The Geopolitical Weaponization of Maps by China
The investigative report by Ij-Reportika aims to scrutinize the contentious matter of Chinese maps throughout history.
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Category: South Asia
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Forced recruitment underway in Myanmar’s Ayeyarwady region
Junta authorities in southwestern Myanmar’s Ayeyarwady region are compiling lists of draft-eligible residents amid a roll-out of the country’s conscription law, sources told RFA Burmese. On Feb. 10, the junta enacted the People’s Military Service Law, prompting many civilians of fighting age to flee Myanmar’s cities, saying they would rather leave the country or join anti-junta forces in remote border areas than serve in the military, which seized power in a 2021 coup d’etat. The junta has sought to downplay the announcement, claiming that conscription won’t go into effect until April, but RFA has received several reports indicating that forced recruitment is already under way across the country. Residents of Ayeyarwady region’s Ingapu, Kyon Pyaw, Yae Kyi and A Thote townships said that junta authorities called a meeting of ward and village administrators in the third week of February and ordered them to gather lists of residents eligible for military service. A resident of Kyhon Pyaw’s Inn Ma village, who like others interviewed for this report spoke on condition of anonymity due to security concerns, told RFA that authorities checked residency lists in the village and compiled a list of 35 people, both men and women, for conscription. “There are 10 wards here and the heads of 10 households in each ward collected the lists, and handed them over to the respective ward administrators,” he said. “They didn’t need to collect the lists door to door, as they can find the information from the family lists. The disabled and ill were exempted from military services.” Recruiting one from each village In Ingapu, the junta’s township administration ordered ward and village administrations to recruit one person from each village-tract for military service, residents told RFA. A resident of Ingapu’s Thet Kei Tan village said that the village administrator gave superiors the name of one young man in nearby Chin Kone village, who he said “seemed willing to join the military.” “On the other side of our village, each household had to pay 10,000 kyats (US$5) if they did not want to serve,” he said. Southwestern commander Brig. Gen. Wai Lin meets with militia members from townships in the Ayeyarwady region on Sept. 22, 2023. (Myanmar military) In nearby Bogale township, junta authorities organized military training for teachers in front of the town hall around mid-February, residents said. On Feb. 20, leaflets were distributed in area markets persuading people to join the military. Township authorities called a meeting with respective ward administrators and instructed them to “focus on youths who have no parents and few relatives” for recruitment, a resident told RFA. “It wasn’t mandatory to recruit one person from each household,” he said. “Authorities recommended at the meeting that the recruitment focus on youths with no parents and those who are willing to join the military to earn a salary.” In another Ayeyarwady township called Myan Aung, a resident told RFA that the recruitment process began around Feb. 15 in the wards and villages. He also said that the junta conducted military training for 30 people at the headquarters of Infantry Battalion 51 in the seat of Myan Aung township on Feb. 27. Residents of the township were made to pay for the cost of two sets of military uniforms and the daily wages of the trainees, he said. A member of the Ayeyarwady parliament, who declined to be named, told RFA that the junta leadership has focused on his region to recruit soldiers as it is their “stronghold.” “However, I don’t think they will get the numbers they had hoped for,” he said. Another Ayeyarwady lawmaker condemned the junta’s use of forced recruitment to implement the conscription law. “Although they use the term ‘military service,’ people are actually being forced to work as porters or act as human shields on the battlefield,” he said. “It’s a grave violation of human rights.” Hundreds held in Mandalay RFA also received reports on Wednesday that hundreds of youths aged 20-30 who had been recruited for military training from around the country are being stationed in Mandalay region’s Yamethin township. “Around 200 or 300 youths are being held at the No. 1 Police Training Depot for military training,” said a resident of the township. “They have to live in dormitories there and no one is allowed to leave.” Another resident of Yamethin told RFA that, beginning on March 1, security had been strengthened at the facility. “It’s not the regular training period for new police officers,” he said. “Authorities are inspecting all passers-by.” Myanmar junta authorities conduct inspections at the Dedaye bridge checkpoint in Pyapon district, Ayeyarwady region. (We Love Dedaye) The junta’s Information Ministry said in a social media post on Feb. 27 that there had been some “misinformation” circulating about the collection of personal data of men aged between 18 and 35. It also dismissed reports that junta security forces and administrative organizations are forcibly arresting people for military service. Similarly, pro-junta newspapers said Wednesday that reports of youths being held for military training at the No. 1 Police Training Depot in Yamethin are false. On Feb. 15, pro-junta media quoted spokesman Major General Zaw Min Tun as saying that around 50,000 people will be drafted into military service each year in accordance with the country’s conscription law. He added that 13 million people are currently eligible for service in Myanmar, based on a 2019 census. Missing for more than a month Reports of the forced recruitment in Ayeyarwady came as a resident of the region told RFA that four people arrested by junta authorities in Dedaye township for alleged possession of weapons remain missing one month after their detention. Hlaing Myo Kyaw, Naing Myo Shwe and his wife Su Mar, and Htet Myat Soe from Dedaye’s Kyeik Taw and Ka Wet Chaung villages were arrested on Feb. 4 with drones and weapons, including rocket-propelled grenades, or RPGs. Two others from the township – former political prisoner Wai Yan Oo and his mother – were also detained at the time. Two…
Authorities urge ‘stability’ amid restrictions on Tibetans due to dam protests
Chinese officials have told local ethnic Tibetans and monastic leaders in Sichuan province to maintain stability following the arrest of more than 1,000 protesters over a hydropower dam, and made clear that the project would continue, two Tibetans with knowledge of the situation said. If built, the Gangtuo Dam power station on the Drichu River could submerge several monasteries in Dege’s county’s Wangbuding township and force residents of at least two villages near the river to relocate, sources earlier told RFA. “Chinese officials have held meetings in the Wonto village area where they ordered local Tibetans to comply with the government’s plans and regulations and called for the leaders of the local monasteries to mobilize the locals to toe the party line,” said one source who hails from Dege and now lives in exile. On Feb. 25, Dege County Party Secretary Baima Zhaxi visited Wangbuding and neighboring townships to meet with Buddhist monastic leaders and village administrators, during which he called for “stability” and urged residents to comply with regulations or else be “dealt with in accordance with the law and regulations,” according to a local news report. “As the stability maintenance period in March and the national Two Sessions approach, we must implement detailed stability maintenance measures to promote continued harmony and stability in the jurisdiction,” Zhaxi was quoted in the report as saying. The Two Sessions refers to China’s annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, being held this week in Beijing. “We must continue to carry out the investigation and resolution of conflicts, risks and hidden dangers, and effectively resolve conflicts and disputes at the grassroots level, and nip them in the bud,” Zhaxi said. Zhaxi’s visit comes ahead of Tibetan Uprising Day on March 10, a politically sensitive date that commemorates the thousands of Tibetans who died in a 1959 uprising against China’s invasion and occupation of their homeland, and the flight of their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, into exile in northern India. Keep building Zhaxi also visited the dam construction site and told the leaders of the coordination team to adhere to their work orders and make arrangements for “the next step of work,” according to a local Chinese government announcement. Zhaxi told residents about “the great significance and necessity of the construction of hydropower stations” and indicated that the government would “protect the legitimate interests of the masses to the greatest extent.” “Abide by the law, express your demands in a legal, civilized and rational manner, and do not exceed the bottom line,” Zhaxi told locals during the on-site visit, according to the same news report. “Otherwise, you will be dealt with in accordance with the law and regulations.” Tibetans in exile hold a rally in Amsterdam to support dam protesters in Dege county, southwestern China’s Sichuan province, March 1, 2024. (Netherlands Tibetan Community) On Feb. 23, police arrested more than 1,000 Tibetans, including monks and residents in the county in Sichuan’s Kardze Autonomous Tibetan Prefecture, who had been protesting the construction of the dam, meant to generate electricity. Authorities continue to heighten security restrictions in Dege county on the east bank of the Drichu River, called Jinsha in Chinese, and in Jomda county of Qamdo city in the Tibet Autonomous Region on the west bank of the river, said the sources who both live in exile and requested anonymity for safety reasons. Strict surveillance Residents are forbidden from contacting anyone outside the area, the sources said. Chinese officials continue to impose strict digital surveillance and tight restrictions on movement in Wangbuding after rare video footage emerged from inside Tibet on Feb. 22 of Chinese police beating Tibetan monks, before arresting more than 100 of them, most of whom were from Wonto and Yena monasteries. Since then, authorities have carried out wide-scale rigorous interrogations of the arrested Tibetans, even as information from inside Tibet has been harder to come by amid a crackdown on the use of mobile phones and social media and messaging platforms to restrict communication with the outside world, sources said. The protests began on Feb. 14, when at least 300 Tibetans gathered outside Dege County Town Hall to protest the building of the Gangtuo Dam, part of a massive 13-tier hydropower complex with a total planned capacity of 13,920 megawatts. Over the past two weeks, Tibetans in exile have been holding solidarity rallies in cities in the United States, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Australia and India. Global leaders and Tibetan advocacy groups have condemned China’s actions, calling for the immediate release of those detained. Last week, Chinese authorities released about 40 of the arrested monks on Feb. 26 and 27, RFA reported. Additional reporting and editing by Tenzin Pema for RFA Tibetan. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.
Why Laos’ Communists cannot do anti-corruption
Corruption is often seen as a byproduct, a quirk, of a political system. But in many authoritarian states, it is actually the modus operandi. Consider what binds a political structure together. How do you make sure that lowly officials in the provinces listen to their masters in the capital? How do you instill the sense that everyone is working together for the same cause, that all participants aren’t just a bunch of self-interested, warring individuals? One way is through terror. Officials listened to Joseph Stalin, the Soviet dictator, and his Politburo because they feared for their lives. Another is through a common sense of purpose. This could be ideological. Everyone works towards the same goals because they believe they are creating a better world. Or it could be existential, such as everyone pulling together during wartime. Or it could be transactional, as we see in meritocracies, with everyone accepting the norms and hierarchies of the political structure because doing so means they stand a chance of advancing up the political ladder. Cambodia’s King Norodom Sihamoni, front center, and members of Cambodia’s government pose with newly elected members of parliament during the opening ceremony at the National Assembly building in Phnom Penh on Aug. 21, 2023. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) However, another method is through corruption, what some academics would call “rent-seeking”. Low-ranking officials in the provinces pay heed to their superiors in the capital because they are all part of vast patronage networks. Low-ranking officials are loyal to their patrons in return for financial benefits and promotion, while the higher-ranking patrons in government are able to get others to follow their policies because they control the fortunes of those lower down the hierarchy. Moreover, corruption provides something of a common purpose, a common understanding, amongst all levels of the political structure. Everyone knows how the game is rigged and that they have to pay fealty to those who control the most important patronage networks in order to advance up the hierarchy. Indeed, graft instills a sense of loyalty. When harmonized, as in Cambodia, a rent-seeking system ensures that all political grandees have just enough access to financial rewards and that graft is spread somewhat equitably so that there are no major internal frictions. That begs the question of how anti-corruption campaigns can work in authoritarian states that previously had rent-seeking systems. Vietnam is a good example. Before 2016, the Communist Party of Vietnam held its hierarchy together in large part through corruption. This was partly because of the decentralization that occurred in the 2000s, which made it much more difficult for the central party apparatus to control what was happening in the provinces and districts. More importantly, ideological factors that had previously held the Communist Party together began to fade. Rent-seeking cadres By the early 1990s, when Hanoi made peace with Beijing, Vietnam was for the first time in half a century unthreatened by a foreign power. No longer could the CPV compel internal cohesion within its ranks through rally-around-the-flag appeals to cohesion and unity At the same time, because the Vietnamese government became more professionalized, it meant bringing in non-communist officials. This, added to the public’s disinterest in socialist ideals, especially after the capitalist reforms in 1986, meant that communist ideology no longer functioned as a way to bind the political structure together. And the CPV was no longer the sole arbitrator of nationalism. In the early 2000s, a popular strain of nationalism emerged among the public that accused the party of being unpatriotic for selling Vietnamese land to foreign (mainly Chinese) investors, which culminated in the momentous Bauxite protests of 2009. Amid these social changes, a new generation of rent-seeking apparatchiks emerged – personified by Nguyen Tan Dung, who became prime minister in 2006 – who cast aside ideology and nationalism and instead embraced graft as a way of building their own personal power and binding the splintering party apparatus. This led to a reaction, however, from the more ideological factions of the party, led by Nguyen Phu Trong, who became party chief in 2012. Vietnam’s Communist Party general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, left, gestures as he arrives at the National Assembly in Hanoi on Jan. 15, 2024. (Nhac Nguyen/AFP) However, it was only when he defeated Dung in the 2016 National Congress that Trong launched his anti-corruption campaign. Even then, dismissing or jailing the corrupt was only one side of the coin. Far more important, as Trong has acknowledged, has been his so-called “morality campaign”. Since 2016, he has reinstated socialist ideology and ethics as the defining factor of party membership. To be promoted now, an official must at least rhetorically profess fealty to socialism and demonstrate a clean, hard-working lifestyle. At the same time, Trong has re-centralized power, taking away authority from the provincial officials and giving it to his small clique in Hanoi, which is one reason why he has struggled to find a successor, given that he has now cloaked his own position in so much power — perhaps the most since 1986 — that it has become even more precarious and existential if the CPV selects an unfit successor. So what about next-door Laos? Similar to Vietnam, it embraced decentralization in the 1990s, stripping the apparatchiks in Vientiane of some of their authority. Given its geography, the central party apparatus in Laos has always been unable to fully control what local officials do. Its capitalist reforms in the late 1980s also stripped socialist ideology as a common cause within Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP). In fact, the LPRP has long been less ideological than its Vietnamese counterpart. Anti-corruption failure Nationalism, too, has disappeared. Indeed, the growing anti-Chinese chorus of Laotians has led many to regard the LPRP with disdain, believing it has allowed foreign businesses to destroy the environment and made Laotians second-class citizens. Unlike in Vietnam, however, anti-corruption efforts have failed in Laos. When he became prime minister in 2016, Thongloun Sisssoloth vowed to unleash a vast anti-graft campaign, but it had…
Ford vans seen in Kim Jong Un’s entourage
North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency released at least two photos of vans used in Kim Jong Un’s motorcade that appeared to be made by Ford Motor Co., suggesting that Pyongyang has again evaded U.N. sanctions. One Feb. 29 photo of a groundbreaking ceremony shows Kim walking on a red carpet lined with soldiers at attention with the black passenger vans in the background. Another shows the four of the vans bearing the Ford logo on the front driving behind a luxury black sedan. The vehicles appear to be fourth generation Ford Transit vans that have been manufactured in North America since 2021. The photos didn’t show any passengers in the vans. A 2013 U.N. sanctions resolution bans the import of luxury cars into North Korea. Another U.N. resolution in 2017 banned the import of all means of transportation. But it’s widely believed that luxury goods are still being smuggled into North Korea. Two black Ford Transit vans are seen in the background during North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s visit to air force headquarters on Dec. 1, 2023. (KCNA) T.R. Reid, director of corporate and public policy communications for Ford, told Radio Free Asia that Ford “fully complies” with sanctions against North Korea and other countries, and “doesn’t provide products or services in, to or through agents of the country.” “How these vehicles were procured for use in and brought to North Korea is unknown,” he said. In January 2023, a vehicle presumed to be a Mercedes-Benz Maybach GLS 600 belonging to Kim was revealed in images from North Korea’s Korean Central Television. And at the end of last year, Kim and other top North Korean officials were seen arriving at Party Central Committee headquarters in a Mercedes-Benz S-Class car. Allowing the Ford vans to be photographed was a demonstration by Kim that he can still access luxury items from all over the world, said Bruce Bennett, a senior researcher at the Rand Institute. “American things like a Ford. German things, like a Mercedes,” he said. “He’s basically demonstrating his power and access that his people can get around all of these sanctions.” Translated by Jisoo Kim. Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster.
Exclusive: Kim Jong Un is now ‘Great Comrade,’ no longer ‘Great Leader’
North Korea’s supreme leader Kim Jong Un has received a new title, “Great Comrade,” signaling that the leadership wants to emphasize his achievements over his predecessors, father Kim Jong Il and grandfather Kim Il Sung, residents told Radio Free Asia. The shift from “Great Leader” to “Great Comrade” occurred sometime this month, as the country circulated a five-point oath – shared exclusively with RFA Korean – that must be sworn by all North Koreans to pledge their loyalty. The oath, sent to all organizations and institutions in the country, is read by officials at various events, including holidays and national anniversaries, and repeated by the people, said a North Korean resident who requested anonymity for security reasons Each of the five parts of the oath contains the title “Great Comrade.” The promise commits the speaker to “support and defend” Kim Jong Un “politically and ideologically,” and pledges that they will remain “loyal and obedient” to his sole leadership “at all costs,” and will only follow the “Mt. Paektu bloodline,” which refers to the Kim Dynasty. National founder Kim Il Sung and the ruling Kim family is said to have strong connections to Mt. Paektu, the tallest mountain on the Korean peninsula and a sacred peak in Korean mythology. The oath goes on to say the speaker is armed with the “revolutionary ideology of Great Comrade Kim Jong Un” and commits them to “vigorously participate in the construction of socialism,” and fight against anti-socialism. It concludes by pledging to dedication “to the final victory of the Juche revolution and National Unification.” Juche is North Korea’s founding ideology of self-reliance. Elevating his status The five points are preceded by a singular statement about working towards the socialist theory known as “Great Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism” – but after that, neither Kim’s father nor grandfather are mentioned. The lack of emphasis on Kim’s predecessors suggests that the government wants to elevate his status above them, according to Jiro Ishimaru of the Osaka-based Asia Press, a news outlet that specializes in North Korea. The cover of the oath administered to all North Korean residents. (RFA) “In the past there were consistent messages saying that we should not forget the leadership of Grand Marshal Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and carry out their instructions,” Ishimaru said. “But in this oath, these messages have almost disappeared. It refers to ‘Great Comrade Kim Jong Un’ and only mentions that Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism is to be maintained,” he said. “It certainly seems like a lot has changed.” The new oath places unique emphasis on Kim Jong Un, whereas previously the government included adherence to the ideologies of the predecessors to project a sense of continuity to enhance the perception of his legitimacy, Cheong Seong-chang, the director of the Center for Korean Peninsula Strategy at the Sejong Institute, told RFA. “In the past, they expressed their stance to inherit the ideology and policies of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. But there are many differences between Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il’s policies and Kim Jong Un’s policies,” he said. “This oath basically puts Kim Jong Un’s instructions and guidance forward as the absolute standard. So, it seems that Kim Jong Un’s leadership is firmly rooted now.” Dropping national unification Recently, the North Korean government has reversed its official stance on reunification, and no longer considers it a priority. This makes the fifth clause of the oath, which mentions national unification, obsolete. Experts therefore believe that this oath was written in 2021 or earlier. A resident of North Korea who requested anonymity for safety reasons said that instructions were given to officials to skip the part about national unification when reading the oath. Experts expect that a revised version of this oath will be circulated soon to reflect the shift away from the South, which in recent months North Korea has defined as its “primary enemy.” Additionally, Pyongyang has ended economic cooperation with Seoul, and has stopped using language that considers Koreans on both sides of the DMZ as belonging to the same race of people. Translated by Claire Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.
Tibetans in India march in solidarity with those arrested in dam protest in China
Tibetans and Buddhist leaders in northern India on Wednesday participated in a march to show their solidarity with Tibetans in southwestern China’s Sichuan province arrested for peacefully protesting the planned construction of a dam. Similar solidarity rallies were held in London and other cities the same day. The large Buddhist community in Ladakh – in Jammu and Kashmir – expressed concerns that the dam project will submerge several significant monasteries with ancient murals that date back to the 13th century. The Regional Tibetan Youth Congress, which organized the march and rally, said Buddhists there were concerned about the humanitarian situation and the violation of cultural and religious rights stemming from the expected impact of the dam on several monasteries and villages near the Drichu River. On Feb. 23, police arrested more than 1,000 Tibetans, including monks and residents, of Dege county in Sichuan’s Kardze Autonomous Tibetan Prefecture, who had been protesting the construction of the Gangtuo Dam, meant to generate electricity. If built, the power station could submerge monasteries in Dege’s Wangbuding township and force residents of at least two villages near the Drichu River to relocate, sources told RFA. Rigzin Dorjey, president of the youth wing of the Ladakh Buddhist Association Leh, said there is an urgent need to address the ongoing human rights abuses and environmental destruction perpetrated by China’s communist government. He underscored the interconnectedness of global Buddhist communities and the shared responsibility to stand in solidarity with Tibetans in their struggle for justice, freedom and dignity. ‘Collective commitment’ Lobsang Tsering, vice president of the Regional Tibetan Youth Congress of Ladakh, said the rally serves as “an expression of solidarity and support for Tibetans facing challenges and oppression in Dege county.” “It symbolizes a collective commitment to standing up against oppression, promoting human rights and preserving Tibetan culture and identity in the face of adversity,” Tsering said. Tenzin Peldon, who participated in the march in Ladakh said while Tibetans everywhere usually gather to raise their voices against China on politically significant dates such as March 10, known as Tibetan Uprising Day – which commemorates the thousands of lives lost in the 1959 uprising against China’s invasion and occupation of their homeland – it is crucial that they come together during dire situations like the one being faced by Tibetans in Dege to collectively speak up against China’s oppression. “I urge all Tibetans in exile not to give up hope and to continue to raise awareness on online platforms about the plight of Tibetans in Dege county,” she said. Other protests were held in Bir village and Clement town in India, and in London, where Tibetans demonstrated outside the Chinese Embassy to show their support for the Dege county protesters, demand the release of the detainees, and call for an immediate halt to the dam construction. “Risking arrest and torture, Tibetan residents of Kham Derge [Dege county] have shared images and videos of the protest with the outside world,” the Tibetan Community UK said in a statement. “They want the international community in the free world to know about their plight and to raise their voice.” Authorities released about 40 of the arrested monks on Feb. 26 and 27, RFA reported on Tuesday. Chinese authorities released about 20 monks each on Monday and Tuesday, said the sources who spoke on condition of anonymity for safety reasons. Also on Wednesday, Human Rights Watch called on Chinese authorities to immediately release the detained Tibetan monks. “The Chinese authorities have long been hostile to public protests, but their response is especially brutal when the protests are by Tibetans and other ethnic groups,” said Maya Wang, the group’s acting China director, in a statement. “Other governments should press Beijing to free these protesters, who have been wrongfully detained for exercising their basic rights,” she said. Translated by Tenzin Dickyi and Tenzin Pema for RFA Tibetan. Additional reporting by Pelbar for RFA Tibetan. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.
Junta troops beat Myanmar man unconscious during interrogation
Junta troops have arrested at least 10 young people from Myanmar’s delta region, beating one unconscious during questioning, locals told Radio Free Asia on Wednesday. The youths, from three villages in Ayeyarwady region, were accused of involvement in political activities, residents from Kyonpyaw township said, citing sources close to the police station. On Sunday, soldiers arrested a man from Kyee Taw Yoe village who goes by the name Freddy. Following Freddy’s arrest, around 10 youths from Nyaung Kone and Kyar Inn villages were rounded up. A Kyonpyaw township resident who wished to remain anonymous for security reasons told RFA the youths were thought to be connected to Freddy, who was tortured by the police. “There was a young man who was arrested in Kyonpyaw on Feb. 25. He was the first to be arrested. He is still under investigation and in Ah Htaung police custody,” said the local. “We found out that the young man was unconscious because they beat him during the interrogation. After that, more than 10 people were arrested on political suspicion.” Some other young people from the area have fled as a result of the arrests, he said. RFA called Ayeyarwady region’s junta spokesperson Khin Maung Kyi to learn more about the arrests, but he did not answer calls. In October, 20-year-old Kyonpyaw local Soe Paing Oo died during interrogation after being accused of communicating with resistance forces. Days earlier, he was awarded cash and a certificate for his surrender in a junta ceremony. On Jan. 6, at least seven locals were arrested in connection with the murder of two village administrators, Than Min Aung and Ngwe Thein in Kyonpyaw township’s Ma Gu Yoe village, locals said. The township in eastern Ayeyarwady has faced some of the nation’s heaviest recruitment efforts, even before junta leader Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing announced on Feb. 10 plans to enforce the People’s Military Service Law. Junta troops demanded 10 recruits per village in January, threatening to burn down houses if their quota was not met. Relying on surrendered resistance fighters and retired military personnel, troops also attempted to bolster numbers in December. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Mike Firn.
US official expresses concern over crackdown on Tibetans protesting dam
An American official expressed deep concern about the arrest of over 1,000 Tibetans protesting a dam project in central China that would destroy several Buddhist monasteries, saying the United States “stands with Tibetans in preserving their unique cultural, religious, and linguistic identity.” Tibetan advocacy groups condemned China’s actions, calling for the immediate release of those detained. On Feb. 23, police arrested more than 1,000 Tibetans, including monks and residents, in Dege county in Kardze Autonomous Tibetan Prefecture, who had been peacefully protesting against the dam, which would also force two villages to be relocated, sources told Radio Free Asia. Over the weekend, police began interrogations, beating some detainees so badly that they required medical attention, sources told RFA. Uzra Zeya, U.S. under secretary for civilian security, democracy and human rights and U.S. special coordinator for Tibetan Issues, said on X on Feb. 25 that she was deeply concerned by reports of the “mass arrests of Tibetans protesting the construction of a dam that threatens displacement of villages & destruction of monasteries.” “China must respect human rights & freedom of expression and include Tibetans in the development & implementation of water and land management policies,” she tweeted. “These centuries-old monasteries are home to hundreds of Tibetan Buddhist monks and contain irreplaceable cultural relics,” she wrote. “The U.S. stands with Tibetans in preserving their unique cultural, religious, and linguistic identity.” ‘Wiping out culture and religion’ The arrests “should be a reminder to the world of how brutal daily life under China’s occupation is for the Tibetan people,” a statement issued Monday on X from the International Campaign for Tibet by its president, Tencho Gyatso. “China tries to hide its forced relocation of Tibetans, its destruction of their environment, and its attempts to wipe out their culture and religion,” the statement said. Saying the protesters demonstrated “incredible courage,” Gyatso said they needed the support of the international community. “We call on the Chinese government to free these Tibetans at once,” she said. “We also call on the U.S. and other governments to step up pressure on China to end its vicious occupation of Tibet.” Chinese authorities arrest Tibetan monks during a protest against a dam project on the Drichu River in Dege county, southwestern China’s Sichuan province, Feb. 22, 2024. (Image from citizen journalist video) Four Tibetan NGOs based in Dharamsala, India, home to the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, issued a statement of solidarity with the Tibetan community in Dege county. They said that the displacement of Tibetan communities is “not new phenomena,” just one of many examples. “The continued disregard for the rights and well-being of Tibetans in the face of such development projects is unacceptable and demands immediate attention from the international community,” said the statement by the Tibetan Women’s Association, National Democratic Party of Tibet, Regional Tibetan Youth Congress and Students for a Free Tibet. Environmental disruption The four groups went on to say that the construction of the dam not only threatens the local Tibetan community but also poses a risk to the fragile ecosystem of the Tibetan plateau. “Any disruption to Tibet’s rivers and a diversion of the rivers could have far-reaching consequences for the environment, biodiversity, and livelihoods of millions of people downstream,” they said. William Nee, research and advocacy coordinator at Chinese Human Rights Defenders, or CHRD, told RFA that his organization was concerned about the situation of the detainees, whether they are being maltreated and if they have sufficient food. RFA reported earlier that authorities told those who were arrested to bring bedding and food, suggesting they would not be released soon. CHRD was also concerned whether authorities were giving those arrested access to relatives and lawyers, and whether they were being detained according to Chinese Criminal Procedure Law. “But beyond that, there are also concerns about the livelihood of the potentially affected communities by the dam and whether this has been taken into consideration,” Nee said. “And also the cultural rights, given that this might impact monasteries – some having ancient murals going back to the 13th century.” Khenpo Sonam Tenphel, speaker of the Tibetan parliament-in-exile, tweeted on X that Tibetans worldwide condemned the crackdown. “We urge China to promptly release those detained and to cease the dam construction,” he tweeted. “It is crucial for China to acknowledge the peaceful protests of Tibetans, addressing their concerns about preserving historic monasteries and safeguarding their homes.” Translated and edited by Tenzin Pema. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.
Vacation is over for Cambodian strongman Hun Sen
Every politician, especially one whose chokehold over a country lasted nearly four decades, needs some time off. Hun Sen, who handed over the prime ministership of Cambodia to his eldest son last summer, has had his feet up for the past seven months. Not that he’s been idle; he’s still president of the ruling party and head of the King’s Privy Council, and has occasionally intervened to publicly chide his son for some mistakes. But after the Senate elections on Feb. 25, he’ll be coronated as the new Senate president. The position will make him acting head of state when King Norodom Sihamoni is out of the country, as he often is for health checkups in China. With Cambodia now a Hun family fiefdom, you’ll have Prime Minister Hun Manet as head of government and Hun Sen as de-facto head of state. What does it matter, you may ask, since Hun Sen is already all powerful? But the question contains the answer. Clearly, Hun Sen doesn’t think of himself that way or else why would he want the Senate presidency? Indeed, he stated on the day that he resigned as prime minister last July that he would become Senate president, so clearly this had been decided when the ruling party was crossing the T’s on its vast succession plan in 2021 and 2022. Moreover, it’s not a risk-free move. It means the current Senate president, Say Chhum, has to retire. This has the added benefit of pensioning off another graying ruling party grandee and one who some think controls a rival faction within the party. Say Chhum had agreed to resign last year, perhaps safe in the knowledge that his family’s patronage networks are now in the hands of his son Say Sam Al, the land management minister. But for those in the party (and there are some) angry that the CPP has become a family-run affair, the Hun duo as heads of government and state won’t sit well. Hun Sen stated last July during his resignation speech that by becoming Senate president, “I will not intrude into the responsibilities of the new prime minister,” but it certainly appears that may to some. Cambodia’s Prime Minister-designate Hun Manet, center, and incoming cabinet members pose for a group photo at the headquarters of the Cambodian People’s Party in Phnom Penh, Aug. 10, 2023. (Kok Ky/Cambodia’s Government Cabinet via AFP) Moreover, it seemingly goes against the spirit of the party’s generational succession scheme in which the aging “first generation” CPP leaders (Hun Sen included) were supposed to retire from frontline politics and give formal powers to the “second generation”, even if the elders still called the shots behind the scenes. So why not give the Senate presidency to a younger, “second generation” politician? Given that the CPP took years to meticulously plot this succession process – so it cannot be that they were stuck in making a decision about who would become Senate president and Hun Sen was the easiest option to fill the void – the only logical conclusion is that Hun Sen wants the Senate presidency because he thinks he needs it. First, it will allow him to travel abroad on state visits or welcome visiting leaders in an official capacity, which he hasn’t been able to do since August. Despite having been the world’s longest-serving head of government, he never gained acceptance as a world’s statesman, certainly not one spoken of with the same reverence as Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore. The Senate presidency might give him another decade or so to attempt to claim such a mantle. Second, according to some, it gives him official diplomatic immunity, which may come in handy at some point in the future. Third, and while one ordinarily ought to avoid psychoanalyzing politicians, it’s probable that Hun Sen detests being away from frontline politics and not being able to make public displays of his power, so maybe it’s the case that he is taking the Senate presidency simply because he can. Institutional capture Now 71, he has been a senior politician since the age of 27, and he never seemed the type to enjoy retirement nor to shy away from publicity. Hun Sen is never happier than when delivering a three-hour monologue to a crowd of bussed-in workers. But he’s had few opportunities to do so since August, although that’s partly because he has wanted to give his son the limelight. As Senate president, he will have a captive audience (in more ways than one) again. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the Senate presidency gives him yet more institutional power to intervene if something was to go wrong with his son’s government – or, indeed, if there was ever a putschist attempt against Hun Manet. Remember that Hun Sen has repeatedly said he would return as prime minister if any major crisis befouled the government; the insinuation being that his vacation from the premiership may be temporary. For the best part of a decade, the Hun family has been on a long march through the institutions, wary that some of its rivals may also be on their own such project. Today, he has the King’s ear as head of the Supreme Privy Advisory Council. He controls the powerful but unruly (and quick to disgruntlement) business tycoons, the oknha, as president of the newly-formed Cambodian Oknha Association. He’s also president of some other CPP-linked “uncivil society” groups. Through constitutional reforms in 2022, he greatly weakened the power of the National Assembly to reprimand ministers or the prime minister, and in 2023 he helped make the loyal but politically weak Khuon Sudary the new president of the lower chamber of parliament. These steps gave even more power to the CPP over personnel choices. Cambodian People’s Party President Hun Sen, left, addresses supporters in Phnom Penh as his son Prime Minister Hun Manet, right, listens during a ceremony marking the 45th anniversary of the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime, Jan. 7, 2024. (Tang Chhin…
