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Category: Americas
INTERVIEW: Documentary filmmaker re-lives the 2019 Hong Kong protests
A journalist who made a feature-length documentary using on-the-ground footage of the 2019 Hong Kong protests has spoken about the need to face up to the trauma of the months-long movement. The protests, which began as an outpouring of anger over plans to allow the extradition of criminal suspects to face trial in mainland China, were a key milestone in Hong Kong’s transformation from one of the most free-wheeling cities in Asia to the restrictive semi-police state it is today. The filmmaker, who gave only the nickname Alan for fear of reprisals, will screen his film “Rather be Ashes Than Dust” in Canada this month to mark the fifth anniversary of the protest movement this year. Built from thousands of hours of handheld footage from Hong Kong’s streets, much of the action takes place amid pitched street battles between frontline protesters wielding umbrellas, bricks and Molotov cocktails confronting fully-equipped riot police with non-lethal bullets, water cannons and a seemingly inexhaustible supply of tear gas. For Alan, editing his film involved reliving the chaos, terror and heartache of those months, as well as facing up to his own traumatized response. “I knew all of the scenes inside out,” he told RFA Cantonese in a recent interview. “Every location, exactly what happened there — where shots were fired, where people were arrested, where blood was spilled.” PTSD Alan, who like many Hong Kongers has suffered with post-traumatic stress disorder after witnessing so much violence and anguish on Hong Kong’s streets, had to take the edit slowly. “There were some scenes where I really couldn’t stop crying,” he said. “I would cut for maybe one or two minutes, then I wouldn’t be able to carry on.” Only some protesters took on police at the barricades, however. The film also portrays peaceful protesters in their thousands and millions coming out in support of the “Five Demands”: the withdrawal of amendments to extradition laws; fully democratic elections; an amnesty for all arrested protesters; accountability for police brutality and the withdrawal of the use of the word “rioters” to describe them. Hong Kong director “Alan,” whose film “Rather be Ashes Than Dust” premieres in Canada in September 2024. (RFA) While the extradition amendments were withdrawn after crowds of masked activists stormed the Legislative Council on July 1, 2019, the government continued to describe the protests as “riots” instigated by “hostile foreign forces,” and eventually quashed an independent report into police violence. Tens of thousands of people were arrested and packed into overcrowded jails amid reports of abuse in custody, while electoral rules were rewritten to ensure that only “patriotic” candidates loyal to the ruling Chinese Communist Party could stand. Inner conflict At times, Alan found that his role as a supposedly impartial observer was at odds with his desire to help those he was filming. “One time, the police pinned down a couple,” he said of one incident, which happened as protesters occupied the Hong Kong International Airport at Chek Lap Kok. “I was some distance away at the time, but I could see them going after people.” “I really, really wanted to warn them to get out of there fast,” he said. “But I was a coward and kept quiet – I just kept on filming the whole thing.” That decision haunts Alan to this day, leading him to feel that the film could encourage similar “soul-searching” in others. “The couple got arrested in the end,” he said. An image from the trailer from the documentary “Rather Be Ashes Than Dust”. (Doc Edge via Youtube) Later, he was to act as a witness for protesters who were being arrested. “Everyone who got arrested started saying their names and ID card numbers in front of a video camera,” Alan said. “Because there were rumors going around that anyone who got arrested would likely just disappear, never to be heard of again.” “So we recorded all of their images and their voices, as evidence,” he said. Sold-out theaters “Rather be Ashes Than Dust” has already been screened at film festivals in South Korea, New Zealand and Sweden. At the Busan International Film Festival last October, it played to three sold-out theaters that were packed with young Koreans. “Hong Kong’s government is actually quite similar to that of South Korea: there’s a lot of conflict and disputes,” he said. “That atmosphere was the reason why so many young South Koreans came to watch my film.” Alan thinks his film, which is scheduled to screen in Toronto on Sept. 28 and 29, will encourage others to face up to Hong Kong’s recent history, even if the wounds are very far from healed. “It’s been five years now, and regardless of how you see things, I think we have to face up to what happened with courage and fortitude, because it’s our history,” he said. “Then, maybe we can reflect on it, maybe do some soul-searching, ask if we did the right thing, and if it was enough?” Even from exile, the film has a role to play, he believes, adding: “The media should never abandon its duty to speak out on behalf of the powerless, the vulnerable and the oppressed.” Translated by Luisetta Mudie. 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EXPLAINED: The (worrying) popularity of caterpillar fungus
By now the army of scavengers has retreated from the high hillsides of the eastern Tibetan plateau, their bounty in hand. Harvest season for yartsa gunbu (དབྱར་རྩྭ་དགུན་འབུ།), or caterpillar fungus, typically runs from May to July, when winter snows have receded and thousands of rural, ethnic Tibetans can prospect for what’s also known as “soft gold.” It’s hard to overstate the importance these few weeks hold for the people who climb the steep slopes. Collecting caterpillar fungus — which is used to treat a variety of ailments — can account for as much as 90% of a rural family’s annual income. But high demand has spurred overharvesting, making it harder to find the fungus in its natural environment. Climate change poses another challenge. Warmer temperatures on the high plateau are reducing the length of winter, a critical time for yartsa gunbu. Now a new threat is emerging, sources inside China say: artificial varieties designed to fill the gaps between supply and demand, in the form of either cultivated fungi or fake products altogether. Although Chinese authorities have tried to regulate the sale of cultivated fungus, interviews with Tibetans and online videos that attract tens of thousands of viewers say imposters have infiltrated the market. “It will definitely jeopardize the lives of thousands of Tibetan herders and farmers whose income depend on the wild yartsa,” said Lobsang Yeshi, who has practiced traditional Tibetan medicine at Men-Tsee-Khang in Dharamshala, India, for the past 20 years. A local resident pulls out a caterpillar fungus west China’s Qinghai province May 12, 2007. (Simon Zo/Reuters) What is caterpillar fungus and where does it come from? Yartsa gunbu translates to “summer grass, winter bug.” The Ophiocordyceps sinensis – its scientific name – releases spores that sink underground and infect the larvae of ghost moths, so called for the white color of males. The yartsa gunbu takes over, commandeering the caterpillar’s nervous system, consuming its organs and finally, in spring, emerging from its head as a brown stoma at altitudes of greater than 13,000 feet (4,000 meters). Its methods have drawn comparisons to the fungus that stars in the HBO hit zombie series, “The Last of Us.” Harvested intact, it’s about the length of a little finger and shaped like a caterpillar with a stem attached. Yartsa gunbu is found primarily in the Himalaya mountains and the Tibetan plateau. The Yushu Tibetan Autonomous prefecture in Qinghai province, east of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, is a particularly good place to look. Thousands of its residents set up makeshift camps from which they hike into the thin air. The annual harvest is reportedly around 300 million fungi that can cost $7 a pop or more, leaving a multi-billion dollar market. A jar of caterpillar fungus on sale at a herbal medicine shop in Queens, New York, Aug. 23, 2024 (Lobsang Gelek/RFA) What is caterpillar fungus used for? Yartsa gunbu has been used in Tibetan and Chinese traditional medicine to treat heart, liver and lung ailments. More recently, it acquired a reputation for improving sexual stamina in men and women. (“Himalayan Viagra” is another moniker.) Studies have shown possible benefits, though scientists say more clinical research is needed. Users consume yartsa gunbu by brewing it with hot water similar to how tea or herbal infusions are prepared, or chewing it as it comes. Some put it in soups and other recipes. Lesser specimens are ground into powders. Why are people growing a fungus ? Pluckers like to pick the fungus before it releases spores, limiting its ability to reproduce and leading to its population decline. China has encouraged the development of cultivated yartsa gunbu, and one company has reportedly solved the puzzle, synthetically growing the O. sinensis fungus found in the wild. But some individuals are trying to cultivate fungus varieties on their own. That, fungus traders say, has undercut prices and, because the buyer’s remain suspicious of its medicinal properties, consumer confidence, several sources told RFA. In Guangzhou, a major market, “there is a hesitancy of customers in buying because of too much artificial fungus in the market,” one trader said. A Tibetan living in Qinghai province said prices have dropped nearly 20% this year. In New York, a retailer said he can still sell a single piece of wild fungus for $14, but “there are a lot of fake and cultivated yartsa” undercutting the business, he said. “Nowadays, people are selling thousands of artificial yartsa online per day, as well as in shops, jeopardizing the original yartsa business,” he said. Studies have shown that cultivated fungus can replicate the chemical compounds of natural varieties, though there are differences. A local resident displays a few caterpillar fungus, Qinghai province, China, May 12, 2007. (Simon Zo/Reuters) What is China doing to protect the market? Chinese authorities seem to be aware of the financial risks to some of their poorest populations. In April, the Chinese government in Qinghai, tried to control the artificial plantation of yartsa gunbu. But a trader in Nagchu, Tibet Autonomous Region, an area that historically has been among the best for finding wild yartsa gunbu, said enforcement has been lax. “Chinese authorities have come out with a lot of rules saying that the artificial fungus is banned,” the trader said. “But the on-ground reality is that the Chinese authorities are not strictly monitoring or stopping the sale of artificial fungus. And this is making it tough for us to sell the real fungus.” Lobsang from RFA Tibetan contributed to this article. Edited by Jim Snyder and Boer Deng. Check out our reports Author: Investigative Journalism Reportika
Chinese soccer fans bemoan 0-7 loss to Japan as ‘Day of Humiliation’
Read a version of this story in Chinese Chinese netizens reacted with embarrassment and frustration to the men’s national soccer team’s humiliating 0-7 loss to Japan in a World Cup qualifying match, with some calling it a “Day of Humiliation.” “Ah! It’s simply embarrassing to talk about. As a Chinese, I am ashamed,” sports enthusiast Zhao Xiang told Radio Free Asia. “This is practically a joke.” “Why can’t we solve these problems?” he asked. “I don’t think the physique of Chinese people is an issue. Koreans and Japanese are also Asian and they make it to the (World Cup). Why can’t we?” Japan is one of Asia’s strongest teams, competing in every World Cup since 1998. Meanwhile, China has only managed to qualify once, in 2002 – so getting beaten isn’t terribly surprising. But losing by such a lopsided score in Thursday’s match in Saitama, north of Tokyo, was hard for many Chinese fans to swallow. Japan’s Takumi Minamino fights for the ball with China’s defender Liu Yang during their World Cup qualifying match in Saitama, Sept. 5, 2024. (Yuichi Yamazaki/AFP) Despite its relative lack of success in the world’s premier tournament, China is a soccer-crazed nation. President Xi Jinping, a fan himself, once expressed his hope for China to host and even win the men’s World Cup one day. “Sept. 5 is a day of humiliation for Chinese soccer,” said an online media outlet run by the government of Shandong province. Chinese citizens have a complex relationship with Japan, owing to the troubled history between the two nations, which fought major wars against each other during the 20th century and found themselves aligned on opposite sides of the Cold War. EXPLORE OUR WORLD CUP QUALIFIER COVERAGE North Korea falls 0-1 to Uzbekistan to start 3rd round of World Cup Asian qualifiers Asian qualifier outlook round 3: North Korea Podcast: RFA Insider EP10 (Timecode 17:32) While thousands of Chinese tourists have flocking to Japan each year, Chinese social media regularly erupts in Japan-bashing sentiment, such as when Japan released wastewater from the crippled Fukushima nuclear power plant last year into the ocean, sparking fears about tainted seafood. ‘Real gap’ It was the worst loss for China’s men’s team since 2012, when the team suffered a 0-8 shellacking to perennial world powerhouse Brazil. The Chinese women’s national soccer team has performed much better, competing in eight World Cups, with the 1999 team finishing 2nd in that year’s tournament. The women’s team is ranked 18th in the world, while the men’s team is ranked 87th. Zhang Yuning, a former player of the Chinese team, said the match “demonstrates the real gap between Chinese and Japanese football.” “It is ultimately reflected in the score, which demonstrates the difference between Chinese and Japanese football,” he said. China’s Fernandinho, Alan, Dalei Wang and teammates after their 0-7 World Cup qualifier loss to Japan in Saitama, Sept. 5, 2024. (Issei Kato/Reuters) He said the Chinese team should acknowledge the gap and try to perform better in the upcoming matches. According to Chinese media reports, Fan Zhiyi, another former national player, also criticized the home team by stating that the loss to a powerful team like Japan was understandable, but it was terrible that Japan was allowed to score so easily. “If it weren’t so far from here, I would have really jumped into the Huangpu river,” Fan said, referring to Shanghai’s main waterway, in a widely circulated video. “How many football association presidents have we had? Has anything changed? It’s just changing the syrup without replacing the prescription!” Competing for spots Thursday’s match was the start of the third round of China and Japan’s world cup qualifying campaign, and they are competing with 16 other Asian teams for spots in the 2026 FIFA World Cup, which will be hosted jointly by Canada, Mexico and the United States. Wataru Endo opened up the scoring for Japan in the 12th minute, and China managed to keep the Japanese out of the goal for the rest of the first half until the second minute past regulation, when Kaoru Mitoma found the back of the net. Goals rained down on China in the second half, with Takumi Minamoto scoring in the 52nd and 58th minutes, followed by Junya Ito at 77, Daizen Maeda at 87, and Takefusa Kubo at 5 minutes past regulation. China’s head coach Branko Ivankovic on the sidelines during the World Cup qualifying round football match between Japan and China in Saitama, Sept. 5, 2024. (Yuichi Yamazaki/AFP) Many fans on social media blamed the loss on China’s new manager, Croatian Branko Ivankovic, who was handed the reins in February, but others clapped back. “Stop blaming the head coach and demanding for his resignation after the game,” netizens said. “It doesn’t matter who the coach is. … (we should) just withdraw from the competition. … We can’t afford the embarrassment.” Others suggested that China withdraw from international soccer altogether. With the defeat, China sits at the bottom of the Group C standings, and will look to regain its footing on Tuesday vs Saudi Arabia in Dalian. Also in Group C, Bahrain upset Australia 1-0 and Saudi Arabia and Indonesia played to a 1-1 draw. Meanwhile, in Group B, Palestine turned heads earning a scoreless draw against heavily favored South Korea, and in Group A, North Korea lost to Uzbekistan 0-1. Translated by Li Yaqian. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.
Cambodian civil servant caught up in dragnet is brother of government critic
Read RFA coverage of this story in Khmer. As a Cambodian civil servant, Hay Vannith’s only apparent wrongdoing was being related to an ardent critic of Hun Sen. But even that was enough to get him arrested at a busy border crossing last month as he attempted to flee into Thailand. Three weeks later, the 28-year-old Ministry of Health official remains in detention at Prey Sar prison in Phnom Penh. He is one of nine still being held following a crackdown in August aimed at critics of a decades-old regional economic cooperation agreement with Laos and Vietnam. Hay Vannith and the eight others are accused of plotting to overthrow the government and can expect to be prosecuted, Prime Minister Hun Manet – the son of long-time leader Hun Sen, who is now Senate president – said Thursday at a graduation ceremony for law students and trainees in Phnom Penh. All told, Hun Manet announced that 66 people were arrested last month ahead of planned – but never carried out – protests against the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Triangle Development Area, or CLV. All but the nine were released. Cambodian scholar Hay Vannith is seen in a screen grab of a Zoom call posted on social media. (VOA) But friends say Hay Vannith has not been involved in political activism – unlike his brother Hay Vanna, an opposition figure who lives in Japan. “From what I have known and shared with him for almost a decade, he has nothing to do with politics, and has no political interest or rivalry against the current government,” said Chiva Sum, a former classmate of Hay Vannith’s at the Royal University of Phnom Penh. “These allegations are falsified in a political manner,” he said. ‘Unlawfully detained’ A joint statement from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch last week criticized the mass arrests, saying that activists and others were “unlawfully detained and charged for peacefully expressing their views.” The 1999 CLV agreement was aimed at encouraging economic development and trade between Cambodia’s four northeastern provinces and neighboring provinces in Laos and Vietnam. Debate over the deal has resurfaced over the last several months, with some activists expressing concerns that it could cause Cambodia to lose territory or control of its natural resources to Vietnam, mostly through the use of land concessions to private investors. The prospect of losing sovereignty or land to Vietnam is a politically sensitive issue in Cambodia, with opposition politicians often using anti-Vietnamese rhetoric. Overseas Cambodian activists organized protests on Aug. 11 against the CLV in South Korea, Japan, Canada and Australia. One of them was Hay Vanna. Hay Vannith and other relatives of Hay Vanna had been worried about their safety since July 23, when Senate President Hun Sen gave an angry speech on state-run television that specifically threatened the activist’s family. Cambodian scholar Hay Vannith is seen in a booking photograph following his Aug. 16, 2024, arrest in Phnom Penh. (Confidential source) “This person by the name of Hay Vanna, who lives in Japan, commented on the so-called ceasing of the four Cambodian provinces to others,” Hun Sen said. “But you shouldn’t be confused – you have family members here in Cambodia,” he said. “And they who are living here, must not be arrogant. After hearing his message … you must stop, or else.” Tense political environment Hay Vannith was born in Kampong Cham province, the fourth child in a well-to-do family. After earning his bachelor’s degree in biological engineering, he studied at Kansas State University in the United States on a Fulbright scholarship. He earned a master’s degree in food science in 2023, and returned to Cambodia to work at the Ministry of Health’s National Institutes of Public Health. At first, Hay Vannith didn’t consider leaving Cambodia in response to Hun Sen’s threats, according to Chiva Sum, who lives in Japan. He was focused on his work at the ministry, engrossed in his pursuit of scientific knowledge and wanted to continue preparing for a return to the United States for doctoral studies. Also, he believed he would be overlooked by authorities amid the tense political environment due to his lack of interest and involvement in national affairs, his longtime friend said. RELATED STORIES Cambodian political activist’s brother arrested at Thai border crossing Cambodia arrests 30 amid warnings over anti-CLV demonstrations Hun Sen warns of more arrests related to Vietnam-Laos cooperation deal But by mid-August, a heavy police and military presence could be seen in every major city and along highways, where authorities set up checkpoints and began making arrests in an effort to prevent the protests, which had been planned for Aug. 18 throughout Cambodia. Other family members successfully made it out of Cambodia on Aug. 5, according to Hay Vanna. Eleven days later, Hay Vannith was arrested at the Poipet border crossing in northwestern Cambodia. Authorities didn’t confirm his whereabouts for four more days. A day later, on Aug. 21, a recorded confession was posted on the government spokesperson’s Facebook page. In the audio clip, Hay Vannith said that his brother instructed him “to carry out a plan to mobilize the people with an intent to overthrow the government and absolutely oppose the CLV through the means of sharing on Facebook and Telegram.” Authorities have also distributed a typed confession signed with Hay Vannith’s thumbprint. Legal observer Son Chumchoun told Radio Free Asia that prosecutors will have to show other evidence that supports the confession. Coerced statements go against the principle of the rule of law – even if the accused has signed with a thumbprint, he said. Unlike other previous cases, where detainees in political cases were released after they acknowledged their wrongdoing, the authorities haven’t released Hay Vannith, Son Chumchoun said. RFA hasn’t been able to reach the Ministry of Health for comment on the arrest. Translated by Sum Sok Ry. Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster.
EXPLAINED: Why is Taiwan called ‘Chinese Taipei’ at sports events?
If you’re watching the Paris 2024 Paralympic Games and wondering what or where “Chinese Taipei” is, you’re not alone. More than 10 athletes from Taiwan are competing in the games, but they aren’t being introduced as coming from Taiwan. Instead, they are represented as being from “Chinese Taipei.” This isn’t just the case at the Paralympics or Olympics – it happens at all major international sporting events. Taiwan’s athletes are not allowed to compete under the Taiwanese flag. Here is why. What is ‘Chinese Taipei’? “Chinese Taipei” is the name Taiwan agreed upon with the International Olympic Committee, or IOC, in 1981 to participate in the Olympic Games. Instead of Taiwan’s red and blue flag, Taiwanese athletes compete under the “Plum Blossom Banner,” a white flag that carries the Olympic rings. A traditional flag-raising song, not Taiwan’s national anthem, is played when its athletes are on the podium. This allows Taiwan to compete without presenting itself as a sovereign nation. The Badminton Men’s Doubles Gold Medal Match at the Paris 2024 Olympics, Paris, France, Aug. 04, 2024. Supporters can be seen holding Chinese and Chinese Taipei Olympic flags during the gold medal match. (Ann Wang/Reuters) Why not ‘Taiwan’? Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is not diplomatically recognized by most countries despite being a self-ruled democracy of 23 million people with its own borders, currency and government. This dates back to 1949, when Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China disagreed over which government was the rightful “China.” After the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, the Nationalist government fled to Taiwan, while Mao Zedong’s communist forces established the People’s Republic of China on the mainland. According to Beijing’s communist leadership, there is only “One China,” meaning Taiwan is considered part of it and must eventually be reunified with the mainland, by force if necessary. In Beijing’s view, as a breakaway province, Taiwan does not have the right to state-to-state relations or to be treated as a state on the international stage. As part of its efforts to isolate Taiwan, Beijing prevents the island from using the name “Taiwan” in international events. Why ‘Chinese Taipei’? The dispute over Taiwan’s name at international sports events began in 1952 when both Taiwan and China were invited to the Olympics. At that time, both governments claimed to represent China, leading Taiwan to withdraw from the Games. In 1956, Taiwan participated under the name “Formosa-China,” but Beijing boycotted those Games and withdrew from the IOC two years later. During the 1960s, Taiwan competed under the name “Taiwan” at the request of the IOC. However, Taiwan’s government at the time objected, insisting on being called the Republic of China, or ROC. By the 1970s, more countries were diplomatically recognizing Beijing instead of Taiwan. In 1972, Taiwan participated in the Olympics as the ROC for the last time. Taiwan then boycotted the 1976 Games after host country Canada insisted it compete under the name Taiwan rather than ROC. In 1979, Taiwan was suspended from the Olympics after the IOC recognized Beijing as the representative for China. Two years later, Taiwan was allowed back into the Games after agreeing to compete under the name “Chinese Taipei,” which it has used ever since. A flag bearer holding the flag to represent Taiwan enters the stadium for the closing ceremony of the 19th Asian Games in Hangzhou, China, Sunday, Oct. 8, 2023. (AP/Eugene Hoshiko) Back to Taipei? There are now growing calls to use the name Taiwan at the Games once again as relations between Taiwan and China are at a low point. The Formosan Association for Public Affairs, U.S.-based nonprofit organization that seeks to build worldwide support for Taiwan independence, urged the IOC in early August to allow Taiwan’s team to compete under the name “Taiwan” rather than “Chinese Taipei”. “Taiwan is an independent, sovereign country, and this is a long-established ‘status quo’,” the association’s president said in a statement, adding that Taiwan’s Olympic team was “fully entitled to compete proudly under the name ‘Taiwan’.” A referendum on whether “Chinese Taipei” should be changed was held in Taiwan in 2018, although “Taiwan” lost, partly because top athletes opposed the change, fearful of being banned from major sports events. China has dialed up diplomatic and economic pressure on the island since former president Tsai Ing-wen’s administration came to power in 2016, as Tsai and her party refused to acknowledge that Taiwan and the mainland belonged to “One China.” President of Taiwan, Lai Ching-te, who came to power after winning a January election despite Beijing’s fierce opposition to his bid, ran on a platform of promoting peace in the Taiwan Strait while not compromising on claims of Taiwanese sovereignty. Edited by Mike Firn.
Hong Kongers march in London to mark subway station police attacks
Read RFA coverage of this story in Mandarin from London and Canada Hundreds of Hong Kongers gathered in London over the weekend to mark the fifth anniversary of 2019 attacks by riot police on unarmed train passengers with baton’s and tear gas in Prince Edward subway station. Around 500 people gathered in London’s Trafalgar Square on Saturday, raising the colonial-era flag of British Hong Kong and singing the banned protest anthem “Glory to Hong Kong,” before lowering the flag to half-mast to mourn those who died during the months-long protests against Hong Kong’s vanishing autonomy under Chinese rule. The protesters then marched to the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in London, shouting “Hong Kong is not China!” and “One Hong Kong, one nation!” and handing out information leaflets about the attacks to passers-by. Police were present at the march, and while the demonstration drew stares from some people around Chinese-owned businesses as the march passed through Chinatown, there was no physical or verbal altercation. Details of the attacks by riot police at the height of the 2019 protest movement remain shrouded in secrecy. Journalists and activists are having difficulty piecing together a coherent picture of what exactly happened in the station as much of the evidence remains in the hands of the authorities. While police and government officials have hit out at ‘malicious rumors’ that someone died, the selective release of stills from surveillance footage from cameras inside the station has done little to assuage public mistrust in the official narrative. Call for investigation A woman who gave only the surname Wong for fear of reprisals said she has been living in the U.K. for three years now, and has attended every rally marking the Aug. 31, 2019, attacks. Wong said the attacks were one of the most iconic events in the entire anti-extradition movement, adding that she “can’t accept” that the Hong Kong police charged into a subway station and “indiscriminately attacked” people. She said the government has yet to fully investigate the incident, and called for the truth about what happened in the subway station to be made public. Passers-by view an art exhibit about the 2019 Hong Kong protests in Vancouver, Aug. 31, 2024. (RFA/Liu Fei) The parents of a 6-year-old marcher told RFA Mandarin that they had “mixed feelings” about being allowed to hold peaceful demonstrations in the United Kingdom after moving to the country in June. They said they felt an obligation to tell people in Britain about how their freedoms were built on the sacrifices of others, and that Hong Kongers had been forced to emigrate to the U.K. by the ongoing political crackdown in their home city. In Canada, around 40 protesters gathered outside the Chinese Consulate in Calgary, burning photos of Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee and security chief Chris Tang, who was chief of police at the time of the protest movement, when rights groups hit out at the use of “excessive force” by the authorities. 39 minutes Public anger against the police treatment of protesters began with the intense tear-gassing of unarmed crowds who had no escape route at the start of the anti-extradition protests. It gained momentum when officers took 39 minutes to respond to hundreds of emergency calls when unidentified mobsters in white T-shirts attacked passengers and passers-by at Yuen Long MTR on July 21, 2019. And it took on a much darker turn following the bloody attacks on train passengers, after which the MTR refused to release video footage from trains and platforms despite persistent rumors that at least one person died in the attacks. Photos of Lee’s second-in-command Eric Chan and Secretary for Justice Paul Lam were also burned. Protest organizer Paul Cheng, who organized the protest, called them Hong Kong’s “Gang of Four,” and called on the Canadian government to sanction them. “They helped the Communist Party destroy Hong Kong and kill Hong Kong,” Cheng told RFA Mandarin at the protest. “They are the Communist Party’s running dogs. The Communist Party is the culprit in the killing of Hong Kong, and they are its accomplices.” Cheng, who emigrated to Canada more than 40 years ago, says he remembers the freedoms once enjoyed by the city’s 7 million residents, adding that things are very different now. First sedition conviction Last Thursday, a Hong Kong court found two editors of the now-defunct Stand News guilty of conspiring to publish seditious material, marking the first sedition conviction against any journalist since Hong Kong’s handover from Britain to China in 1997. The publication’s former editor-in-chief, Chung Pui-kuen, and former acting editor-in-chief, Patrick Lam, could face a maximum prison term of two years under colonial-era sedition laws. A former Hong Kong journalist who gave only the nickname Stephen for fear of reprisals said he used to work as a journalist in the city, and was particularly saddened by those convictions. “All Hong Kong media have the same tone now,” he said. “There’s no opposing voices, just a unified message.” Meanwhile, Vancouver-based activist Christine described physical and mental “torment” after leaving the city she once called home. “I can’t let it go, to be honest,” she said. “It’s not easy. But fortunately, there is a group of us with the same aspirations, so we can use that discomfort as motivation.” “So we come out on days that need to be commemorated, which is better than pretending I’ve forgotten about it,” she said. Translated by Luisetta Mudie. Edited by Malcolm Foster.
Taiwan’s chips industry ‘key reason’ for world to protect island: Lai
UPDATED Sep. 2, 2024, 02:07 ET. Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te said the island can take advantage of its semiconductor industry not only to promote the development of the economy but also as a key reason for the world to protect the island. Commenting on a rumor circulating in the U.S. that Taiwan’s semiconductor industry could be the very reason for China to decide to attack Taiwan, Lai said he would try his best to protect the island’s security. “Since TSMC’s operating system is very complex, not any group of people could just take it and continue to operate it,” he said during a televised interview on Sunday. TSMC, or Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, is a Taiwanese multinational semiconductor contract manufacturing and design company. In the first quarter of 2024, TSMC recorded a market share of 61.7% in the global semiconductor foundry market, while its closest competitor, South Korea’s Samsung, occupied 11%. Since controlling semiconductor production and distribution can reshape global economics and trade as well as establish a new technological order, Taiwan’s semiconductor industry has become crucial in the strategic competition between the U.S. and China. Lai said the purpose of any Chinese invasion of Taiwan would not be about acquiring more territory, but rather about the desire to change the “rules-based world order” in order to achieve hegemony. Counting on the international community’s support for Taiwan, the Taiwanese President said the Taiwan Strait issue was “not only a Taiwan-China issue, but also an Indo-Pacific issue, and even a world issue”. This echoes remarks made last month when Lai urged the world’s democratic countries to come together and act to prevent China from expanding authoritarianism. “China has even weaponized trade. Using various pressures and threats, it’s politically manipulating not just Taiwan, but also Japan, Korea, Australia, Lithuania, Canada, and other countries,” said Lai last month. RELATED NEWS China’s ‘growing authoritarianism’ won’t stop with Taiwan: Lai Ching-te China says it ‘destroyed large network’ of Taiwanese spies Taiwan proposes biggest ever defense spending of US$19.7 billion China regards Taiwan as a renegade province that should be reunited with the mainland, by force if necessary. The democratic island has been self-governing since it effectively separated from mainland China in 1949 after the Chinese civil war. Regarding a rumor about his visit to the U.S., Lai said during the Sunday interview that he had no plans to do so, stressing that there were already “very good” channels of communication between Taiwan and the U.S. Edited by Mike Firn. This story has been updated to clarify a translation of Lai’s remarks.
How secure is Hun Manet’s year-old premiership in Cambodia?
On Aug. 22, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet marked his first anniversary in office by personally receiving dozens of Khmer artifacts returned to Cambodia by the United States. The ceremony at his Peace Palace was dripping with symbolism. “Why did these Khmer statues leave Cambodia? Because we were divided,” he declared. “However, now, their return symbolizes our reunion. On the first anniversary of [his government], we have maintained stability, peace, and prosperity for the people. Today, we celebrate as a unified nation, free from war and division.” However, just a week earlier, the Cambodian Interior Ministry had ordered police to tighten security around Phnom Penh, instructing provincial leaders to do the same, citing a group allegedly plotting a Bangladesh-inspired “color revolution.” There is unease in the country over tensions with neighboring Vietnam over the Funan Techo Canal, the Hun dynasty’s legacy project, which could threaten Vietnam’s rice-growing heartlands. In this photo released by Agence Kampuchea Press (AKP), Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet, front, prays before a statue with Culture and Fine Arts Phoeurng Sackona, right, during a ceremony for the return of artifacts in Peace Palace in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Thursday, Aug. 22, 2024. (AKP via AP) The public is also concerned about the implications of the Development Triangle Area, an old agreement involving Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam that has become a new point of contention in anti-Cambodian People’s Party circles. Despite the government’s efforts to frame this as a purely economic zone, old prejudices persist, with some Cambodians viewing Hun Manet’s government as unpatriotic, much like they did his father’s. Hun Sen, who ruled from 1985 until he handed power to his son last year, was often accused of being a puppet of Vietnam and later China, accused of selling off Cambodian land to the highest foreign bidder. On the surface, despite concerns about the recent Bangladesh revolt, Hun Manet and his family appear secure. They control almost every significant political and social institution, and the economy continues to provide jobs and food for the people. Hun Sen meticulously planned last year’s transition, implementing a “generational succession” in which key political and civil service families passed power down to their sons or relatives. Shrewd transition strategy This strategy was shrewd, as many authoritarian governments have succumbed to fratricide during leadership transitions. By allowing the political families that matter to keep their patronage and corruption networks, no one lost wealth or influence, thus ensuring stability during the changeover. The Hun family remains first among equals, the ruling house within Cambodia’s political aristocracy. They control nearly every important institution except two: the navy, run by the Tea family, and the national police, overseen by the Sar family. Hun Sen secured the presidency of the Cambodian Senate earlier this year, making him the acting head of state – a position that grants him the institutional power to intervene if his son’s government faces a crisis. To further consolidate power, he enacted constitutional amendments last year to weaken the National Assembly and appointed a loyalist, Khuon Sudary, as its president. Additionally, he installed a family ally as army chief, succeeding Hun Manet, while another son, Hun Manith, heads military intelligence and now serves as deputy army chief. People carry small Cambodia national flags and banners during the groundbreaking ceremony of the Funan Techo Canal in Kandal province, Aug. 5, 2024. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) Another son, Hun Many, who leads the country’s largest youth movement, was appointed minister of the Civil Service last year, ensuring the Hun family’s control over the bureaucracy. Hun Sen intends to remain CPP president for life, with Hun Manet running the party’s youth wing. Hun Sen has also brought the rowdy but powerful business tycoons into line through the Cambodia Oknha Association he formed last year and presides over. The monarchy, while independent, lacks political interest, with King Norodom Sihamoni staying out of politics and the Queen Mother, the power behind the throne, now 88 years old. Moreover, Hun Sen, Hun Manet, and their allies dominate the Royal Council of the Throne, the body responsible for selecting the next king. In this feudal-like political system, the Hun family has appeased other influential families by allowing them to keep their patronage networks while consolidating its power across almost every key institution. Ordinary Cambodians’ concerns No family from this First Estate can rival the Huns. They also enjoy the support of the economic barons, the oknhas, and other business elites who finance the political aristocracy. That leaves the Third Estate, the ordinary Cambodians. Hun Sen needed to rig last year’s general elections—and the two prior—to secure his son’s ascent to power. Repression has persisted under Hun Manet’s rule. The opposition has been neutralized, and civil society has been either silenced or co-opted. Hun Manet’s government has successfully distributed patronage to the middle classes, whose loyalty might have shifted toward a political alternative, if one was ever to exist again. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet (C, front) cuts the ribbon at the launching event of the Kampot Multipurpose Port in Kampot province, Cambodia, June 6, 2024. (Ly Lay/Xinhua via Getty Images) The government continues to deliver basic needs. While the recent revolution in Bangladesh alarmed the Hun family, Cambodia does not face similar conditions. The country’s garment industry, which many expected to collapse during the COVID-19 pandemic, has instead rebounded and is once again driving economic growth. Cambodia’s tourism industry has also recovered in terms of visitor numbers, though revenue remains about two-thirds of pre-2020 levels. There has been progress in the tech and service sectors, though the construction industry and related sectors, like brickmaking, have declined. Typically, young women worked in garment factories while young men found jobs on construction sites, so the loss of construction jobs could have posed a threat to the government. However, many young men have returned to agriculture, which is thriving, especially with increased exports to China. Read more RFA commentaries COMMENTARY: Cambodia’s Hun Dynasty stakes reputation on the Funan Techo Canal COMMENTARY: Elite power…
Propaganda Network of YouTube Influencers
China’s strategic use of influencer-based YouTube channels has become a crucial element in its soft power propaganda network, particularly in shaping global perceptions of China and countering Western narratives. These influencers, many of whom are expatriates or foreign residents in China, utilize their platforms to promote themes such as the alleged falsehoods spread by Western media, the superiority of China’s infrastructure, technology, and safety over that of the United States and their home countries, and the notion that China is always on the right side of geopolitical conflicts. A sample of the most prominent channels reveals the extensive reach and influence these platforms hold. For instance, channels like Jabiertzo with 845K subscribers and Daniel Dumbrill with 167K subscribers, frequently address topics such as the situation in Xinjiang, presenting narratives that counter reports on human rights issues. Similarly, Nathan Rich with 490K subscribers and Cyrus Janssen with 661K subscribers often highlight China’s advancements in technology and infrastructure, portraying China as a superior alternative to the United States. In total, the combined reach of these most prominent channels accounted for in this report amounts to 5.33 million subscribers, with a staggering 10,577 videos that have collectively garnered over 1.05 billion views. This extensive content library is used to disseminate China’s narrative on various global issues, reinforcing the idea that China’s approach is not only legitimate but preferable to Western models. Channels like Living in China and Niranjan China, with subscriber counts of 460K and 814K respectively, contribute to the portrayal of China as a safe, prosperous, and culturally rich society, often contrasting it with perceived notions. Channel Name Subscribers Videos Views Country Alex from Xinjiang 44.1K 70 7,204,566 Hong Kong Numuves 84K 392 15,687,017 China Daniel Dumbrill 167K 266 13,473,874 Hong Kong FerMuBe 41.2K 693 3,585,459 United States Jabiertzo 845K 915 218,626,212 Spain Asia Hot Topics 19.7K 97 2,650,695 United States Cross Pacific Confrontation 623 33 75,992 N/A VOC: Vision of China 4.47K 119 994,783 Canada Nathan Rich 490K 233 36,895,956 United States Noel Lee 31.2K 144 2,886,782 N/A Living in China 460K 320 57,661,697 United Kingdom Niranjan China 814K 575 125,939,595 India China Content Center 607K 4,069 210,156,033 United States BeeRose in China 18.4K 29 860,928 United States TripBitten 78.1K 224 7,788,812 United States Part Time Traveller – China 25.6K 553 3,760,153 India Cyrus Janssen 661K 411 119,111,974 United States Barrett 376K 601 52,129,466 United Kingdom Harvey in China 24K 133 2,336,921 United Kingdom Fel Thommy 263K 399 85,110,680 United States Reporterfy Media & Travel 211K 302 29,413,718 United Kingdom 5,333.73K 10,577 1,056,299,162 Statistics of some of the popular Chinese Propaganda YouTube Channels The strategic deployment of these influencer-led channels is a sophisticated tool in China’s Soft Power Propaganda Network, allowing the country to shape international discourse and influence global public opinion in favor of its geopolitical stance. Through engaging, relatable content that appeals to both Western and non-Western audiences, these YouTube channels effectively support China’s broader propaganda objectives, reinforcing its narrative of being a global leader in technology, governance, and social stability. Country Number of YouTube Users (in millions) as of April 2024 India 476 United States 238 Brazil 147 Indonesia 139 Mexico 84.2 Japan 79.4 Pakistan 66.1 Germany 65.7 Vietnam 63 Philippines 58.1 Turkey 58.1 UK 55.7 France 50.2 Egypt 48.1 Thailand 44.2 Number of YouTube Users (in millions) as of April 2024 Despite China being the world’s most populous country after India, it is notably absent from the list of leading YouTube audiences as of April 2024. This absence is primarily due to the Chinese government’s long-standing restrictions on YouTube, which has been blocked in the country since 2009. Consequently, the platform is inaccessible to the vast majority of China’s population, leading to a significant gap in its user base despite the country’s vast potential audience. Interestingly, this gap has given rise to a unique phenomenon where many foreign YouTubers, residing and working in China, create content that caters primarily to international viewers, particularly those in countries where YouTube remains highly popular. These content creators often focus on showcasing various aspects of Chinese culture, travel, and daily life, which aligns with the growing global interest in China. However, their content frequently extends beyond mere cultural exchange, becoming a vehicle for soft power and state-sponsored propaganda. These YouTube channels and vlogs are often subtly or overtly linked to the Chinese state, either through direct support or indirect influence. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leverages these influencers to build and promote narratives that align with its geopolitical objectives and desired international image. By presenting an idealized version of China, these influencers contribute to shaping global perceptions in a way that supports the CCP’s strategic interests. This content often portrays China as a modern, harmonious, and prosperous nation, glossing over or omitting discussions of controversial issues such as human rights, censorship, or political repression. Furthermore, these influencers may receive preferential treatment, easier access to restricted locations, and other incentives that are not available to independent journalists or content creators critical of the Chinese government. In this way, the CCP effectively utilizes foreign YouTubers as part of a broader soft power strategy, disseminating state-approved narratives to a global audience, while circumventing the direct use of traditional state media channels. This influencer-driven content plays a crucial role in the CCP’s efforts to build a favorable narrative about China on the global stage, leveraging the reach and appeal of YouTube to influence public opinion, even in the absence of direct access to the platform within China itself. Following some of the prominent YouTube channels indulged in Chinese Propaganda: Channel: Living in China Key Propaganda Themes: Channel: Niranjan China Key Propaganda Themes: Read the entire report for a comprehensive understanding of the Influencer Network: Link Niranjan’s content across these platforms consistently promotes a narrative of China’s advancements, quality of life, and rapid development, often contrasting these aspects with India and other countries to highlight China’s superiority. Channel: China Content Center Key Propaganda Themes: China Content Center consistently promotes narratives that emphasize China’s economic and…
Soft Power Propaganda Network of Chinese Cinema
Chinese cinema serves as a potent tool for extending Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda, promoting narratives that align with the party’s vision across various genres. Here are some examples of best Chinese propaganda movies: The Founding of a Republic (2009) This series dramatizes the events leading to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. It highlights Mao Zedong’s leadership and the CCP’s victory over the Nationalists, emphasizing the legitimacy of the current regime. The Founding of a Republic dramatizes the events leading to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, presenting the rise of the Chinese Communist Party as a heroic and inevitable triumph. The film seeks to highlight the historical struggle for democracy but offers a revisionist theme, framing the CCP’s ascent as a natural and just outcome of the nation’s history. Despite this, the film has been critiqued for being more of a historical romp rather than a disciplined treatment of the subject, as noted by G and M.E. Davies. The former editor of the Southern Weekend, Chiang Ping, remarked that the film underscores the limits of the contemporary Party-guided commercial repackaging of Chinese history. The impact of the film was significant enough that Douban, a Chinese film rating site, eventually disabled the rating feature for it and the other films in the trilogy. In response to some international reactions, co-director Huang Jianxin defended the film, stating, it’s unfair to describe The Founding of a Republic as propaganda since modern Chinese audiences are too sophisticated to swallow a simplistic rendering of history. International Reach: The movie has been strategically showcased at various international film festivals and cultural events as part of China’s broader propaganda efforts to influence foreign audiences. Notably, the film earned significant revenue internationally, grossing $1,035,741 worldwide, with substantial earnings in Hong Kong, New Zealand, and Thailand. It was prominently featured at the Chinese Film Festival in Pakistan, held at the Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA), among other global venues. Additionally, the film is available on Amazon Prime in select locations and YouTube with English subtitles/audio, where it has garnered over 260,000 views since August 30, 2021. Despite YouTube being banned in China, this substantial viewership from international audiences underscores the attempts to project the state-sanctioned narratives beyond China’s borders The Founding of a Party It is a Chinese propaganda film released in 2011 to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The film was produced by the state-owned China Film Group and aims to depict the early formation of the CCP. Starting with the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and concluding with the Party’s founding congress in 1921, the film portrays the struggle and rise of the CCP as a response to the socio-political challenges of the time. While the film attempts to present a narrative of ideological commitment and revolutionary fervor, it is widely recognized as a state-sponsored effort to reinforce the legitimacy and historical significance of the CCP. The film’s romanticized portrayal of figures like a young Mao Zedong aligns with its propagandistic goals, aiming to evoke patriotic sentiments and support for the Party among its domestic audience. International Reach: “The Founding of a Party,” internationally released as “Beginning of the Great Revival,” exemplifies China’s use of cinema as a propaganda tool to shape foreign perceptions of the Chinese Communist Party’s history. Unlike its prequel, “The Founding of a Republic,” this film was dubbed in multiple languages, including Japanese, French, Russian, and English, to ensure a broader international reach. Screened in over 10 countries, including the U.S., Canada, and Australia, it grossed $58,320,429 worldwide. The film was strategically promoted to international audiences, featured at the China Image Film Festival in Europe, where it received The Committee Special Awards. Its multilingual availability and different international cut underscore China’s efforts to influence global audiences more effectively than its predecessor, projecting a state-approved narrative through carefully curated cinematic experiences. The Founding of an Army (2017) It is the third installment in what can be humorously dubbed the People’s Republic of China Cinematic Universe (PRCCU), following The Founding of a Party and The Founding of a Republic. Directed by Andrew Lau and backed by an astonishing forty-six credited producers, the film is a state-sanctioned, star-studded epic commemorating the 90th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army. Despite its attempts to attract a younger audience by featuring teen idols, the film remains largely a propaganda piece, with a polished narrative that highlights Mao Zedong’s leadership while portraying Chiang Kai-shek as a short-sighted antagonist. The film does include two notable battle scenes that add to its visual appeal, though overall, it continues the trend of its predecessors in presenting a highly stylized and idealized version of history. International Reach: Unlike its predecessors, this film was strategically released in Southeast Asia, targeting audiences in Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and Estonia before being showcased at the ASEAN international film exhibit. Grossing $60,600,361 worldwide, the film serves as a vehicle for the Chinese government to project its narrative beyond its borders. “The Founding of an Army” underscores China’s ongoing efforts to shape foreign perceptions of its military history and bolster its soft power in strategically important areas. Wolf Warrior (2015) and Wolf Warrior 2 (2017) The Wolf Warrior series, comprising Wolf Warrior (2015) and Wolf Warrior 2 (2017), exemplifies Chinese cinema’s role in advancing CCP propaganda. These films follow Leng Feng, a Chinese special forces operative, as he battles foreign mercenaries who threaten China’s sovereignty and global interests. Wolf Warrior emphasizes the discipline and heroism of the Chinese military, contrasting it with the ruthless, morally corrupt foreign adversaries, thereby promoting a narrative of national pride and military strength. International Reach: “Wolf Warrior” (2015) was strategically marketed and released on a large scale for international audiences. The film is available on prominent streaming platforms like Apple TV, Amazon Prime, Peacock Premium, and many others, ensuring widespread accessibility. Released in both Mandarin and English, it grossed a substantial $81,411,331 worldwide,…
