• contact@ij-reportika.com
Ij reportika Logo

Category: World

Uneasy calm in Dhaka under curfew, police arrest hundreds for ‘violence’

Editor011 mins

An uneasy calm prevailed in Bangladesh’s capital Dhaka on the third day of a nationwide curfew Monday, as authorities said they had arrested hundreds of people for their alleged involvement in violence during protests that turned deadly last week. While there were no protests or street clashes, two people badly hurt in the earlier violence succumbed to their injuries on Monday.  This took the death toll to at least 138 in a week of street clashes that began as protests against a discriminatory quota system for government jobs and became a wider agitation against Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s 15 years in power. Hasina and other government officials blamed opposition groups for last week’s deadly violence, according to footage from Channel 24 distributed by Reuters news agency. But university students, who began the protests after the quotas were reinstated by a court last month, have alleged that it was members of the student wing of Hasina’s Awami League, aided by the police, who incited the clashes.  A man rides his motorbike on a mostly empty street past vehicles that were set on fire during clashes among university students, police and government supporters, after violence erupted during what were initially protests against government job quotas,Dhaka, July 22, 2024. (Mohammad Ponir Hossain/Reuters) U.S. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller on Monday said the U.S. condemns “reported shoot-on-sight orders” that are part of a crackdown on the protests. “The United States is concerned by reports of ongoing telecommunications disruptions in Bangladesh,” Miller told reporters, referring to a state-imposed internet and mobile connectivity shutdown that continued Monday, reported Reuters. Habibur Rahman, Dhaka Metropolitan Police’s commissioner, told reporters on Monday that police have arrested more than 600 people, mostly in Dhaka, for violent acts during the protests. A senior official from the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Zahir Uddin Swapon,  and a minor party’s leader, Md. Tarek Rahman, were arrested Monday. Tarek’s wife, Tamanna Ferdosi Sikha, told BenarNews that a joint force of police, border guard and soldiers entered their house at about 2:30 am and picked up Tarek and his brother. “They seized a computer and other digital devices from our house,” she said. Students give a 48-hour ultimatum After the curfew that was imposed Friday was indefinitely extended on Sunday, Bangladesh Army chief Waker-uz-Zaman told reporters that more time was needed to “normalize” the situation.  “Many state properties were vandalized … there are many ways of staging protests,” he said Monday. “But carrying out attacks on state properties is not wise.” Several government buildings and properties were set on fire last week during the clashes, including the state broadcaster and a train station. The protesting students were not mollified by the Supreme Court on Sunday ending most of the quotas in civil service jobs.  The court lowered the number of reserved jobs to 7% from 56%. A key plank of the quota system was the reservation of civil service jobs for relatives of those who fought in Bangladesh’s 1971 independence war. The students also demanded that the internet be restored and security forces be withdrawn from university campuses. “We are issuing an ultimatum … 48 hours to stop the digital crackdown and restore internet connectivity,” Hasnat Abdullah, coordinator of the Anti-Discrimination Student Movement, told the Associated Press. “Within 48 hours, all law enforcement members deployed at different campuses should be withdrawn, dormitories should reopen and steps should be taken so that students can return to the [residence] halls.”  Asif Nazrul, a professor in Dhaka University’s law faculty, said protesting students might only be satisfied if authorities apologize for unlawful actions, arrest armed cadres of the ruling Awami League’s student and youth wings and arrest police and elite Rapid Action Battalion members who fired on unarmed civilians. “Over 150 people died and thousands of protesters were injured in the uprising. I think the protest will not end with the judgment of the Supreme Court. Bangladesh’s people are not so foolish,” he told BenarNews.  The Rapid Action Battalion has previously been accused of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings and the use of torture and the U.S. has imposed financial sanctions on it for “serious human rights abuses.”  Two auto rickshaws are seen on an otherwise empty road during a nationwide curfew in the Jatrabari area in Bangladesh’s capital, Dhaka, July 22, 2024. [Jibon Ahmed/BenarNews] Some students are also demanding Hasina apologize or retract her comments from a week ago, when she said anti-quota protesters were akin to collaborators with Pakistan in the 1971 war Bangladesh fought to separate from that nation.  The protests spread after Hasina’s comments.  Reuters video showed her telling business leaders at a meeting in her Dhaka office that opposition forces were responsible for vandalism, arson and murders during the protests.  Hasina’s advisor, Salman F. Rahman, said the student movement had been hijacked by people who wanted to overthrow the government. “There was a big conspiracy, they tried to ensure the fall of the government,” Rahman said. Another Hasina administration member, Nasrul Hamid, state minister for power and energy, claimed that the clashes caused U.S. $85 million in damages to power equipment. “We are trying to identify the people involved in such sabotage and they must be prosecuted,” he said. Bangladesh army personnel stand guard near the parliament house during a curfew imposed after clashes during anti-quota protests turned deadly, Dhaka, July 22, 2024. (Munir uz Zaman/AFP) Meanwhile, average Bangladeshis are bearing the brunt of the curfew, according to their accounts and those of vegetable, fruit and meat sellers. Abdul Baten, who operates a garment factory in an area called Mirpur-11, told BenarNews that prices of staple foods have risen. “We mainly depend on potato, egg, broiler chicken skin and leg, and lentils. A dozen eggs now costs 160 taka, up from 135,” he said. The problem, said vegetable trader Nur Mohammad, is that no produce is coming into Dhaka. “There is an abundant supply of vegetables outside Dhaka. But due to the curfew it cannot be transported here,” he told BenarNews. “Unless the supply chain is restored, the prices will not come down,”…

Read More

Second Thomas Shoal: deal or no deal?

Editor08 mins

China and the Philippines said they have achieved a “provisional arrangement” on resupply missions by the Philippines to the Second Thomas Shoal, where it maintains an outpost that China objects to, but their accounts of the agreement differed. The shoal, known in China as Ren’ai Jiao and in the Philippines as Ayungin Shoal, has been at the center of sharply rising tension and confrontation between the two countries, with China being accused of blocking access to Filipino troops stationed there. On June 17, a Filipino soldier was wounded in an encounter with Chinese coast guard personnel who also confiscated some Philippine guns during a Philippine rotation and resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre – an old navy ship that Manila deliberately grounded on the reef in 1999 to serve as its outpost to reinforce its claim. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs said in a statement on Sunday that both countries had “recognized the need to de-escalate the situation in the South China Sea and manage differences through dialogue and consultation.” The provisional arrangement for the resupply of daily necessities and rotation missions to the BRP Sierra Madre was achieved following the “frank and constructive” discussions at the 9th Bilateral Consultation Mechanism meeting on the South China Sea on July 2, the foreign ministry said, noting that it would not prejudice either side’s position in the disputed waters. It did not provide any further details. The hot-headed June 17 encounter raised fears of a more serious clash between U.S. ally the Philippines and China, but both sides agreed at the early July consultation to “de-escalate tensions” in the waters. RELATED STORIES Philippines reports fewer Chinese ships in South China Sea Philippine military chief demands China pay US$1 million in damages for clash Tensions simmer near a shoal both China and the Philippines claim China’s version On Monday, a spokesperson at China’s foreign ministry said Beijing continued to demand that the Philippines tow away the BRP Sierra Madre and restore the state of hosting no personnel or facilities at the Second Thomas Shoal. In the meantime, China would allow the Philippines to send living necessities to the personnel on the warship “in a humanitarian spirit” if the Philippines informed it in advance and after on-site verification was conducted, according to the spokesperson. But if the Philippines were to send large amounts of construction materials to the warship and attempted to build fixed facilities or a permanent outpost, China would “absolutely not accept it and will resolutely stop it,” the spokesperson added. A Chinese think tank – the South China Probing Initiative – said that with this statement, the two sides may agree to return to the situation between 1999 and 2022 when the Philippines promised not to send construction materials to the Second Thomas Shoal and China would continue to let humanitarian supplies go there. Analyst Collin Koh from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore wrote on the X social media platform that China’s version of the agreement “draws more questions than not about whether it will hold at all even before the ink is dry.” In this handout image provided by Armed Forces of the Philippines, a Chinese Coast Guard holds an axe as they approach Philippine troops on a resupply mission in the Second Thomas Shoal at the disputed South China Sea on June 17, 2024. (Armed Forces of the Philippines/AP) Shortly after the Chinese side issued its statement, Philippine foreign ministry spokesperson Teresita Daza denied that such arrangements as prior notification and on-site confirmation had been made. “I want to stress that the agreement was concluded with the clear understanding by both sides that it will not prejudice our respective national positions,” she said. “For the Philippines, this means that we will continue to assert our rights and jurisdiction in our maritime zones as entitled under UNCLOS (U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea).” The Second Thomas Shoal lies well inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone but also within the self-proclaimed nine-dash line that China draws on its maps to claim historic rights to almost the entire South China Sea. Maritime expert Ray Powell at Stanford University in the United States said that given the latest exchanges, he was “not sure there is a deal at this point.” A meeting of foreign ministers from Southeast Asian countries is to take place this week in Vientiane, Laos, and Daza said the Philippines would continue to articulate its positions on the South China Sea issue there. Edited by Taejun Kang. 

Read More

Nguyen Phu Trong left Vietnam’s Communist Party ripe for strongman rule

Editor015 mins

On July 19, the Vietnamese Communist Party announced the death of its general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong. The previous day, it announced that Trong, 80, ostensibly the most powerful politician in the country, had been relieved of his duties for health reasons.  He had missed several key meetings in recent months, and even when he did attend, he appeared shaky and unwell. He suffered a stroke a few years ago but seemingly bounced back.  However, his near-unprecedented third term in office has been cut short.  To Lam, the public security minister and promoted to state President last month, will now assume Trong’s duties. Having led the party since 2011, Trong attempted to reinvigorate an institution that, by the early 2010s, had become bogged down by individual rivalries, profit-seeking, and self-advancement.  A man rides past a poster for the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in Hanoi on Jan. 22, 2021. (Nhac Nguyen/AFP) Corruption was so rampant the public was mutinous. Ideology and morality had fallen by the wayside. Pro-democracy movements threatened its monopoly on power. The private sector was not just fantastically wealthy, but desired more political power. But in what condition does Trong leave the institution he sought to fix?  Externally, its monopoly on power is safer. It has increased repression of activists and democrats while appeasing the public through its high-profile takedown of the corrupt.  The private sector has been constrained, too, so poses no threat to the party’s political authority. The economy has insulated the party from any meaningful repercussions from the West over human rights. ‘Blazing Furnace’ Within the Communist Party, however, Trong leaves behind a mess.  Lam, as public security minister, and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, artfully used Trong’s signature “Blazing Furnace” anti-corruption campaign to advance their own interests, effectively purging anyone who might rival them for Trong’s job in 2026.  More Politburo members have been sacked than at any time in memory. Two presidents have “resigned” in as many years. The Politburo is now filled mostly with military personnel and securocrats, the only two factions – and sometimes rivals – left with power.  Lam, if he does formally become acting general secretary, which the Politburo will have to vote on, is in a prime position to maintain the job in 2026. One imagines he has very different ideas about the nature of the Communist Party than Trong. Early in the anti-corruption campaign, Trong remarked that he did not want to “break the vase to catch the mice.” That metaphor implied that tackling corruption should shield a delicate Communist Party, not smash it to pieces.  Vietnam’s President To Lam, front right, and Cambodia’s Defense Minister Tea Seiha, back right, pay their respects in front of honor guards at the Independence Monument in Phnom Penh on July 13, 2024. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) However, in his quest to rid corruption from a corrupt institution, he eroded almost every check the Communist Party of Vietnam had to prevent a supreme leader figure from rising to the top. Trong violated the three major “norms” that the party introduced in the early 1990s.  Politburo members were expected to retire at 65, and individuals could only occupy the most senior positions for a maximum of two terms. More importantly, no one person could hold at the same time two of the four most powerful positions: General Secretary, State President, Prime Minister, and Chair of the National Assembly.  This “four pillar” (tu tru) system  created a form of succession plan. Regular reshuffles and a separation of powers amongst the political elite would prevent the Communist Party from tilting towards dictatorship.  Shattering the norms The norms created a structure in which politicians could fight over policies, often brutally, but without the entire apparatus collapsing because of division. There could be a regular rotation between different factions and geographic networks, meaning no one group was ascendant for too long.  Hanoi called this “democratic centralism.” Of course, it’s not democracy, but it’s a form of pluralism that, in theory, had prevented the party from descending into dictatorships like North Korea, Cuba, or China under Xi Jinping. Trong broke every one of these rules.  Between 2018 and 2021, he held the posts of party general secretary and state president simultaneously, the first person to do so since 1986. (Lam seems likely to repeat that.)  Trong passed away during his third term as party chief, the first leader since Le Duan to have that record. He not only constantly had the party flout retirement-age limits for himself – he should have stepped down in 2021, if not earlier – but such exemptions have been handed out like confetti during his tenure. Vietnam’s Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong addresses a press conference after the closing ceremony of the Communist Party of Vietnam 13th National Congress in Hanoi on Feb. 1, 2021. (Manan Vatsyayana/AFP) At the same time, his anti-graft campaign has centralized power among an increasingly small number of Politburo members. Provincial party politics have been purged and constrained to give more power to the central party apparatus. The party dominates the government. The public security ministry is all-seeing.  This was always going to happen. How else do you clean up an uncleanable organization in which power flows up and discipline is enforced only by those above you?  The campaign increases the necessity of one section of the party to maintain power indefinitely.  Who designates what is the true morality and which cadres are truly moral? Well, a certain clique of the party running the anti-corruption campaign In one speech on the theme, Trong urged the party to “strengthen supervision of the use of the power of leading cadres, especially the heads, push up internal supervision within the collective leadership; make public the process of power use according to law for cadres and people to supervise.”  The purge is designed to enforce the view that no one has absolute power above the party. Anyone who uses the power must serve the…

Read More
Pacific Ocean Islands and Japan

A palm reading: Japan’s navigation plan for Pacific waters

Editor07 mins

The triennial meeting of the Japanese Prime Minister with the leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum  – referred to as PALM – is normally not much of an attention grabber. But this year’s meeting, which has just concluded in Tokyo, makes it clear that Japan is looking to significantly ramp up its presence in the region. This comes on the back of increased bilateral engagement – think new embassies in Kiribati and Vanuatu – and a reinvigorated QUAD with a focus on resource and burden sharing among the membership of the strategic security partnership (Australia, India, Japan, USA). The joint declaration from this their tenth meeting, known as PALM10, with its associated action plan sets out what we can expect from Japanese engagement with the Pacific over the next three years. The use of the seven pillars of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent as a structure for future engagement is notable. The Blue Pacific concept was developed by Pacific nations as a home-grown framing to address their challenges. Other partners have inserted the term Blue Pacific into announcements and documents. However, this takes the recognition of the Pacific’s own framework to another level. It is particularly significant given that Japan’s former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe coined the term Indo-Pacific, which many in the Pacific islands region have resisted. Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum Baron Waqa (L) and Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida shake hands during the opening session of the 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM10) in Tokyo on July 18, 2024. (AFP) PALM10 sees a move to an “All Japan” approach to working with Pacific partners. Whilst several Japanese agencies are referenced in the outcome documents, the most notable is the prominence of the Japanese Self-Defense Force in future engagement. Japan’s military impacts in the Pacific islands region are well known and loom large in the regional memory. While the PALM10 action plan references the continuation of activities related to World War II, such as retrieval of remains and clearance of unexploded ordnance, new activities will see the Japanese presence in the region take on a markedly military aspect. This will add to what is an already crowded environment in which defense diplomacy has been increasing in recent years. However, Japan’s use of this strategy has been relatively limited until now. The PALM10 action plan refers to increased defense “exchanges” to consist of port calls by Japanese Defense Force aircraft and vessels. This may not be as easy to achieve as Tokyo officials might like. At the same time as PALM10 was in session in Tokyo, Vanuatu’s National Security Advisory Board refused a request for a Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force vessel to dock in Port Vila. The reasons for the refusal remain unclear. Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (C) speaks during the opening session of the 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM10) in Tokyo on July 18, 2024. (AFP) Other examples of increased use of the JSDF are the provision of capacity building to Pacific personnel for participation in peace-keeping operations and inclusion of a Self-Defense Unit in disaster relief teams to be deployed to Pacific island countries at their governments’ request. At the end of the Action Plan are items for “clarification.” Included in the list (of three) for Japan to clarify are two that continue this push for increased defense diplomacy. They are: a proposal to accept Pacific cadets into the National Defense Academy of Japan and to use the Japan Pacific Islands Defence Dialogue to foster “mutual understanding and confidence building.” The JPIDD has met twice, most recently earlier this year. We are now into the Pacific meeting season and in six weeks the 53rd Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting will convene in Nuku’alofa, Tonga. Japan is a longstanding dialogue partner of the forum. The ongoing review of regional architecture includes revisions to how dialogue partners are selected and accommodated. What was discussed and agreed at PALM10 will play a role in determining where at the Blue Pacific table Japan will sit.

Read More

Hun To went after the press; who really won?

Editor09 mins

ANALYSIS He is the notorious playboy cousin of Cambodia’s prime minister, and has long been viewed as the family’s fixer for all things they would rather not come into public view.  Hun To has reportedly been investigated by Australian police for heroin trafficking; faced questions in connection to threats against the family of slain political analyst Kem Ley, which fled to Australia in 2016 and; in recent years, reporting by Al Jazeera and The Australian newspaper has tied him to cyber slavery, scam compounds and drug smuggling.   But in bringing lawsuits against those news organizations, he inadvertently highlighted how Australia – a key regional partner for Cambodia – is running out of patience for the Hun dynasty’s antics.  Earlier this month, Hun To scored an apparent victory after he secured an out-of-court settlement over a years-long dispute with The Australian. The outlet agreed to retract a 2-year-old story it had published about Hun To that “some readers may have understood” to have alleged that he “was linked to human trafficking, cyber scams and drug importation,” the paper wrote.  “The Australian did not intend to make any such allegations against Mr Hun and accepts his denials of such conduct.” The retraction marked the conclusion of a defamation case Hun To had brought against The Australian in December 2022. It came just after the Australian government had declined to renew his visa, RFA has learned – even though he had spent decades living part-time in the country and he and his family owned extensive business and property interests around Melbourne.  While Canberra gave no reason for its decision, Hun To’s lawyers insisted in court complaints seen by RFA that the rejection was spurred by news stories from The Australian and Al Jazeera linking him to organized crime, fraud factories and human trafficking in his native Cambodia.  A case launched in parallel by Hun To against Al Jazeera is ongoing. The Qatari state-funded outlet did not respond to a request for comment. Australian libel law is notoriously plaintiff-friendly, particularly in cases where the defendant is a news organization. This growing reputation led the author of a 2019 New York Times op-ed to dub the island nation “the defamation capital of the world.”  In Australian defamation cases, the burden of proof uniquely rests with the defendants. No other type of case places such burden on the party being sued. In such a legal environment, defendants run higher risks of losing and incurring hefty damages, and that has often encouraged news organizations to settle out of court. The retraction might have gone little noticed until Hun To’s lawyer, Adam Lopez – who has been known for taking on controversial defamation cases – took to LinkedIn to gloat about his victory. The dispute with The Australian had been “resolved on a confidential basis,” he noted, suggesting that the newspaper had made further concessions beyond the retraction.  Cambodia press and social media users quickly picked up the story, with some simply reporting on the retraction and others criticizing The Australian or the Australian court system.   With the scrubbing of the controversial story, Hun To enjoyed precisely one day of victory.  On July 10, news broke suggesting Hun To’s business interests were neck deep in exactly the type of allegations for which The Australian had just apologized. Elliptic, a financial compliance firm specializing in tracing cryptocurrencies, published a report alleging that a “Cambodian conglomerate with links to Cambodia’s ruling Hun family” had laundered more than US$11 billion for cyber scammers. The name of the company was Huione Pay, and Hun To is one of its three directors.  A subsequent report by Reuters found evidence that Huione Pay had processed cryptocurrency worth $150,000 that had been stolen by the sanctioned North Korean hacking collective known as Lazarus. In response to the allegations, National Bank of Cambodia, the country’s central bank, told Reuters that it “would not hesitate to impose any corrective measures” on Huione, although it said so “without saying if such action was planned,” the news agency drily noted. Following the revelations, digital finance company Tether announced that it had frozen $29 million of cryptocurrency held by Huione following a “a direct request from law enforcement.” Whether the latest news make Hun To reconsider going after the press, however, seems unlikely, said Phil Robertson, director of Asia Human Rights and Labor Advocates.  Hun To “would be wise to abandon his case since all the dirt has come out on Huione, but he won’t because he’s a shameless, arrogant, rights-abusing tycoon who believes that whatever he does, the ruling Hun family will have his back.” Neither Huione’s nor Hun To’s lawyer had responded to requests for comment as of publication. These allegations are far from the first time Hun To has caught negative publicity. Australian MP Julian Hill spoke in Parliament last March arguing that Hun To and other politically connected Cambodian figures “should never again be granted visas to visit Australia.”  His speech charted Hun To’s long and checkered links to Australia, noting that as early as 2003 Australian police had sought to arrest him on suspicion of heroin trafficking. Since then, Hun To and his wife acquired millions of dollars’ worth of property in Australia, Hill added, “with seemingly no legitimate explanation for where their wealth has come from.” “It’s no secret that Hun To has his finger in lots of pies — drug trafficking, illegal deforestation, animal trafficking, illegal gambling,” Hill said. “Most recently, we’ve heard reports he’s dipping his toes into human trafficking, as well. That’s diversifying, isn’t it?”

Read More

North Korea’s Kim in military talks with Russian vice defense minister

Editor05 mins

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has discussed the “importance and necessity” of military cooperation with Russia’s vice defense minister to “defend mutual security interests,” the North’s state media reported on Friday. Kim met a Russian military delegation, led by the vice minister, Aleksey Krivoruchko, in Pyongyang on Thursday, according to the Korean Central News Agency, or KCNA. “The talk shared recognition of the importance and necessity of the military cooperation between the two countries to defend mutual security interests,” the KCNA said. Kim reiterated his firm support and solidarity for Russia’s war with Ukraine and stressed the need for the militaries of the two countries to “get united more firmly” to develop bilateral relations, the news agency added. Krivoruchko is the first known ranking Russian military official to visit North Korea since a summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kim.   The two met in Pyongyang for talks aimed at bolstering their economic and security relations and underscoring their shared defiance of Western sanctions. Under a new partnership treaty announced at their summit they  agreed to offer each other military assistance “without delay” if either were attacked. Russia has been cozying up to North Korea since Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The United States has accused North Korea of sending Russia weapons for use in its Ukraine war but both North Korea and Russia deny that. RELATED STORIES North Korea, Russia agree to offer military assistance if either is attacked North Korea’s Kim hails Russia alliance, promises Putin support on Ukraine Putin arrives in North Korea, vows to boost cooperation and fight sanctions More balloons The military in U.S. ally South Korea resumed propaganda loudspeaker broadcasts toward North Korea in response to the North’s latest launch of trash-carrying balloons into the South. The broadcasts took place from Thursday evening to early Friday in areas near where the balloons were launched, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, or JCS, said on Friday. Since late May, North Korea has sent more than 2,000 trash-carrying balloons into the South in retaliation for the launch by anti-North Korea activists of balloons carrying propaganda leaflets towards the North. “The military’s response going forward will fully depend on North Korea’s actions,” the JCS said, without providing further details.  On Thursday, the JCS said the latest North Korean balloons appeared to be traveling toward the northern part of Gyeonggi Province that surrounds Seoul, advising the public to not touch any fallen balloon and to report them to the military or police. South Korea resumed loudspeaker broadcasts last month as it fully suspended a  2018 inter-Korean military tension reduction agreement in response to the North’s launch of waves of trash-carrying balloons. Edited by Mike Firn.

Read More
vietnam Brides on sale

To Lam: The man with the golden steak is now leading Vietnam

Editor08 mins

In the West, he may be best known for eating a gold-covered steak while his countrymen survive on an average of about US$10 a day. But in Hanoi, Vietnam’s new top leader To Lam has for years been seen as an operator whose decades in politics long paved the way for his ascent. On Thursday, that climb reached a new zenith after Vietnamese state media announced that Lam, 67, would take over the duties for Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. It comes less than two months after Lam was elevated to the Vietnamese presidency – a move that put him in pole position for the general secretary job, the most powerful in the country. Vietnamese President To Lam attends a press briefing with Russian President Vladimir Putin (not pictured), at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 20, 2024. (Minh Hoang/Pool via Reuters) The son of a Vietnamese police colonel, Lam began his career in public security in 1979. He joined the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1981, eventually rising to become the minister for public security – the country’s top security official – in 2016.  In 2019, he was awarded the rank of general by then-president Trong. Security czar In his capacity as security minister, he focused on internal politics and counter-intelligence – areas that may well have helped him to later cement his political powers. The stint was not without controversy. In 2017, Lam was accused of being involved in the kidnapping of Trinh Xuan Thanh, a fugitive oil executive and former provincial official, in Berlin.  Thanh later returned to Hanoi through Slovakia. The government denied kidnapping but the case led to a temporary rift in diplomatic relations between Germany and Vietnam.  But it would fit a larger pattern of alleged transnational repression and quashing of dissent overseen by Lam.  His term as security minister saw the arrests and suspected kidnappings of journalist critics, including RFA blogger Truong Duy Nhat, who disappeared in Thailand in 2019 but is now in jail in Vietnam serving a 10-year sentence. Golden steak and ‘Onion Bae’ In 2021, Lam was involved in another controversy after he was caught on video eating a piece of gold-plated steak at a luxury restaurant in London.  A video clip of the general being fed a US$2,000 steak by celebrity chef Salt Bae went viral, causing a public outcry at home.  This was followed by a draconian crackdown, including the arrest and jailing of a noodle-seller nicknamed “Onion Bae” who had dared to ridicule Lam by posting a parody of the incident to social media. He remains in jail. Lam subsequently ramped up anti-corruption crackdowns that saw off potential rivals within the party in what critics have said were clearly politically motivated investigations. Vietnamese President To Lam, left on red carpet, and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, right on red carpet, review the guard of honor at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 20, 2024. (Minh Hoang/AP) Lam’s enthusiastic implementation of this so-called “Burning Furnace” campaign led to the sacking of half a dozen senior ministers and Politburo members within the span of months beginning in 2022. Yet Lam and Trong, the ally he succeeds, are also said to have questionable hidden interests. In May, the Tiếng Dân newspaper revealed that a younger brother of To Lam, To Dung, was the chairman of the construction and real estate firm Xuan Cau Group, noting that the company had been conspicuously absent from any investigation even as it has won projects worth billions of Vietnamese dong with little oversight.  Private man Little else is known about the private life of Vietnam’s new top man.  He does not appear to have ever given any remarks to Western media and nothing in English has been written of his immediate family, though Vietnamese reports say he has been twice married, first to Vu Hong Loan, the sister of a Vietnamese police major general and currently to Ngo Phuong Ly.  He appears to have several children. One daughter was revealed to have graduated from London’s prestigious School of Oriental and Asian Studies, or SOAS, in 2023.  On the global stage, Lam has made clear his endorsement of the so-called “Bamboo diplomacy” Hanoi has undertaken to balance its relations between East and West.  In June, he welcomed Russian President Vladimir Putin, weeks after his swearing in as president, calling him “comrade” and hailing a successful visit.  Hanoi saw visits from Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden within the previous nine months. Whether his caretaker role becomes a more permanent one, there seems little likelihood that Lam would veer from the established path. At his presidential swearing-in in May, he promised to “continue to strengthen the party’s capabilities, its ruling power and combat prowess.” He may well be looking to strengthen the same in himself.  Edited by Malcolm Foster.

Read More

Myanmar anti-junta activists accused of assassination plot die in custody, group says

Editor04 mins

Two members of an anti-junta group accused of trying to kill Myanmar’s junta leader died after being tortured during interrogation, a spokesperson for the group told Radio Free Asia. Seven people were arrested on June 8, allegedly in possession of two 107 mm rockets and launchers, near the site of a bridge opening ceremony attended by the junta leader, Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. Two more suspects were rounded up the following day, and another rocket was seized. Another four people were detained several days later in connection with the plot, junta-controlled media reported. The Yangon-based Dark Shadow urban guerrilla group said four of the people arrested were its members and two of them died after being tortured. ‘Comrade Shein Myint Mo Aung and Comrade Zaw Gyi died during the interrogation. Although we don’t know exactly what date they died, they died at Ba Yint Naung Military Interrogation Center,” said the spokesperson, who declined to be identified for fear of reprisals. “The other two Dark Shadow members, Myo Thein Tun and Ye Zaw Tun, have been out of touch with their families and we don’t know whether they are dead or are still alive.” Members of urban guerrilla groups were arrested by junta forces for allegedly plotting to kill junta leader Min Aung Hlaing, according to the junta-controlled newspaper, Myanma Alin on June 17, 2024. (Myanmar Military)   The other nine people arrested, who are members of other guerrilla groups, are believed to be still in custody. RFA called the Yangon region’s junta spokesperson, Htay Aung, to ask about the suspects but he did not respond by the time of publication. RELATED STORIES Myanmar guerrilla groups claim responsibility for bombings Junta deploys first round of military recruits to Myanmar’s frontlines Drafting of women underway in Myanmar, despite junta claims to the contrary According to information released by junta-controlled newspaper Myanma Alin on June 17, the plot was foiled when informers told police the group was aiming to fire three 107 mm rockets at Yangon region’s Thanlyin Bridge No. 3 during its opening ceremony. Myanmar had been in turmoil since the military ousted an elected government led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi in early 2021 with many young democracy supporters taking up arms in a bid to end military rule after troops crushed protests. As of Thursday, more than 5,400 civilians have died due to extrajudicial killings, public crackdowns on protests and attacks by land and air across the country, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, . Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn. 

Read More
Myanmar Brides on Sale

As Myanmar junta falters, rival ethnic armies jostle in Shan state

Editor015 mins

The rout of military junta troops and seizure of territory across Myanmar’s border with China has brought the Three Brotherhood Alliance a new struggle in Shan state: dealing with a myriad of actors and shifting alliances seeking to profit from the rapidly changing political landscape. The region’s multiple well-armed ethnic armies include a powerful force that is a de facto ally of Beijing, groups that are aligned with the junta, and other militias with no allegiance to the democratic opposition National Unity Government or the fight to reverse the 2021 military coup. In northern Shan state, insurgent alliance members the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Defense Alliance Army (MNDAA) last month launched the second phase of Operation 1027, capturing key military outposts in the country’s largest state.  The TNLA’s capture of the last junta camp in Nawnghkio, and its move south into Mogok, will complicate the movement of reinforcements and resupply of Lashio, northern Shan state’s biggest city and a commercial gateway between Mandalay and Muse on the Chinese border.  Members of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Mandalay People’s Defense Force stand in front of the captured building of the Myanmar War Veterans’ Organization in Nawnghkio township in Shan state, June 26, 2024. (Mandalay People’s Defence Force via AP) China has put pressure on the alliance to halt the offensive, which started after violations of a cease-fire China negotiated in January. On July 13, the MNDAA announced a unilateral cease-fire would go into effect from July 14-18, out of respect for the Chinese Communist Party, which was convening a Third Plenum session in Beijing,  While the two forces remain in positions around Lashio, their offensive has slowed for now.  That’s not to say that hostilities have ceased: The junta continues to launch airstrikes.  China has been unable to broker a new ceasefire, even though the Three Brotherhood Alliance had sent representatives to nearby Kunming for talks.  The MNDAA and TNLA always fight back in self-defense. And with their newly captured Chinese-made anti-aircraft artillery, the two Shan state-based armies have more capacity to target the heavy-lift Mi-17 helicopters the junta uses to resupply and reinforce remote positions.  RELATED STORIES Myanmar rebels rack up more gains as Operation 1027 enters new phase Myanmar insurgent allies capture strategic Shan state town from junta Ethnic army overruns junta command center in Myanmar’s Kokang region China awaits junta approval to resume border trade with Myanmar’s Shan state Inroads into Shan regions The turmoil in Shan state has drawn local actors – the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP) – off the sidelines. They are trying to limit the Brotherhood’s gains and exploit the weakness of the State Administrative Council, as the junta is formally known.  Tensions between the TNLA and SSPP continue to fester, with both sides accusing the other of instigating attacks.  July 13 talks between the two sides in Panghsang aimed at lowering tensions were declared successful by the TNLA.  But while these have not escalated into a larger conflict, they’ve resulted in the SSPP not joining the fight against the junta. Indeed, the SSPP, along with the UWSA, seem to be abetting the junta. What we are seeing play out are  ethnic loyalties and alliances in the complex Shan patchwork. At over 155,000 square kilometers 60,000 square miles), Shan state is not just the largest of Myanmar’s 14 states and administrative divisions, it makes up nearly a quarter of the total land area.  The majority of the six million population are ethnic Shan, with nine other ethnic groups. The TNLA represents the roughly half a million Ta’ang, or Palaung people. The MNDAA is comprised of Mandarin-speaking ethnic Chinese based on the border with China’s Yunnan province. As a result of Operation 1027, the two Brotherhood armies are making significant inroads into ethnic Shan-dominated regions.  The state has several ethnic resistance organizations composed of ethnic Shan, including the SSPP and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS).  But they are bitter rivals and with limited manpower, equipment, and resources, and neither army controls a contiguous area, making a political map of central and southern Shan State look like a patch of leopard spots. Most of the armed groups in the region have been highly opportunistic and unprincipled. None joined the National Unity Government or picked up arms against the regime.  All three groups have benefited from the insecurity caused by the coup, which allowed them to focus on their illicit business activities, including the production, sale, and/or taxation of methamphetamine. The Wa: rested and ready After Operation 1027 began last October 27, the SSPP attacked its rival the RCSS, on the grounds that it remained a National Ceasefire Agreement partner of the junta. While it was hoped that the SSPP would join Operation 1027, their limited operations against the junta’s ally last year was accepted as sufficient for the time being. The SSPP seemed to pledge support for the second phase of Operation 1027, but its tensions with the TNLA have put that on hold.  In a surprise move, the United Wa State Army has started to move well outside of its Kokang autonomous region, centered on the border crossing to China at Panghsang (Pangsang).  The UWSA captured the mountain town of Tangyan, which is 135 km (85 miles) south of Lashio, without firing a shot, then continued west and took Mongyai.  There are now reports that the UWSA have moved west all the way to the Salween (Thanlyin) River – leading observers to ask, what’s going on? With 20-30,000 men, the UWSA, which grew out of the wreckage of the Communist Party of Burma, is one of the largest and best armed ethnic resistance organizations. Ostensibly an ethnic Wa organization, today its leaders are all Mandarin-speaking ethnic Chinese, and the group is seen as Beijing’s closest proxy. They’ve had autonomy since 1989. United Wa State Army soldiers march during a military parade in the town of Panghsang, April 17, 2019….

Read More
Thai natural gas project suspended after pipeline explosions in Myanmar

Anti-junta forces capture camps in central Myanmar township

Editor07 mins

An anti junta group in Myanmar’s Mandalay region is continuing to make gains in a key township following the collapse of a truce between insurgent armies and the military who seized power in a 2021 coup. The Mandalay People’s Defense Force, or PDF, captured a junta camp at the Alpha cement factory in Madaya township on July 14, and one at Taung Ta Ngar two days later, it said in a statement on Tuesday. Madaya is just 30 km (19 miles) north of Mandalay, the capital of the region and Myanmar’s second-largest city. The Mandalay PDF has been fighting alongside the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, since late October 2023.  The TNLA, which has also teamed up with the Arakan Army and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army as part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, pushed back junta forces in several regions before agreeing a shaky China-brokered truce with the junta in January. When the ceasefire collapsed on June 25, the TNLA attacked Mandalay’s Mogoke township and several towns in Shan state to the region’s east, while the Mandalay PDF focused much of its attention on Madaya and Singu townships in Mandalay region. The defense force said it had captured 28 junta camps as of Wednesday. Weapons and ammunition seized after Mandalay PDF captured the junta base at the Alpha cement factory in Madaya township, Mandalay region in a photograph released on July 16, 2024. (Mandalay PDF) Mandalay PDF spokesman Osmon, who goes by one name, told Radio Free Asia Myanmar’s military suffered heavy losses in the battle for Madaya. “There were many casualties on the side of the junta in these operations. We have seized corpses and arrested junta soldiers,” he said. “There were some casualties on the side of Mandalay PDF.”  Osmon didn’t disclose the numbers of casualties on either side but said the PDF took more than 150 prisoners. He added the group is now engaged in a fierce battle with junta forces at Madaya’s Kyauk Ta Dar base. RELATED STORIES Myanmar junta steps up security in Mandalay as fighting spreads across region  Thousands stuck between checkpoints on Myanmar road amid renewed fighting Thousands displaced in Myanmar’s Mandalay region On Tuesday, three people were killed when a shell hit Madaya town, close to its train station and main market. “It happened around 8 a.m.,” said a resident who didn’t want to be named for fear of reprisals. “A 44-year-old woman, a 30-year-old woman and a two-year-old girl were killed.” The man said he didn’t know which side had fired the shell, while another resident said the blast happened close to where junta troops were stationed. “It was about 10 to 14 meters away from them,” he said, also requesting anonymity for security reasons. “It was also close to where the junta soldiers always come to drink tea.” RFA phoned the junta spokesman for Mandalay region, Thein Htay, for details on the fighting in Madaya, but he did not answer calls. The National Unity Government, a shadow government formed by members of the civil administration ousted in the 2021 coup, said on June 27 that PDFs and their allies have made sweeping gains in Mandalay region and Shan state to the east, in a campaign it dubbed “Operation Shan-Man.” The Mandalay PDF said it had captured 11 junta camps in Singu township,  80 km (50 miles) north of Mandalay city, by July 7. Now the junta is fighting back, damaging around 100 houses and injuring more than 20 people in airstrikes on July 16, as it seeks to flush PDF forces out of Singu town. The PDF’s Singu-based head of information, Than Ma Ni, said the junta carried out more than 20 airstrikes on Tuesday and also bombarded the town with heavy artillery.  “The junta’s air force has been striking all day as Mandalay-PDF has taken over Singu town,” he said Wednesday. “There were no deaths, but those who were hit by shrapnel have been moved to a safe place and are receiving medical treatment. The entire town was pretty much destroyed.” Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Mike Firn and Taejun Kang.

Read More

Investigative Journalism Reportika © March 2022 by Ij-Reportika is licensed under CC BY 4.0