On Aug. 22, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet marked his first anniversary in office by personally receiving dozens of Khmer artifacts returned to Cambodia by the United States. The ceremony at his Peace Palace was dripping with symbolism.
“Why did these Khmer statues leave Cambodia? Because we were divided,” he declared. “However, now, their return symbolizes our reunion. On the first anniversary of [his government], we have maintained stability, peace, and prosperity for the people. Today, we celebrate as a unified nation, free from war and division.”
However, just a week earlier, the Cambodian Interior Ministry had ordered police to tighten security around Phnom Penh, instructing provincial leaders to do the same, citing a group allegedly plotting a Bangladesh-inspired “color revolution.”
There is unease in the country over tensions with neighboring Vietnam over the Funan Techo Canal, the Hun dynasty’s legacy project, which could threaten Vietnam’s rice-growing heartlands.
The public is also concerned about the implications of the Development Triangle Area, an old agreement involving Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam that has become a new point of contention in anti-Cambodian People’s Party circles.
Despite the government’s efforts to frame this as a purely economic zone, old prejudices persist, with some Cambodians viewing Hun Manet’s government as unpatriotic, much like they did his father’s.
Hun Sen, who ruled from 1985 until he handed power to his son last year, was often accused of being a puppet of Vietnam and later China, accused of selling off Cambodian land to the highest foreign bidder.
On the surface, despite concerns about the recent Bangladesh revolt, Hun Manet and his family appear secure. They control almost every significant political and social institution, and the economy continues to provide jobs and food for the people.
Hun Sen meticulously planned last year’s transition, implementing a “generational succession” in which key political and civil service families passed power down to their sons or relatives.
Shrewd transition strategy
This strategy was shrewd, as many authoritarian governments have succumbed to fratricide during leadership transitions. By allowing the political families that matter to keep their patronage and corruption networks, no one lost wealth or influence, thus ensuring stability during the changeover.
The Hun family remains first among equals, the ruling house within Cambodia’s political aristocracy. They control nearly every important institution except two: the navy, run by the Tea family, and the national police, overseen by the Sar family.
Hun Sen secured the presidency of the Cambodian Senate earlier this year, making him the acting head of state – a position that grants him the institutional power to intervene if his son’s government faces a crisis.
To further consolidate power, he enacted constitutional amendments last year to weaken the National Assembly and appointed a loyalist, Khuon Sudary, as its president. Additionally, he installed a family ally as army chief, succeeding Hun Manet, while another son, Hun Manith, heads military intelligence and now serves as deputy army chief.
Another son, Hun Many, who leads the country’s largest youth movement, was appointed minister of the Civil Service last year, ensuring the Hun family’s control over the bureaucracy. Hun Sen intends to remain CPP president for life, with Hun Manet running the party’s youth wing.
Hun Sen has also brought the rowdy but powerful business tycoons into line through the Cambodia Oknha Association he formed last year and presides over.
The monarchy, while independent, lacks political interest, with King Norodom Sihamoni staying out of politics and the Queen Mother, the power behind the throne, now 88 years old. Moreover, Hun Sen, Hun Manet, and their allies dominate the Royal Council of the Throne, the body responsible for selecting the next king.
In this feudal-like political system, the Hun family has appeased other influential families by allowing them to keep their patronage networks while consolidating its power across almost every key institution.
Ordinary Cambodians’ concerns
No family from this First Estate can rival the Huns. They also enjoy the support of the economic barons, the oknhas, and other business elites who finance the political aristocracy.
That leaves the Third Estate, the ordinary Cambodians. Hun Sen needed to rig last year’s general elections—and the two prior—to secure his son’s ascent to power.
Repression has persisted under Hun Manet’s rule. The opposition has been neutralized, and civil society has been either silenced or co-opted. Hun Manet’s government has successfully distributed patronage to the middle classes, whose loyalty might have shifted toward a political alternative, if one was ever to exist again.
The government continues to deliver basic needs.
While the recent revolution in Bangladesh alarmed the Hun family, Cambodia does not face similar conditions. The country’s garment industry, which many expected to collapse during the COVID-19 pandemic, has instead rebounded and is once again driving economic growth.
Cambodia’s tourism industry has also recovered in terms of visitor numbers, though revenue remains about two-thirds of pre-2020 levels. There has been progress in the tech and service sectors, though the construction industry and related sectors, like brickmaking, have declined.
Typically, young women worked in garment factories while young men found jobs on construction sites, so the loss of construction jobs could have posed a threat to the government. However, many young men have returned to agriculture, which is thriving, especially with increased exports to China.
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Economic challenges
However, there is a potential vulnerability.
The CPP framed last year’s succession as a handover from the “first generation” of party leaders, such as Hun Sen, Tea Banh, and Sar Kheng, who “saved” Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge and brought peace and prosperity to a war-torn country.
The “second generation,” led by Hun Manet, is supposed to build on these achievements – a generation of technocrats, not warriors or visionaries. Their legitimacy stems from being the chosen successors of their heroic parents and from the economic progress they are expected to deliver.
Many Cambodians are skeptical of the first claim, recognizing that Hun Manet and his peers hold power due to patronage rather than merit. This means they will be judged entirely on their economic performance.
In fact, the current government has distanced itself from certain state matters. Hun Sen, as Senate president, has taken on a shadow foreign policy role, handling controversial issues and leaving the actual foreign ministry to focus solely on trade and investment.
Hun Manet’s power will only be secure as long as his father remains.
While his family wields considerable institutional power, from the military to the civil service and business elites, most of these institutions ultimately answer to Hun Sen, not his son.
Taking control of these power centers will be far more of a challenge in the coming years than simply being handed the prime ministership. For now, Hun Manet’s legitimacy rests solely on the economy, which ought to concentrate his attention.
However, holding power in Cambodia’s political system requires more than just delivering jobs and food to the populace.
David Hutt is a research fellow at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) and the Southeast Asia Columnist at the Diplomat. He writes the Watching Europe In Southeast Asia newsletter. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of RFA.
