EXPLAINED: What is China’s United Front and how does it operate?

Evidence is mounting of clandestine Chinese influence operations in the heart of America. Just in the last few months, a former aide to the governor of New York state and her husband were arrested for alleged illicit activities promoting the interests of China; a Chinese democracy activist was arrested and accused of spying for China; and a historian was convicted of being an agent for Beijing. The three separate cases of former Albany functionary based on expert testimony. United front groups often have innocuous sounding names, like the Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification or the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. Many appear to be ordinary overseas Chinese community organizations, and are found in business and even in multinational corporations. Lurking behind or within them, though, are government or party agencies – very often China’s powerful intelligence, security and secret police agency. “United front groups are used – very specifically – to hide the Ministry of State Security,” said Peter Mattis, head of the non-profit Jamestown Foundation. “This is why I like to think of the United Front Work Department as the tall grass that is sort of deliberately cultivated to hide snakes,” he told RFA. What is the history of China‘s ’united front’ work? Under the Moscow-led Comintern in the 1920s, the Chinese Communist Party adapted Soviet revolutionary Vladimir Lenin’s concept of forming a “united front” – forging temporary alliances with friends and lesser enemies in order to defeat greater enemies. After Mao Zedong’s Communists took power in 1949, united front work focused internally on co-opting Chinese capitalists and intellectuals, who were brought to heel and persecuted in the 1950s under Mao’s vicious ideological campaigns. Supporters await the arrival of Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to Kings Park in Perth, Australia, June 18, 2024. Citizens of Taiwan have for decades been pressured by united front efforts to support unification with the Communist-controlled mainland. The recent imposition of draconian national security legislation in Hong Kong has made citizens and exiles who oppose those authoritarian steps in formerly free Chinese territory targets of united front pressure. These targets are not alone and the list is growing, with Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand also grappling with Chinese influence campaigns that smack of united front work. “There’s no clear distinction between domestic and overseas united front work: all bureaus of the UFWD and all areas of united front work involve overseas activities,” the report from Australia’s ASPI said. “This is because the key distinction underlying the United Front is not between domestic and overseas groups, but between the CCP and everyone else,” it said. The Chinese Embassy in Washington told Radio Free Asia that the United Front’s domestic role is to “promote cooperation between the (Communist Party) and people who are not members of it.” Outreach to the diaspora “helps give full play to their role as a bridge linking China with the rest of the world,” the embassy spokesperson’s office said in an e-mailed statement. “Its work is transparent, above-board and beyond reproach,” it said. “By making an issue out of China’s United Front work, some people are trying to discredit China’s political system and disrupt normal exchange and cooperation between China and the United States.” Additional reporting by Jane Tang of RFA Investigative. Edited by Malcolm Foster. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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Wei Guoqing, founding general of China’s People’s Liberation Army. (People's Liberation Army)

China Honors Wei Guoqing Tied to Cannibalism in Full-Honors Burial Ceremony

Beijing, China — The ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) recently reburied the ashes of Wei Guoqing, a founding general of the People’s Liberation Army and former regional party chief in Guangxi, with full honors, despite his notorious association with atrocities during the Cultural Revolution. The high-profile burial ceremony, held on October 24 at Beijing’s Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery—a final resting place for China’s top leaders and revolutionary heroes—was attended by relatives of late revolutionary leaders Zhu De and Peng Dehuai. Wei’s legacy is overshadowed by his role in the brutal Guangxi Massacre, where factional violence during the Cultural Revolution led to the deaths of an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 people through methods like beheadings, stoning, drowning, and even cannibalism. Investigative Journalism Reportika recently highlighted similar cases in its report on China’s Soft Power Propaganda Network, which examines how the CCP shapes narratives by honoring figures with violent histories while downplaying their actions to project a cohesive revolutionary image. Public Outrage and Satire News of Wei’s burial sparked outrage on Chinese-language social media, with comments characterizing Wei as a “butcher” and satirizing the CCP’s willingness to honor a figure associated with such violence. One user on X (formerly Twitter) remarked, “Babaoshan is already packed full of demons and monsters – there’s always room for one more,” while another joked, “Paying tribute to a legendary gourmet,” accompanied by an image of Wei with a fictional KFC backdrop. These comments reflected disgust, referencing notorious fictional killers and highlighting the lasting resentment in Guangxi over his legacy. Symbolism and Political Commentary Experts suggest the burial of Wei’s remains is politically symbolic. Feng Chongyi, a professor at the University of Technology in Sydney, argued that honoring Wei signals President Xi Jinping’s positioning as a political heir to Mao Zedong, endorsing the Cultural Revolution’s “struggle” tactics. “By giving him the honor of entering Babaoshan, Xi Jinping is endorsing the persecution mania of the Cultural Revolution,” Feng said, noting parallels between Xi’s approach and Mao’s. Professor Yang Haiying of Japan’s Shizuoka University added that Wei’s burial reflects the CCP’s unwillingness to distance itself from the violent legacies of the Cultural Revolution. Investigative Journalism Reportika’s report emphasized that the CCP continues to honor violent figures as a means to reinforce its revolutionary ethos, using their stories to control narratives in a way that bolsters the CCP’s own historical legacy. Wei Guoqing died on June 14, 1989, days after the Tiananmen Square massacre ended student-led pro-democracy protests. His ashes remained in storage until this recent burial, renewing public discourse around his legacy and the lasting impacts of the Cultural Revolution’s brutality. Reference: https://www.rfa.org/english/china/2024/11/02/china-enshrines-cultural-revolution-leader-guangxi-massacre-cannibalism

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To Lam moves to secure full term at pinnacle of Vietnamese power

To Lam’s recent relinquishing of the presidency of Vietnam is no sign of weakness or a challenge to his leadership. It was a logical step toward securing a full term as Communist Party general secretary. In a system that prides itself on collective leadership, there was consternation within the Communist Party of Vietnam, or CPV, about Lam’s rapid accumulation of power over the past year. The National Assembly has been signaling since August that this transfer of power would happen. For Lam, the presidency was just a stepping stone. While he seemed to enjoy the diplomatic function and traveled to eight countries in his brief five month tenure, and there’s a logic to the most powerful person being the country’s top representative, his priority is getting elected to a full term with his team at the 14th Party Congress in January 2026. While Lam may be the CPV general secretary, he still needs the support of the party Central Committee, and there are other power centers that he has to contend with. He has nothing like Xi Jinping’s hold over the Communist Party of China. Stacking the Politburo The 18-member Politburo elected at the 13th Party Congress in January 2021 has fallen to a low of 12 members. Lam has moved to fill the ranks. There have been five new Politburo members elected since May, including his protege, Luong Tam Quang at the Ministry of Public Security, or MPS. Deputy Prime Minister of Vietnam Tran Luu Quang delivers a speech at the Nikkei Forum “Future of Asia” in Tokyo on May 25, 2023 Lam understands that the party’s legitimacy comes through performance. Lam is not just stacking the Politburo; he’s appointing allies, especially those from his home province of Hung Yen, across key party positions. Lam installed another MPS deputy, Nguyen Duy Ngoc, as the head of the Central Committee office, a very powerful behind-the-scenes position in personnel issues and agenda setting. Lam now has his eyes and ears at the nerve center in the Central Committee. Ngoc also serves on the CPV’s 12-member Secretariat, which runs the party’s day-to-day affairs. Institutional checks Also new to the Secretariat is Le Minh Tri, who heads the Central Committee’s Civil Affairs Committee and is the prosecutor general of the Supreme People’s Procuracy. Le Hoai Trung, Lam’s top foreign policy adviser, who has been by his side in all foreign trips and meetings, also serves on the Secretariat. Lam is also moving to neutralize opposition. He appointed Vu Hong Van, a police major general also from Hung Yen, as deputy chairman of the Central Inspection Commission. Its chairman, Tran Cam Tu, is the one person on the Politburo who could cause the general secretary some trouble. He heads an investigative body with powers to investigate senior leadership that’s beyond Lam’s control. And as a reminder that Lam is not in complete control, on Oct. 25, the Politburo elected Tu as the standing chairman of the Secretariat, over Lam’s preferred candidate, Nguyen Duy Ngoc. Soldiers march in a parade in Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam, May 7, 2024. The other institutional check is the People’s Army. While armies tend to dominate politics in Southeast Asia, in Vietnam, power is the security police, a reflection of the regime’s fear of popular color revolutions. In addition to Lam and Luong Tam Quang, there are four other members of the Politburo who came up through the Ministry of Public Security. Many have looked to the military as an institutional check on the MPS, which is why the election of Luong Cuong to the presidency on Oct. 21 is seen as so important. Gen. Cuong is a career political commissar, becoming the chief of the Vietnam People’s Army’s General Political Department in 2016. As the top party official in the military, he also served on the Secretariat since 2016, becoming its standing chairman when Truong Thi Mai was forced to resign in May. In addition to Cuong, Minister of National Defense Phan Van Giang serves on the Politburo. Shoring up army ties Lam has been trying to build ties to the military. As general secretary, he is concurrently the chairman of the Central Military Commission, the highest defense decision-making body. In that capacity, he routinely meets with different military units and leadership. Lam’s also trying to carefully make his mark on personnel. He promoted Trinh Van Quyet, the current head of the General Political Department, to the Secretariat. He promoted three other senior officers from Hung Yen Province, including Deputy Minister of National Defense Hoang Xuan Chien, and Lt. General Nguyen Hong Thai, the commander of Military Region 1, which borders China. Even if the generals aren’t happy with a cop as chairman of the Central Military Commission, Lam is slowly putting his people into leadership positions. And all this matters, because the army comprises 11-13% on the Central Committee, the largest single bloc. Lam understands that getting allies into key positions should make himself unassailable just over a year from now at the 14th Congress. Through Luong Tam Quang, he can continue to investigate rivals. Other allies are in charge of personnel selection and drafting key party documents. The Communist Party of Vietnam has a culture of collective leadership – a norm that Lam briefly violated. By ceding the presidency, especially to a military man, he neutralizes some of the opposition to him, while giving up very little real power. In his consolidation of power, Lam took down eight different rivals on the Politburo since December 2022, a period of unprecedented political churn. Any more turmoil could be counter-productive. Lam seems to have succeeded in getting all his ducks in a row to be elected to a full term in January 2026. So rather than see the relinquishing of the presidency as a sign of weakness, it’s more accurate to think of it as a sign of growing political strength. Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College in Washington and an adjunct at Georgetown…

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North Korea

North Korea Intensifies Inspections on Propaganda Speakers called the Third Network

Ryanggang Province, North Korea — North Korea’s main anti-socialism inspection division is conducting door-to-door checks in the northern Ryanggang province to ensure that government-installed propaganda speakers in every household are functioning. Known as the “Third Network,” these speakers deliver local government messages, propaganda songs, and emergency alerts, often deemed critical for mobilization during times of crisis. Unified Command 82, established in 2021 to consolidate anti-socialism inspection units, is leading the current inspections, marking the second round of checks this year following a similar operation in March. Since October 11, residents have been required to listen to daily patriotic war songs and follow all government broadcasts, residents told Investigative Journalism Reportika under anonymity. By October 21, the inspections intensified, with inspectors identifying citizens who were either missing speakers or not actively tuning into the broadcasts. Households lacking a working speaker have been advised to purchase one through the post office, while those failing to comply are being publicly reprimanded. According to a local agricultural worker, many rural homes face challenges with the Third Network, with some areas still disconnected due to infrastructure issues dating back to the 1990s economic crisis. As a solution, officials proposed that residents donate dried ferns or omija berries to fund the purchase of broadcasting lines from China. However, this proposal has met resistance, as rural citizens are already struggling to meet basic needs. With a looming deadline at the end of November, officials warned that local party leaders may face severe punishment if they fail to restore full speaker functionality in their communities. However, previous years’ similar threats of punishment have reportedly gone unenforced.

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Cashing In

North Korea is sending more than 10,000 Korean People’s Army troops to fight for Russia in Ukraine, with some 3,000 already moved close to the front in western Russia. The deployment, under a security partnership pact North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russia’s Vladimir Putin signed in June, has raised concern among the U.S. and allies South Korea, Japan and Ukraine. Critics see mercenary motives in Pyongyang, which will receive cash and technology for the mission. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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