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Category: Europe

Cambodia’s Hun Manet goes up against the private sector

Editor014 mins

On November 13, Cambodia’s princeling prime minister, Hun Manet, will meet with Cambodia’s aggravated private sector for his administration’s first Government-Private Sector Forum which his nascent government has been preparing for months. There has already been a public furore over the likely rise in taxation, which Hun Manet has denied will happen, but anyone with sense knows it must happen.  The property sector is in a very bad way. Worse is the banking sector, where high private debt has everyone on alter and is leading to sleepless nights amongst the middle classes—domestic credit to the private sector stands at 182 percent of GDP as of last year, according to a World Bank report from last month (p. 46). By comparison, in China, it was 220 percent. Hun Manet greets supporters during a campaign rally in Phnom Penh in July 2023. Prime Minister, Hun Manet, will meet with Cambodia’s aggravated private sector for his administration’s first Government-Private Sector Forum in November which his nascent government has been preparing for months. Credit: Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP Wetting our appetites, Hun Manet has suggested that he will announce new policies, including for the property sector, later this month. One could be to allow foreigners to buy villas in gated communities (boreys), where most of the toxic credit in the property sector seems to be.  At the same time, however, Hun Manet will be being told by his elders—including his father, Hun Sen, Cambodia’s ruler for almost four decades—that he cannot give away too much to the private sector. Hun Manet is an inexperienced, slightly hollow leader whose legitimacy is tied to being his father’s chosen successor, not any of his own achievements (yet). No ‘social bargain’ The upcoming forum will be a moment when some people in the private sector—those expected to fund the lavish lifestyles of the political nobility and the increasing tax burdens of the state, but without getting an actual seat at the political table—think they can gain an advantage.  There is no “social bargain” in Cambodia between the political nobility and commoners. If the economy goes pear-shaped, the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) won’t voluntarily resign from power, nor would it allow the masses to openly protest on the streets. However, there is a delicate bargain between the political nobility and the private sector. The task for all authoritarian regimes is this: how do you ensure that the private sector pays the piper but doesn’t call the tune? After all, why maintain the political nobility (which is rentier in nature) when the private sector isn’t getting something in return? Why not go over the heads of the political rent-seekers?  A man rides a cart in Phnom Penh, Sept. 2023. Credit: Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP This dynamic isn’t specific to Cambodia. In China and Vietnam, the defining policies of Xi Jinping and Nguyen Phu Trong, the two communist parties’ general secretaries, have been a mammoth crackdown on the private sector that reasserts the communists’ monopoly on power as part of vast anti-corruption campaigns. Why? Because authoritarian governments only have to be good at one thing: denying space for any alternative to their authority. But private sectors would be an alternative if they weren’t constrained, as seemed to be the case in both communist states before 2012, the year Xi and Trong came to power. Indeed, businesses and tycoons might start demanding the predictability of the rule of law and private property rights; they might want a direct say in politics; they might start to publicly criticize their political masters (think Jack Ma of Alibaba!); and they might protest by denying the state the taxation it needs to survive.  Splurging on titles How do you rectify this? You co-opt the private sector; you turn a blind eye to its dodgy actions; you create policies favorable to its advancement; you intermarry your political nobility with the economic elites; you arrest outspoken individuals for corruption to set an example of what happens if someone steps out of line. During its succession process this year, the CPP in Cambodia has tried to appease the private sector. It has splurged on the number of oknha titles it awarded; as of June 2023, there were 1,299 people with the honorific, although the number grew after the July general elections The number of land concessions and other corrupt practices also boomed. The Cambodia Oknha Association was launched in June by Cambodia’s most prominent tycoons, with Hun Sen as honorary president. Ostensibly a way for the ruling party to collect “charitable” donations, it is actually a way for the most powerful oknha to constrain their lessors and do Hun Sen’s bidding. Hun Manet’s government now has 1,422 secretaries or undersecretaries of state, more than double the number his father’s government had. Many of these positions are bought and allow the occupiers to extract patronage payments. Moreover, the new administration has vowed to run the country in a more technocratic and economic-minded manner.  A woman on a motorcycle laden with goods rides past a Rolls-Royce at a car dealership in Phnom Penh in 2014. Credit: Samrang Pring/Reuters The apparent insinuation is that it will focus on finances, not playing at geopolitics. It has maintained or appointed ministers whom the private sector trusts. Aun Pornmoniroth, the powerful finance minister, kept his job and is now the real architect of government policy. Sok Chenda Sophea, formerly the head of the Council for the Development of Cambodia, the government body tasked with attracting and managing foreign investment, is now foreign minister. Keo Rottanak, the new Minister of Mines and Energy, was managing director of the state-owned electricity provider Electricite du Cambodge. Chheang Ra, the new health minister, was director of the state-run Calmette Hospital. However, constraining the private sector and economic barons will become a lot more difficult. Things were easier in the past when the lifestyles of the political nobility were relatively cheap (a few billion dollars) and when the Cambodian state had a small budget that was primarily funded by foreign…

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Interview: Opposition’s Operation 1027 in Shan State indicates ‘low point’ in Myanmar-China ties

Editor017 mins

On Oct. 27, the Northern or “Three Brotherhood” Alliance of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Arakan Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army launched “Operation 1027” – named for the date of the offensive. The groups simultaneously struck junta positions in the strategic Shan cities of Kunlong, Hseni, Chin Shwe Haw, Laukkaing, Namhkan, Kutkai, and Lashio, the state’s largest municipality. Since then, reports indicate that the alliance has taken some 150 military camps in battles throughout Shan state and caused alarm in the top military brass. The campaign will “break the country into pieces” if left unchecked, said junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing on Nov. 8. To understand the significance of Operation 1027, Radio Free Asia Burmese reporter Ye Kaung Myint Maung interviewed Jason Tower, the country director for the Burma program at United Stated Institute of Peace in Washington. Tower has decades of experience researching cross-border conflicts in Southeast Asia. Radio Free Asia: The Northern Alliance groups have advanced their campaign 1027, a military operation. And it was reported that they have captured more than 100 military outposts and even some important towns in northern Shan State, and some fighting has reached an area not far from where the military academy is located. What’s your overall take on Operation 1027? Tower: In my view, this operation potentially could really be a game changer in terms of the broader revolution and conflict in Myanmar. I think a lot of this in terms of the timing has to do with China’s growing dissatisfaction with the junta regime, because over the past five months you’ve seen where the junta not only has proven incapable of working with the Chinese to advance any of China’s economic interests. You’ve also seen it fail miserably in terms of providing support to China around security interests and cracking down on increasingly malign criminal actors who are harming a global population through scams and human trafficking – a lot of which are targeting Chinese nationals. And so you’ve seen … out of frustration, the Chinese side has cracked down in a pretty strong way on the United Wa State Army and on the National Democratic Alliance Army, even detaining high-level Wa leaders like Bao Jin Fang, the number two in the army, and issuing arrest warrants for two other leaders, really showing, I think, very clearly how serious the Chinese side is in terms of wanting the military to try to crack down on this activity.  And despite all of that pressure, the military still failed to act. So I think very clearly you saw they’re going to launch this operation. What’s very significant about it is just how quickly the Brotherhood has been able to take major cities within 24 hours of the announcement of the operation. In my view, this was not something that was done quickly. This was a plan that was coordinated over probably a month or more. This operation is a very serious operation. And in order for the Brotherhood Alliance to do this, it would need to have at least tacit support from the Chinese side. And I believe it did have this in this case. Now, what’s really interesting about it is the way the Brotherhood Alliances framed this around cracking down on the transnational criminal activity and liberating people from these scam centers. And that does seem to be what a lot of the initial targets are that you are seeing, now the Brotherhood Alliance groups and PDFs go in, identify some of these centers and liberate the scam centers. So you are seeing some of that happening. But of course, I think the bigger issue here is that in Koh Kong, all eyes of the Myanmar army, the four eco Kong clan families that represent the COCOM border guard force have refused to do anything to crack down on this because this is the main source of revenue and a major source of revenue also for the military. And so now you’re seeing the Brotherhood really take this into their own hands. I think the other major factor here is that on one hand, you know, the entire country is watching this operation and they’re seeing how weak the Myanmar army is. You know, Myanmar army troops are going in and they’re defecting immediately, giving all of their arms over to the Brotherhood alliance. … And I think this is emboldening everyone. It’s letting everyone sort of see just how weak the military has become and how illegitimate it has become. Because the ultimate reason why the Chinese greenlighted this operation is because the junta has failed to take any steps to crack down on this awful transnational criminal activity, which is harming the interests of Thailand, harming the interests of China, harming the interests of really every country around the world. So in that respect, I think this really a game changer, because we’re at a point right now where the Chinese side has really reached a kind of a low point in terms of its relationship with the military junta.  Radio Free Asia: We know that China has played a very important role in the armed conflict in northern Myanmar. And also China has strong ties with members of Northern Alliance groups. So in this case in particular, what led you to the conclusion that China has given the green light to start this military operation? Tower: I think that the reason why China is comfortable with this operation is because the operation is framed around doing exactly what the Chinese side has been telling the Myanmar army to do for the past four months. But what the Myanmar army has refused to do, which is to crack down on the criminal activity, take down these scam syndicates, free the victims of human trafficking and so on. And so that’s, you know, the justification that the Brotherhood is giving for launching this operation. And you do see where it has yielded…

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Uyghur rights activist among those honored by King Charles III

Editor04 mins

A prominent Uyghur human rights activist, singer and interpreter was among dozens of activists honored at a reception at Buckingham Palace on Wednesday to recognize British contributions to humanitarian efforts around the world. King Charles III expressed his gratitude to Rahima Mahmut, founder and executive director of Stop Uyghur Genocide and the U.K. director of the World Uyghur Congress, for her work defending Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in China. The king said called work “a crucial undertaking” and thanked her for “the exceptional contributions you are making to this important endeavor,” Mahmut later told Radio free Asia. On her LinkedIn account, Mahmut said she was “thrilled and honored” to be representing the Uyghur community at the humanitarian reception. A native of Ghulja, or Yining, in Xinjiang, Mahmut decided to leave her homeland because of the massacre of Uyghur youth who had taken to the streets on Feb. 5, 1997, to protest the Chinese government’s discriminating policies against the predominantly Muslim people.  Mahmut has long been a vocal critic of the Chinese government, taking aim at the mass incarceration, surveillance and persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang and countering Beijing’s official propaganda from overseas. For more than two decades, she also has used her artistic talent as a singer to make the Uyghur voice known through music, while drawing the attention of the international community to the crisis in Xinjiang.  Mahmut, who has lived in the United Kingdom since 2000, has performed Uyghur songs at major concerts and cultural festivals in Britain, across Europe and in the United States. “As an [sic] Uyghur human rights activist, I have built a cross-party, cross-community coalition of UK-based activists working to end the genocide in my homeland,” Mahmut says on her LinkedIn profile, adding that she has been involved in high-profile parliamentary campaigns, including the Genocide Amendment to the U.K. Trade Bill, Parliament’s recognition of the Uyghur genocide, and the diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. Also in attendance at the reception were Saleh Saeed, chief executive of the Disasters Emergency Committee — a U.K. organization that brings together 15 top domestic aid charities to raise funds quickly and efficiently for overseas crises — British actress and activist Dame Joanna Lumley, actor and comedian Sir Michael Palin, and actor and director Adrian Lester, who all have launched appeals for the nonprofit.

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Australia and China: Besties again? It’s complicated

Editor010 mins

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese wrapped up a three-day trip to China Tuesday, calling for the “full resumption of free and unimpeded trade” in a meeting with counterpart Li Qiang. The previous day, he held wide-ranging talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, covering everything from Tasmanian Devils to New Zealand wine, not to mention improving relations with Australia’s largest two-way trading partner in goods and services. In the next step towards mending the previously fraught relations and stabilizing them, Albanese told reporters in Beijing on Tuesday that both sides have agreed on practical steps to advance dialogue in areas of common interests, including climate change, trade and people-to-people links.  He also said he raised the plight of detained Australian writer Yang Hengjun – although he provided no details about his possible release – and human rights issues within China, in a move that highlighted the controversial nature of the trip in Australia. It was the first visit to China by an Australian prime minister since 2016, with the two sides visibly making an effort to reframe a relationship marred by disputes on trade, human rights and the COVID-19 pandemic during the tenure of the previous prime minister Scott Morrison. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese delivers his speech at the opening ceremony of 6th China International Import Expo and the Hongqiao International Economic Forum in Shanghai on Sunday, Nov. 5, 2023. Credit: Jin Liwang/Xinhua via AP   “It is wise for Labor to ‘stabilize’ the relationship with China,” Han Yang, a former Chinese diplomat turned political commentator, told Radio Free Asia. Albanese has been the leader of the Labor Party since 2019. “Australia is a middle power. It’s not in Australia’s interest to pick a quarrel with China, a superpower and its largest trading partner. ‘Cooperate where we can and disagree where we must’ is the right mantra to approach the relationship,” Yang said. Chinese misjudgment? Yang pointed out that Canberra did not make major strategic concessions, nor was it simply acting on the orders of the U.S. as some pro-China activists have argued. “It’s worth noting that Australia didn’t concede on any national security strategic goals. AUKUS is pushing on,” he said, referring to the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the Indo-Pacific region. Australia’s ban on Huawei remains, as does its anti-foreign interference law. “What has changed is the tone, and China got the message. “That is why it welcomed Albo with a red carpet,” Yang said, referring to the Australian prime minister’s nickname.  “If you look at the foreign ministry read out, it gives significantly more space to Xi’s speech compared to meetings with other second-tier power world leaders.” Another China watcher Gerry Groot, senior lecturer in Chinese Studies at the University of Adelaide, told RFA that whatever transpired from Albanese’s meetings with the Chinese leaders was driven more by Australia’s own policy than American interests. “It’s Chinese actions and demands in the South China Sea and South Pacific – Australia’s own backyard – which are so alarming to Australian politicians and defense planners,” Groot said. Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese visits the Temple of Heaven in Beijing, China, November 6, 2023. Credit: AAP Image/Lukas Coch via Reuters He said he believed that Chinese strategic analysts had miscalculated the effect of weaponizing economic relations with Australia to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Australia or force more concessions, as well as punish the previous Morrison government for its anti-China stance.. “The grudging concessions on some of these sanctions have come about because the cost to China’s reputation internationally was greater than anticipated and the impact on Australia in economic terms was less, while at the same time driving relations with America closer,” he said. Exiles push back Australia’s relationship with China is made more complex by the fact that it is home to probably tens of thousands of exiles from China who have fled due to human rights violations, ethnic or religious oppression, or personal safety. “I think Albo’s China visit is morally corrupt, economically miscalculated and contradictory to Australia‘s national security interests,” exiled Chinese artist Ba Diucao told RFA. “Morally it is unacceptable to keep doing business as normal with a regime like China amid ongoing genocide against millions of Uyghurs and [while it is] supporting Russia’s invasion in multiple ways. “Also, an Australian citizen Yang Hengjun is still in jail as a political hostage in China,” Ba Diucao added. The writer was detained in 2019 while visiting family and charged with espionage. Some Uyghurs and Tibetans living in Australia, such as Ramila Chanisheff, president of the Australian Uyghur Tangritagh Women’s Association, reject any deals with the “devil.” Chanisheff told RFA that she and Tibetan representatives had petitioned against Albanese’s visit to China in Canberra ahead of the trip. “I think it was when we learned that Albanese was taking 400 trade reps [representatives] to China that it hit us the hardest. One Tibetan colleague of mine said she found it triggering,” she said. “Of course, as Australians, we feel shame at what happened to indigenous Australian youth, forced education etc, but now we’re facilitating a massive state that is doing the same in East Turkestan and Tibet.” Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese meets with China’s President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, November 6, 2023. Credit: AAP Image/Lukas Coch via Reuters Groot added, “While PM Albanese is beaming in his photos with CCP General Secretary Xi, we can only hope it is because the Chinese side has decided that more concessions to Australia are needed and perhaps that Yang Hengjun will be released shortly, rather than the grandeur of the occasion.”  “In the meantime,” he added. “Gordon Ng [an Australian citizen charged with subversion] languishes in a Hong Kong jail on trumped up retrospective charges also.” Edited by Mike Firn and Elaine Chan.

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What’s behind the latest corruption trial in Hanoi?

Editor011 mins

On October  23, Vietnamese prosecutors began a second corruption trial against fugitive businesswoman Nguyen Thi Thanh Nhan. Given her alleged ties to Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, this is no run of the mill fraud and bribery trial. Elite political infighting is clearly at play as the jockeying for power ahead of the 14th Congress intensifies. Nhan, 54, is the former chairwoman of the Advanced International Joint Stock Company (AIC), a trading company established in 1994, which has been involved in the import of any number of things, from corporate electronics, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, auto parts, alcohol, machine tools, and farm equipment. Nhan who was tried in absentia along with 35 other defendants in December 2022 for a $6.3 million bid rigging and bribery case involving 16 hospitals in Dong Nai province. She allegedly paid some $1.8 million in bribes to local officials to secure inflated contracts,  Nhan was convicted and received a 30-year sentence in January 2023. Also convicted was Tran Dinh Thanh, who had been the provincial party chief at the time for accepting bribes.   The current case is similar to her first conviction, and involves six instances of bid rigging in the sale of medical equipment to state hospitals in the northeastern province of Quang Ninh, as well as bid-rigging at a medical lab in Ho Chi Minh City.  Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh meets with U.S. President Joe Biden (not pictured) in Hanoi, Sept. 11, 2023. Credit: Evelyn Hockstein/Reuters The fraud involved in this case is only VND50 billion ($2 million). There are 15 other defendants including AIC’s accountant and Nhan’s brother. The latter had fled but returned to Vietnam to face justice.  But what makes the case so sensitive is that the Quang Ninh’s provincial party chief from 2011-2015, was Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh. The former Ministry of Public Security intelligence official was given some of his first management experience as he was being groomed for senior government service.  Nhan is rumored to be Chinh’s former mistress. But even if that is an unfounded rumor, Nhan clearly benefited from her close relationship with the prime minister and other leaders. She had a pattern of cultivating ties with provincial leadership where she sought contracts.   AIC’s webpage also notes that the firm serves as a consultant to the powerful Ministry of National Defense. Nhan as the middlewoman In addition to dealing in medical supplies, she allegedly became Vietnam’s intermediary for weapons procurement from Israel. Israeli defense firms reportedly secured some $1.5 billion in sales in the past decade as the People’s Army sought to modernize and lessen their dependence on Russian arms. Israel has been negotiating some $2 billion in additional sales to Vietnam, including surface-to-air missiles and other weapons systems, with Nhan as the middlewoman. In 2018, Vietnam entered into negotiations with Israel Aerospace Industries about procuring the Ofek-16 spy satellite, which would give Vietnam their first independent overhead imagery.  The deal was worth $550 million, but Nhan allegedly tried to get the Israeli manufacturer to significantly increase the price to secure a larger commission. Israeli officials were angered that the corruption scheme has potentially upended the sale, and at the very least delayed its implementation. An Ofek-16 spy satellite blasts off from the Palmachim air base in central Israel, July 6, 2020. Credit: Israel Ministry of Defense Spokesperson’s Office via AP Nhan has never been charged for anything involving military procurement, which probably reflects a fear of shedding light on the sensitive issue of the military’s procurement practices. Prosecutors have focused on her medical industry dealings, much the way that investigators may be focusing on tycoon Nguyen Thi Phuong Thao’s other business dealings, rather than her conglomerate SOVICO, which has an extensive history of brokering weapons imports from Russia. Madame Nhan has been a fugitive since the Ministry of Public Security issued a warrant for her arrest in April 2022.  Her December 2022 trial came as CPV General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s “Blazing Furnace” campaign brought down two deputy prime ministers, Politburo-member Pham Binh Minh and Vu Duc Dam, and two months later President and Politburo member Nguyen Xuan Phuc. At the time, Prime Minister Chinh appeared to be the next target. Chinh is reported to have gone through a self-criticism session and has held onto his job. But arguably what really saved him was not his innocence, but the lack of an obvious replacement. None of the new deputy prime ministers are on the Politburo and there’s an overall dearth of economic management experience on the top decision-making body.  Nhan is reportedly hiding in Germany, which rejected a formal extradition request from Vietnam. Indeed, Berlin issued a very stern warning to Hanoi to not repeat the abduction of the former executive of the state-owned PetroVietnam Construction, Trinh Xuan Thanh, in 2017. After his illegal rendition, allegedly through Slovakia, Thanh was convicted of embezzlement and sentenced to life in prison; a trial that also saw Politburo member and former chief of PetroVietnam, Dinh La Thang, sentenced to 13 years. Germany expelled two Vietnamese diplomats and has convicted two people for the abduction, but wants to deter a similar operation. New targets Nhan’s trial could be another attempt to weaken the prime minister as jockeying for leadership positions heats up ahead of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s 14th Congress expected to be held in January 2026.  RFA’s Vietnamese Service has reported that the vice chairman of the Quang Ninh People’s Committee and two former vice chairmen have been investigated and officially reprimanded for their management shortcomings and oversight of the AIC deal. It’s just more unwanted pressure on the Prime Minister. Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Vu Duc Dam was one of the high-ranking officials recently removed from their positions. Credit: Hoang Dinh Nam/AFP file photo The Politburo continues to have just 17 members, as both the 7th and 8th Central Committee Plenums in May and October, respectively, failed to garner sufficient consensus to elect new members following the ouster of Minh and Phuc. …

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Uyghur artist wins prize at prestigious art exhibit in Italy

Editor014 mins

Lékim Ibragimov was well into his career as an artist when he visited the Kizil Thousand-Buddha Caves in Xinjiang in the 1990s.  It was a seminal experience that would shape his already renowned work and earn him a special commendation at one of the most prestigious exhibitions for contemporary art, the Florence Biennale in Florence, Italy. The series of rock-cut grottoes, each containing murals of Buddha, sometimes surrounded by other figures, date from the 5th to 14th century and sit on cliffs near Kizil township in Aksu prefecture.  The caves, reputed to contain the most beautiful murals in Central Asia, were an important medium for Buddhist art at a time when Buddhism prevailed in Xinjiang for more than a thousand years until it was replaced by Islam around the 13th century. Now they are a source of pride and symbol of desired freedom for Uyghurs who live in the region and abroad. Ibragimov, a Uyghur graphic artist and painter who lives in Uzbekistan, explored the regional capital Urumqi and the town of Turpan. But when he went to the caves, the ancient murals and their historical richness deeply moved him.  “I was particularly inspired by the Kizil Thousand-Buddha Caves [near] Kucha,” he told Radio Free Asia. “These paintings can’t be found anywhere else in the Turkic world. They are the epitome of Uyghur paintings, encapsulating the history and art of the Uyghurs. I found myself captivated.” One of the five works of Uyghur artist Lékim Ibragimov displayed at the 2023 Florence Biennale contemporary art exhibition in Florence, Italy, October 2023 Credit: Courtesy of Lékim Ibragimov Now 78, Ibragimov said he has dedicated more than 40 years to studying the cave murals and incorporating their style into his work.  “Over the years, I introduced these artworks to the world with support from prominent artists who encouraged me to continue,” he said. “Through art, I paved a way for the Uyghur people. I became an academic in Russia, a national-level artist in Uzbekistan, and received many awards. I am delighted to have made this artistic contribution for the Uyghur community.” Cave frescoes Lékim Ibrahim Hakimoghli, as the artist is known among Uyghurs, has incorporated the style and colors of the cave frescoes into his abstract, surreal artwork that combines drawing, painting and calligraphy. His paintings earned him widespread recognition in Russia, Germany and other European countries after the 1990s as well as numerous awards, including the special commendation in the painting category at this year’s Florence Biennale, an event that has been held every two years since 1997.  The five pieces Ibragimov presented at the exhibition were among 1,500 works by over 600 artists from 85 countries at the Oct. 14-22 event. Three of his works were of Turkic figures, outlined and accented by muted colors against a light brown background in the style of the frescoes at the Kizil, also known as Bezeklik, Thousand-Buddha Caves. Another one depicting a neighing steed trying to break free of its tether resembles a Chinese ink-and-water painting, while his rendering of an ancestral angel is reminiscent of the style and motifs of Belarussian-French artist Marc Chagall. All the works were created between 2008 and 2020. Piero Celona, the vice president and founder of the Florence Biennale, who is knowledgeable about the cave paintings in Xinjiang, expressed admiration for Ibragimov’s work.    “Germany and other European countries have preserved and respected Uyghur culture, and he noticed the similarities [to the cave murals] in my paintings,” Ibragimov told RFA. “He commended my work and emphasized the Uyghur people’s yearning for freedom, predicting a brighter future for them.”  Chinese suppression The award comes as the Chinese government is repressing Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples living in Xinjiang and trying to Sinicize the vast northwestern region in part by destroying Uyghur culture.  Beijing has denied committing severe human rights violations in the region, despite credible reports, witness accounts and growing condemnation by Uyghur advocacy groups and the international community. One of the five works of Uyghur artist Lékim Ibragimov displayed at the 2023 Florence Biennale contemporary art exhibition in Florence, Italy, October 2023. Credit: Courtesy of Lékim Ibragimov Marwayit Hapiz, a Uyghur painter who lives in Germany and is well-acquainted with Ibragimov’s works, said the inclusion of his paintings in the Florence Biannale was a significant achievement for Uyghur art. “Lékim Ibrahim’s selections for this exhibition were a rare distinction among Turkic ethnicities,” she told RFA. “He is the sole Turkic artist to have earned this recognition.”   Hapiz, who first met Ibragimov in Urumqi in 1991, calls him one of the leading artists in the field of contemporary Uyghur fine art, whose works in the style of the cave murals highlight the traditional art of Uyghurs. “I wouldn’t hesitate to call him the foremost artist in Uyghur arts,” Hapiz said. “In Europe, whenever someone inquires about painters of symbolic Silk Road paintings, his name comes up.” “Lékim Ibrahim’s paintings emanate the spirit of Uyghur art from the era of the Uyghur Buddhas,” she said. “Our Uyghur artistic legacy essentially originates from these stone wall paintings.” Narratives Through extensive research, Ibragimov developed a deep understanding of the narratives and tales depicted in the cave wall paintings and incorporated them into his creative spirit, Hapiz said. “He innovatively adapted their expression and aesthetics, establishing a unique method of painting,” she said. Ibragimov has played a pivotal role in introducing Uyghur art to the world, alongside other renowned Uyghur painters Ghazi Ehmet and Abdukirim Nesirdin, she added. “He stands as a distinctive artist from the Silk Road and Asia primarily due to his ability to reflect the ancient paintings,” said Hapiz. Other artists familiar with Ibragimov’s work took to social media to offer their congratulations and praise. The special commendation certificate and medal presented to Uyghur artist Lékim Ibragimov at the 2023 Florence Biennale contemporary art exhibition in Florence, Italy, October 2023. Credit: courtesy of Lékim Ibragimov Gulnaz Tursun, a Uyghur artist from Central Asia, who like Ibragimov, serves as a mentor…

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Junta battalion surrenders amid Shan state ethnic offensive

Editor08 mins

An entire military battalion has surrendered to rebel forces amid an offensive by an alliance of three ethnic armies in northern Myanmar’s Shan state, according to sources with the armed resistance who called the capitulation the first of its kind in the region. All 41 members of Light Infantry Battalion 143, including a deputy commander and two company commanders, agreed to lay down their arms on Monday following talks with the Northern or “Three Brotherhood” Alliance a day earlier, Yan Naing, information officer of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, or MNDAA, told RFA Burmese on Wednesday. “It is true that the 41 [troops] surrendered – it happened on [Oct.] 30,” said Yan Naing, whose MNDAA, based in Shan’s Kokang region along the border with China, is one of three members of the ethnic army alliance along with the Arakan Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. Representatives of the Three Brother Alliance had urged commanders of the Kunlong township-based battalion to give up on Oct. 28, a day after it launched “Operation 1027” – named for the Oct. 27 date of the offensive – and simultaneously struck junta positions in the strategic Shan cities of Kunlong, Hseni, Chin Shwe Haw, Laukkaing, Namhkan, Kutkai, and Lashio, the state’s largest municipality. The MNDAA’s information department said Monday’s surrender marked the first time that a whole battalion had capitulated during an operation in northern Shan state, adding that the alliance had also confiscated a weapons cache as part of the agreement. It said 15 pro-junta militia fighters had also surrendered with their weapons on Tuesday. As part of a deal to entice junta forces to surrender, the MNDAA paid 1.5 million kyats (US$715) to each soldier from the battalion and pro-junta militia fighters that lay down their arms and escorted them to territory under their control, the group said. Operation 1027 making gains The MNDAA claims that more than 100 junta troops and pro-junta militia fighters have surrendered during Operation 1027, although its claims could not be independently verified. The Irrawaddy online journal cited the Three Brotherhood Alliance as saying that, from Oct. 27-31, it took control of 87 Myanmar military camps and three towns in Shan state – Chinshwehaw, Nawngkhio, and Hseni. In a statement issued on Tuesday, the alliance urged junta troops to give up their camps and outposts or face attack. It said those who surrender will be guaranteed safety, medical care, and other assistance that will allow them to return to their families “with dignity.” United Wa State Army soldiers participate in a military parade in Myanmar’s Wa State, in Panghsang on April 17, 2019. Credit: Ye Aung Thu/AFP The junta has yet to release any information about the surrender of its troops. Calls to junta Deputy Information Minister Maj. General Zaw Min Tun went unanswered Wednesday. Local resistance groups – including the anti-junta People’s Defense Force, or PDF – have joined in Operation 1027, which the Three Brotherhood Alliance says was launched to stop military attacks on ethnic armies in the region, get rid of online scamming rings in Kokang, and build a federal union. UWSA staying ‘neutral’ One group that will not be joining the operation is the ethnic United Wa State Army, or UWSA, which confirmed it was staying out of the campaign in a statement on Wednesday. Wa troops will “adopt a principle of neutrality” and avoid armed conflict in the Kokang region, but will retaliate against military intervention of any kind in its region, the statement said. A UWSA official confirmed to RFA that the information contained in the statement was correct. The UWSA said that the troops involved in the current conflict should “exercise restraint and pursue negotiations aimed at reaching a ceasefire.” It also said that humanitarian assistance had been provided to displaced persons who fled into the region due to the fighting. On the day Operation 1027 was launched, Kokang forces attacked Chin Shwe Haw, which was controlled by the United Wa State Army. The fighting forced some 10,000 residents of the town to flee to nearby Nam Tit for shelter, the UWSA official said. Another ethnic armed organization called the National Democratic Alliance Army, or NDAA, based in eastern Shan state has said it will not take part in the offensive and was adopting a principle of neutrality, but would “continue to maintain peace and stability” in the border region. The Three Brotherhood Alliance armies are also members of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee, or FPNCC, led by the UWSA. The seven-member coalition also includes the Shan State Progressive Party, the Kachin Independence Army, and the NDAA. Translated by Htin Aung Kyaw. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.

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Migration throws Laos’ communist government a lifeline

Editor015 mins

In a rare moment in the international spotlight, Laos was the topic of two articles published by major world media outlets in early October, although not with the sort of headlines the ruling communist party wanted to read.  The BBC ran a piece on October 8 under the banner: “’I feel hopeless’: Living in Laos on the brink”. Days later, the Washington Post went with “China’s promise of prosperity brought Laos debt — and distress”, presumably because the editors thought Laos isn’t interesting enough unless tales of Chinese debt traps are also included.  But both gave an accurate sense of the grim situation most Laotians, especially the young, now find themselves in. As the BBC report began: “Confronted with a barren job market, the Vientiane resident holds no hope of finding work at home, and instead aims to become a cleaner or a fruit picker in Australia.”  Laotians are leaving the country in droves. My estimate is that around 90,000, perhaps more, will have migrated officially by the end of the year, joining around 51,000 who left last year and the hundreds of thousands who have moved abroad earlier. Laos has had a horrendous last few years.  The landlocked Southeast Asian nation didn’t do particularly well during the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the early months of 2021, it has had one of the worst inflation rates in Asia, peaking at 41.3 percent in February and still hovering at around 25 percent. The kip, the local currency, is collapsing; it hit an all-time low in mid-September when it was trading in commercial banks at 20,000 to the U.S.  dollar, compared to around 8000 (US$44) in 2019. An acquaintance in Vientiane tells me that it used to cost 350,000 kip to fill up his car with diesel in 2019; today, it’s closer to 1.2 million kip (US$58)  and the price keeps rising—and bear in mind that the minimum wage is now just 1.6 million kip  (US$77), per a tiny increase in October. Another correspondent of mine, a foreigner, says he’s now leaving: “It’s got to the point where I’m just… done!”  Motorcyclists line up for gas in Laos amid shortages, May 10, 2022. Credit: RFA The communist government is hopeless in responding, and not even the rare resignation of a prime minister last December has added any vitality to its efforts. Worse, far larger structural problems remain. The national debt, probably around 120 percent of GDP, puts Laos at risk of defaulting every quarter. It cannot continue to borrow so the authorities are jacking up taxation, and because of flagrant corruption, the burden falls more heavily than it should on the poor.  Looking ahead, what is the national debt if not a tax deferred on the young and yet-to-be-born? There are not enough teachers in schools and not enough schools for students. Attendance rates have plummeted. Public expenditure on education and health, combined, has fallen from 4.2 percent of GDP in 2017 to just 2.6 percent last year, according to the World Bank’s latest economic update. More than two-thirds of low-income families say they have slashed spending on education and healthcare since the pandemic began, it also found. According to the BBC report, 38.7 percent of 18-to-24-year-olds are not in education, employment or training, by far the highest rate in Southeast Asia. A Laotian youth told me that few people want to waste money on bribes to study at university when they can quickly study Korean and try to get a high-paying factory job in Seoul.  In June, an International Labour Organization update gave a summary of the numbers of Laotians leaving by official means, as estimated by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare:  Thailand 2022: 51,501 (29,319 women) 2023, up until 30 June: 42,246 (23,126 women) Malaysia 2022: 469 men Japan 2022: 312 (122 women) 2023, up until 30 June: 289 (120 women)  South Korea, long-term (3 years contract) 2022: 796 (194 women) 2023, up until 30 June: 389 (54 women)  South Korea, short-term seasonal workers (5 months contract) 2022: 1,356 (598 women) The first thing to note is that this is emigration by official channels. To Japan and South Korea, that official process is arduous and involves a lengthy contract procedure before leaving the country. However, the workers in South Korea can earn in a day what they would earn in a month in Laos.  It’s less strenuous getting to Thailand although a considerable number of Laotians emigrate there by unofficial means, hopping across the border and not registering that they’ve left. In 2019, the Thai authorities estimated that there were around 207,000 Lao migrants working legally and 30,000 illegally, but the actual number of legal and illegal workers could have been as high as 300,000. (No one really knows how many Laotians work illegally in Thailand.) Also, consider how many Laotians have left the country so far this year compared to 2022. If we assume that emigration flows keep the same pace in the last six months of 2023 as they did in the first six, around 84,000 Laotians will have officially emigrated to Thailand by the end of this year, up from 51,000 in 2022.   In April, a National Assembly delegate castigated the government for the fact that “workers have left factories in Laos for jobs in other countries because the wages paid by factories here are not keeping pace with the rising cost of living…As a result, factories in Laos are facing a labor shortage.”  Saving grace? But isn’t this actually a saving grace for the communist Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), at least in the short term? Much woe betide is made of Laos’ land-locked geography but it is rather convenient to border five countries, four of which are wealthier, if you want to avoid a situation of having disaffected, unemployed or poorly paid youths hanging around doing nothing but getting increasingly angry at their dim prospects. Conventional wisdom holds that authoritarian regimes constrain emigration as it can lead to mass labor shortages, one reason…

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Ethnic alliance launches offensive on junta in eastern Myanmar

Editor09 mins

An alliance of three ethnic armies opened an offensive against Myanmar’s military regime on Friday, launching attacks on outposts in seven different locations in Shan state, in the east, including the headquarters of the junta’s Northeastern Command. At around 4:00 a.m., the Northern Alliance made up of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Arakan Army simultaneously struck junta positions in the strategic Shan cities of Kunlong, Theinni, Chin Shwe Haw, Laukkaing, Namhkan, Kutkai, and Lashio – the state’s largest municipality. In a statement, the alliance said “Operation 1027” – named for the Oct. 27 date of the offensive – was initiated to protect the lives and property of civilians, defend its three member armies, and exert greater control over the self-administered regions within their territories. It said the operation was also part of a bid to reduce the junta’s air and artillery strike capabilities, remove the military regime from power, and crack down on criminal activities – including online scam operations – that have proliferated along the country’s northeastern border with China. Residents of Shan state told RFA Burmese that at least eight civilians were killed in Friday’s fighting, including three children. The number of combatant casualties was not immediately available, as the clashes were ongoing at the time of publishing. Pho Wa, a resident of Hopang, near Chin Shwe Haw in Shan’s Kokang region, said there were “many casualties” among junta troops and civil servants, and that key infrastructure, including bridges, had been destroyed, slowing the flow of goods in and out of the area. “Since multiple checkpoints … were raided, many customs agents, police officers and soldiers were killed,” he said. “The residents of Chin Shwe Haw have fled to [a region] administered by an [ethnic] Wa force called Nam Tit. Many are still trapped in Chin Shwe Haw city.” Residents said Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, or MNDAA, troops raided the downtown area of Chin Shwe Haw on Friday afternoon. They said inhabitants of Laukkaing were urgently preparing to flee the area ahead of an anticipated raid on the city by the armed group Kutkai and Lashio clashes In Kutkai township, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, soldiers attacked a pro-junta Pan Saye militia outpost on Friday morning, leading to fierce fighting, residents said. Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army soldiers seize Myanmar military security gate near Laukkai city in Northern Shan state, Friday, Oct. 27, 2023. Credit: Screenshot from AFP video A woman from Kutkai said that junta troops based in nearby Nam Hpat Kar village counterattacked with artillery fire, drawing the village into the battlezone. At least two civilians – a man and a child – were killed and five others wounded, she said, speaking on condition of anonymity due to fear of reprisal. “I think there were more than 30 artillery strikes this morning,” the woman said. “Clashes broke out when the TNLA attacked the [junta’s] outposts … That’s why they counterattacked with artillery from Nam Hpat Kar, but many of the shells fell on Nam Hpat Kar village.” A 40-year-old man was also killed in a military air strike amid fighting near Kutkai’s Nawng Hswe Nam Kut village, residents said. In Mong Ko township, fighting between junta forces and MNDAA troops has been fierce since Friday morning, and at midday the junta sent two combat helicopters to attack, residents said. Junta outposts near villages of Tar Pong, Nar Hpa and Mat Hki Nu in Lashio township, which is the seat of the military’s Northeastern Command, as well as a toll gate in Ho Peik village, were attacked Friday morning. Lashio residents said they heard the sound of heavy weapons until 7:00 p.m. on Friday and that all flights out of the city’s airport had been suspended amid the clashes. Due to the complicated and fast-moving situation in the villages around Lashio, the exact number of casualties is not yet known, but a rescue worker said that two people had been injured and sent to the hospital. Fighting in the area was tense until noon on Friday. ‘Strategic shift’ for region RFA reached out to TNLA spokesperson Lt. Col. Tar Aik Kyaw regarding the alliance operation, but had yet to receive a response by the time of publishing. Attempts to contact the MNDAA and Arakan Army, or AA, went unanswered Friday. Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government’s ministry of defense welcomed the operation in a statement. RFA was unable to reach junta Deputy Information Minister Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun for comment, but he confirmed to local media that fighting had taken place in Chin Shwe Haw, Laukkaing, Theinni, Kunlong and Lashio townships.  He said that the military and police had “suffered casualties” in attacks on outposts at Chin Shwe Haw’s Phaung Seik and Tar Par bridges. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning told reporters at a regularly scheduled press conference that Beijing is “closely following” the latest fighting along its border and called for dialogue between all parties to avoid escalation of the situation. Speaking to RFA on Friday, military commentator Than Soe Naing said that the alliance operation was retaliation for recent junta attacks on the headquarters of their ally, the Kachin Independence Army, in Lai Zar, a remote town in Kachin state on the border with China. “I consider this to be a strategic shift for the entire northern region, centered on Shan state,” he said. Translated by Htin Aung Kyaw. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.

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China urges ‘fair’ investigation into Baltic pipeline damage

Editor010 mins

China has said it will stand “ready to provide necessary assistance” to the investigation into Finland’s claims a Hong Kong vessel may have damaged a natural gas pipeline. Finnish police said on Tuesday the Balticconnector pipeline between Finland and Estonia was likely damaged by an anchor as “on the seabed, a 1.5 to 4 meter-wide dragging trail is seen to lead to the point of damage in the gas pipeline.” The investigators said they found the anchor just a few meters from the gas pipeline damage point. They said the anchor may have belonged to the Chinese container vessel Newnew Polar Bear which was sailing through the area at around 1:20 a.m. local time on Oct. 8, 2023 when the pipeline was reported damaged. The police focused their suspicion on the ship as until now, they “could not visually confirm that both front anchors of the vessel were in their place.”  Newnew Polar Bear is a Chinese-owned and Hong Kong-registered commercial ship.   The vessel “was contacted several times, but they were not willing to cooperate,” they said, adding that help is needed from the Chinese authorities for the investigation to continue. A graphic obtained by Reuters on October 13, 2023, shows where the Balticconnector pipeline between Finland and Estonia was damaged on October 8, by an unknown reason. Credit: NORSAR/Handout via Reuters In Beijing, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson said China maintains “unimpeded communication with parties including Finland” over the incident, which is still under investigation, and “stands ready to provide necessary assistance in accordance with international law.” Mao Ning told reporters on Wednesday that the Chinese government hopes “relevant parties will follow the principles of being objective, fair, just and professional and find out what happened soon.” Earlier this week, Mao said the Chinese vessel was “sailing through relevant waters normally when the incident occurred. Due to the rather bad conditions at sea, it didn’t detect anything abnormal.”  Finland’s National Bureau of Investigation has published a photo of the broken anchor that investigators retrieved from the seabed.  The next step would be to confirm that it came from the Chinese container vessel and determine if the damage was an accident or intentional, said Carl Schuster, a retired U.S. Navy captain turned maritime analyst. “If evidence of the Newnew Polar Bear’s involvement surfaces, then the captain will try to claim it was an accident but that is not likely unless the evidence is conclusive,” Schuster told RFA. Cable cutting The Estonian government has said it is investigating two incidents that might also be linked to the Newnew Polar Bear, in which a telecoms cable connecting Finland and Estonia and another between Sweden and Estonia, were damaged. Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas was quoted in the domestic media as saying that there are reasons to believe that the three incidents are related, but “it is too early to reveal sensitive information.” Some observers recall that Chinese ships were accused of damaging communications cables before. In April, Taiwan’s National Communications Commission blamed two Chinese ships for cutting two undersea internet cables connecting Taiwan island and the outlying islands of Matsu, leading to 50 days of no, or very limited internet access, there. The same cables have been damaged 27 times since 2017 by Chinese sand dredging and fishing boats, some cut by ships’ anchors, Taiwanese authorities said. RFA analyzed automatic identification system data provided by ship-tracking website MarineTraffic and found that at around 1:00 a.m. on Oct. 8, the Newnew Polar Bear was approaching the site of the Balticconnector pipeline.  During the course of one hour or so, the Newnew Polar Bear slowed down to under 11 knots before picking up again, but did not stop.  Besides the Chinese ship, a Russian flag bearer – the nuclear-powered cargo ship Sevmorput – was also seen at the scene, sailing at a higher speed. Norwegian seismology institute NORSAR reported blast-like waves near the pipeline at the time. What does Russia say? NewNew Polar Bear was renamed and registered in Hong Kong in June. Immediately prior to this, the ship sailed under the name Baltic Fulmar flying the Cypriot flag. Newnew Polar Bear and four other ships owned by China’s Hainan Yangpu Newnew Shipping Co. began transporting cargo between Russia and China using the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s Arctic coast in July. The route was previously not operational because of the ice. The Newnew Polar Bear made a port call in Baltiysk, Russia, on Oct. 6. Credit: Anton Alikhanov’s Telegram Russian state nuclear corporation Rosatom is believed to assist the Chinese shipping line with nuclear-powered icebreakers, reducing the transit time between Russia’s St Petersburg and China’s Shanghai to less than a month, compared to 45-50 days if using the route through the Suez Canal. Sevmorput is part of the Rosatom-owned nuclear icebreaker fleet, the only such fleet in the world. The Northern Sea Route is one of the strategic priorities of cooperation between the Russians and the Chinese, and Newnew Polar Bear reflects this close collaboration.  But Russian netizens have posted photos of the vessel flying the Russian flag at port calls, such as on Oct. 6 in Baltiysk, Kaliningrad’s region. This left watchers puzzled. “It is not legal under international law for the ship to fly a Russian flag unless its registration was changed to Russia. There is no evidence it has changed its registration,” said maritime analyst Carl Schuster.  “A commercial vessel must fly the flag of its country of registration although it may have a logo of its country of ownership painted on its superstructure,” he added, So far, as the suspicion is not directed at Russia, Russian official channels have yet to comment on the case.  Yet on social media platforms, Russian analysts and observers have been talking about what they call “the West attempting to block traffic from China to Russia and Europe.” “Perhaps the West understands that this traffic can increase massively in the near future – both from the Baltic and along the Northern Sea Route,” one…

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Investigative Journalism Reportika © March 2022 by Ij-Reportika is licensed under CC BY 4.0