army when they fired and tried to run away,” said the official. “The incident happened in our PNO-controlled area. They invaded it and started shooting although there was no problem. I don’t know why they shot.” He said no one was injured although vehicle windows were smashed by bullets. RFA’s calls to the PNLO went unanswered Monday, however an official close to the organization who also declined to be named told RFA the PNLO would not have carried out the shooting. “The PNLO is working to help IDPs,” he said.  “Now they are calling for foreign diplomats and officials from the aid group to meet up to [discuss] that issue. It is impossible that the PNLO shot [the convoy].” Calls to the junta spokesperson for Shan state, Khun Thein Maung, went unanswered. RFA also called and emailed the embassies of Singapore and Indonesia in Yangon regarding the incident but received no reply The conflict in Myanmar is likely to be one of the main topics of the ASEAN Summit but junta leader Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing has not been invited to attend. However, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said Friday her country has been quietly engaging with the State Administration Council – as the junta regime is formally known –  along with Myanmar’s parallel  National Unity Government and Ethnic Armed Organizations in its role as ASEAN chair this year. She said the more than 60 engagements this year, which also included talks with the European Union, Japan, the United Nations and the United States, aimed to build trust “with non-megaphone diplomacy.” Referring to ASEAN’s five-point plan – agreed to by the junta in April 2021 and subsequently ignored by the country’s military leaders – President Widodo said Monday the 10-member group may struggle to get buy-in from the junta but he wasn’t giving up hope. “The situation in Myanmar is complex and Indonesia continues to push for the implementation of the five-point consensus. Various efforts have been made,” Jokowi said. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Mike Firn. Ahmad Syamsudin in Labuan Bajo contributed to this report. BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated news service.

Read More

Myanmar junta targets health, education facilities to undermine shadow government

In the past six months, in addition to their increased targeting of civilians as part of its “four-cuts” strategy–denying the opposition access to food, finances, intelligence and recruits–the Myanmar military has made a concerted effort to target the shadow National Unity Government’s nascent civil administration and the provision of health and education. The April 11 air strike on a gathering for the opening of a NUG government office in Sagaing’s Pa Zi Gyi village, which coincided with the distribution of food for the Lunar New Year’s celebration, led to the death of at least 186 people.  A single plane dropped two 500-pound (227-kilogram). bombs, followed by attacks by helicopter gunships. Almost all the casualties were civilians or civil administrators, and included 40 children; the youngest was six months old.  While most of the shadow government’s limited fundraising is going towards its military efforts, it’s providing basic social services in some liberated zones. Of the 330 townships in the country, 23 have a NUG prosecutor’s office and 118 judges have been appointed to date.  The shadow government claims to have established 154 “Pakafwe” township governments and to be providing some degree of education in 95 townships, and limited health services in 198.  The room of a hospital in Hsaung Phway village, Pekon township, Myanmar, is seen after an airstrike by junta forces on April 25, 2023. Credit: Mobye PDF, KNDF The National Unity Government has long had popular legitimacy, evidenced in the daily flash mobs, acts of civil disobedience, or nationwide stay at home strikes, as seen during the anniversary of the coup or the Lunar New Year. The NUG has bolstered its legitimacy through the battlefield courage and tenacity of their People’s Defense Forces (PDFs).  But increasingly, the NUG will have to base their legitimacy on performance and the provision of social services. This is all the more important as the military’s government’s effective control is diminishing.  And for that reason the military has stepped up their attacks on the NUG’s and the various Ethnic Resistance Organizations’ (EROs) civil administration. Since the bombing of the NUG office in Pa Zi Gyi, the military has destroyed two NUG offices in Magway. It had only targeted one other NUG office in the past six months. Of the four, two were destroyed by air attacks. Targeting health care and public services The NUG’s provision of health care seems to be a case in point. In the six-month period from November 2022 to April 2023, I have documented 35 separate attacks on health care facilities, either directly controlled by the NUG or EROs, or in areas under their influence. Health care providers were amongst the first and staunchest supporters of the civil disobedience movement.  These attacks have led to the death of four, with 13 people wounded. In 17 attacks, the health care facilities were completely destroyed, while eight suffered major damage; the remainder had minimal damage. Fifteen of those attacks were from either air-dropped bombs, or rocket fire and machine gun attacks from helicopter gunships. Four health care facilities were damaged by artillery fire. The rest of the attacks on health care facilities were caused by ground forces or pro-regime militias.   A school bag lies next to dried blood stains on the floor of a school in Let Yet Kone village in Tabayin township in the Sagaing region of Myanmar on Sept. 17, 2022, the day after a junta airstrike hit the school. Credit: Associated Press Fourteen of the 35 attacks, or 40 percent, were in Sagaing, which has seen a disproportionate amount of violence, and four were  in neighboring Magway. Four occurred in Kayin, while the remainder were spread in Shan, Kachin, Tanintharyi, Kachin, and Kayah.  In the latest attack, a helicopter dropped a 500-pound (227 kilogram) bomb on a health clinic in Shan State, though the bomb failed to detonate. Only three people were wounded.  The military has also routinely targeted both the NUG’s education system and rural schools that are technically part of the state system but which are actively supporting and staffed by members of the Civil Disobedience Movement.  Since November 2022, it has either bombed, struck by artillery or destroyed by ground forces some 20 schools. Six were destroyed in Kayin and Sagaing states, each, with two in Kachin and Kayah, and one each in Mandalay, Magway, Tanintharyi, and Chin.  Unapologetic military The military has refused to concede that the targeting of health, educational and other social services represents a war crime. It often justifies the attacks by alleging that the PDFs were using the facilities for military purposes or that the militia members were receiving health care treatment. The military has been unapologetic in targeting those facilities. The executive director of the the pro-military ThayNinGa Institute for Strategic Studies in Yangon, Thein Tun Oo, justified the attack on Pa Zi Gyi and others like it, calling it “ordinary … from an anti-terrorism standpoint” and said, “No government of a country can accept a declaration of autonomy within its sovereign territory.” The attacks on the NUG’s civil administration also comes when the military has increased their own budget for the 2023-24 fiscal year by 51 percent, from $1.8 billion to $2.7 billion, to deal with the escalating war. Although the economy is no longer in freefall, the two percent growth in 2022 and three  percent growth predicted in 2023 has not made up for the 18 percent decline in 2021. Revenue collection remains down. Increased military spending is coming at the expense of public health and education, where enrollment and matriculation numbers are plummeting. A young waste collector paddles a polystyrene boat looking for plastic and glass to sell in Pazundaung Creek in Yangon, Myanmar, Jan. 14, 2023. Dozens of Myanmar citizens are taking to the murky creek waters after being unable to find work amid the post-coup economic crisis. Credit: AFP The NUG’s provision of health, education, and civil administration pose a threat as the regime acknowledges its own loss of control.  Senior Gen. Min Aung…

Read More

For China’s ‘young refuseniks,’ finding love comes at too high a price

Linghu Changbing will be 23 this year. Even before the pandemic hit China, he was already starting to feel that the traditional goals of marriage, a mortgage and kids were beyond his reach.  “I had no time to find a girlfriend back in China, because I was working from eight in the morning to 10 at night, sometimes even till 11.00 p.m. or midnight, with very little time off,” said Linghu,  who joined the “run” movement of people leaving China in 2022. “I didn’t earn very much, so I couldn’t really afford to go out and spend money having fun with friends, or stuff like that,” he says of his life before he left for the United States.  “I had very little social interaction, because I didn’t have any friends, which meant that I couldn’t really pursue a relationship,” he said. “As for an apartment, I had no desire to buy one at all.” The situation he describes is common to many young people in China, yet not all are in a position to leave. They are part of an emerging social phenomenon and social media buzzword: the “young refuseniks” – people who reject the traditional four-fold path to adulthood: finding a mate, marriage, mortgages and raising a family.  They are also known as the “People Who Say No to the Four Things.” Three years of stringently enforced zero-COVID restrictions left China’s economic growth at its lowest level in nearly half a century, with record rates of unemployment among urban youth.  Refusing to pursue marriage, mortgages and kids emerged from that era as a form of silent protest, with more and more people taking this way out in recent years. ‘Far too high a price’ Several young people who responded to a brief survey by RFA Mandarin on Twitter admitted to being refuseniks. “I’m a young refusenik: I won’t be looking for a partner or getting married, I won’t be buying a property and I don’t want kids,” reads one comment on social media. People use mobile phones in front of a fenced residential area under lockdown due to Covid-19 restrictions in Beijing, May 22, 2022. Credit: Noel Celis/AFP “Finding love comes at far too high a price,” says another, while another user comments: “It’s all very well having values, or being sincere, but all of that has to be backed up with money.”  “It’s not that I’m lazy,” says another. “Even if I were to make the effort, I still wouldn’t see any result.”  Others say they no longer have the bandwidth to try to achieve such milestones.  “I’ve been forced back in on myself to the point where I feel pretty helpless,” comments one person. For another, it’s more of a moral decision: “I think the best expression I can make of paternal love is not to bring children into this world in the first place.” Similar comments have appeared across Chinese social media platforms lately, and have been widely liked and reposted. Marriage rates have been falling in China for the past eight years, with marriages numbering less than eight million by 2021, the lowest point since records began 36 years ago, according to recent figures from the Civil Affairs Ministry.  People are also marrying much later, with more than half of newly contracted marriages among the over-30s, the figures show. According to Linghu Changbing, who dropped out of high school at 14 and moved through a number of cities where he supported himself with various jobs, refuseniks are mostly found in the bigger cities with large migrant populations. Young people in smaller cities like his hometown are more likely to be able to afford a home, and will often marry and start families as young as 18. “In my experience, refuseniks seem to cluster mostly in the busier cities,” he says. “The more competitive a city, the more you will see this phenomenon.” Curling up, lying flat, running away and venting Shengya, a migrant worker in Beijing, has a similarly depressing view.  He spent two years doing nothing at his parents’ house, a phenomenon that has been dubbed “lying flat” on social media.  “I basically lay around at home the whole time,” he said. “I couldn’t get motivated to do anything. My dad asked me why I didn’t go out and get a job, and I told him: ‘The only point of a job would be to prevent starvation, but I already get enough to eat here, so what difference would it make?’” An employment agency in Shanghai. Credit: Reuters Linghu Changbing went through a very similar phase, until someone got him a job working overseas.  Looking back on that time, he says that China’s young refuseniks are similar to the rats in the Universe 25 experiments by ethologist John B. Calhoun in the 1960s, in which rats given everything they needed eventually stopped bearing young, leading the population to collapse.  “The marginalized rats gradually gave up competing at all, and suppressed their natural desires, leading to constant personality distortions,” he says.  “Lying flat” has entered the online lexicon as a way of describing the passive approach adopted by many young people in China, while “curling up,” also known as “turning inwards,” describes a personality turned in on itself from a lack of external opportunity for change.  While those who can join the “run” movement, leaving China to seek better lives overseas, others act out their frustrations in indiscriminate attacks on others, known on social media as “giving it your all,” or “venting.” For late millennials and Generation Z in China, curling up, lying flat and running away are the main available options, as not many young people have the wherewithal to leave the country and start a new life elsewhere. ‘A very heavy burden’ A Chengdu-based employee of an architectural firm, who gave only the nickname Mr. J, said he first came to the realization that he would be a refusenik during the rolling lockdowns, mass incarceration in quarantine camps and compulsory daily testing…

Read More

Damning evidence emerges in Cambodian monkey smuggling case

Hidden camera footage has emerged showing what U.S. prosecutors say is clear involvement by a senior Cambodian official in running a research monkey smuggling operation. In the video, whose existence was first reported by RFA last year, former Cambodian Department of Wildlife and Biodiversity head Kry Masphal is seen facilitating an illicit drop-off of long-tailed macaques at a breeding facility in northern Cambodia, even offering advice on how to move the endangered species more efficiently. “Why don’t you make another road?” Kry is seen asking a worker. “If you make another road, this means [it’s] more safe for your smuggling.” The footage was filmed in 2019 by a confidential informant for U.S. investigators and submitted by prosecutors as evidence against Kry in a high-profile U.S. government smuggling case against him and other conspirators. It was obtained from the court by animal rights group PETA, which shared it with RFA. In aviator sunglasses and a buttoned-down blue checkered shirt, Kry carries himself in the video with a swagger a world apart from the nervous figure who sat in a Miami court two weeks ago listening to his lawyers fight to exclude the contents of his mobile phone from his upcoming trial. Kry was director of Wildlife and Biodiversity in Cambodia’s Forestry Administration at the time of his arrest at New York’s JFK airport in November 2022, where he was transiting on his way to a conference in Panama on the protection of endangered species. He has been charged with being party to a plot to launder wild-caught long-tailed macaques – a primate prized for medical research – from the jungles of Cambodia and Thailand into U.S. research laboratories. In part to conserve dwindling wild populations, but also to preserve the integrity of scientific findings, only captive-bred monkeys can be used in medical experiments. Also accused are Kry’s boss, Forestry Administration Director General Keo Omaliss and six individuals involved in the management of the Chinese-owned Vanny Group’s monkey farms in Cambodia. Kry has pleaded not guilty, while the Cambodian Ministry of Agriculture, which oversees the Forestry Administration, and the Vanny Group have both denied any improper activity took place. However, the video that has emerged among a mountainous pile of evidence against Kry contains damning proof of his involvement and acknowledges the illegal nature of the operation. Kry is seen helping to offload crates of monkeys from the back of a pickup truck at what prosecutors say is Vanny Group’s monkey farm in Pursat province. The person working with him asks how many monkeys Kry has brought with him “this time.” “Twenty-four,” Kry replies. “We cannot take more because many observers, we have to do [it] very quick and go very fast.” In a last-ditch attempt to avoid a trial, Kry’s lawyers – whose firm has been a registered lobbyist for the Cambodian government since January 2022 – have pushed for the case to be dismissed on the grounds that he was acting on orders from his government. For conservationists, the stratagem was a confirmation of their worst fears: that the poaching and laundering of wild-caught macaques from Cambodia was not the behavior of a few rotten apples but the de facto policy of the government. “This means that there is no safe, legitimate and legal supply of monkeys,” Lisa Jones-Engel, a primatologist with PETA, told RFA. “When you have somebody like Kry involved, working so out in the open, saying, ‘This is great for our smuggling.’ From a government official who signs on the dotted line?” “Kry is just another run-of-the-mill monkey juggler, there was nothing that distinguished him from every other person on that video,” she added. An RFA investigation last month showed the deep penetration of the primate industry into Cambodia’s ruling elite, from the immediate family of Prime Minister Hun Sen down through the relevant regulatory and enforcement bodies that are supposed to be policing the trade. Agriculture Minister Dith Tina did not immediately respond to a request for comment on why a public official might need to hide their activities from observers. Vanny has denied the U.S. prosecutors’ central allegation that wild monkeys were laundered through its farm and passed off as captive bred ones for export. However, in conversation with RFA earlier this year an employee at the farm said that in 2022 the practice became almost routine as demand, amped up by spiking prices, vastly outstripped legitimate supply. “There weren’t enough monkeys before because demand was so high, so we bought them from a nearby mountain,” the person said, not wanting to be identified for fear of retaliation. “If they had good eyes, a good body, good fur, then we exported them,” they added. “We have a lab to weigh them and do blood tests to see if they have diseases or not.” The unsealing of the indictment against Kry, Keo and Vanny’s management last November halted exports from the farm, the employee said. Prior to that, they added, the farm’s outbound shipments in 2022 regularly included between 100 and 200 “mountain monkeys,” in clear violation of international laws and regulations governing trade in the species. The employee was insistent that this was something that only took place in 2022. However, the U.S. prosecutors’ case alleges illicit activity to have taken place between December 2017 and January 2022. Kry’s case is due to go to trial in Miami in June.  Edited by Boer Deng.

Read More

UN working group issues opinion on detention of Vietnamese political prisoner

A U.N. Human Rights Council working group has issued an opinion on the case of a Vietnamese activist arrested in 2021 and sentenced to 10 years in prison for “anti-state propaganda,” saying that his detention was arbitrary. Do Nam Trung, 41, was sentenced in December 2021 to 10 years in prison for “spreading materials against the state” under Article 117 of Vietnam’s Penal Code, frequently used by authorities to restrict freedom of expression and opinions deemed critical of Vietnam’s one-party communist state or government leaders. The activist is known for his work promoting freedom of expression, human rights and democracy in the Southeast Asian county. Trung had participated in several social movements and had spoken out against official corruption in posts on his Facebook page. He also had posted criticisms of the build-operate-transfer highways that Vietnam has adopted in recent years, sparking rare protests over toll collections that many motorists deemed unfair. Authorities arrested Trung in July 2021 in Hanoi while driving to work. At the time, about two dozen police officers searched his home, disabled internet and phone connections and confiscated memory sticks, business cards and driving licenses.   In the 11-page report dated March 9 and just released publicly, the Council’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention deemed Trung’s detention arbitrary because his “conduct falls within the right to freedom of opinion and expression protected under articles 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”  The group also stressed that no trial should have taken place. The working group requested that the government immediately remedy Trung’s situation and bring it into conformity with relevant international norms, including those set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  It also urged Hanoi to ensure a full and independent investigation of the circumstances surrounding the arbitrary deprivation of Trung’s liberty and to take appropriate measures against those responsible for violating his rights. In June 2022, the working group asked Hanoi to provide detailed information about Trung’s situation and to clarify the legal provisions justifying his continued detention as well as its compatibility with the country’s obligations under international human rights law.   The Vietnamese government requested an extension last August, but failed to submit a response by the Sept. 15 deadline. It sent a late response on Oct. 4, which the Working Group said it could not accept because it did not arrive on time. The working group has given the Vietnamese government six months to respond to the current opinion. Bottom of the list The development comes as Paris-based Reporters Without Borders issued its 2023 World Press Freedom Index, which ranks Vietnam 178 of 180 countries, falling four places from last year. The group said Vietnam, whose traditional media is controlled by the state, is the third-largest jailer of journalists. Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director of Human Rights Watch, told Radio Free Asia that the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention had done “an excellent job of rejecting all the Vietnamese government’s weak reasons for Do Nam Trung’s detention and of giving clear-cut cause for Trung’s immediate release.” “Once again, the disparity between international conventions on human rights and Vietnam’s law is fully exposed,” Robertson said in an email. “Vietnam is carrying out a widespread crackdown on political activists and completely disregarding all human rights principles. A journalist in Vietnam, who spoke on condition of anonymity for safety reasons, told RFA that authorities have subjected independent journalists and writers to fierce repression, convicting them under vaguely-worded articles under the 2015 Penal Code and under the Cybersecurity Law, which took effect in 2019. “It seems that the Vietnamese government disregards all international criticism of her human rights violations,” the journalist said.  Vietnam’s permanent delegation to the United Nations in Geneva issued a response on March 24 to a November 2022 request by the Special Procedures Branch of the U.N. human rights agency concerning the arbitrary arrests of nine activists, including Trung. Authorities convicted them of propagating untruthful information and abusing the right to freedom of expression and democracy to distort and smear the government. Hanoi said the arrests, detentions and convictions complied with Vietnamese law and the country’s international human rights commitments. In January, Vietnam began a three-year term on the 47-member Human Rights Council, despite objections by human rights groups that the country should have been excluded because of its dismal rights record.  Translated by Anna Vu for RFA Vietnamese. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.

Read More

Data lacking on Asia’s electricity needs, report says

Asia urgently needs to improve the transparency of its power sector data, as over half of the region’s economies lack information regarding electricity generation, a report said Thursday. Some 24 of 39 economies in Asia have “poor” or “insufficient” power data, said the joint “Asia Data Transparency Report 2023” by Ember, a global energy think tank, and Subak, a climate non-profit.  “This means that there is little to no data about how the electricity needs of 684 million people are being met,” the report said. The Asia-Pacific is home to 80% of global coal generation, while power sector emissions in the region make up 62% of the total worldwide. Its electricity demand is increasing by about 5% per year, a rate twice as fast as the rest of the world. In Asia, many economies struggle to phase down coal power, as electricity demand has significantly impacted the region’s economic growth.  Decarbonizing the region’s power sector is crucial for limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees, Ember’s researchers said, concluding that poor data transparency is holding back the speed of the transition to clean power in Asia. The report said that China, despite being the largest electricity consumer in Asia and globally, only scored an “acceptable” rating due to “a lack of detailed data” and “inconsistent reporting.”  Among the top 10 power sector emitters, China led the world by three times more than the U.S., the second-biggest carbon dioxide emitter. In a report last month, Ember said China created the most CO2 emissions of any power producer in the world in 2022, with 4,694 million metric tons of CO2, accounting for 38% of total global emissions from electricity generation. Coal alone made up 61% of China’s electricity mix, though it was a 17 percentage points fall from 78% in 2000. However, in absolute terms, it is five times higher than at the start of this century. The report said that 24 out of 39 of economies in Asia have insufficient or poor data transparency regarding electricity generation. Credit: Ember Among Southeast Asian countries, Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, and Vietnam scored “poor” for data transparency, while Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myanmar were rated “insufficient.” These countries had a long time lag for annual and monthly reports, with data too difficult to analyze. The Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore performed relatively better. Five countries with no data –  Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Papua New Guinea, and New Caledonia – were more concentrated in low to lower-middle-income countries. India, New Zealand, and Australia were found to be the best-performing countries regarding data transparency. “Three lower-middle income countries – India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh – scored higher than any other upper-middle income countries. They are showing that it is possible to improve data transparency and encourage others to follow suit,” Uni Lee, Ember’s Asia data analyst, said.    “Bangladesh provides daily generation data for each power plant and provides various metrics for the electricity market, including outage and day-ahead schedules through the central utility,” the report said. The research looking into data transparency for the power sector identified 74 official data sources across Asia-Pacific. The evaluation was based on six rating criteria: publishing lag, geographical granularity, fuel breakdown, time granularity, ease of access and additional data.  Open data informs evidence-based policymaking and plays a pivotal role in decarbonizing the power sector, said the report, the first-in-kind presenting a comprehensive regional picture of the availability of power sector data in Asia.   “Ideally, power sector data must be provided at hourly or fewer intervals … and made free to access without restriction in a machine-readable format,” the report recommended. “Data is essential for climate professionals to monitor, track and set clean power targets, as well as to develop innovative technologies for better grid flexibility and engage in evidence-based policymaking,” said Subak’s data cooperative associate, Justine White. Edited by Mike Firn.

Read More

Rights group says Xinjiang phone search program targets Uyghurs

Police in Xinjiang have relied on a list of 50,000 multimedia files determined to be “violent and terrorist” to flag Uyghur and other Turkic Muslim residents for interrogation, according to a report from Human Rights Watch released on Wednesday. Among the findings by the New York-based group was that Uyghurs could trigger a police interrogation just by storing the Quran on their phone. Human Rights Watch said in a statement that the use of the list is another example of China’s “abusive use of surveillance technology in Xinjiang.” The list is used by police to compare against data received from two apps that authorities have required residents of Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi, to install on their phones, according to Maya Wang, the acting Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Essentially, these apps on people’s phones are checking against this list – the master list – as well as searching for other information,” she told Radio Free Asia in an interview.  Xinjiang police in Urumqi forced Uyghur people to download Jing Wang Wei Shi and Feng Cai surveillance apps on their mobile phones, which scans cellphones for audio and video files and dispatches their information to an outside server. Credit: Open Technology Fund. The data collected by the apps – known as Jing Wang Wei Shi and Feng Cai – and the master list examined by Human Rights Watch fits in with other Xinjiang surveillance systems, which Wang described as “multidimensional and multi-layered” and includes checkpoints and the Chinese government’s collection of biometrics.  “Human Rights Watch has repeatedly raised concerns about China’s approach to countering acts it calls ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism,’” the group said in a statement on Wednesday.  “China’s counterterrorism law defines ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’ in an overly broad and vague manner that facilitates prosecutions, deprivation of liberty, and other restrictions for acts that do not intend to cause death or serious physical harm for political, religious, or ideological aims,” Human Rights Watch said. Religious materials flagged in police database The master list of multimedia files is part of a large database of more than 1,600 data tables from Xinjiang that was leaked to The Intercept in 2019. The news organization reported that Urumqi police conducted surveillance and arrests between 2015 and 2019 based on texts of police reports found on the database. The list examined by Human Rights Watch was located in a different part of the same database and has not been previously reported on or analyzed, the group said.  Human Rights Watch also found that during nine months from 2017 to 2018, police conducted nearly 11 million searches of 1.2 million mobile phones in Urumqi. The police search found a total of 11,000 matches with the master list of more than 1,000 different files on 1,400 phones. A guard stands in a watchtower of Kashgar prison in Xinjiang on May 3, 2021. Credit: Thomas Peter/Reuters. Human Rights Watch’s analysis found photo, audio and video files that contain violent content, “but also other material that has no evident connection to violence,” including common religious materials, the group said. The UN Human Rights Council should create an investigation and concerned governments should identify technology companies involved in the phone surveillance and act to end their involvement, Human Rights Watch said in its statement. “I think what happens in Xinjiang is a very important one for the future of China, but also how governments will use these systems,” Wang told RFA. “How do they relate to technology and human freedoms in general in the world? And so that’s why we have been trying to piece these puzzles together.” Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster.

Read More