Myanmar’s junta uses identity documents as tools of genocide against Rohingya: report

Myanmar’s junta is using identity documents to carry out a genocide of the ethnic Rohingya community, much like the perpetrators of the Holocaust and Rwandan genocide, according to a new report, which calls on the U.N. Security Council to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The 63-page report entitled “Genocide by Attrition: The Role of Identity Documents in the Holocaust and the Genocides of Rwanda and Myanmar” and published Tuesday by the Southeast Asian rights group Fortify Rights, details how the junta is forcing Rohingya to obtain National Verification Cards (NVCs) that its authors say effectively strip them of access to full citizenship rights and protections. It also draws on case studies from the Holocaust and Rwandan genocides to demonstrate how authoritarian regimes use such documents to “systematically identify, persecute, and kill targeted populations on a widespread and massive scale.” “Perpetrators have long used identification documents in the commission of genocide,” said Ken MacLean, co-author of the report, senior advisor to Fortify Rights, and Clark University Professor at the Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, in a statement accompanying the release of the report. “Evidence from the Holocaust and Rwandan genocides show striking similarities with the ongoing erasure of the Rohingya identity in Myanmar by the junta.” The report found that identification cards such as those used during the Holocaust and Rwandan genocides contributed to “genocide by attrition,” which it defined as “the gradual destruction of a protected group by reducing their strength through sustained, indirect methods of destruction.” Such policies have long been in use in Myanmar and continue to play a role in the ongoing genocide of the Rohingyas, the report said, citing interviews with more than 20 Rohingya-genocide survivors, leaked junta documents, and a media analysis of junta-backed news outlets since the military’s Feb. 1, 2021 coup. It said that Rohingya in Western Myanmar’s Rakhine state described how the junta forces them to carry NVCs to prevent them from identifying as “Rohingya,” restrict their movement, and curtail their ability to earn a living, “creating conditions of life designed to be destructive.” Instead, they are made to identify as “Bengali” immigrants from Bangladesh in what the report said is a bid by authorities to exclude them from citizenship and ethnicity within Myanmar. The report cited the United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention’s findings that increased politicization of identity and discriminatory measures targeting protected groups are indicators in creating “an environment conducive to the commission of atrocity crimes,” noting that similar legal and administrative tools were used to facilitate the destruction of the Jewish and Tutsi populations, and are now being used against the Rohingya. “Rohingya continue to face existential threats under the military junta, an illegitimate regime responsible for far-reaching atrocities,” said John Quinley, senior human rights specialist at Fortify Rights and co-author of the report. “The ongoing denial of Rohingya ethnicity and citizenship are indicators of genocide. The [shadow] National Unity Government has committed to ensuring Rohingya citizenship and inclusion. The junta, however, is still using coercive measures to force Rohingya to identify as foreigners, erasing records of their existence.” Myanmar immigration officials hand over an identification document to a Rohingya woman at the Taungpyoletwei town repatriation camp in Rakhine state’s Maungdaw township, near the Bangladesh border, in a file photo. Credit: AFP Holding the junta accountable Fortify Rights said that while the connection between identification documents and international crimes is well-recognized, some U.N. officials, embassies, and others in Myanmar have failed to condemn the use of NVCs in targeting Rohingya. In some cases, the group said, they have even endorsed the documents as a solution to the group’s “statelessness.” The report’s findings demonstrate links between the NVC process and acts of genocide and should be a focus of investigations and legal proceedings, Fortify Rights said. The violations documented in Genocide by Attrition demonstrate links between the NVC process and genocidal acts and should be a focus of ongoing investigations and legal proceedings, said Fortify Rights. It called on U.N. member states to cut Myanmar’s junta off from access to arms, finances, and political legitimacy, and urged the U.N. Security Council to refer the situation in the country to the International Criminal Court (ICC). “The Myanmar military junta poses an undeniable threat to international peace and security,” said Fortify’s Quinley. “U.N. member states must wake up and act now to deny the junta the resources it craves and to hold it accountable for all of its crimes including genocide.” In 2016, a military crackdown forced some 90,000 Rohingya to flee Rakhine state and cross into neighboring Bangladesh, while a larger one in 2017 in response to insurgent attacks, killed thousands of members of the ethnic minority and led to an exodus of more than 740,000 across the border.  Human rights groups have produced a trove of credible reports based on commercial satellite imagery and extensive interviews with Rohingya about the operations in Rakhine state in 2017, including arbitrary killings, torture, and mass rape. Gambia has accused Myanmar’s military leadership of violating the 1948 Genocide Convention in Rohingya areas in a case it brought to the Hague-based International Court of Justice. The court is holding hearings to determine whether it has jurisdiction to judge if atrocities committed there constituted a genocide.

Read More

Myanmar’s junta vows to proceed with high-profile executions

The court-ordered executions of four Burmese prisoners, including a deposed lawmaker and a prominent former activist sentenced to death for “terrorism,” will be carried out despite widespread international criticism, a junta official said Tuesday. Junta deputy information minister, Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, rejected the possibility for pardons in the four cases, which are part of a surge in death sentences under martial law in Myanmar. Since taking over in a coup last year, the military has transferred the authority to try cases of civilians to special or existing military tribunals, resulting in what rights groups say are summary proceedings with no chance of appeal. Former National League for Democracy (NLD) lawmaker Phyo Zeyar Thaw and 88 Generation leader Ko Jimmy were sentenced to death for violating the country’s Anti-Terrorism Law. Two other men — Hla Myo Aung and Aung Thura Zaw — were sentenced to death in Yangon region’s Hlaing Tharyar township on charges of murder. All four lost appeals of their cases last week. “The death penalty will be implemented,” Zaw Min Tun told RFA’s Burmese Service. “They will not be pardoned. We have finished the process all the way up through the appeals,” he added, when asked whether junta chief, Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, would consider staying their executions. Zaw Min Tun said the four men had been transferred to the custody of the junta’s Prison Department, which is now responsible for their cases. According to the junta, Phyo Zeyar Thaw and Ko Jimmy maintained contact with Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG), the Committee Representing the People’s Parliament (CRPP), and other organizations labeled “terrorist groups” by the military regime and had carried out “acts of violence.” The two men were sentenced to death by a military tribunal on Jan. 21. The four death sentences, as well 111 others that have been handed down by junta courts between the military’s Feb. 1, 2021, coup, and May 19 this year, have drawn criticism from legal experts and rights groups, who say the regime is threatening the public with unfair executions. The United Nations, Washington, Ottawa, and Paris have issued statements strongly condemning the decisions in the cases now proceeding to execution, although the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — of which Myanmar is a member state — has yet to respond. Thailand-based rights group Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), which claims junta security forces have arrested 14,032 people between the start of the coup and June 7 this year – 10,976 of whom it says remain in detention – issued a statement Monday calling on the U.N., ASEAN, and the rest of the international community to intervene in the cases. The junta’s Foreign Affairs Ministry recently responded to the statements by the U.N. and Western governments, accusing their authors of “condoning acts of terrorism.” Waging ‘psychological warfare’ Kyaw Htwe, a member of the NLD’s Central Executive Committee, echoed concerns that the junta is using the sentences as a warning to its opponents in an interview with RFA on Tuesday. But he said proceeding with the executions could ultimately harm the regime itself. “I think the junta is using the [threat of the] death penalty of the four men, including Ko Jimmy and Ko Phyo Zeyar Thaw, to wage psychological warfare against the armed resistance and the people,” he said. “They are testing the limits. They have crossed the line and made an irrational decision, which required presidential orders and involved several steps of appeal. If they stupidly implement this decision, they will face a strong response from the domestic and international communities.” Kyaw Htwe said the junta’s administrative, legislative and judicial decisions are all “illegal,” because it is an illegitimate government that seized power through force. However, he didn’t provide clarification on how the NLD intends to respond to the death sentences. NUG Human Rights Minister Aung Myo Min said the junta lacks the judicial authority to issue execution orders, which require an in-depth and transparent process to avoid wrongful convictions. “We cannot trust the junta’s tribunal, courts, and sentencing. They are murdering innocent civilians and view all democracy activists as the enemy,” he said. “[Proceeding with execution] is the wrong decision, both in terms of human rights and rule of law.” High-stakes bluff A Yangon-based attorney, who spoke to RFA on condition of anonymity, said he believes the execution orders are a bluff by the military regime as part of a bid to extract some sort of concession from the international community. “After reviewing all factors, I conclude that it is very unlikely they will carry out the execution order,” he said, adding that it is likely the junta wants to use the cases “as a bargaining chip for political reasons.” “Given the fact that the world is protesting these orders, and that the decisions are in violation of international and domestic laws, they will face severe consequences if they proceed.” However, political analyst Than Soe Naing told RFA that the junta, which the AAPP says has killed more than 1,900 civilians since the coup, has demonstrated over the past 16 months that it has little regard for the sanctity of human life. “They might reconsider if the international community appeals to them courteously,” he said. “Otherwise, I think they would actually hang Ko Jimmy and Phyo Zeyar Thaw, as they are little more than a group of thugs.” In its latest annual report covering the judicial use of the death penalty for the period January to December 2021, London-based rights group Amnesty International found that dozens of people were “arbitrarily sentenced to death” by Myanmar’s military tribunals, “several without the defendants being present, in what was widely perceived as a way to target political opponents and protestors.” The group said that prior to February 2021, Myanmar’s known death sentences were sporadically imposed for murder and usually commuted through mass pardons. However, the yearly average for the years 2017-2020 had remained lower than 10. The last execution in Myanmar — that of student leader Salai Tin Maung…

Read More

Cambodia and China deny that Beijing is building secret facility at Ream Naval Base

China is not secretly building a military facility for its exclusive use inside a naval base Cambodia, a government spokesman said, dismissing a new report that detailed how both countries have been concealing a project that first gained U.S. attention in 2019. The Washington Post reported on Monday that China is building a new facility­–its second overseas military installation after a base in Djibouti–on the northern part of Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand, where Cambodia will host a groundbreaking ceremony on Thursday. The newspaper quoted a Chinese official in Beijing as saying that “a portion of the base” will be used by “the Chinese military.” The official denied it was for “exclusive” military use, telling the Post that scientists would also use the facility. Cambodian government spokesperson Phay Siphan echoed the Beijing official’s denial that it would be for exclusive Chinese military use. “There is no agreement or law saying that the construction is reserved for Chinese benefit exclusively,” he told RFA’s Khmer Service. He said the base remains open for visits from other countries, including the United States, but the Post report said Cambodian and Chinese authorities have worked hard to hide the Chinese presence in Ream, keeping the Chinese areas off limits to third-country visitors and altering their dress to avoid scrutiny. Ream base became the center of controversy in July 2019 after The Wall Street Journal cited U.S. and allied officials as confirming a secret deal to allow the Chinese to use part of the base for 30 years—with automatic renewals every 10 years after that—and to post military personnel, store weapons and berth warships. The reported deal, which would provide China with its first naval staging facility in Southeast Asia and allow it to significantly expand patrols on the South China Sea, was vehemently denied by Hun Sen, who said permitting foreign use of a military base in the country would “be in full contradiction to Cambodia’s constitution.” Last year, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman voiced concern about the Chinese military presence at Ream Naval Base during a visit to the country, citing Cambodia’s razing of two U.S.-constructed buildings on the base in 2020. After meeting with Prime Minister Hun Sen, she arranged for the U.S. Embassy to send its defense attaché for regular visits. Ten days later, the attaché arrived at the base, but he cut the tour short when he was not allowed full access, including to the sites of the two buildings. The U.S. had offered to renovate one of them, and the choice to destroy it suggested that Cambodia had accepted Chinese assistance to develop the base, a Pentagon report released last year said. A Cambodian official told RFA at that time that Cambodia never agreed to give the attaché a full tour, and that the U.S. had committed a breach of trust for asking more than what was agreed upon. Exiled political analyst Kim Sok told RFA that Cambodia and China are hiding the truth with their denials. “If any suspicions about the Chinese naval base are not resolved, Cambodia could face serious consequences—not only a diplomatic crisis in the form of pressure from the U.S.—but also it will lead to a security crisis. This will affect regional issues if there is no solution,” Kim Sok said. The base will bring more Chinese into Cambodia for purposes other than tourism or business, Cambodian-American rights activist and legal expert Theary Seng told RFA. “The Cambodian political situation is fragile, especially in terms of building good communication with the free world, because the ruling party dissolved its competitors to bolster the dictatorial regime. This has enabled China to [pounce on] the opportunity to increase its influence [in the region],” she said. Australia-based political scientist Carl Thayer said the semantics don’t change the situation. “Ream Naval Base is a Cambodian base on its own territory. Are they allocating a section that China can use? And if so, can Cambodians gain access to it without seeking prior permission?” he asked. “So Hun Sen says it’s not a base, it is a facility, and it’s still a base. Or [as] Shakespeare [said], ‘A rose by any other name would smell as sweet,’” added Thayer, an emeritus professor at the University of New South Wales in Australia. “A Chinese navy base in Cambodia, if it’s called a facility, it’s still a Chinese navy base,” he said. Translated by Samean Yun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.

Read More

Refugees in Myanmar’s Chin state excluded from ASEAN humanitarian assistance plan

Nearly 100,000 internally displaced ethnic Chins in western Myanmar have called for help from civil society groups to avoid allowing the military junta to control distribution of humanitarian aid from Southeast Asian countries, saying their strife-torn region is not receiving assistance. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — a regional grouping that aims to promote economic and security cooperation among its 10 member states, including Myanmar — announced on Sunday that it would work with the military regime to distribute humanitarian aid to Myanmar. The number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Myanmar topped 1 million as of May 30 amid fighting and armed clashes across the country since the February 2021 military coup overthrew the democratically elected government, triggering civilian displacement and a humanitarian crisis, according to the U.N.’s refugee agency (UNHCR). Residents of Chin state have been strong opponents of the military since the takeover, turning the 36,000-square-kilometer (13,900-square-mile) territory into a battlefield. Nearly 90,000 local residents have been forced by the fighting to flee the area. In Chin state and Magway and Sagaing regions in Myanmar’s northwest, indiscriminate attacks by junta forces against civilians have resulted in numerous deaths and casualties, the torching of homes and villages, house searches, arbitrary arrests and detentions, UNHCR said. Restrictions on movement and transportation has led to shortages of food and goods in among IDPs and host communities in the region, the U.N. agency said. ASEAN’s promised aid will bypass ethnic Chin IDPs, according to the interim Chin National Consultative Council, Chin state’s leading political group, and the national Unity Government (NUG), the government in exile formed elected lawmakers and members of parliament ousted in the coup. ASEAN will provide assistance to Kayah and Kayin states, as well as to Magway, Sagaing and Bago regions, allowing a military junta-led task force to make decisions on how aid is delivered through the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management, said Salai Isaac Khin, chairman of the Interim Chin National Consultative Council (ICNCC). “We wonder if they had ignored us because they didn’t know the ground conditions,” he told RFA. “What’s the meaning of this? This is questionable. It’s like the people of Chin state, the most vulnerable people, have had their rights ignored.” ‘We’re so disappointed’ The states and regions that will receive the humanitarian aid have 50,000 IDPs due to post-coup fighting and violence, about 45% of the number of displaced people in Chin state, said the ICNCC and the NUG in a statement issued Sunday. Furthermore, over 30,000 IDPs from Chin state have fled over the border into India. RFA called ASEAN’s office in Yangon to ask why Chin IDPs were not included in the aid program, but no one responded. A spokesman for the Chin State Joint Defense Committee (CJDC) said it was disappointing that the state is being excluded from receiving ASEAN humanitarian assistance. “Almost the entire town of Thantlang in Chin state was burned down during the fighting,” he said. “In Falam, about 93 houses were turned into ashes. Thirty percent of the Chin people are war refugees. We’re so disappointed that our people have been left out of the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Program. It isn’t fair. We strongly oppose that this entire aid program is coming through the junta.” An aid worker assisting the Chin IDPs, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said ongoing fighting has made it difficult to travel between Thantlang and Hakha, and food and medical aid are badly needed. “Chin state is a mountainous region, and it’s very difficult to bring rice from the mainland,” he said. “We want to ask ASEAN whether it has ignored us because it doesn’t think that Chin state is involved in Myanmar politics,” the aid worker added. “Another thing is that ASEAN should meet and work with NGOs and international NGOs instead of with the junta.” Salai Charlie, who helps Chin refugees in Mizoram, India, told RFA that Christian groups and NGOs in India provided initial assistance to those fleeing the fighting but now have stopped. “Currently we are not receiving foreign aid,” he told RFA. “The Mizoram government is not helping us. The church in Mizoram, the NGOs and the wealthy in Mizoram have donated everything they could to help us. No one is helping us anymore. The rains have come, and we cannot work.” RFA could not reach junta spokesman, Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, for comment. Translated by Khin Maung Nyane for RFA Burmese. Written in English by Roseanne Gerin.

Read More

Cantopop singer Tommy Yuen in court accused of ‘incitement’ under security law

Hong Kong police on Tuesday charged Cantopop singer and activist Tommy Yuen with “inciting hatred against the government” and “fraud” after he spoke out on social media against COVID-19 restrictions, and tried to raise money to assist a 19-year-old woman accused of “rioting.” Yuen, 41, appeared in court on Tuesday after police froze some H.K.$140,000 of his assets, charged with one count of “one or more acts of incitement” and one count of “fraud.” He had no defense lawyer present, and confirmed that he had withdrawn his application for legal aid, and would hire a private attorney instead. Yuen appeared in court with hair grown out to shoulder length, wearing a blue denim jacket, in apparently good spirits, waving to onlookers at the end of the hearing. He made no bail application, and will be remanded in custody until July 26. The charges against Yuen are based on posts he made to Facebook and Instagram between Sept. 26, 2021 and Jan. 21, 2022, which the prosecution alleged were “intended to provoke hatred or contempt for the government … or cause resentment or rebellion among Hong Kong residents.” He is also accused of using fraudulent means to raise funds for a 19-year-old defendant charged with “rioting,” a charge often used to target those present during the 2019 protest movement, or even its absent supporters. Meanwhile, secondary schools in Hong Kong are removing books deemed in breach of the national security law, the city’s Ming Pao newspaper reported. A list of books removed from the shelves of three school libraries obtained by the paper showed that more than 200 titles have disappeared from libraries because of fears they could breach the law. Targeting books Education bureau director Kevin Yeung said schools are responsible for ensuring that they don’t break the law. “Books are as important as textbooks and can influence the minds of young students,” Yeung told reporters. “The choice of books isn’t the sole responsibility of librarians; subject director, and even principals — the whole school — needs to get involved in this work,” he said. Bao Pu, publisher of the memoirs of late ousted premier Zhao Ziyang, one of the books on the list, said the book has little to do with national security. “When this book was published, I didn’t think it violated the laws of Hong Kong, nor did I think this book had anything to do with China’s national security,” Bao told RFA. “I believe that the books I published were all beneficial to readers and to China,” he said. But he added: “How they choose to self-censor is not my business and has nothing to do with me.” Bookburning Sociologist Chung Kim-wah described the removal of books as the modern version of book-burning. “The government doesn’t dare to actually draw up a list of banned books, so they are leaving the schools, teachers and library staff to try to guess what their superiors would think about them,” Chung told RFA. “This means that any works that might be regarded as objectionable or unfriendly by the government will be removed from the shelves,” he said. “It’s the safest way of controlling them, through intimidation,” he said. “It’s no different from burning books … it’s basically about control over the freedom of speech and expression.” Under guidelines published by the Education Bureau in February, schools are required to “establish/ strengthen the monitoring mechanism for regular review of learning and teaching resources (including their content and quality).” “Schools should ensure that the display of words or objects within the campus (including school buildings, classrooms and bulletin boards, etc.), such as books (including library collections), publications and leaflets does not involve contents that endanger national security,” the guidelines state. “Schools should also prohibit anyone from bringing objects to schools in contravention of the rules.” The national security law criminalizes speech and actions deemed to amount to secession, subversion, terrorism, or collusion with foreign powers, and enabled the setting up of a national security office under the direct control of Beijing to oversee the implementation of the law, as well as a Hong Kong headquarters for China’s feared state security police, to handle “special cases” deemed important by Beijing. It also bans speech or actions anywhere in the world deemed to incite hatred or dissatisfaction with the CCP or the Hong Kong government. Translated and edited by Luisetta Mudie.

Read More

COVID test scandal topples two Vietnam Communist Party high officials

It’s always a sign when the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) calls for an emergency session of its Central Committee. Following a late May report by the Central Inspection Discipline Commission that detailed the wrong doing and bribe taking by the country’s Minister of Health and the Chairman of the Hanoi Party Committee, the Central Committee voted to expel the two men from the communist party. A third individual, the Deputy Minister of Science and Technology, but not a member of the Central Committee, was also expelled from the party. Expulsion from the party is in itself a major deal. Party investigators have four levels of discipline: reprimand, warning, demotion and expulsion. No longer protected by their elite party status, their legal jeopardy just went up a few notches. Now that the party’s inspection has concluded, they will now be passed on the prosecutors for trial and an almost certain conviction. While the investigation of Central Committee members is not unheard of (indeed two members of the 12th Politburo were expelled), this is an incredibly elite body of 180 members and 20 alternate members in a country of 100 million people. So what was the scandal about? This was no run of the mill corruption scandal involving payments to regulators or misuse of public funds. This was a through, year-long  investigation, a sign of how importantly the VCP is taking the scandal. One has to recall that in the first year of the pandemic, Vietnam was the international gold standard or response. They sealed their borders, imposed quarantines, waged a public health campaign, and rallied the population. But Vietnam soon faltered. The Delta and Omicron variants hit the country hard. Vietnam had been so successful in containing the virus that they failed to secure vaccines. Vietnam tried to develop four separate vaccines rather than concentrating its efforts on one or partnering with foreign firms. And following the 13th Party Congress in January 2021, a new leadership team was slow to find its footing. By May 2021, Ho Chi Minh City, the country’s economic engine was in lockdown. In February 2020, the elite Military Academy of Medicine and Viet-A received an $830,000 grant for a pilot project to produce. In a significant breakthrough, they developed an effective, accurate, and cost-effective test within a month and then quickly moved into commercial production. The Ministry of Health authorized the purchase of the kits at $21 apiece. But then the dodginess began. In April 2020, the Ministry of Science and Technology announced that the World Health Organizations had authorized the Viet-A test kit, with the expectation of massive sales overseas. Communist Party Chief Nguyen Phu Trong publicly awarded the company with a medal for its achievements in March 2021. Not only did the WHO not recognize the Viet-A test, they rejected it. That should have set off some alarm bells, but Viet-A made up for the loss of overseas sales by inflating the price at home. A 45 percent markup netted the firm some $175 million. Calls for investigations mounted in the latter half of 2021. And perhaps with the walls closing in, the company’s Chairman, Phan Quoc Viet, increased the bribes and kickbacks. By the time of his arrest in December 2021, he acknowledged paying bribes of over VND500 billion, roughly $22 million. His arrest was just the beginning: 21 people have been investigated and VND1.6 trillion in assets were seized. In March 2022, two senior colonels from the Military Medical Academy were arrested. The director of the Military Medical research Institute was arrested for embezzlement and abuse of power, while the head of the Equipment and Supplies Department was investigated for “violating regulations on bidding, causing serious consequences.” Both were expelled from the party.   In April, Lieutenant-General Do Quyet, director of Vietnam Military Medical University and his deputy, Major General Hoang Van Luong, were investigated for their institution’s role in the scandal. In May, authorities arrested the deputy head of the price management division of the Drug Administration of Vietnam. That month, the Central Committee’s Central Inspection Committee released their report that culminated with a recommendation for disciplinary actions against the Hanoi party chief Chu Ngoc Anh, who had previously been the Minister of Science and Technology, and current Health Minister Nguyen Thanh Long for their lax oversight and corruption within their ministries. A health worker waits amidst empty stools at a Covid-19 coronavirus vaccination centre for youths between the age of 12 to 17 in Hanoi, Nov. 23, 2021. Credit: AFP Does it Matter? Vietnam is a $271 billion economy, and growing quickly. Even by Vietnamese corruption scandals, the Viet-A scandal wasn’t that large. Yes, bribes were paid, but bribes are paid every day in Vietnam. But this scandal seems to have stung the leadership a little bit more. In part there was the direct link between the firm and the senior leadership. General Secretary Nguyen Pho Trong had egg on his face. But more importantly, Vietnam’s response to the pandemic was really quite exemplary. Even after the omicron wave rocked the country in mid-2021, they handled it well, and more importantly, had an extremely effective vaccine rollout. Vietnam’s handling of the pandemic was critical in keeping the economy humming. In 2020 as every other economy in Southeast Asia contracted, Vietnam,’s economy grew, though at a modest 2.9 percent. Growth slowed to 2.58 percent in 2021, but is set to grow rapidly in 2022. Public health is seen as essential to economic growth, especially as Vietnam seeks to benefit from decoupling from China and supply chain diversification. The scandal has also hit the vaunted Vietnam People’s Army, an institution that enjoys the highest levels of trust in the country. Vietnam has largely avoided the major kickback procurement scandals in their military modernization program that plagues many other countries. But it is far from immune to corruption. And one only has to look to Russia to see how pervasive corruption can hollow out a fighting force even after two decades of concerted…

Read More

North Korea imposed ‘loyalty funds’ on trade officials in China amid missile tests

North Korea ordered trade officials stationed in China to pay U.S. $3,000 in so-called “loyalty funds” by the end of July, which some sources in China said was likely an effort to offset at least part of cost for ballistic missile tests over the weekend. The China-based trade officials are tasked with doing business with Chinese partners to earn foreign cash for their government, in some cases for leader Kim Jong Un’s personal slush fund. Occasionally the government will demand that they pay funds in addition to what their businesses earn for the government, effectively cutting into their own earnings. The call for loyalty funds usually coincides with important events, a North Korean trade official in the Chinese city of Dalian, in the northeastern province of Liaoning, told RFA’s Korean Service Monday on condition of anonymity for security reasons. “This is the third time the authorities have imposed a loyalty fund on us this year. The first and second time, though, trade had been partially open, so we could at least pay half of the fund,” the source said. “This time it is not easy because China is on complete lockdown due to the coronavirus,” said the source.” The North Korean economy is in shambles, partially because of the closure of the Sino-Korean border and the suspension of trade for essentially the first two years of the coronavirus pandemic. Earlier this year rail freight resumed, but it was quickly shut down due to new outbreaks of COVID-19 in China. With no trade, it is difficult for the officials sent overseas to pay their loyalty funds, and they have come to resent it, the official in Dalian said. “Trade officials are indignant that they keep imposing loyalty funds. We know through the internet that yesterday, once again, they tested ballistic missiles, this time eight from four locations,” said the source. “We are well aware that tens of millions of dollars are spent to launch a single missile. But how many ballistic missiles have been launched this year? I can’t quite understand the behavior of the authorities, who waste foreign currency on missile launches and forcibly impose loyalty funds on us.” South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the eight missiles were fired from four locations, including the Sunan area of Pyongyang into the sea east of the Korean peninsula. RFA sources estimate that North Korea has sent around 1,000 trade officials to China, meaning that the loyalty funds imposed this time should bring in around $3 million, far less than the estimated cost of Sunday’s missile test. Another trade official in Donggang, a port located close to the North Korean-Chinese maritime border, told RFA that the last time the government imposed loyalty funds, it was for a military parade in Pyongyang. That event later forced the government to acknowledge the virus after fever cases began to erupt among parade participants after they returned to their homes. “Trade officials cannot disobey orders from Pyongyang, so some of us have had to borrow money from our Chinese counterparts to contribute last time,” the second source said. “Because of that parade they ended up blocking train and maritime trade again, leaving us in debt. The complaints are pouring in because they are asking us to pay loyalty funds again,” the second source said. “They are squeezing more money out of us and wasting it on missile launches.” Translated by Leejin J. Chung. Written in English by Eugene Whong.

Read More

New Australian PM pledges to help make Indonesia’s G20 presidency, summit successful

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese pledged Monday to help host country Indonesia make this year’s G20 summit a success, including by attending the gathering, which controversially has both the Russian and Ukrainian presidents on the guest list. Australia’s new PM made the pledge during a news conference at the Presidential Palace in Bogor, after he and Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo held talks and rode around the palatial grounds on bamboo bicycles, in a nod to their humble origins. Albanese, who took office two weeks ago, was on his maiden visit as prime minister to the giant neighbor next-door. “[D]eepening engagement with Southeast Asia is a priority for my Government,” he stressed in a statement read out to reporters. “I will work closely with President Widodo to help deliver a successful summit,” Albanese said, adding that international cooperation was needed “to tackle the many challenges we face in navigating the post-COVID global economic recovery.” Indonesia holds the 2022 presidency of the grouping of the world’s top 20 economies. The United States has urged Indonesia not to invite member-state Russia to the G20 summit, scheduled for November in Bali, because of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.  Jakarta so far has refused to disinvite Russia from the summit but has invited Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the president of Ukraine, which is not a G20 member, as a guest. In March, U.S. President Joe Biden said Ukraine should be able to participate in the G20 summit, if the grouping did not expel Russia. Indonesian President Joko Widodo (left) and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese interact with journalists at the Presidential Palace in Bogor, Indonesia, June 6, 2022. Credit: Indonesian Presidential Palace ‘Mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation’ Albanese also pledged closer cooperation with Indonesia on trade, security and climate change. “Indonesia is on track to be one of the world’s five largest economies,” Albanese said. “Revitalizing our trade and investment relationship is a priority for my government,” he said. Albanese added that the two countries were working to realize the potential of the Indonesia Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, a free trade agreement which came into effect two years ago. Albanese came to Indonesia with a delegation that included chief executives of major Australian companies, as well as Foreign Minister Penny Wong and Trade Minister Don Farrel. Jokowi, for his part, said that the “strategic partnership agreement” and the free trade deal with Australia provided a strong foundation for bilateral relations. “These two foundations are very important for the two countries to continue to strengthen mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation,” Jokowi said. Jokowi stressed the importance of expanding access to exports for Indonesian products to Australia, including cars. “The first shipment of completely built-up cars made in Indonesia to Australia was made in February and I hope that export access like this will continue to expand,” he said. Jokowi said he told Albanese that good bilateral relations could contribute to regional peace and prosperity. “International principles and laws must be consistently obeyed, strategic competition in the region needs to be managed properly to avoid open conflict, a culture of peace and strategic trust needs to be strengthened,” he said. Albanese also promised increased cooperation in the fields of defense, as well as maritime security and safety, amid China’s growing assertiveness in the contested South China Sea. Indonesia has on several occasions expressed concerns about a new trilateral security pact between Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom, known as AUKUS, which allows Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. In their respective statements, however, the two leaders made no references to AUKUS. Albanese stressed that his government would work closely with Australian Super Funds, one of the country’s largest investors, to explore investment opportunities in Indonesia. Ninasapti Triaswati, an economist at the University of Indonesia, said the visit provided an opportunity for Indonesia to strike business deals with Australian companies. “But it requires technical readiness on the part of the Indonesian side to be able to make cooperation contracts that benefit the Indonesian people,” Ninasapti told BenarNews. Ninasapti said she believed the presence of Putin at the upcoming G20 summit would not affect economic ties with Australia. “If Putin comes, the Australian government may leave the room, but CEOs of Australian private companies will still be interested in investing in Indonesia,” he said. ‘Strengthen partnerships in the Pacific’ Albanese also said his government was committed to deepening economic ties with Southeast Asian countries. “And we will deliver a comprehensive ASEAN Economic Strategy to 2040, to map current and future export and investment opportunities across key ASEAN markets,” he said. Albanese said Australia would give A$470 million (U.S. $338.55 million) to Southeast Asia over four years under Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) programs, on top of A$200 million for its climate and infrastructure partnership with Indonesia. “We also agreed to strengthen partnerships in the Pacific, especially in the fields of climate, fisheries and agriculture,” he said. “True to my government’s ambitious climate targets, I want better access to affordable, reliable and secure clean energy right across our region, as we transition to a net zero world together.”

Read More

Vietnam Communist Party expels health minister and Hanoi mayor for COVID test scandal

The Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) on Monday expelled the country’s health minister and the mayor of the capital Hanoi for their roles in a U.S. $172 million scandal involving overpriced coronavirus test kits, the party said at an emergency meeting of its Central Committee. Minister of Health Nguyen Thanh Long and Mayor Chu Ngoc Anh are the latest casualties of the one-party state’s crackdown on corruption, which has seen several high-profile arrests of government and private sector officials over the past few months. Long and Anh could face criminal charges for their actions in connection to the Viet A Technologies Company scandal, during which officials were paid off so that hospitals would use overpriced COVID-19 test kits. “It’s always a sign when the Vietnam Communist Party calls for an emergency session of its Central Committee,” Southeast Asia analyst Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington, told RFA. “Expulsion from the party is in itself a major deal… No longer protected by their elite party status, their legal jeopardy just went up a few notches,” he said. “Now that the party’s inspection has concluded, they will now be passed on the prosecutors for trial and an almost certain conviction.” The company’s director-general, Phan Quoc Viet, faces charges of bribing health officials so that they would agree to overpay for the test kits to be distributed to hospitals and provincial Centers for Disease Control. Viet was able to make $172 million in profit and then re-channel $34 million into more bribes, AFP reported. The Viet-A scandal was uncovered at the end of last year as part of the Communist Party’s efforts since 2016 to get tough on corruption. The anti-corruption campaign, referred to as “furnace burning” by its architect, Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong, has seen high-profile arrests of government officials over the past few months for their involvement in various scandals. For example, several Ministry of Health officials have been accused of accepting bribes for space on international rescue flights out of areas in the world heavily hit by COVID-19. Authorities have also discovered a number of training violations at the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences. The director of a military hospital was arrested for granting slots to unqualified applicants at the ASEAN Medical and Pharmaceutical College. Vietnam also recently arrested 19 people on charges of “violating regulations on asset management and use, causing losses and waste” at an agriculture company, and seven senior coast guard officials, including the commander, for embezzling funds Nguyen Ngoc Gia, an independent journalist, told RFA that corruption is more widespread than even the recent arrests would indicate. “I think the big reasons are that the rule of law doesn’t exist, the rule of virtue is just a formality, and the technocracy is too weak,” Gia said. “Meanwhile, culture and education, the two most important areas making up the soul of a nation, are widely manipulated by money. Therefore, it can be seen that the current appearance of morality is just hypocrisy,” said Gia. Totalitarianism and the one-party system have led to an overemphasis on money and power, Gia said. The Viet-A scandal was not as large as others, but the government is paying special attention, Abuza said. “This scandal seems to have stung the leadership a little bit more. In part there was the direct link between the firm and the senior leadership. General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong had egg on his face,” Abuza said. “Anti-corruption has been the hallmark of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s tenure. Trong has wielded anti-corruption as he believes that the country’s endemic corruption threatens the VCP’s legitimacy,” he said. “But he also has wielded it as a tool against political rivals. And many in the country will see this as just that: elite political infighting.” Trong suffered a stroke in 2020, so there are expectations that the third-term general secretary will step down before the term is up in 2026, Abuza said. “But as long as he believes that corruption is still reaching the senior most ranks, he’ll fight to stay on, convinced that others will take the issue of corruption as seriously.” Translated by Anna Vu. Written in English by Eugene Whong.

Read More

‘Follow the party and prosper: oppose it and die’

In the second part of this two-part essay, Bao Tong, a former political secretary to late, ousted Chinese leader Zhao Ziyang, comments on then Premier Li Peng’s accounts of the events leading up to the June 4, 1989 bloodshed by the People’s Liberation Army that put an end to weeks of student-led protests on Tiananmen Square. An English-language version of the diary was published in 2010 as “The Critical Moment – Li Peng Diaries.”  Zhao was later removed from office and spent the rest of his life under house arrest at his Beijing home, dying in early 2005. Bao, who before the events of 1989 worked as director of the Office of Political Reform of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, served a seven-year jail term for “revealing state secrets and counter-revolutionary propagandizing.” The 89-year-old Bao, a long-time contributor of commentary on a wide range of Chinese and international issues for RFA Mandarin, including a column titled “Under House Arrest,” remains under close police surveillance in Beijing.Now I think we need to take a look at what Zhao Ziyang did next. Zhao, of course, had no idea that the tangled web being woven by the chairman of the Central Military Commission, the president and the premier. He just took Deng’s “all agreed” and set to work implementing it. His schedule for May 14 and 15 was full, and he had a meeting with visiting Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on the afternoon of the 16th. Once that was over, Zhao hurried back to his office in Qinzheng Hall to call a meeting of the Politburo standing committee. He had finalized the agenda, which was to affirm the student protesters’ patriotism and to retract the April 26 People’s Daily editorial. Zhao didn’t say or imply to the standing committee that Deng had agreed to the plan, but outlined his reasoning for the move. Li Peng made a few points against affirming the students’ patriotism, then looked at Yang Shangkun and Yao Yilin, and saw they weren’t very engaged. So he stopped trying to oppose the motion, and it eventually passed. So it was that on the following day, all the major media outlets reported that Zhao Ziyang, on behalf of the Politburo standing committee, had affirmed the students’ patriotism. But the retraction of the People’s Daily editorial remained a sticking point. Li Peng, Yao Yilin and Yang Shangkun were all adamantly opposed, saying that it couldn’t be allowed because it would harm the image of Comrade Xiaoping. Zhao tried to reassure them by saying that the editorial was based on inaccurate reports made to Deng by standing committee members, so it should all be seen as coming from the committee. People would know that Comrade Xiaoping had supported us in making a correction of our own mistake, so the move wouldn’t harm Deng, but rather enhance his prestige, Zhao argued. Qiao Shi and Hu Qili made their support for Zhao’s plan clear, while Li Peng and Yao Yilin were strongly against it. Yang Shangkun supported Li Peng’s position, but he wasn’t a member of the Politburo standing committee. According to the standing committee’s rules of procedure, a majority vote holds sway. Three votes were for Zhao and two for Li Peng, so they could have gotten the resolution through. But they decided to keep talking just to be on the safe side. This is why Zhao didn’t request his next meeting with Deng until the morning of May 17.Deng said that was fine. Deng told Zhao to arrive at a specific time that same afternoon (I no longer recall the exact time) and not to be late. As soon as Zhao turned up, on time, Deng set his plan in motion.   The devil’s in the details. But I have never read a detailed account of this endgame written by any of those involved. And I certainly don’t set much store by the speculations of those who were not. All I have is Zhao Ziyang’s personal account when he spoke to me and his secretary and deputy director Zhang Yueqi that same evening. As I remember it, Zhao said: “There was a trial today. Yao Yilin has won everything. I have lost everything. I thought Deng and I were just talking privately. I didn’t realize he had called a meeting of the standing committee. When I got there, they were all ready for me. Yang Shangkun was there too. Yao criticized my [May 7] speech to the Asian Development Bank, saying it was appalling, as it had struck two notes that weren’t in keeping with Deng’s line.” “Some decisions were made today. I can’t tell you what they were, because they’re classified.” I replied: “A decision is better than no decision. But I can’t implement it.” “Deng told me that I’m still the general secretary,” Zhao told us. “But when I got back, I thought some more about it, and I realized that I have to resign. So you need to draft a letter of resignation for me.” “From both posts?” I asked, referring to the general secretary of the CCP and the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. “From both posts,” Zhao replied. The bodies of dead civilians lie among mangled bicycles near Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in this June 4, 1989 file photo. Credit: AP Deng’s personal mantra Incidentally, some details did emerge from the standing committee meeting called by Deng. I was told to be careful not to leak anything when I drafted Zhao’s letter of resignation. “That’s easy,” I said. “I never leaked a secret in my life.” “Someone is saying that you did,” Zhao replied. “That’s got to be Li Peng, because the others would never say something so irresponsible,” I said in anger. “They’re saying you have already leaked something,” Zhao said. I replied that there has to be some basis for such claims under the rule of law. He said “I have a basis, but I won’t talk about that until it’s really necessary.” I finally found out that Li Peng…

Read More