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Five years on, PolyU protesters say they were defending freedoms
Five years after riot police besieged Hong Kong’s Polytechnic University and trapped protesters fought back with catapults and Molotov cocktails, four people who were there say they were trying to stand up for their promised rights and freedoms in the face of ongoing political encroachment from Beijing. The 10-day siege of PolyU began on Nov. 18, 2019, after around 1,000 protesters occupied the university as part of an ongoing series of actions to achieve the movement’s key demands: fully democratic elections; the withdrawal of plans to allow extradition to mainland China; greater official and police accountability; and an amnesty for detained protesters. The protesters were then trapped on campus as riot police encircled the area, prompting nearly 100,000 people to turn out to battle riot police across Tsim Sha Tsui, Jordan, Yau Ma Tei, Mong Kok and other parts of the Kowloon peninsula. Four young people who were among the besieged protesters spoke to RFA Cantonese on the fifth anniversary of the siege, which ended Nov. 19, 2019, and proved to be one of the last major standoffs between black-clad protesters and riot police after months of clashes sparked by plans to allow extradition to mainland China. Protesters are sprayed with blue liquid from a water cannon during clashes with police outside Hong Kong Polytechnic University in Hong Kong, Nov. 17, 2019. He said many young protesters were motivated by a desire to burn their home city to the ground rather than acquiesce in its transformation into another Chinese city under Communist Party rule. “Nowadays, the Chinese Communist Party is no longer hiding its authoritarian tendencies, and has been sanctioned by the international community, while the Hong Kong economy declines by the day,” Kai said. “This shows that our idea that we would all burn together was right on the money,” he said. Around 1,300 people were arrested, with around 300 sent to hospital for injuries related to water cannon blast, tear gas, and rubber bullets, as protesters wielding Molotov cocktails, catapults and other makeshift weapons from behind barricades beat back repeated attempts by riot police to advance into the university campus. Small groups of protesters continued to make desperate bids for freedom throughout the siege, many of them only to end up being arrested and beaten bloody by police. Police also deployed tear gas, water cannon, and rubber bullets against a crowd of thousands trying to push through towards Poly U from Jordan district, with hundreds forming human chains to pass bricks, umbrellas, and other supplies to front-line fighters. “I took part in a lot of protest-related activities from June [of that year] onwards, although I never considered myself a front-line fighter,” a former protester living in the United Kingdom who gave only the pseudonym Kit for fear of reprisals, told RFA Cantonese in a recent interview. “But I felt that if I wasn’t prepared to take it further, then we really would lose the rule of law in Hong Kong.” Protesters leave the Hong Kong Polytechnic University campus to surrender to police, in Hong Kong, Nov. 19, 2019. “What impressed me most was that some of the protesters used a homemade catapult to launch Molotov cocktails, which set fire to the police armored vehicle, forcing it to retreat,” he said. “Everyone cheered when that happened.” “Actually, the situation inside PolyU was total chaos, with a lot of misinformation coming in, and nobody really knew what to do,” he said. Tin said he had fled Hong Kong and wound up in Japan after traveling to several other countries first. “I’ve had good and bad experiences over the last five years, but I’ve survived,” he said. A former protester now living in Germany who gave only the nickname Hei for fear of reprisals said he went to PolyU on Nov. 17 to try to persuade his fellow protesters to leave while they still could. Before he knew it, he was trapped inside. “I wanted to persuade them to leave, because the situation was critical, with helicopters flying overhead,” Hei said. “But they refused to leave.” Hei never thought he’d be stuck there for as long as he was. “When it became clear at around 9.30 that evening that those of us left inside weren’t going to be able to leave, things got pretty dark,” he said. “One guy told us to make a written statement pledging not to commit suicide.” So he stayed behind to resist the advance of the riot police. “The police offensive was really intense,” he said. “I was on the platform of A Core for the entire night.” Pro-democracy lawmakers stand amid items left behind by protestors in Hong Kong Polytechnic University in Hong Kong, Nov. 26, 2019. “Just below us were the frontline fighters, and the police water cannon truck, which sprayed us on the platform with blue water from time to time,” Hei said. “Then at about 6.00 p.m. on the 18th, the police suddenly launched an offensive and fired large numbers of tear gas rounds and rubber bullets from a high altitude at the Core A platform.” “I opened my umbrella and squatted down next to a tree, and the bullets kept cracking on the umbrella,” he said. “We lost the position pretty quickly, but I was able to make it back to PolyU luckily.” Inside, rumors were swirling that the police would burst in to arrest everyone, so Hei managed to escape by following a lawyer who had come in to try to help the young people inside. He had a lucky escape. Anyone arrested during the siege was eventually charged with “rioting,” with some receiving jail terms of up to 10 years. “They only took my ID details,” said Hei, who wasn’t arrested, and who later left Hong Kong for Germany. He said the siege taught him how hard it is to stand up to an authoritarian regime. “But I have no regrets, because anyone with a conscience or any sense of justice would have chosen to stand up,” he…
HSBC restructuring a chance to rescue UK’s Hong Kongers from transnational repression
HSBC’s recently-announced plan to split into four businesses from Jan. 1 offers the British multinational bank a chance to correct a wrong against tens of thousands of Hong Kongers in the UK and Canada who have been denied access to their retirement savings. The Calls grow for UK to expand lifeboat scheme for Hong Kongers China Derecognizes BNO Passports as UK Launches Hong Kong Visa Scheme As the largest trustee of the MPF, HSBC oversees five MPF schemes and manages approximately 30 percent of the total MPF market, with assets totalling HK$371 billion (£37 billion). From this, Hong Kong Watch has estimated that HSBC is denying Hong Kongers access to as much as £978 million worth of assets in MPF holdings. ‘Financial transnational repression’ This week 13 Parliamentarians from every major political party in the UK wrote new HSBC Group Chief Executive Georges Elhedery urging him to resolve the frozen funds issue. “As Members of Parliament, we welcome information on how the restructuring of HSBC, specifically the creation of separate ‘Hong Kong’ and ‘UK’ businesses, will impact the more than 180,000 BNO Hong Kongers living across the UK who attempt to withdraw their MPF savings,” said the letter. Chris Patten, the last British governor of Hong Kong and a signatory to the letter, called on HSBC to make “meaningful changes” for the affected Hong Kongers during the restructuring. “If HSBC has not yet taken into account how its reorganisation, specifically in regard to the split between the Hong Kong and UK markets, will affect Hong Kongers abroad, it should carefully consider how to protect its Hong Kong customers from further financial transnational repression,” wrote Patten, a patron of Hong Kong Watch. It has been nearly four years since the UK government launched the BNO scheme, which is far too long for Hong Kongers to be blocked from the very savings that, for some, would unleash the path to their new life in Britain. A man bids farewell to relatives and friends at the Hong Kong airport as he and his family prepare to leave the city for England, on May 21, 2021. I continue to hear accounts of struggle as Hong Kongers long to adjust to their new lives in the UK, including a single mom who is again worried about not being able to afford heating this winter, as well as one family which cannot afford accessibility features in their home for their child with disabilities. HSBC must seriously consider how it will handle Hong Kongers’ MPF savings as they rearrange the foundations of the company to split the Hong Kong and UK markets, as it is time for their funds to be rightfully released. In addition, the new UK government should seek to further understand the issue, raise the freezing of BNO Hong Kongers’ savings in every bilateral meeting with China and Hong Kong, and take immediate action to issue guidance to MPF trustees regarding the use of BNO passports as valid, UK government-issued identity documents. This would ensure that Hong Kongers who are part of the UK’s BNO community do not have to face another cold winter nor a sleepless night trying to figure out how they will provide for their family while still in the shadow of trauma from escaping political repression in Hong Kong. Megan Khoo is policy director at the international NGO Hong Kong Watch. Khoo, based in London, has served in communications roles at foreign policy non-profit organizations in London and Washington, D.C.. The views expressed here do not reflect the position of Radio Free Asia. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika
Fresh Chinese support may not be enough to save Myanmar junta
Myanmar’s military dictator, Min Aung Hlaing, returned from a five-day trip to China, his first since the February 2021 coup, with promises of further on border trade. As of now only one of five official border posts, Mongla, is open. China has not restored electricity and internet service to many of the border towns as punishment. Under Chinese pressure, the Myanmar National Defense Alliance Army (MNDAA), had to publicly distance themselves from the National Unity Government (NUG), the shadow opposition government. And yet they continue to defy Beijing, both continuing their military operations and coordination with the NUG. People gather around a destroyed building following an airstrike in Namhkham township in Myanmar’s northern Shan state, Sept. 6, 2024. The military is increasingly reliant on air power, which has led to the death of over 540 civilians and 200 schools in the first 10 months of 2024, alone. The most recent strike targeted the ruby-mining town of Mogoke, which the TNLA seized in July. But opposition gains have put those airbases in range. On November 5, a drone dropped a bomb at the airport in Naypyidaw soon after Min Aung Hlaing and his delegation departed for Kunming. On November 11, opposition forces fired rockets into the Shan Te airbase in Meiktila township. Meiktila is a major military hub with several bases and defense industries, and the airbase is the hub of Air Force operations in northern Shan, Kachin, Sagaing and Sagaing regions. There is now satellite evidence that the military is making improvements to a small airfield in Pakokku, just across the Irrawaddy River to the southwest of Myingyan, a major logistic and energy transit hub in Mandalay province where opposition forces have stepped up attacks. The regime appears to be moving to smaller airfields in strongholds, which would allow it to save fuel in operations. It also suggests that they are increasingly reliant on riverine transportation to get jet fuel safely delivered. Now in the dry season, the military sees a window of opportunity to regain territory lost since Operation 1027 began a year ago. Min Aung Hlaing has secured additional Chinese assistance, despite Beijing’s misgiving about his competence. But that support may be insufficient across so many distinct battlefields, against an opposition that has demonstrated their refusal to kowtow to Beijing. Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College in Washington and an adjunct at Georgetown University. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, the National War College, Georgetown University or Radio Free Asia. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika
Myanmar junta can order migrant workers home to fight, agency says
Read RFA coverage of this topic in Burmese. Myanmar’s Ministry of Labor has issued a ruling allowing it to call back overseas workers for military service and has made the employment agencies that send workers abroad responsible for bringing them back if ordered to, an agency told Radio Free Asia on Friday. Since the military ousted a democratically elected government in a 2021 coup, many thousands of Myanmar people have moved abroad to escape a crumbling economy, violent turmoil and, since early this year, the threat of being drafted into the military as it struggles against anti-junta forces. While many try their luck and head abroad in the hope of finding work, many others find work through employment agencies, filling jobs overseas through deals Myanmar has struck with other governments. The military’s ministry issued a regulation this week ordering job agencies to take full responsibility for their workers’ military service, and only to issue new contracts stipulating that workers and their foreign employers must agree that employees can be called back to serve, a member of staff at a Yangon-based employment agency told RFA. “Agencies have been given responsibility for their conscription. After we take that duty, the junta has a lot of ways of calling them back. It’s a lot of pressure,” said the agency employee who declined to be identified given the sensitivity of the matter. “If the workers we send are called back, then the trouble will start. If they don’t return, are we going to take action?” he said. Under the regulation, workers would only be called back after two years, the agency source said, while expressing concern that the time rule could easily be ignored. RFA was not able to determine the reaction of foreign employers to the regulation. RFA tried to call the junta’s labor minister, Nyan Win, to ask about the rule but he did not respond by the time of publication. The junta enacted a conscription law in February, making men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 to serve for up to three years, after various insurgent forces battling to end military rule went on the offensive and made significant advances. The law triggered an exodus of young people to places like Thailand. Myanmar authorities have detained and forcibly recruited people being sent back to Myanmar and turned to prisoners and even minors to fill gaps in the ranks, according to witnesses and residents of some communities. Struggling with a crippled economy, the junta has already ordered that Myanmar workers in Laos and Thailand make payments from their salaries to bolster foreign reserves and employment agencies risk having their licenses revoked if those remittances are not collected. Military authorities have also announced strict action against anyone caught trying to dodge the draft, state-run media reported on Nov. 7. Nationwide, there are 21,000 conscripts at 23 training schools, the independent research group Burma Affairs and Conflict Study said in a report on Oct. 15. RELATED STORIES Myanmar junta expands mandatory remittance for migrant workers Surge of Myanmar migrants into Thailand comes with grim costs 29 young men escape Myanmar junta’s conscription Translated by Kiana Duncan. Edited by RFA staff. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika
China hawk to steer Trump’s national security
Michael Waltz, a Republican congressman from Florida, will be President-elect Donald Trump’s pick for national security advisor– a position in which he is likely to play an outsized role in shaping China policy. Waltz, 50, has long been hawkish on Beijing. A former Green Beret who served in Afghanistan, the Middle East and Africa, he won several Bronze Stars, including two for valor, for his service. Waltz then worked in policy at the Pentagon and served as an advisor to former Republican Vice President Dick Cheney. In 2018, he was elected to Congress and became known as one of its most hardline members on China. He serves on the House Foreign Affairs, Armed Services and Intelligence Committees. Waltz has also been on the House China Task Force, which examines how the U.S. can best compete with China. He has called for additional support for Taiwan, saying on X in May 2023 that the U.S. should start “arming Taiwan NOW before it’s too late.” In addition, he’s demanded that China put an end to human rights abuses in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and called for the U.S. to boycott the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing. Waltz used to feel frustrated by the deferential manner shown by another Republican president, George W. Bush, in the White House Situation Room. In his 2014 book, Warrior Diplomat: A Green Beret’s Battles from Washington to Afghanistan, he wrote of sitting in during a tense videoconference with then-President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan and lamenting Bush’s failure to be firmer. “Unfortunately, really sticking it to Karzai was not Bush’s style,” Waltz wrote. The atmosphere in the second Trump White House will be dramatically different. Waltz will move to the front of the Situation Room. And Trump, known for “sticking it to” any number of people, will have his own style. RELATED STORIES China expecting harder times after Trump victory Asian leaders congratulate Trump on US election victory Asians see Trump offering tougher policies on China, despite contradictions Yet Waltz‘s uncompromising views could also create tension with Trump, despite the President-elect signalling that he will be tough on China says June Teufel Dreyer of the University of Miami Coral’ and author of China’s Political System: Modernization and Tradition. Waltz “is distrustful of the People’s Republic of China and its motives,” she says. “He does not believe in the hype that we can work together in peace and friendship.” Trump has threatened to slap tariffs on Chinese goods and sought confrontation with Beijing over intellectual property, technology and other economic issues. Those efforts are likely to continue when he takes office. But at the same time, he has expressed admiration for the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping. He has called Xi a “brilliant guy” and praised him for his success at becoming “president for life.” Teufel Dreyer says that Trump may decide at some point to take a more deferential approach to Xi, and this could cause a rift between Trump and his advisor. “Waltz is not a shrinking violet. He’s willing to speak his mind,” she says. “He’s not going to back down.” The unpredictable nature of the White House has far-reaching implications. So does the track record of the incoming national security advisor and his hawkish views. “There will be efforts to crack down on the bad behavior of China – how they are ripping off American goods, as well as the spying—that’s going to be top of mind for Waltz,” predicts Brett Bruen, a former director of global engagement on the National Security Council in the Obama White House. “If I’m sitting in the Chinese foreign ministry office, these are worrying signs.” Edited by Boer Deng and Abby Seiff We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika
Minister in Myanmar’s ousted government dies days after release
Read RFA coverage of this topic in Burmese. A former minister in Aung San Suu Kyi’s ousted government has died shortly after being released from prison, family friends and party colleagues told Radio Free Asia, the latest jailed member of Myanmar’s last elected government to die. Win Khaing, 74, was minister of electricity and energy in the government formed by Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, or NLD, which was overthrown on Feb. 1, 2021, when the generals ended a decade of tentative reform and reimposed hardline military rule. “The respected Win Khaing joined hands with the NLD to make it the best. He was involved in both management and policy reforms and was capable of carrying them out,” said NLD colleague Bo Bo Oo, the party’s deputy chairperson for the Sanchaung township in the main city of Yangon. “The loss of our distinguished Win Khaing is a loss for all Myanmar citizens, the whole country’s loss,” Bo Bo Oo told Radio Free Asia from an undisclosed location. Family friends said Win Khaing died of heart disease and diabetes in hospital late on Friday. He had been released from the infamous Obo Prison in Mandalay on Oct. 28 due to deteriorating health and taken to Mandalay General Hospital. Win Khaing was arrested shortly after the 2021 coup and later jailed for 28 years on corruption charges related to a hydro-power project. Almost all NLD leaders, including Suu Kyi, have been jailed on various charges that they have dismissed as politically motivated. Calls to Myanmar military spokesperson, Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, went unanswered. Military-run media did not report Win Khaing’s death but the news spread quickly in Myanmar’s second-biggest city. ‘Military is responsible’ Some residents drew parallels with the death last month of Zaw Myint Maung, another top NLD member who died of cancer days after being released on medical grounds from a lengthy sentence in the same prison. “Of course, they only give amnesty to a person when they know they’re going to die,” said one resident who declined to be identified for security reasons. “People in Mandalay knew he had been released a week before he passed away.” The civilian shadow administration in exile, National Unity Government, or NUG, formed by former NLD members, has criticized the junta officials for failing to provide prisoners with adequate medical treatment. A spokesperson for the NUG, Nay Phone Latt, denounced the “ illegal capture and jailing” of pro-democracy politicians. “The military is completely responsible for this,” Nay Phone Latt said. The death of elderly NLD members raises concerns for the fate of Myanmar’s most popular politician, Suu Kyi. The 79-year-old daughter of the hero of Myanmar’s campaign for independence from colonial rule was also arrested after the 2021 coup. She was sentenced on various charges, that she dismissed as trumped up, and jailed for 33 years though her sentence was reduced to 27 years. The Nobel Peace Prize laureate is believed to be in solitary confinement in prison in the capital, Naypyidaw, but her exact whereabouts are unknown. About 2,000 other NLD members have been jailed by the military regime since the coup along with thousands of other democracy campaigners. Among those to have died in custody was Nyan Win, a top NLD adviser to Suu Kyi, who died of COVID-19 in 2021. A year later, the junta executed former NLD lawmaker Phyo Zayar Thaw, for treason and terrorism charges. RELATED STORIES Myanmar democracy champion Tin Oo, dead at 98 Relative of Myanmar’s ex-dictator arrested over social media posts Over 100 Myanmar political prisoners have died since coup, group says Translated by Kiana Duncan. Edited by RFA staff. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika
The New Star War? Key to Winning the AI and Semiconductor Race
In March 1983, US President Ronald Reagan delivered his iconic Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) speech, known as “Star Wars,” which ignited an arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union centered on missile defense systems. Today, a similar race is unfolding between China and the United States, this time focused on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and its backbone, semiconductors. These technologies are viewed as strategic assets vital to national security, and whoever secures the upper hand will likely dominate global leadership. The U.S. currently holds a technological edge over China in both AI and semiconductors, bolstered by export controls designed to slow China’s progress. Yet, the geopolitical rivalry is unlikely to subside, regardless of who occupies the White House. The emergence of a “trust alliance” among democratic nations and the push for self-sufficiency within pro-China regimes are expected to accelerate the decoupling of the tech landscape into distinct spheres of influence. The Role of the “CRINK” Group The Halifax Forum’s term “CRINK”—representing China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—has drawn comparisons to the Axis powers of World War II. However, such an ideological lens oversimplifies the complexities of today’s geopolitical landscape. Unlike the WWII era, today’s world is deeply interconnected through globalization, with China playing a pivotal role in global manufacturing and supply chains as well as the largest market for those products. China’s economic footprint is significant: it produces one-third of the world’s manufacturing output, including 72% of flat-panel displays, 36% of electronic products like smartphones and PCs, and two-thirds of electric vehicles (EVs). It is also the largest consumer market for EVs, industrial robots, and semiconductor equipment. Any comparison to Cold War dynamics must take into account this interdependence. The CRINK nations, especially China, Russia, and Iran, also control substantial shares of global resources, such as minerals, crude oil, natural gas, and rare earth elements that are critical to global production. Addressing Asymmetric Dependence The West faces a dilemma: how to reduce dependence on China without destabilizing global supply chains. The U.S. and its allies have focused on increasing resilience by diversifying sources of supply, but this strategy only tackles one side of the problem. Without reducing reliance on China as a consumer market, these efforts may fall short. This is not a call for erecting a new “iron curtain” to divide the world but rather a recognition that the democratic world has underinvested in innovation and market development. More must be done to stimulate demand for AI, semiconductors, and related components within trusted allied countries. If new chips made in America and Europe lack viable markets for assembly and sale outside of China, these efforts risk becoming redundant. The Challenge of Enforcement Recent events illustrate the complexity of enforcing tech restrictions. GlobalFoundries was fined by the U.S. Department of Commerce for supplying chips to an affiliate of SMIC, a Chinese semiconductor company on the U.S. Entity List. Similarly, a TSMC chip was discovered in a Huawei processor, highlighting gaps in oversight and the difficulty of monitoring supply chain loopholes. The U.S. approach of adding more companies to the Entity List is akin to a game of whack-a-mole—reactive and unsustainable. Huawei’s founder Ren Zhengfei has underscored this challenge, noting that with 99% of Chinese companies unaffected by U.S. sanctions, workarounds are almost inevitable. Huawei can obtain chips indirectly, buying from third or fourth-tier customers of TSMC, which only comes to light through painstaking reverse engineering. Similarly, SMIC and other sanctioned firms can establish new affiliates to circumvent restrictions, exposing the limits of self-regulation and due diligence. The Motivation Behind SMIC’s Moves While media coverage has focused on the immediate facts, less attention has been given to the motivations behind SMIC’s clandestine purchases from GlobalFoundries. Despite significant investments in expanding mature node capacity with dozens of new fabs, why does SMIC continue to source chips from other manufacturers? This suggests that advanced technology or strategic stockpiling may still be critical for sanctioned entities, or even attempts at technology theft by reverse engineering, revealing deeper vulnerabilities in the current enforcement strategy. The Path Forward for the Democratic Alliance Forming a “trust alliance” that shares technology securely is crucial, but it must go beyond reactive measures. Are there robust mechanisms to prevent sanctioned chips from being falsified and re-entering the global market? Simply adding trade tariffs as a deterrent to China’s exports may not work. The need to address the asymmetry of both supply and demand dependencies in China cannot be underestimated. The democratic world must shift from a reactive posture to a proactive strategy. This involves investing in innovation, building demand for AI and semiconductors within allied markets, and fortifying tools to track down product sales endpoints and counter falsifications for regulatory frameworks to close loopholes. Without such foresight, the democratic camp risks repeating the fate of the Soviet Union and its allies during the original “Star Wars” era—falling behind due to a lack of comprehensive strategy. By fostering resilience and innovation, the trust alliance can ensure it remains competitive and secure in the evolving geopolitical landscape. About the Author Judy Lin is the Deputy Editor At Large of Taiwan’s CommonWealth Magazine English Website and founder/editor in chief of TechSoda.online. She has covered Semiconductor, AI, and Geopolitics during her tenure as lead reporter and managing editor of DIGITIMES Asia and Foreign Exchange Market/Macroeconomics for Reuters Taiwan. Source : Link (Investigative Journalism Reportika has obtained the author’s authorization for reproducing the content).
2024 US election live updates: Reactions from Asia
What you need to know The U.S. presidential election is being keenly watched across Asia. The outcome of the race between Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump will have a major impact on America’s relations with the region on issues like trade, security and climate change. Radio Free Asia reporters will be gauging reactions in Asia and will regularly update this post with what we hear from regular citizens and from governments. For most part, our reporting is from countries that are under authoritarian rule. Hopes run high in Harris’ ancestral village A tiny village located on the other side of the world in the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu is offering prayers at the local Hindu temple, hoping for victory for one of their own, Vice President Kamala Harris. Harris, 60, was born in California to an Indian mother and Jamaican father, both of whom immigrated to the United States for higher education. In the village of Thulasendrapuram – where Harris’s maternal grandfather Painganadu Venkataraman “P.V.” Gopalan was born – residents have been gathering each day at the village temple to offer special prayers to the Hindu deity Ayyanar – worshipped in rural parts of Tamil Nadu as a guardian or protector – to watch over Harris. The residents refer to Harris as the “daughter of the land,” and say they feel a deep connection with her because of her ancestral ties to the village. The village is decked out with signs featuring Harris‘s portrait and banners wishing her good luck in the election, which will determine whether or not she will become America’s first female president and first president of Indian descent. “We in this village offer daily prayers for Kamala Harris to win the election,” Aruna Murli Sudhagar, the leader of the village, told Radio Free Asia. Read more of this story Posted at 5:13 pm Eastern on 11/5/24 Take a moment to explore our election coverage Live U.S. election map Deep dive: How would Harris and Trump differ on Asia? China focuses on threat of violent unrest as US voters head to polls US presidential election sparks curiosity in North Korea Vietnamese show interest In Vietnam, social media platforms are abuzz about candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump, and at least three newspapers are asking, “Who will be elected U.S. president?” Nguyen Binh, a farmer in the southern province of Dong Nai, expressed surprise that Americans were free to talk openly about elections. He recalled that a number of independent candidates in Vietnam’s 2016 National Assembly election are in prison. “I only wish for one thing: that talented people in Vietnam and virtuous people in Vietnam can run for election fully, openly, and run comfortably without being coerced,” he said. “The right to self-determination belongs to the people with their votes, not from any political party.” Independent journalist Nam Viet said he believes that the interest shown by Vietnamese demonstrates their thirst for democracy. “The commenting, judging, choosing sides… of Vietnamese people in the U.S. election is sometimes funny, but it shows that a desire for change is still smoldering in the hearts of the nation,” he said. “The people must be rehearsing their right to self-determination,” Nam said, saying Vietnam holds “sham” elections. Posted at 5:34 pm Eastern on 11/5/24 Clockwise from top left, China’s President Xi Jinping, North Korea’s leader Jim Jong Un, Laos Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone and Vietnam’s Communist Party General Secretary To Lam. How do elections work in authoritarian Asian nations? In a world bracing for a close U.S. presidential election result this week, a large swathe of Asia picks its leaders without suspense — and mostly with little popular participation. Chinese President Xi Jinping was confirmed by the National People’s Congress in March 2013 with 2,952 votes for, one against, and three abstentions. Last year the rubber stamp parliament voted unanimously to give him a third term, putting him on track to stay in power for life. North Korea’s leaders have inherited their power from father to son for three generations. They are technically “elected” – but there is no choice. In 2014, Kim Jong Un was elected to the Supreme People’s Assembly without a dissenting vote with 100% turnout. Fellow communist states Laos and Vietnam pursue their own variations of the same Marxist-Leninist party-state model copied from the Soviet Union, with Hanoi avoiding strongman rule in favor of collective leadership. Cambodia has been dominated by the ruling party of Hun Sen, who banned the main opposition parties in the previous two parliamentary elections. Myanmar held a credible multi-party election in November 2020, a vote that delivered a strong majority to the National League for Democracy of de facto national leader Aung San Suu Kyi. But the military didn’t like the results and staged a coup on Feb. 1, 2021. Read more here. Posted at 5:05 p.m. Eastern, 11/5/2024 We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika
Malaysia objects to Vietnam’s South China Sea island building: media
Malaysia has protested over Vietnam’s island building in the South China Sea in a rare negative exchange between the neighbors, Reuters news agency cited Malaysian officials as saying. Late last month, Radio Free Asia reported on Vietnam’s development of an airstrip on Barque Canada reef, an artificial island within the Spratly archipelago that Malaysia also claims. The reef’s landfill area is estimated to have expanded to nearly 2.5 square kilometers (617.7 acres) as of October 2024, more than doubling in a year. Two unidentified officials told Reuters that the Malaysian government sent a letter of complaint to Vietnam’s foreign ministry in early October, before RFA’s report, “but has so far received no reply.” Malaysia and Vietnam are among the six parties that hold overlapping claims in the South China Sea and to its numerous islands and reefs, alongside China, Brunei, the Philippines and Taiwan. The Philippines has said it was “monitoring” Vietnam’s island-building activities but has not officially protested. The recently leaked letter of complaint, if true, could be a rare point of tension as until now Malaysia has only complained about Vietnamese fishermen’s “illegal activities” in Malaysian waters. Kuala Lumpur claims at least 12 features in the Spratlys, including Vietnam-controlled Amboyna Cay and Barque Canada reef, and Philippines-controlled Commodore and Rizal reefs. Malaysia has a physical presence on five features – Swallow, Ardasier, Erica, Mariveles and Investigator reefs – which are also claimed by some other parties. Due to the complexity of those overlapping claims, regional countries generally stay quiet about their neighbors’ island building and instead focus their attention on China, which has reclaimed the most land in the South China Sea and completed the militarization of three large artificial islands. Suspected Vietnamese runway on Barque Canada reef, Oct. 2, 2024. Anwar visits China Malaysia has repeatedly rejected China’s claims in the South China Sea, most recently in 2023 over the latest edition of the Beijing-issued standard map of China, which encompasses areas lying off the coast of Malaysian Borneo. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has reiterated on many occasions that Malaysia would continue to conduct oil and gas exploration in Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea, despite objections from China. Anwar is in China on an official visit from Nov. 4-7, his third in two years, and observers say the trip signals a closer relationship between Malaysia and its big neighbor. “That may explain if there is any recent friction between Malaysia and Vietnam, which has had big issues with China in the South China Sea,” said Viet Hoang, a Vietnamese maritime expert. The Chinese government has not said anything publicly about the reclamation works done by Vietnam but Chinese analysts have warned about the risk of a new flashpoint. RELATED STORIES Vietnam expands strategic capabilities in South China Sea Increased risk of conflict in South China Sea, forum warns East Asia fails to adopt South China Sea statement amid finger pointing Malaysia is the rotating chair of the Southeast Asian grouping ASEAN in 2025 and its support would bolster China’s confidence in disputed waters, Viet said. For its part, “Anwar’s government seems to view China as a significant economic opportunity and is willing to set aside other issues to pursue this opportunity,” said Ian Chong, an associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore. However, if Kuala Lumpur managed to carry on with some oil projects it is mainly thanks to the fact that “they’ve had a longer history of conducting such projects and are physically further away from China,” Chong said. Edited by Mike Firn. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika
EXPLAINED: What is China’s United Front and how does it operate?
Evidence is mounting of clandestine Chinese influence operations in the heart of America. Just in the last few months, a former aide to the governor of New York state and her husband were arrested for alleged illicit activities promoting the interests of China; a Chinese democracy activist was arrested and accused of spying for China; and a historian was convicted of being an agent for Beijing. The three separate cases of former Albany functionary based on expert testimony. United front groups often have innocuous sounding names, like the Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification or the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. Many appear to be ordinary overseas Chinese community organizations, and are found in business and even in multinational corporations. Lurking behind or within them, though, are government or party agencies – very often China’s powerful intelligence, security and secret police agency. “United front groups are used – very specifically – to hide the Ministry of State Security,” said Peter Mattis, head of the non-profit Jamestown Foundation. “This is why I like to think of the United Front Work Department as the tall grass that is sort of deliberately cultivated to hide snakes,” he told RFA. What is the history of China‘s ’united front’ work? Under the Moscow-led Comintern in the 1920s, the Chinese Communist Party adapted Soviet revolutionary Vladimir Lenin’s concept of forming a “united front” – forging temporary alliances with friends and lesser enemies in order to defeat greater enemies. After Mao Zedong’s Communists took power in 1949, united front work focused internally on co-opting Chinese capitalists and intellectuals, who were brought to heel and persecuted in the 1950s under Mao’s vicious ideological campaigns. Supporters await the arrival of Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to Kings Park in Perth, Australia, June 18, 2024. Citizens of Taiwan have for decades been pressured by united front efforts to support unification with the Communist-controlled mainland. The recent imposition of draconian national security legislation in Hong Kong has made citizens and exiles who oppose those authoritarian steps in formerly free Chinese territory targets of united front pressure. These targets are not alone and the list is growing, with Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand also grappling with Chinese influence campaigns that smack of united front work. “There’s no clear distinction between domestic and overseas united front work: all bureaus of the UFWD and all areas of united front work involve overseas activities,” the report from Australia’s ASPI said. “This is because the key distinction underlying the United Front is not between domestic and overseas groups, but between the CCP and everyone else,” it said. The Chinese Embassy in Washington told Radio Free Asia that the United Front’s domestic role is to “promote cooperation between the (Communist Party) and people who are not members of it.” Outreach to the diaspora “helps give full play to their role as a bridge linking China with the rest of the world,” the embassy spokesperson’s office said in an e-mailed statement. “Its work is transparent, above-board and beyond reproach,” it said. “By making an issue out of China’s United Front work, some people are trying to discredit China’s political system and disrupt normal exchange and cooperation between China and the United States.” Additional reporting by Jane Tang of RFA Investigative. Edited by Malcolm Foster. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika
