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Dalai Lama marks 89th birthday, allays concerns about his health

Editor3 weeks ago010 mins

In a video released Saturday on his 89th birthday, the Dalai Lama said he was recovering from his recent knee replacement surgery, felt “physically fit” and thanked Tibetans around the world for praying for him. “I am nearly 90 now, except for the issues with my knee, I am basically in good health,” the Tibetan spiritual leader said in the five-minute video, his first public statement since undergoing successful knee surgery on June 28 at a top New York City hospital. “Despite the surgery, I feel physically fit,” the Dalai Lama said, allaying concerns about his overall health. “So, I wish to ask you to be happy and relaxed.” “Today, Tibetans inside and outside of Tibet are celebrating my birthday with much joy and festivity,” he said, speaking in Tibetan. “I would like to thank all my fellow Tibetans, inside and outside Tibet, for your prayers on my birthday.” Several global leaders, including Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, sent birthday greetings. “Through his promotion of nonviolence and compassion, as well as his commitment to advancing human rights for all, His Holiness serves as an inspiration for the Tibetan community and many around the world,” Blinken said in a statement. Modi wrote on X: “Sent my greetings to His Holiness the Dalai Lama on the occasion of his 89th birthday. Pray for his quick recovery after his knee surgery, good health, and long life.” The Nobel Peace Prize winner enjoys strong support in the United States, where prominent lawmakers have spoken out about human rights issues in Tibet. China, however, considers him a separatist and has criticized those who meet with him, including a delegation of U.S. lawmakers who recently met with him in Dharamsala, India. Last month, the U.S. Congress passed a bill urging China to re-engage with the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan leaders to resolve its dispute over the status and governance of Tibet. China-Tibet talks ground to a halt in 2010. “We stand by His Holiness and the Tibetan community as they seek to preserve Tibetans’ distinct cultural, religious, and linguistic heritage,” said U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues Uzra Zeya, in a birthday greeting. Thousands converge At the Park Hyatt Hotel in New York, where the Dalai Lama is recovering, a steady stream of Tibetans and Buddhist devotees have gathered every day since his arrival in the United States on June 23, braving the heat to walk around the hotel and offer prayers. On Saturday, to mark his birthday, devotees converged in even larger numbers to offer hundreds of katags, white Tibetan silk scarves, and bouquets of flowers outside the hotel, which many referred to as their “temple.” Billboards in New York’s Times Square flash birthday greetings to the Dalai Lama just after midnight on July 6, 2024. (RFA/Nordhey Dolma) On Friday evening, on the eve of his 89th birthday, at least a thousand Tibetans gathered in New York’s Times Square to witness two giant billboards carrying birthday messages written in Tibetan and English. As the messages flashed at midnight, the crowd – many of whom were decked out in Tibetan dress and waving the Tibetan flags – cheered, sang, danced and chanted prayers. Reflecting on his life so far, the Dalai Lama said in the video he was resolved to continue to give his best to promote Buddhism and the well-being of the Tibetan people. He also acknowledged the “growing interest” in the Tibetan cause in the world today, and felt he had made a “small contribution” toward that. ‘Year of Compassion’ In Dharamsala, India, Sikyong Penpa Tsering, the leader of the Central Tibetan Administration, the Tibetan government-in-exile, announced plans to celebrate the Dalai Lama’s 90th birthday next year as the “Year of Compassion” marked by a series of year-long events starting in July 2025. The Dalai Lama has said that he will provide clarity around his succession, including on whether he would be reincarnated and where, when he turns 90. Sikyong Penpa Tsering and Sikkim Chief Minister Prem Singh Tamang cut the birthday cake at the official Central Tibetan Government-led ceremony to commemorate the Dalai Lama’s 89th birthday in Dharamsala, India on Saturday, July 6, 2024. China – which annexed Tibet in 1951 and rules the western autonomous region with a heavy hand – says only Beijing can select the next spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhists, as it seeks to control the centuries-old selection process for religious leaders, including the Dalai Lama. Tibetans, however, believe the Dalai Lama chooses the body into which he will be reincarnated, a process that has occurred 13 times since 1391, when the first Dalai Lama was born. The 14th Dalai Lama fled Tibet amid a failed 1959 national uprising against China’s rule and has lived in exile in Dharamsala, India, ever since. He is the longest-serving Tibetan Buddhist spiritual leader in Tibet’s history. Ever since, Beijing has sought to legitimize Chinese rule through the suppression of dissent and policies undermining Tibetan culture and language. Beijing believes the Dalai Lama wants to split off the Tibet Autonomous Region and other Tibetan-populated areas in China’s Sichuan, Qinghai, Yunnan, and Gansu provinces – which Tibetan refer to as “Amdo” and “Kham” – from the rest of the country. However, the Dalai Lama does not advocate for independence but rather proposes what he calls a “Middle Way” that accepts Tibet’s status as a part of China and urges greater cultural and religious freedoms, including strengthened language rights. Blinken said in his statement Saturday that the “The United States reaffirms our commitment to support efforts to preserve Tibetans’ distinct linguistic, cultural, and religious heritage, including the ability to freely choose and venerate religious leaders without interference.” Additional reporting by Tashi Wangchuk, Dolkar, Nordhey Dolma, Dickey Kundol, Yeshi Dawa, Sonam Singeri, Dorjee Damdul, Tenzin Dickyi for RFA Tibetan. Written and edited by Tenzin Pema, edited by Malcolm Foster.

Chinese Students in USA Committed to CCP?

Editor4 weeks ago4 weeks ago014 mins

In a revealing survey report titled “Experiences and Aspirations of Foreign Students in the USA” by “Investigative Journalism Reportika,” a significant pattern emerges among Chinese students studying in the USA. Despite recognizing the superior socio-political freedoms and personal liberties in the United States, many Chinese students still express a strong desire to return to China after completing their studies. This trend underscores a broader dynamic of technology and knowledge transfer from the USA to China, reflecting a blend of appreciation for American freedoms and a commitment to contributing to China’s development. Dichotomy of Preferences According to the survey, 78% of Chinese students in the USA feel a greater sense of personal freedom compared to their experiences in China. These students under anonymity cite freedom of expression, individual rights, and opportunities for self-determination as key reasons for their preference. The lack of media and social media censorship in the USA is particularly noted as a stark contrast to the restrictive environment in China. The students identify several major challenges facing China today. Notably, 38% point to censorship as a significant issue, arguing that restrictions on freedom of speech and expression hinder open discourse and societal progress. Additionally, 20% express concern about China’s global image, which they believe is often perceived as authoritarian and lacking respect for human rights and democratic values. These students emphasize the importance of improving China’s international reputation to foster better relationships with other nations. However, when asked about their post-graduation plans, a significant majority (76%) of Chinese students express a desire to return to China. They see their return as essential to contributing to China’s development and helping it become the world’s leading economy. These students believe that their exposure to advanced technology and education in the USA will equip them with the necessary skills and knowledge to advance China’s ambitions. It is ironic that, 78% of Chinese students in the USA feel a greater sense of personal freedom compared to their experiences in China, yet a significant majority (76%) express a desire to return to China. This trend suggests that the decision to return might not solely be driven by personal ambitions or reasons, but rather influenced by external factors so compelling that even under anonymity, students feared to state their true preference. This article explores some of these influential factors, shedding light on the complexities behind these students’ decisions. The Role of CSSA The Chinese Students and Scholars Association (CSSA) plays a significant role in the lives of Chinese students studying abroad. Established in the late 1970s, the CSSA was created by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to monitor Chinese students and mobilize them against views that dissent from the CCP’s stance. This directive remains in place, with the CSSA actively working to suppress open inquiry on foreign campuses. In a 2017 New York Times article, CSSA chapters were described as collaborating with Beijing to promote a pro-Chinese agenda and suppress anti-Chinese speech on Western campuses. For instance, the University of California, San Diego chapter protested the university’s decision to invite the 14th Dalai Lama to speak at its 2017 commencement. Similarly, the Wayne State University chapter funneled money from the Chinese consulate to finance a trip to China for the mayor of Ypsilanti, Michigan, and three officials. The CSSA has also been involved in several controversies. In 2019, Human Rights Watch called for closer monitoring of CSSAs in response to threats to academic freedom. The CSSA chapter at McMaster University was stripped of its status as a student organization after coordinating with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) consulate in ways that violated student club rules. Additionally, in 2021, Human Rights Watch published a report documenting instances of CSSAs being used to monitor Chinese university students abroad. In 2023, a significant development at George Washington University saw Chinese international students forming an independent group called Torch on the Potomac as an alternative to the local CSSA chapter. This move was driven by concerns over the CSSA’s influence and its alignment with the Chinese government’s agenda. This shift reflects sentiments captured in the survey question, “What motivated you to pursue higher education in the USA instead of China?” Notably, 36% of respondents cited dissatisfaction with China’s political system and restrictions on freedom of speech and expression as their motivation for seeking educational opportunities in a more democratic environment like the USA. Confucius Institutes (CIs) The PRC has established and helped fund hundreds of Confucius Institutes (CIs) on campuses worldwide since 2004. These institutes are frequently staffed by a combination of Chinese scholars, U.S. citizen faculty, and CCP-selected Chinese instructors who teach the CCP’s interpretation of Mandarin and Chinese culture. Most agreements to establish CIs feature opaque nondisclosure clauses, do not explicitly protect academic freedom, and require strict use of a narrow, CCP-approved curriculum. In 2020, the U.S. State Department designated the Confucius Institute U.S. Center (CIUS) as a foreign mission of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), acknowledging it as an entity that promotes Beijing’s global propaganda and malign influence campaigns. Reflecting these concerns, several universities have recently taken decisive actions. In 2023, the University of Michigan shut down its Confucius Institute due to escalating worries about Chinese government influence and a strong push for transparency and academic freedom. Similarly, in 2022, Tufts University closed its Confucius Institute after extensive debate and pressure centered on national security concerns and maintaining academic independence. That same year, the University of Kansas also terminated its Confucius Institute partnership, aligning with broader national concerns about foreign influence and the imperative to protect academic freedom. The Strategy of Technology Transfer The PRC is engaged in a concerted effort to divert key technology and research to China and its military, often at the expense of U.S. universities, taxpayers, and the Federal government. Foreign technology acquisition is a major component of the PRC’s strategy to quickly advance its scientific, economic, and military development goals. The PRC’s national strategy of Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) directs collaboration with foreign universities to acquire cutting-edge research…

North Korea draws navigable group in round 3 of FIFA World Cup Asian qualifiers

Editor4 weeks ago05 mins

The road to the 2026 FIFA World Cup for the North Korean team will go through three Middle Eastern countries and two former Soviet republics, the Asian Football Confederation decided in a drawing for the third round of qualifiers in Kuala Lumpur Thursday. North Korea was drawn into Group A along with Iran, Qatar, Uzbekistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Kyrgyzstan. Though the team, known by supporters as the Chollima, have the lowest world ranking among the six teams, Group A offers a chance for qualification, with only Iran ranked among the world’s top 30 teams. In drawing Group A, North Korea avoids an inter-Korean showdown, with South Korea heavily favored to dominate Group B, full of Middle Eastern minnows Iraq, Jordan, Oman, Palestine and Kuwait. Group C, meanwhile, is the “Group of Death,” with powerhouses Japan, Australia and Saudi Arabia drawn together, and Bahrain, China and Indonesia rounding out the group. In the second round, North Korea finished second in its group behind Japan and ahead of Syria and Myanmar. They crushed Myanmar 6-1 in Yangon and 4-1 in a home match played in Vientiane, Laos. The campaign also featured a strong showing against 17th-ranked Japan in Tokyo, where they lost 1-0. But North Korea forfeited the home match because they refused to host. North Korea fans in the stands before the match against Japan, March 21, 2024 in Tokyo. (Issei Kato/Reuters) North Korea hasn’t hosted a home match since the last World Cup cycle, playing South Korea to a 0-0 draw in Pyongyang in 2019. The third round will kick off on Sep. 5, with North Korea set to face Uzbekistan in Tashkent. Should the Chollima finish in second place or higher after playing each member of Group A home and away, the team would advance to the 2026 FIFA World Cup in Canada, the United States and Mexico. Finishing the group in third or fourth place would advance North Korea to a fourth round of qualifying, where six teams would vye for two more spots in 2026 or a berth in the inter-confederation playoffs. Questions remain as to whether North Korea will host its own home matches or continue to coordinate them with third countries. Although the country has reopened its borders that had been shuttered since the beginning of the COVID pandemic in 2020, it may not be ready to welcome teams from other countries and their fans. The Chollima are very popular among fans in their home country, but the team also has fans from outside its borders. Should the team advance to the finals and play on U.S. soil, Paul Han, a North Korean escapee who lives in Indianapolis, would cheer for the North Korean players, he told RFA Korean. “I cheer for North Korea especially when they play against South Korea, the United States, or Japan,” he said. “It’s a matter of the fate of those players, because they can be sent to a place where the sun and moon cannot be seen (if they lose).” Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong.

Thousands welcome Dalai Lama’s arrival in US for knee surgery

Editor1 month ago05 mins

Updated at 18:40 ET on June 23, 2024. The Dalai Lama was greeted by a large crowd of chanting and flag-waving Tibetans and other supporters upon his arrival Sunday in the United States for knee surgery. It was the first trip to the United States for the 88-year-old Tibetan Buddhist spiritual leader in seven years and his first overseas trip since November 2018, before the coronavirus pandemic. He lives in exile in Dharamsala, northern India, After landing at Teterboro Airport, in New Jersey, he was greeted by people holding traditional khata white scarves, chanting, singing, waving flags and wishing him a quick recovery from the operation on his right knee. “It’s a moment of profound joy and spiritual fulfillment for us,” said Tsering Dickey, who traveled from New York with her family to see him at the airport. “Seeing His Holiness in person after such a long time brings hope and inspiration to our community and we hope and pray that his knee surgery goes well.” The Dalai Lama then traveled by car to New York, where thousands of well-wishers awaited him outside the Park Hyatt, lining up along 57th Street in Manhattan, where he will be staying. No public talks or engagements are currently planned for his visit. The doctor suggested that successful right knee surgery would help his left knee function better as well, and that he may be able to walk properly within three weeks, Sikyong Pempa Tsering, the head of the Central Tibetan Administration, told RFA. Devotees wait for the arrival of the Dalai Lama outside of the airport in Teterboro, New Jersey, June 23, 2024. (RFA) The Dalai Lama enjoys strong support in the United States, where prominent lawmakers have spoken out about human rights issues in Tibet, though China considers him a separatist and has criticized those who meet with him. The well-wishers included Tibetans and people from Himalayan regions, Mongolia, India, Vietnam, Bhutan and Nepal, as well as individuals from across the United States. “The presence of His Holiness here in the United States is a spiritual boon, as he is visiting after seven years,” said Tashi Kyiloe from New York. “It is a great opportunity for older people like me to receive his blessing.” The visit comes after the recent passage of a bill in the U.S. Congress that urgest the Chinese government to engage in dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, or democratically elected Tibetan leaders, to resolve the China-Tibet dispute. The Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act, also known as the Resolve Tibet Act, calls on China to cease its propagation of disinformation about the history of Tibet, the Tibetan people and the Dalai Lama. Additional reporting by Nordhey Dolma, Jolep Chophel, Yeshi Tashi and Tashi Wangchuk. Edited by Malcolm Foster.

Putin visits Vietnam aiming to renew Cold War ties

Editor1 month ago09 mins

Russian President Vladimir Putin was given a grand welcome with a 21-gun salute on Thursday after arriving in old ally Vietnam on a trip that is likely to be promoted by Moscow as more evidence of the West’s failure to isolate him over the invasion of Ukraine. Presiding over the ceremony was Vietnam’s new president, To Lam, and not the Communist Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong, due to the latter’s ailing health. The two presidents saluted their countries’ flags before inspecting the guard of honor, who cheered “We wish the president good health!” In later talks, Lam congratulated Putin on his re-election and praised Russia’s achievements, including “domestic political stability,” Reuters reported. The Vietnamese president told a press briefing that both Vietnam and Russia were committed to the principle of “not forming alliances nor agreements with third parties to take actions that harm each other’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and fundamental interests.” Putin arrived in Hanoi in the early hours from Pyongyang, where he and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un signed an agreement that pledges “mutual assistance in the event of aggression” against one of them. He was met at Hanoi’s airport by the head of Communist Party’s external affairs commission and a deputy prime minister in a much more low-key reception compared with the lavish fanfare laid on for him in North Korea. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Vietnam’s President To Lam at the welcome ceremony hosted at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 20, 2024. (Athit Perawongmetha/Reuters) No major agreement is expected during the Russian president’s 24 hours in Hanoi but he’s scheduled to meet with, besides President To Lam, the general secretary of the Communist Party, the prime minister and the National Assembly’s chairman. Putin, who has been on a U.S. sanction list since 2022 for ordering the invasion of Ukraine, is also wanted by the International Criminal Court, or ICC. Vietnam is not a member of the ICC and so is under no obligation to act on its arrest warrant. “Few countries now welcome Mr. Putin,” Australian Ambassador to Vietnam Andrew Goledzinowski wrote on social media platform X in a rare post by a foreign envoy. “But he needs to demonstrate that he is still a ‘world leader’. So Vietnam is doing him a huge favour and may expect favours in return.” No nuclear power, for now Ahead of his arrival in Hanoi, Putin praised the close ties between the two countries, who he said share “the same, or similar approaches” to current issues on the international agenda. “We are grateful to our Vietnamese friends for their balanced position on the Ukrainian crisis and for their desire to help find tangible ways to resolve it peacefully,” he wrote in an article on Vietnamese Communist Party’s mouthpiece Nhan Dan. Hanoi has declined to denounce the Russian invasion of Ukraine and did not take part in last weekend’s Ukraine peace summit in Switzerland, to which Russia was not invited. The Russian president said that trade and investment, especially in the energy industry sectors, were the two governments’ priorities. Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom is “ready to help Vietnamese partners develop their national nuclear power industry,” he said. Russia maintains a strong global influence in nuclear power and is the world’s leading exporter of nuclear power plants. Yet Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh told Rosatom’s Director General Alexey Likhachev on Wednesday that his country “has not had any policy to return to developing nuclear power but will continue to research and consider nuclear energy as an important solution to achieve net zero emissions by 2050,” according to the Vietnam News Agency. Hanoi shelved a plan to build its first nuclear power plant in 2016, citing lack of resources and concerns of safety. Vietnam’s President To Lam welcomes Russia’s President Vladimir Putin at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 20, 2024. (Athit Perawongmetha/Reuters) Rosatom, however, is helping construct a nuclear science and technology research center in the southern province of Đồng Nai. Putin’s visit is generally seen as symbolic and could help strengthening interactions in traditional areas such as economy and investment, science and technology, education and training, culture and tourism, and also defense and security. Vietnam is one of the largest buyers of Russian arms and still relies on Moscow to maintain and upgrade its arsenal but no contract signing is envisaged during the visit. Russia is a traditional ally and supported Vietnam throughout the Cold War but the dynamics of the relationship have changed as Vietnam adopts a new multilateral, diversified foreign policy that enabled it to forge new partners such as the U.S. and Japan. “Russia will never again be a strategic partner for Vietnam. Moscow has chosen a different partner and a different strategic destiny,” the Australian Ambassador Goledzinowski wrote, apparently referring to Vietnam’s neighbor China. Hanoi and Beijing are at odds over their sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, an important waterway shared by several countries but China claims having historic rights to more than 80% of it. Russia has maintained a neutral position in the South China Sea and is involved in many oil and gas projects in the region but it has recently voiced support for China’s rejection of “external interference”, or in other words, the role of the U.S. and its allies, in the region’s maritime disputes. Edited by Taejun Kang.

Ecuador ends visa-free entry for Chinese nationals fleeing country

Editor1 month ago07 mins

Authorities in Ecuador have suspended visa-free entry to Chinese nationals starting July 1, citing a jump in arrivals, half of whom either overstay the terms of their entry or leave the country via “irregular routes” to other destinations, making them vulnerable to human traffickers. Ecuador’s capital Quito has become a well-known jumping off point for Chinese nationals planning to make the dangerous journey overland to Mexico prior to claiming political asylum in the United States, a grueling journey known as “walking the line.” The move, which was announced ahead of World Refugee Day on June 20, is a heavy blow for the “run” movement — a buzzword describing the mass exodus of people from China following the lifting of pandemic restrictions in late 2022. The meme took off during the grueling lockdowns, mass incarceration in quarantine camps and compulsory testing of Xi Jinping’s zero-COVID policy, which the government ended abruptly, following nationwide protests, in December 2022. Ecuador’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility said it was suspending visa-free entry to Chinese nationals due to “an unusual increase in irregular migratory flows of Chinese citizens … who would be using Ecuador as a starting point to reach other destinations.” Chinese migrants navigate thick brush after being smuggled into the U.S. from Mexico in Fronton, Texas, April 5, 2023. (Reuters) “In recent months, there has been a worrying increase in migratory flows from China,” the Ministry said in a June 18 statement posted to its official X account. “50% of these entries have not left through regular routes and within the times established by law,” it said, adding that the ban will “[prevent] them from being victims of human trafficking or migrant smuggling.” Chinese border crossings Since last year, a total of 66,000 Chinese citizens have entered Ecuador, but only 34,000 have left the country through official routes, according to the ministry. The U.S. government has also reported a huge increase in the number of Chinese citizens seeking political asylum last year. More than 37,000 Chinese nationals were arrested at the U.S. southern land border in 2023, 10 times the number of the previous year. There was a small dip in the first three months of 2024, but numbers rebounded to 3,282 in April, according to U.S. government statistics. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said the visa-free arrangement had been in place since August 2016, and had “played an important and positive role in promoting cross-border travel and practical cooperation in various fields between the two countries.” While he didn’t directly address the mass exodus of Chinese nationals via Ecuador since the lifting of COVID-19 travel bans in 2022, he said the Chinese government continues to “work with relevant countries to jointly tackle human smuggling activities.” Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian speaks on June 18, 2024, in Beijing. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC) “The Chinese government firmly opposes all forms of human smuggling,” Lin told a news briefing in Beijing on Tuesday. “Chinese law enforcement departments are working with relevant countries to jointly tackle human smuggling activities, repatriate illegal immigrants and maintain a good order in cross-border travel,” he said. Trekking through the rainforest Performance artist and social media personality Chen Shaotian, also known as Brother Tian, documented his hazardous trek through the Central American rainforest after touching down in Quito in May 2023, via a video sharing platform. Chen, who has previously served a 14-month jail term for criticizing the Communist Party on social media, said his trip took him and a party of 200 other Chinese citizens through bus stations, border checkpoints, refugee camps and other facilities that have sprung up to serve the constant stream of people heading for the United States through Central America. Along the way, they were fleeced by corrupt police, paid fees to the “snakehead” people smuggling gangs, who charged extra for a more comfortable trek involving tents and horses, and robbed repeatedly along the way, Chen told RFA Mandarin after arriving in the United States. Chen said he flew to Turkey, then to Ecuador, before making his way northwards along the coast through Peru and Venezuela. Translated by Luisetta Mudie.

China’s dependency on potash imports could give tiny Laos rare leverage

Editor1 month ago1 month ago012 mins

Let’s start with the good news – potentially great news, in fact – for Southeast Asia: Laos could be sitting on 10 billion tons of potash, one of the three main fertilizers used in global agriculture. In 2022, a subsidiary of the Chinese company Asia-Potash International announced a $4.3 billion investment in a potash mining venture in Khammouane province. This deal grants exploration rights to 48 square kilometers for potassium ore. The company reckons it can start with producing 1 million metric tons of potash annually, scale up to 5 million tons by 2025 and eventually reach 7 to 10 million tons. For a comparison, Canada, the world’s largest potash producer, exported around 23 million metric tons, valued at approximately $6.6 billion, in 2023. In 2022, Laos’s potash exports were valued at approximately $580 million, representing about 1.7 percent of global supply. It isn’t inconceivable that Laos will become a global player. Location helps Laos Geography is key. Next door is China, the world’s largest importer of food and food inputs, and the world’s third-biggest purchaser of potash. China imports around 8 million metric tons each year, about half of its demand, although that is increasing. China is the world’s biggest producer of potatoes, which are very reliant on potassium. China’s potato heartlands – Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan provinces – are on Laos’ doorstep. Guangdong province, China’s main banana producer, isn’t too far away. There’s ample room for Laos to expand potash exports in Southeast Asia, too. Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest potash importer, bought around $2.1 billion worth in 2022, with Laos holding a 6 percent market share. Malaysia, the sixth-largest importer, spent around $1 billion on potash, with Laos having a 2 percent share. Laos is already the largest supplier of potash to Vietnam, with exports worth about $82 million in 2022. Officials with Sino-Agri International Potash Co., Ltd. and the Lao government sign a memorandum of understanding March 24, 2023, to build a smart eco-industrial city in Khammouane province. (Pathedlao) If, for instance, Laos was to replace suppliers like Jordan and Israel and capture a 20% share of China’s potash import market, its exports could rise to around US$750-800 million, making potash Laos’ second-largest export product, after energy. Right now, the spot price for potassium chloride is US$307 per metric ton. So, loosely, 10 million tons exported a year would bring in around US$3 billion. Expectations shouldn’t be that high, though. It’s one thing for a Chinese investor to promise to produce 10 million tons a year and it’s another thing for it to actually deliver it. And because it’s a Chinese firm selling the goods, most of the money won’t stay in Laos. And there are already the same complaints as with every Chinese investment: Asia-Potash International isn’t hiring local workers. Geopolitics Nonetheless, estimates vary, but there still could be between $30 million and $300 million in annual revenue for the Lao state. Almost certainly it will be towards the lower end, but it’s not to be sniffed at by the badly-indebted government. However, consider the geostrategic implications. Up until now, China hasn’t really needed Laos. It lacks the strategic importance of Cambodia, with its naval base on the Gulf of Thailand, or the trade routes offered by Myanmar, where China is developing a $7 billion port to access the Indian Ocean for oil and LNG imports from the Gulf. In 2022, Laos accounted for a mere 0.1 percent of China’s total imports; food makes up less than a tenth of that, so Laos isn’t a solution to China’s future food insecurity. A bulldozer works on a large hill of potash at the Dead Sea Works in Israel’s Sodom area, Feb. 16, 2016. (Menahem Kahana/AFP) China’s primary import from Laos is pulped paper, not energy. Instead, China constructs hydropower dams and coal-fired stations in Laos, which generate electricity sold to Thailand and Vietnam. Geostrategically, Laos is a useful ally for Beijing to have because of its ASEAN membership, but Vientiane holds little weight in the regional bloc. Should something drastic occur in Laos – such as the fall of the ruling communist party or the emergence of an anti-China government – Beijing would be displeased and Chinese investments would be at risk, but China’s national security would be unaffected. That situation changes if Laos becomes a significant supplier of potash. If projections are correct and Laos can produce between 7-10 million tons of potash annually, it could theoretically more than meet China’s entire import demand. That makes Laos a national security interest for Beijing. Food security The Chinese government is preparing itself for military conflict. It knows that in the event it launches an invasion of Taiwan or attacks a rival state in the South China Sea, the West will hammer it with economic sanctions so damaging it would make the retribution reaped on Russia look like a slap on the wrist. Self-sufficiency and diversification are the buzzwords. But it’s doubtful that China – arguably the country most dependent on world trade and on U.S. protection of shipping routes – could survive such sanctions. Even short of war, food security has long been a major concern for China., for reasons too long to go into. According to Xi Jinping, the supreme leader, food security is the “foundation for national security.” Beijing is also concerned that its reliance on imported fertilizer inputs “could pose a major threat to its food security”. There’s no way China can achieve the food self-sufficiency that Xi wants, as was spelled out in a detailed study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a U.S. thinktank. Farmers operate rice seedling transplanters in Taizhou, in eastern China’s Jiangsu province, June 12, 2024. (AFP) China can domestically produce enough nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers, the latter essential for phosphate-hungry rice. But almost all of China’s phosphate is produced in Xinjiang and Tibet, far away from the rice-growing Han heartland and where the local population is largely hostile to rule by Beijing. China will remain…

Vietnam sets record in island building in 2024: report

Editor2 months ago07 mins

Vietnam’s island building in the South China Sea has reached a record with the total new land created in the first six months of this year equaling that of 2022 and 2023 combined, a U.S. independent think tank said. The Washington-based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) said in its latest report that since November 2023, Vietnam has created 692 new acres (280 ha) of land across a total of 10 features within the Spratly archipelago. In comparison, it created 404 acres (163.5 ha) of land in the first 11 months of 2023 and 342 acres (138.4 ha) in 2022. Vietnam has reclaimed a total area of about half the area that China has built up, with much of Vietnam’s work on reefs China also claims. Of the two main island groups in the South China Sea, China occupies the Paracels, while the Spratlys, to the south, are contested by several countries. Vietnam occupies 27 features and has been carrying out large-scale reclamation works on some over the past year. Among the 10 largest features in the Spratlys, five are being developed by Hanoi, AMTI said. Vietnam’s features are much smaller than any of China’s so-called Big Three – Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef – artificial islands that Beijing developed and fully militarized. Vietnam’s overall dredging and landfill totaled about 2,360 acres (955 ha), roughly half of China’s 4,650 acres (1881.7 ha). The research group said Vietnam’s reclamation was a major change. Just three years ago, the total amount of Vietnamese dredging and landfill was less than a tenth that of China’s. Vietnam’s work includes the Barque Canada Reef, or Bai Thuyen Chai in Vietnamese, where the area nearly doubled over six months, from 238 acres (96.3 ha) to 412 acres (166.7 ha), the group said. Vietnam says little about its work at the features apart from it is to protect them but not to expand them or change structures. There was no immediate government response to the AMTI report. A Vietnamese outpost in the Spratlys, May 2024. RFA/str Runway potential Six months ago, Radio Free Asia reported on the rapid expansion of Barque Canada Reef from the end of 2021. Chinese think tank the South China Sea Probing Initiative had said Hanoi may be building a second airfield on the reef but the latest satellite imagery shows no sign of that. Vietnam has one 1,300-meter runway on the Spratly Island, or Truong Sa Lon in Vietnamese, which can handle medium-sized military aircraft. The Barque Canada Reef “measures 4,318 meters in length, which makes it the only Vietnamese outpost so far with the potential to host a 3,000-meter runway” like those that China has, the think tank said. China’s three largest artificial islands are all equipped with runways that can accommodate bigger military transport, surveillance, and bomber aircraft. Satellite image of Barque Canada Reef, May 11, 2024. AMTI/Maxar Technologies Other features under Hanoi’s control that have undergone significant development since November 2023 are Discovery Great Reef, South Reef, Namyit Reef and Pearson Reef, according to the report. Vietnam “has continued implementing a mix of cutter-suction and clamshell dredging”, AMTI researchers said. A cutter suction dredger cuts the seabed into fragments with a rotating head. Material is sucked up by dredge pumps and discharged through pipes across sea and land. Scientists say cutter suction dredgers are more environmentally destructive and China has been criticized for using them. The Vietnamese public seems supportive of the island building. Many social media commentators hail “the right strategy” in the face of China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. Six parties – Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam – claim parts of the South China Sea as well as the islands and reefs inside it but China’s claims are the most expansive. A Philippine official, asked about Vietnam’s dredging and landfill work, said that Hanoi was reclaiming features that it occupied before a 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. “Vietnam focuses on minding their own affairs,” Philippine coastguard spokesperson Jay Tarriela told reporters. “They do not engage in harassing our fishermen or illegally deploying coast guard vessels and maritime militia in the waters surrounding our occupied maritime features,” he said. The Philippines has accused China of harassing fishermen and law enforcement agencies in Philippine waters, especially near the Scarborough and Second Thomas shoals. China says it has “indisputable jurisdiction” over all the reefs and atolls in the Spratlys. Edited by RFA staff

Hong Kong exiles in UK and Canada lack access to billions of their savings

Editor2 months ago012 mins

In April 2023, Hong Kong Watch found that Hong Kongers were being denied access to up to £2.2 billion (US$2.8 billion) of their hard-earned Mandatory Provident Fund retirement savings. Fast forward one year, and the number has only increased to over £3 billion (US$3.8 billion). This act of transnational repression is placing an unnecessary financial and mental strain on an estimated tens of thousands of Hong Kongers in the UK and Canada who moved abroad under British National (Overseas) (BNO) passports, set up to allow a permanent residence pathway for them. The Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) is a compulsory retirement savings scheme for the people of Hong Kong. Hong Kongers can ordinarily withdraw their entire account early if they make a statutory declaration that they have departed Hong Kong permanently with no intention of returning to resettle. However, the Mandatory Provident Fund Authority, which oversees the provision of MPF schemes, released a statement in March 2021 saying that because the BNO passport was no longer recognised by the Hong Kong government as a valid travel document and proof of identity as of Jan. 2021. This means that those trying to withdraw their savings early cannot rely on the BNO passport or visa to support an application for early withdrawal of their funds. A protester raises his British National Overseas passports during a candlelight vigil to mark the 31st anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, in Hong Kong, June 4, 2020. (Tyrone Siu/Reuters) Despite this, the MPF-related legislation, regulations, and terms of the deeds governing entitlement to MPF benefits in Hong Kong remain unchanged. Under the MPF trust deed, trustees including those based overseas like HSBC, Standard Chartered, Manulife and Sun Life, have a legal obligation to release MPF to beneficiaries who are able to provide evidence of their right to reside in a foreign country. There is no reason that a BNO passport or visa should be denied under this deed. However, the latest research from Hong Kong Watch includes case studies detailing how Hong Kongers continue to be denied access to their MPF on the grounds that they hold a BNO passport or visa. This includes many Hong Kong families in the UK, from a single mother who is unable to afford a heater for her son due to being denied £57,000 (US$70,000) worth of her MPF, to a family of five that is unable to afford a wheelchair accessible property for their severely disabled child due to the withholding of their MPF. Individual hardship Others with withheld savings struggle to adapt to their new environments for financial reasons, to assist relatives in escaping from increasing repression in Hong Kong, and to start desired business ventures in the UK or Canada. Since 2021 and as recently as last month, Hong Kong Watch has documented numerous rejection letters from MPF trustees to Hong Kongers denying the early withdrawal of their MPF on the grounds that the BNO visa or passport is not a valid form of identification per the Hong Kong government’s lawless declaration. I have spoken with a Hong Konger who has £90,000 (US$114,000) frozen in MPF assets, and another who had obtained Canadian permanent residency and was still denied access to their MPF by Manulife for simply arriving in Canada with a BNO passport. The latter case is especially concerning, particularly after Manulife’s Global Head of Government Relations for Canada, Maryscott Greenwood, testified before the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration on Monday and claimed that Manulife had never denied a Hong Konger access to their savings on the basis of holding a BNO visa. Having seen a written transcript of a call between the Hong Konger who was denied access to their MPF and Manulife, in which Manulife said, “even if you hold Canadian PR, it’s ineligible to withdraw the fund as a BNO passport holder,” this is simply not true. Maryscott Greenwood, Manulife’s global head of Government Relations for Canada, testifies via video before the Canadian Parliament’s Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, June 3, 2024. (Image from Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration video) Sun Life’s Head of Global Government Affairs and Public Policy, Laura Hewitt, also testified in the hearing. It was unfortunate but unsurprising that despite having productive meetings with Hong Kong Watch prior to the hearing, both Manulife and Sun Life executives delivered cautious, pre-prepared answers and repeatedly failed to respond to direct “yes” or “no” questions from the Canadian Parliament. Fortunately, members of the Canadian Parliament including Tom Kmiec, Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Greg McLean, Paul Chiang, Fayçal El-Khoury, and Jenny Kwan, who is herself a prior BNO visa holder, were not satisfied with these non-answers. The MPs pressed the business representatives on why they have withheld Hong Kongers’ own savings from them since 2021. Tom Kmiec asked both companies: “Why are you still operating in an autocratic, totalitarian regime that is dominated by Beijing?” The question remains unanswered. Tasks for London and Ottawa The next UK government should vow to provide clarification to UK-based MPF trustees that the BNO visa is intended to lead to “permanent settlement and British citizenship” to show their support for Hong Kongers in Britain. London should also pledge to raise and condemn this form of transnational repression with their counterparts in Hong Kong. On the campaign trail, the future UK government has the opportunity to present these pledges to 140,000 eligible Hong Kong BNO voters. The Canadian government should work with Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada to change the designation of BNO passport and visa holders from GBN )Great Britain) to CHN (China) or HKG (Hong Kong) on Canadian permanent residency cards to prevent further retaliation from the Hong Kong government. A man waves to family members before leaving for the United Kingdom at the Hong Kong International Airport, June 30, 2021. (Tyrone Siu/Reuters) With a current backlog of 9,000 permanent residency applications for Hong Kongers in Canada, this will only become a greater administrative issue in the near future if IRCC labels the nationality of…

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Experiences & Aspirations of Foreign Students in the USA

Editor2 months ago2 months ago010 mins

In an era marked by globalization and cultural exchange, the experiences of international students studying abroad provide invaluable insights into cross-cultural dynamics, educational systems, and societal perceptions. This is the second survey in the series of “The Survey Reportika” presented by the Investigative Journalism Reportika. This iteration aims to delve into the multifaceted experiences and perspectives of students from China, India, and South Korea studying in universities across the United States of America. These three countries are among the top sources of international students in the USA, making their perspectives particularly significant. Conducted anonymously, this survey gathered responses from 1,500 students, with 500 each from China, India, and South Korea, enrolled in various universities throughout the USA. The participants, while representing diverse academic disciplines and backgrounds, shared their candid insights on a range of topics, including their academic experiences, cultural adjustment, perceptions of freedom, views on their home countries, and reflections on their decision to study abroad. By exploring the perspectives of these students, this report endeavors to offer a nuanced understanding of their academic journeys, cultural adaptation processes, and evolving perceptions of their home countries and the USA. Through their anonymity, participants were able to express themselves freely, contributing valuable insights that can inform future discussions on international education, cultural exchange, and global citizenship. In the following sections, we present a detailed analysis of the survey findings, categorized into relevant themes, accompanied by reflections and implications drawn from the data. It is our hope that this report serves as a resource for educators, policymakers, and stakeholders interested in fostering a more inclusive and enriching educational environment for all students, regardless of their cultural background or nationality. Download the complete Report : Click Here Survey Overview Conducted from February 1, 2024, to April 30, 2024, this extensive survey engaged 1,500 participants from diverse backgrounds, seeking to delve into the sentiments of students from China, India, and South Korea pursuing higher education in the USA. Utilizing a hybrid approach that blends offline and online methods, the survey ensures comprehensive representation across genders, religions, and ethnicities. Designed to explore motivations, challenges, and aspirations, this study aims to provide a nuanced understanding of the experiences of international students abroad, contributing valuable insights to ongoing conversations on global education, cultural adaptation, and international relations. (Click on the following questions and representational images to read the opinions and survey statistics.) Q1: What motivated you to pursue higher education in the USA instead of your home country? Q2: From your experience, how would you rate the academic environment in the USA compared to your home country? Q3: How do you foresee studying in the USA impacting your future career compared to studying in your home country? Q4: How challenging have you found adapting to cultural differences between your home country and the USA? Q5: How important is it for you to maintain your connection to your native identity while living in the USA? Q6: Do you feel more personally free in the USA compared to China? Q7: How would you rate the differences in political and social freedoms between your home country and the USA? Q8: What do you see as the major challenges facing your home country today? Q9: After completing your course in the USA, how likely are you to stay in USA and work towards your career aspirations? Q10: What misconceptions about your home country have you encountered while living in the USA? Conclusion The survey highlights key motivations for international students choosing the USA for higher education. Among Chinese students, 36% cite dissatisfaction with China’s political system and restrictions on freedom. For Indian students, 34% are concerned about the rigidity and outdated nature of education system. Among South Korean students, 32% seek a global perspective and exposure to international cultures. These percentages underscore the perceived drawbacks of their home countries’ systems and the benefits of studying in the USA. The survey also reveals that 42% of Chinese students, 39% of Indian students, and 13% of South Korean students find the academic environment in the USA much better than in their home countries, highlighting greater academic freedom, diverse opportunities, and advanced resources in the USA. The survey highlights varied perspectives on political and social freedoms among international students. For China, 51% of respondents find freedoms much greater in the USA due to censorship and surveillance in China. In comparison, 39% of Indian students believe the USA offers greater freedoms, citing discrimination and women’s rights issues in India. For South Korea, 42% view freedoms as comparable between the two countries, but 29% see the USA as offering somewhat or much greater freedoms due to broader speech rights and a less hierarchical societal structure. Meanwhile, a notable 33% of Indian respondents believe political and social freedoms are greater in India, highlighting social schemes and constitutional protections. The survey highlights the career aspirations of international students after completing their studies in the USA. Among Chinese students, 76% plan to return to China to contribute to its development, while 11% are very likely to stay in the USA for career opportunities in tech hubs like Silicon Valley. Indian students show a strong inclination to remain in the USA, with 40% very likely to stay, inspired by successful Indian CEOs in the West. However, 39% prefer to return to India to aid its progress. South Korean students are more moderate, with 32% very likely to stay in the USA, 45% somewhat likely, and 23% planning to return home to apply their skills. In summation, the comprehensive survey captures the intricate tapestry of experiences and perspectives among international students studying in the USA. From motivations for pursuing higher education abroad to assessments of academic environments and considerations for post-graduation career paths, the survey provides valuable insights into the dynamics of cross-cultural interactions, educational aspirations, and societal contributions. It underscores the pivotal role of international education in fostering global understanding, facilitating personal and professional growth, and driving socio-economic development worldwide. By shedding light on the complex interplay of individual…

Category: Americas