China Says Its Weapons Sales Are Not Linked to Cambodia–Thailand Clashes

China Cambodia Relations : Golden Dragon Exercise Image

China has publicly rejected claims that its arms trade with Cambodia and Thailand is linked to the renewed border conflict between the two Southeast Asian neighbours, even as evidence on the ground and long-standing defence and trade relationships complicate Beijing’s narrative of neutrality.

Responding to reports that Thai troops seized Chinese-made weapons from Cambodian positions, China’s Ministry of National Defence stated that its arms cooperation with both countries is legal, transparent, and “unrelated to the Cambodia–Thailand border conflict.” The ministry urged observers to avoid what it called “subjective speculation and malicious hype.”

At the same time, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi held separate calls with his Thai and Cambodian counterparts, calling for an immediate ceasefire and warning against the spread of “false information” allegedly aimed at smearing China’s ties with both governments. Beijing has also dispatched a special envoy for Asian affairs to conduct shuttle diplomacy between Phnom Penh and Bangkok.

A Conflict with Heavy Costs

Border clashes that reignited this month have reportedly killed more than 40 people and displaced over 500,000 civilians on both sides, according to international reporting. Thailand and Cambodia have accused each other of targeting civilians and infrastructure, while air strikes, artillery exchanges, and landmine incidents have intensified the humanitarian toll.

Beijing has urged both sides to protect Chinese projects and personnel, underscoring the extent of its economic footprint in the conflict zone.

Arms Trade: “Unrelated,” Yet Unavoidable

While China insists its weapons sales are not connected to the fighting, its role as a major arms supplier to both countries places it at the centre of the dispute.

Cambodia is one of China’s closest military partners in Southeast Asia, relying heavily on Chinese weapons and training. Joint military exercises such as Golden Dragon, ongoing defence cooperation, and reported Chinese access to Ream Naval Base have long raised regional concerns about Phnom Penh’s strategic alignment with Beijing.

Thailand, despite being a formal US ally, has increasingly diversified its arms imports toward China. According to international arms-tracking data, China accounted for roughly 43 per cent of Thailand’s total arms imports in 2024, making it Bangkok’s largest weapons supplier. During the current clashes, Thailand is also believed to have used US-made systems, including F-16 fighter jets—highlighting how competing power blocs intersect on this battlefield.

In this context, China’s claim that its arms trade is entirely detached from the conflict appears technically accurate but politically difficult to separate from realities on the ground.

Trade Deals and Strategic Leverage

Beyond weapons, China’s trade and investment ties with both Cambodia and Thailand provide Beijing with significant leverage.

China is Cambodia’s largest trading partner and investor, deeply embedded in infrastructure, energy, and development projects under the Belt and Road Initiative. Economic dependence gives Beijing substantial influence over Phnom Penh’s strategic decisions, including during periods of crisis.

Thailand, meanwhile, maintains a complex balancing act. While preserving strong economic and security ties with the United States, Bangkok’s trade with China continues to expand, particularly in manufacturing, technology, and defence-related industries. Recent high-level visits— including meetings between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Thai leaders—underscore Beijing’s importance to Thailand’s economic calculus.

These trade relationships are not isolated from security dynamics. Stability along borders directly affects Chinese investments, supply chains, and regional connectivity projects, giving Beijing a strong incentive to manage, if not shape, the trajectory of the conflict.

Mediation or Management?

China has framed itself as a neutral peace broker, portraying the Cambodia–Thailand border dispute as a legacy of Western colonial-era boundary-making and urging Asean to take the lead in mediation. Yet Beijing’s deep defence and trade entanglements raise questions about whether its role is purely mediatory—or strategically managerial.

While US President Donald Trump previously brokered a peace agreement in October that later collapsed, China has continued quiet diplomacy through bilateral channels, Asean forums, and the United Nations. President Xi has stated that China is helping both sides “in its own way” to resolve the dispute.

The Bigger Picture

China’s denial of any arms-related responsibility in the conflict may hold legally, but geopolitically, the lines are far blurrier. When a single power is simultaneously a top arms supplier, largest trading partner, key investor, and chief mediator, neutrality becomes difficult to disentangle from influence.

As fighting continues and civilians bear the cost, the Cambodia–Thailand conflict is no longer just a border dispute—it is a test case for how China’s expanding economic and defence footprint in Southeast Asia reshapes regional conflicts, diplomacy, and power balances.

IJ-Reportika will continue to investigate the intersection of arms sales, trade deals, and geopolitical mediation in Southeast Asia.