Biden: US will defend Philippines if vessels are attacked

U.S. President Joe Biden said Thursday that American military support for the Philippines was “ironclad,” and any attacks against its vessels in the South China Sea would invoke a 1951 treaty that compels each country to come to the other’s aid in the event of a conflict. The comments came ahead of an unprecedented summit between Biden and his Japanese and Philippine counterparts at the White House. A senior U.S. official said the talks were arranged because of the recent flare-up in tensions between Beijing and Manila in the South China Sea. “I want to be clear, the United States’ defense commitments to Japan and to the Philippines are ironclad,” Biden said at the opening of the meeting. “Any attack on Philippine aircraft, vessels or armed forces in the South China Sea would invoke our mutual defense treaty.” The U.S. has a mutual defense treaty with the Philippines and a military alliance with Japan, both of which were inked in 1951. Chinese coast guard vessels fire water cannons towards a Philippine resupply vessel, the Unaizah, on its way to a resupply mission at Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin Shoal) in the South China Sea, March 5, 2024. (Adrian Portugal/Reuters) Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said that increased trilateral cooperation between the Pacific nations was borne from their shared democratic values and evidenced by joint military drills in the South China Sea last weekend. “It is a partnership born not out of convenience nor of expediency,” Marcos said, “but as a natural progression of a deepening cooperation amongst our three countries, linked by a profound respect for democracy, good governance and the rule of law.” Water cannon attacks Chinese coast guard vessels have in recent weeks fired water cannons at Philippine boats attempting to supply a deliberately sunken warship that serves as a Philippine naval outpost at the Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin Shoal), with Beijing also warning Manila against trying to access it. The shoal lies in South China Sea waters within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, where Manila holds sovereign rights. But Beijing claims most of the sea as its historic territory and says Manila must ask permission from Chinese authorities to access the area. People protest against the Marcos administration’s 2023 decision to grant the United States greater access to military bases in the Philippines, as they demonstrate in a park near the White House in Washington, where the leaders of the U.S., Philippines, and Japan were holding a summit, April 11, 2024. (BenarNews) Earlier on Thursday, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning accused Manila of “violating China’s sovereignty” for decades due to the half-sunken BRP Sierra Madre, which was grounded at the shoal in 1999 to maintain Manila’s sovereignty but now needs repairs. Speaking at a daily press briefing, Mao said Chinese authorities were “willing to allow” Philippine vessels to freely access the increasingly dilapidated outpost – but only to “tow” it away, and not repair it.  She said Manila needed to inform Beijing of any such plans before accessing the area, and then “China will monitor the whole process.” “If the Philippines sends a large amount of construction materials to the warship and attempts to build fixed facilities and a permanent outpost, China will not accept it and will resolutely stop it in accordance with law and regulations to uphold China’s sovereignty,” Mao said. She added that China’s recent “activities” in the South China Sea, such as the water-cannoning of Philippine vessels, “are in full compliance with international law” and “there’s nothing wrong about them.” ‘Crystal clear’ A senior U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity prior to the summit, told reporters that Biden had been “crystal clear” about American military support for Manila, and said the flare-ups with China in the South China Sea were an impetus for Thursday’s summit. USS Mobile, JS Akebono, HMAS Warramunga, BRP Antonio Luna and BRP Valentine Diaz sail in formation during a multilateral maritime cooperative exercise between Australia, the United States, Japan and the Philippines within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea, April 7, 2024. (POIS Leo Baumgartner/Royal Australian Navy) “It is one of the reasons for the meeting because we are very concerned about what we’ve been seeing,” the official said. “He has repeated many times that the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the South China Sea, including Philippine vessels that may be underway there, including its coast guard vessels,” the official said. Another U.S. official added that Philippine and Japanese coast guard officers would be welcomed aboard U.S. Coast Guard ships during a maritime exercise later this year “to further train and synchronize our work together” in case of a future attack that sparks a conflict. Philippine activists protesting outside the U.S. Embassy in Manila on April 11, 2024, warned that a Washington summit between the leaders of the Philippines, United States and Japan could provoke an angry response from China over the South China Sea and threaten regional stability. (Gerard Carreon/BenarNews) The two officials also said the United States would help fund a major infrastructure project in the Philippines known as the Luzon corridor, as part of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, which is the U.S. answer to China’s high-spending Belt and Road Initiative.  The Luzon corridor, they said, would help connect Subic Bay, Clark, Manila and Batangas in the Philippines, with investments in infrastructure “including ports, rail, clean energy, semiconductor supply chains and other forms of connectivity in the Philippines.” “We stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Marcos,” one of the officials said, “ready to support and work with the Philippines at every turn.” U.S. President Joe Biden hosts Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Japan Prime Minister Fumio Kishida for a summit of the three nations’ leaders at the White House, in Washington, April 11, 2024. (Kevin Lamarque/Reuters) In his final remarks before talks opened behind closed-doors Thursday, Biden said the newfound cooperation between the United States, Japan and the Philippines would be a boon…

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In China, drones, social media monitor foreign journalists: report

Chinese authorities use drones to monitor and follow foreign journalists as they report from the country, as well as detaining, harassing and threatening them with non-renewal of their work permits if they report on topics deemed sensitive by the government, according to a new report on journalists’ working conditions. Four out of five members who responded to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China annual working conditions survey said they had experienced “interference, harassment or violence” while trying to do their jobs in China during the past year, the FCCC report found. Local governments are increasingly using technology to keep track of foreign media workers, the report found. “During a trip to Poyang Lake, where we were reporting on the status of the Yangtze River dolphin, we were followed by multiple cars with plainclothes individuals inside,” the report quoted a journalist with a European media organization as saying.  “At one point, the plainclothes individuals appeared to use a drone when a blocked sandy road prevented them from getting closer by car,” they said. A cameraman from Hong Kong Cable TV is restrained from photographing the crowd waiting to buy tickets for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, July 25, 2008, in Beijing, China. (Robert F. Bukaty/AP) Another European journalist reported similar high-tech surveillance when on a reporting trip to two provinces affected by extreme weather events linked to climate change. “We were followed by multiple carloads of plain clothes officers,” the report quoted them as saying. “Drones were sent out to follow and observe us when we got out of our vehicle to film/collect interviews. When we moved on foot to a spot, the drones would follow us.” Respondents also told the FCCC they had reason to believe the authorities had “possibly or definitely” compromised their WeChat (81%), their phone (72%), and/or placed audio recording bugs in their office or homes, the report found. ‘Endless cat-and-mouse game’ Another journalist with a European newspaper described reporting in China as “an endless cat-and-mouse game.” “Whatever strategy you try, the Chinese surveillance and security system adapts and closes the gap,” the report quoted them as saying. “Whatever strategies you use, the space for reporting keeps getting smaller and smaller.” A foreign reporter of many years’ experience in China who gave only the surname Lok for fear of reprisals told RFA Cantonese that she expects her communications apps to be monitored at all times. “I was talking about an issue with a friend here [in mainland China] … and may have mentioned it on WeChat,” Lok said. “Later, he was called in by the police to ‘drink tea’” – a euphemism for being called in for questioning. Journalists crowd a National People’s Congress press conference a day before the opening of the annual session of China’s parliament, in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People on March 4, 2019. (Greg Baker/AFP) “It turned out that the problem wasn’t him, but the conversation he had with me,” she said. “We have to be careful, because a lot of trouble has come from talking to people on WeChat.” A second Hong Kong journalist who gave only the surname Wong for fear of reprisals said it used to be easier for journalists to evade official surveillance than it is now. “The Chinese government’s digital surveillance methods are comprehensive,” Wong said. “You could describe them as a dragnet, in which every move the target makes is visible to them.” Online surveillance Huang Chao-nien, an assistant professor at the National Development Institute of Taiwan’s National Chengchi University, agreed, adding that the government has used online surveillance to target journalists for years. The government has long used an internet development model that intervenes in the market to control tech companies … forcing them to cooperate with the government in carrying out political surveillance and controls on public speech, he said. More than half of the journalists who took part in the FCCC annual survey said they had been “obstructed” at least once by police or other officials, while 45% encountered obstruction by unidentified persons, the report said. Some had been warned not to join the club as it was deemed an “illegal organization,” while others were threatened with non-renewal of their visas and work permits if they didn’t toe the line, the report said. Areas deemed particularly sensitive by Chinese officials were even harder to work in, it said, adding that 85% of journalists who tried to report from the far western region of Xinjiang in 2023 experienced problems.  “In Xinjiang we were followed the entire time,” the report quoted a European journalist as saying. “It was particularly unpleasant in Hotan, where we counted about half a dozen plainclothes following us by car or on foot.” “In Korla, we at some point had six cars following us. When we did a U-turn and then a detour over an abandoned construction site and dust road, they all faithfully followed us,” the journalist said. Chinese policemen manhandle a photographer, center, as he photographs a news event near the No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court, in Beijing Sunday, Jan. 26, 2014. (Andy Wong/AP) And the definition of “sensitive” areas appears to be expanding. “An increasing number of journalists encountered issues in regions bordering Russia (79%), Southeast Asian nations (43%) or in ethnically diverse regions like Inner Mongolia (68%),” the report said. More than 80% said potential sources and interviewees had declined to be interviewed because they didn’t have prior permission from their superiors to speak to foreign media. Fear of reprisals is even being felt among experts, pundits and commentators, the report said. “Academic sources, think tank employees and analysts either decline interviews, request anonymity, or don’t respond at all,” it quoted respondents as saying. Translated with additional reporting by Luisetta Mudie. Edited by Malcolm Foster.

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Arakan Army’s gains enough to enable self-rule in Myanmar’s Rakhine state

The Arakan Army, or AA, is continuing their sweep across Rakhine, furthering the military gains of the ethnic Three Brotherhood Alliance, of which it is a member, in Shan state. While the capture of nine towns, with a tenth in southern Chin state, is another humiliating defeat for the Burmese military, it also sets the scene for a very messy political discussion moving forward. Myanmar’s military continues to be on their back feet. The Kachin Independence Army continues to make gains, recently securing control over a major trade route with China, after seizing the last of the military camps along the Bhamo-Myitkyina highway. The once staunchly pro-junta border guards forces in Kayin state are now hedging their bets and putting some distance between themselves and Naypyidaw.  Meanwhile, the junta’s announced counter-offensive out of Lashio against the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army – the other two members of the Three Brotherhood Alliance – in northern Shan State has not materialized. But it’s in Rakhine where the military has been handed its most significant territorial defeats. The AA has captured six of Rakhine’s 17 townships and several smaller towns since launching an offensive on Nov. 13, 2023, with ongoing offensives against several others. As of early April, the AA had captured some 170 junta camps and posts, as well as several larger bases, battalion headquarters, and training facilities. Arakan Army soldiers stand with an artillery piece after capturing the Ta Ron Aing base in Chin state from junta forces, Dec. 4, 2023. (AA Info Desk) The capital of Sittwe is surrounded, and many civil servants have been withdrawn. The Chinese special economic zone in Kyaukphyu is on the verge of falling, prompting the United League of Arakan, the AA’s political wing, to publicly pledge to protect all foreign direct investment that benefits Rakhine and “ensure the smooth continuation of their operations.” At present, China’s US$8 billion investment, which includes their oil and gas pipelines and a proposed deepwater port with rail and road links, can only be accessed by sea. As a recent International Institute for Strategic Studies report concluded: “But no matter the final outcome, the AA’s sweeping gains are already enough to enable self-rule over a large portion of the Rakhine homeland and to reshape the wider balance of power in Myanmar.” Little leverage over AA in Rakhine On April 1, 2024, China’s special representative to Myanmar, Deng Xijun, met with junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyidaw to try to broker a ceasefire. While the Chinese-brokered ceasefire between the Three Brotherhood Alliance and the military regime is tenuously holding in northern Shan state, the AA refuses to be bound by it in Rakhine. China has less leverage over the AA, which has shown no interest in halting their offensive. The AA has stated their intention to capture the entire state, not just their traditional heartland in the north, though it’s not clear that they have the manpower and resources to do so. Over-reach could spread their forces too thin. The AA is in the midst of an offensive in Ann township, which is not just the headquarters of the military’s Western Command, but the key junction on the road to Magwe region. The loss of Ann would make overland resupply to northern and central Rakhine extremely difficult. Overland supply could only come in through the highway from Bago region’s Pyay township in the south. The military has responded in typical fashion, with more indiscriminate air and long-range artillery strikes against unarmed civilians. In a two-day period in early April, six civilians were killed and 16 were wounded. RFA Burmese reported that some 79 Rohingya civilians have been killed and 127 more have been wounded in the past four months. The junta has commenced implementation of its national plan to conscript some 5,000 people a month, including amongst ethnic Rohingya in Rakhine, despite the assassination of local administrators. People who appear to be Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine state undergo weapons training by junta military personnel on March 10, 2024. (Image from citizen journalist video) This is a perverse irony after the military waged an ethnic cleansing campaign that drove 1 million ethnic Rohingya, whom they refer to as “illegal Bengalis,” into Bangladesh, and kept many others in concentration camps. Poorly armed and trained conscripts have limited military utility, indicating the military’s desperation for manpower. Role of Rohingya conscripts But the Rohingya conscripts play a much more important role in fomenting political strife within the opposition camp. The Buddhist-dominated Arakan Army has a tense relationship with the Rohingya population. It has tenuously accepted the shadow National Unity Government’s position that the Rohingya are legal citizens and that they should be returned to the country from Bangladesh in an orderly fashion. There have been a number of reports that the military is reaching out to the Arakan Resistance Solidarity Army, or ARSA, whose misguided raids on border posts and police stations in 2017 were the casus belli for the military’s ethnic cleansing campaign. Since being driven into Bangladesh, ARSA’s primary activities have been to secure control over the refugee camps and eliminate rivals within the Rohingya community; they have not participated in the armed rebellion. That the military believes that they can recruit ARSA as a proxy against the AA seems preposterous. The AA is neither willing to share any political power in Rakhine nor countenance the presence of any other armed actors. So there is a perverse logic to the military’s overtures to ARSA, which is searching for relevance. With mounting battlefield losses, the best that the military can do is to strike up ethnic and sectarian tensions. This should come as no surprise: stoking communal tensions has always been a key party of their strategy. An airstrike by Myanmar junta forces destroyed houses in Minbya township’s Myit Nar village in Rakhine state on April 3, 2024. (Arakan Princess Media) Indeed, the United Nations’ Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, which was established following…

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Series of junta attacks leave 6 dead in Myanmar

Multiple junta attacks killed six civilians and injured 16 others over a two-day period, residents who experienced the ambush told Radio Free Asia on Wednesday.  Junta troops conducted aerial assaults and shelled villages across three townships in Myanmar’s western state of Rakhine. The area has experienced several months of indiscriminate violence toward civilians following the end of a year-long ceasefire between the anti junta Arakan Army and the military in November 2023.   Since then, the Arakan Army has seized eight townships across Rakhine state and recently set eyes on a ninth.  In Minbya township, under Arakan Army control since Feb. 6, airstrikes by the junta’s air force killed three women and injured seven more people on Wednesday, said a resident from Myit Nar village who declined to be named for security reasons.  “Two bombs were dropped into the village around 4:00 a.m.,” they said. “One of the injured is a healthcare worker. [The junta] dropped bombs when we were all sleeping.” In Myebon township, which is not under Arakan Army control, airstrikes in Kan Htaunt Gyi village killed three residents and injured three more on Tuesday. Later that day, junta forces also shelled Pauktaw township’s Maw Htoke Gyi village, injuring six. The Arakan Army seized Pauktaw township on Jan. 24.  RFA attempted to contact Rakhine state’s junta spokesperson Hla Thein for a response to allegations that junta air strikes have targeted civilians, but he did not respond by the time of publication. According to data compiled by RFA, fighting between the Arakan Army and junta forces has killed nearly 200 civilians and injured more than 500 since fighting began again on Nov. 13. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn. 

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Government overconfidence could cloud a brighter future for Laos

It may sound  perverse to say – given that inflation in Laos has been at one of the highest rates in Asia since 2022, the national debt stands at more than 130 percent of GDP – but the second-poorest nation in Southeast Asia has many reasons for optimism. Tourism is likely to return to pre-pandemic levels this year. Its ASEAN chairmanship this year is greatly boosting its international profile—and, thus, international trade prospects.  Vientiane has sensibly bet on food exports to China, since China’s demographics are arguably the worst in the world and is set to have the fastest population decline in human history. Even today, China cannot feed itself. It imports around 65.8 percent of all foodstuff.   Although that was down from 93.6 percent in 2000, external demand is likely to rise in the coming years as its working-age population collapses, forcing even more rural folk into the cities and industries. It is therefore a solid bet by Vientiane that agriculture exports to China will grow in the coming decades. Its exports increased to $1.4 billion in 2023, up by a quarter from the previous year.  The Vientiane-Kunming railway has already expanded export opportunities into China. If Laos can attract interest from consumers further west, in Central Asia and Europe, it can use the railway links through China to increase trade.  Better still, if Laos can extend its rail network down to Thailand’s ports, again thanks to Chinese investment, that would make it easier and cheaper to export its goods further afield.  Travelers walk toward the first Beijing-Laos cross-border tourist train at the Beijing Railway Station on March 18, 2024. (Jia Tianyong/China News Service/VCG via Getty Images) Better than that, Vietnam has pledged to connect Laos via railways to its port in Vung Ang, which would make it easier for trans-Pacific exports, opening up Laos’ producers to the U.S. market.  Politically, too, the communist Lao People’s Revolutionary Party can be confident in its own monopoly on power. There is no meaningful resistance group among the diaspora or at home. Unlike communist Vietnam, there is nothing like a pro-democracy movement.  Perhaps most heartening for Vientiane, and something often overlooked, Laos has the youngest population of all the ASEAN states and the healthiest-looking demographics over the coming three decades.  Just 4.7 percent of the population is aged above 65. Some 65.4 percent are of working age (15-64) and 29.9 percent are below the age of 15. By 2050, the working age population will actually grow to 68 percent, while just a tenth will be of retirement age by that year.  Aged versus aging societies By comparison, in 2050, a fifth of Vietnam’s population will be aged 65 and over. In Thailand it will be around a third.  Laos won’t become an “aging society” – when 7 percent of the population is aged above 65 – until 2035. It won’t become an “aged society” – when the over-65 cohort is above 14 percent) – until 2059. One reason for this, however, is the country’s shorter life expectancy. Vietnam became an “aging” society in 2011; Thailand became “aged” in 2020. Moreover, when Thailand became an “aging” society in 2002 its GDP per capita was $2,091. Vietnam reached it in 2011 when its GDP per capita was $1,953.  Laos’ GDP per capita stands at $2,535, and it still has another decade or so before it touches “aging” society status. This means that Laos has at least 30 years before demographics start to bite, and even by 2050 there will still be double the number of youngsters aged 0-15 than retirees.  That gives Laos three decades to expand industry and output. For these reasons, political leaders in Vientiane often give off the air of extreme patience, as though they’re sitting pretty on borrowed time.  On the trade front, Laos achieved above 7 percent growth rates in the 2010s when its trade was almost entirely with its immediate neighbors. New infrastructure could open up vastly more markets and attract far more investment in industry and manufacturing, which remains nascent.  Young people splash water at each other in celebration of the Songkran festival in Vientiane, April 14, 2023. (Kaikeo Saiyasane/Xinhua via Getty Images) Railway connections to ports in neighboring countries can help Laos overcome its landlocked confinement at the same time as its workforce booms in number – with around 2 million Laotians to be added to the workforce by 2050.    However, not all is well. The economy has been shockingly bad since 2020, not all of which was caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.  The government and central bank have been incompetent in constraining inflation—and just about all other economic ailments.  The national debt started to climb to unmanageable levels by 2018. Laos imports too much and has barely any control over exports.  The government admits that close to a third of export revenue doesn’t reenter the country. Mostly it is funneled to foreign-owned companies, or profits are hidden, denying Laos a massive chunk of available taxes.  Education, tax collection concerns It’s unlikely that Laos can fully weaken itself off imports. Dispensing of its petroleum dependency would be sensible, given that Laos produces more than enough energy through its hydropower dams. But that means converting most transport and machinery to electric battery-powered, which is simply too expensive for most countries, not least Laos. It still also relies massively on imports for agricultural inputs such as fertilizers.  Since 2020, ever greater numbers of Laotians have left to find work abroad, mainly in Thailand. This has depopulated many rural communities, leaving the elderly to tend to the young. Many of those who have left are the better-educated.  At the same time, the education sector is now in poorer health than pre-2020, although government spending on education began to fall as a percentage of GDP much earlier. Non-attendance or absentee rates are high among students, and teacher numbers are dwindling.  It’s difficult to see how this generation of children, buffeted by the pandemic and shoddy schooling, will become as…

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Young activists recall abuse at Hong Kong juvenile correctional facility

Young political activists jailed under a crackdown on public dissent have described a litany of physical and sexual abuse inside one of Hong Kong’s juvenile offender facilities, according to recent online reports and interviews with RFA Mandarin and The Reporter magazine. While accounts of abuse and sexual assault by police officers and prison guards have emerged in recent years among former protesters and activists, not many have been confirmed or even fully investigated. But on Jan. 19, a Correctional Services officer and five young inmates at the Pik Uk Correctional Institution were remanded in custody on charges of causing “serious bodily harm” to an 18-year-old inmate, including causing rectal perforations with a wooden implement, online court news service The Witness reported. The victim required surgery and a stoma bag as a consequence of the attack, the report said. The case prompted another young activist who had been detained in the same juvenile facility under the 2020 National Security Law to speak about another unreported incident there. Wong Yat Chin, of the activist group Student Politicism, took to Facebook to talk about a rape and abuse and anal assault with a toothbrush perpetrated on a 15-year-old boy in Pik Uk, which houses young male inmates up to the age of 21. “The 15-year-old boy was under duress and didn’t dare to tell his family about the anal rape,” Wong wrote. “It wasn’t until he was hospitalized for persistent bleeding that Correctional Services officers called the police.” “A few months later, the police gave up the prosecution, saying there was insufficient evidence,” wrote Wong, who was serving a three-year jail term in Pik Uk at the time. The Correctional Services Department then issued a statement accusing Wong of “slander.” But the Ming Pao newspaper later reported that a case sounding much like the one he described was reported to police on Jan. 30, 2022. According to Wong, prison guards don’t always carry out assaults themselves, but allow certain inmates known as “B Boys” special privileges to “discipline” fellow inmates. He also described bullying and physical assaults he and his fellow inmates suffered at the hands of guards and other inmates acting under duress. Youth prison population growing Since the pro-democracy movement of 2014, the authorities have prosecuted large numbers of young people for taking part in “illegal” public gatherings, “rioting” and other protest-related charges, as well as more serious offenses like “terrorism” and “subversion” for peaceful activism under the 2020 National Security law. According to the Hong Kong Correctional Services Department, the number of people in custody under the age of 21 rose from 4% to 6% of the total population, with a total juvenile prison population of around 450 as of the end of 2022. Hong Kong democracy activist Tony Chung poses in a bedroom in Britain on December 29, 2023 (Ben Stansall/AFP) A former Pik Uk inmate who gave only the pseudonym Cheung Tz Hin for fear of reprisals told RFA and The Reporter that he recalls an incident in which guards had a group of seven cellmates squat down in a stairwell that wasn’t covered by surveillance cameras after they sang the banned protest anthem “Glory to Hong Kong” in their cell the night before. To their shock, Cheung and the others were slapped around by the guard. “At first I thought he would stop short,” he said. “I never expected he would actually hit us.” From time to time after that, guards would also shove Cheung and another cellmate around at random times, elbowing them and hitting them on the palms or the soles of the feet with a metal ruler, Cheung recalled. Prison rules bar singing by inmates, but Cheung said exceptions were made for inmates who sang songs with no political content, for their own entertainment. “It felt like the correctional officers were really selective, and targeted us in particular,” he said. Beaten within earshot He said guards and their proxies used to take their victims to the stairwell behind the daily activities room, where the sounds of them being beaten would drift through for the other young inmates to hear. One inmate would walk around on crutches after these assaults, he said. “We could see a little [of what was going on] through a gap, but mostly we could just hear the sound of hitting, which was very regular,” Cheung said. “We would see him walking around on crutches because the soles of both feet had been beaten.” Hong Kong activist Wong Yat-chin, who founded a group called Student Politicism in 2020, poses during an interview with AFP in Hong Kong July 14, 2021. (Anthony Wallace/AFP) The attacks were to have tragic consequences. After four nights of this treatment, Cheung heard the guards gossiping about the boy’s suicide attempt by drinking detergent. He fell to the ground foaming at the mouth, and had to be sent to an external hospital for gastric lavage, Cheung heard them saying. He was later transferred to a forensic psychiatric facility at Castle Peak Hospital, but never returned. “Usually, he would have come back to Pik Uk 14 days later,” Cheung said, “but I never saw him again, and I heard from the staff that he never came back from Castle Peak Hospital.” Hong Kong independence activist Tony Chung, who has served a 21-month jail term for “secession” under the 2020 National Security Law, spent some time after his release campaigning for the rights of other prisoners in Hong Kong. He told RFA Mandarin and The Report that he once tried to help a teenage inmate “forced to have oral sex to the point of ejaculation” by another inmate at Pik Uk to file a complaint. But he was never allowed to meet with the youth alone, only with another inmate who he suspected was actually the perpetrator of the alleged assault. “The older inmate who was rumored to be the perpetrator asked him in a provocative tone of voice: ‘Has someone been treating you badly? Tell me!’ and…

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Ethnic army seizes major trade route on Myanmar-Chinese border

An ethnic army seized five military junta camps near the Myanmar-Chinese border, residents told Radio Free Asia on Friday. During an offensive, the Kachin Independence Army, or KIA, captured encampments under junta Battalion 366 near Kachin state’s Momauk township. The seizure also gave the ethnic armed group partial control of a China-Myanmar border trade road after the Thursday offensive. Since Myanmar’s February 2021 coup, fighting between the KIA and junta forces has raged for weeks at a time over the state’s lucrative jade mines and the rebel army’s historical stronghold near its headquarters on the Myanmar-China border. The KIA now controls portions of two major trade roads in the state since its partial capture of the domestic Myitkyina-Bhamo highway in early March, in addition to a junta camp under Battalion 142 in Momauk township. A battle further north in Lai Zar caused shells to land in China, burning down several houses, residents said.  One resident told RFA that the junta retaliated with air strikes after Yaw Yung Artillery and Hpaleng Hill camps were captured Thursday. “Yaw Yung was entirely captured and Hpaleng camp was also captured yesterday,” he said, asking to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals. “The junta’s air force came to open fire while KIA troops were confiscating things in these camps after the captures.” Yaw Yung is an important strategic camp because of the high-level commander stationed there and its proximity to trading posts with China, residents living near the captured camps said.  Kachin army troops are currently stationed in Lwegel city, about 11 kilometers (seven miles) from Yaw Yung Artillery camp, residents said, adding that they are negotiating with junta troops and administration staff on their exit from the city. RFA contacted Kachin state’s junta spokesperson Moe Min Thein and KIA spokesperson Col. Naw Bu on the junta’s surrender, but neither responded. A statement on the KIA’s Facebook page on March 28, said three camps were captured on the 27th and two on the 28th, namely Shan Tai, Bang Yau, Law Mun, Hpaleng and Yaw Yung. The KIA and joint guerilla armies have captured over 40 junta camps in Momauk and Waingmaw townships near the KIA’s headquarters in Lai Zar city in Kachin state as of Thursday.  Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn.

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Rohingya activists call for more control of aid money

Rohingya Muslim activists representing fellow refugees forced out of Myanmar and into “prison-like” camps in Bangladesh said in Washington on Thursday that foreign aid to the camps would go further if some of it was given directly to refugee-run groups. But a representative of the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, said little money was left over after aid cuts that currently see the refugees provided with only $10 worth of food a month. About 90% of the 1.2 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh struggled to have “acceptable food consumption” late last year, according to the World Food Programme, when their monthly ration of food was bumped up from about $8 to about $10 per person.  Speaking at an event on Capitol Hill to mark two years since the United States labelled Myanmar’s atrocities in 2017 against the Rohingya a “genocide,” the activists said aid was not always spent in ways most helpful for the Rohingya refugees living in Cox’s Bazar. “There are ways to do it effectively,” said Yasmin Ullah, a Canada-based rights activist born in Myanmar’s Rakhine state and the director of the Rohingya Maiyafuinor Collaborative Network. Yasmin Ullah of the Rohingya community is interviewed outside the International Court in The Hague, Netherlands, Jan. 23, 2020. (Peter Dejong/AP) The activist said her group had raised $20,000 through crowdfunding to be disbursed by refugee-run groups in the camp to improve livelihoods there. But she noted global aid flows were far larger. “We know our issues. We know how and where to put this money. We can run with $10,000 farther than any other humanitarian groups can,” she said. “We are asking for aid to be utilized and to directly go to refugee-led initiatives and refugee-led organizations.” Unsolved problems Aid for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh has dwindled, with less than two-thirds of the approximately $850 million in annual aid requested by aid agencies in the country being fulfilled, a U.N. report said. Lucky Karim, a Rohingya refugee who resettled in the U.S. state of Illinois in 2022 and now works with the International Campaign for the Rohingya, said that any international aid sent to help people in the camps “means a lot to us as refugees” and was appreciated. But she questioned why the hundreds of millions of dollars flowing into the camps each year were not improving conditions. “It’s not about how many years the U.S. has been supporting Rohingya,” Karim said. “What are you guys able to solve?” “Did you solve the labor issue? Did you solve the sexual and domestic and the other violence in the camps? Did you solve the human trafficking issue? Did you figure out the security risks at the camp? Did you figure out and identify the gangs and the nonstate actors in the camp at night?” she said. “Those are the only questions we have.” Requests for more help, she added, were “not just about increasing funding,” with many Rohingyas understanding funds are limited.  “When it comes to the funding issue, when I talked to USAID, for example, they’re like, ‘Oh no Lucky, we have other places in war, like Gaza, for example, and Ukraine, for example,’” Karim recounted, noting there were “many other cases coming up every few years.” Like Ullah, she said some aid could be spent more effectively. “The amount of funding you’re sending to Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar and elsewhere should go to the right people at the right time to the needed situations,” she said. “How do you ensure it without Rohingya’s involvement in the decision making process?” Limited funds Peter Young, the USAID director for South and Central Asia, told the event that the United States had sent more than $1.9 billion in aid to support Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh since the 2017 genocide. Brothers Mohammed Akter, 8, and Mohammed Harun, 10, pose for a photograph on the floor of their burned shelter after a fire damaged thousands of shelters at the Balukhali refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, March 25, 2021. (Mohammad Ponir Hossain/Reuters) But he acknowledged the global aid being made available “is not sufficient to meet the needs of people” in the refugee camps. What was once a $12 monthly food ration to the refugees, he explained, was cut to just $8 last year before the eventual bump back to $10. At the end of the day, he said, aid groups were left grappling with the fact they have few funds left after disbursing those meager rations. “We certainly agree with – as Lucky said – the importance of working with and through the Rohingya community,” Young said. “We do make sure our projects that are implemented there are staffed by Rohingya there [or] developed in consultation with community leaders.” “At the same time, if you do the math, $10 a month for a million people consumes our entire budget pretty quickly,” he said. “So the bandwidth that we have to do other programming besides food is limited.” One of the first priorities for the refugee camps outside of food would be “durable shelters,” Young said, due to both the propensity of the camps to be hit by devastating disasters and the “understanding that there will be a lot of people there for some time into the future.” But for the Rohingya activists, that’s only a start. Karim, the Illinois-based refugee, said little will change in the camps until Rohingyas are given some decision-making powers – and “not just coming to D.C. every six months” for forums on Capitol Hill. “You take a bunch of notes, you leave us, you forget us,” the activist said. “We want a specific seat at the table.” Edited by Malcolm Foster.

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Hong Kong journalists’ new norm is to do a job under ‘unclear’ laws

For Hong Kong journalists, there is absolutely no room for old habits, even if they die hard.  The city’s second national security law passed swiftly last week has widened the scope of what constitutes a breach of national security. It has also raised the  risk of news reporting which has already increased since the Beijing-imposed first law came in 2020 and  China increasingly encroached on the city. “What had been habitually acceptable, normal practice before, is no longer the case,” said a veteran journalist who declined to be named. “Journalists have to relearn and recalibrate.” This means throwing into the wind best practices in journalism. In their place, the most experienced practitioners are learning by reviewing daily how government officials posture and how the court rules, the veteran journalist told Radio Free Asia. Another seasoned journalist who also spoke on condition of anonymity said while the immediate effects of the new law officially known as the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance have yet to be seen, the editorial process – from a journalist reporting the news to editors editing the story for publication – has become much more complex. “For instance, if you have a scoop on a new government policy – would you report and publish that or would it be a breach of law? We don’t know what is considered lawful or what can become questionable,” the seasoned journalist explained, echoing the veteran journalist’s view of the unease that has been clouding the media since 2020. The change in journalistic practices started nearly four years ago, after China’s parliament passed the National Security Law. However, the introduction of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance last week, also referred to as Article 23  based on a clause in Hong Kong’s mini constitution, the Basic Law – has intensified the concerns and uncertainties that Hong Kong journalists have faced over the past few years. While there are overlaps with the first law, Article 23 has also created new offenses, given increased punishment for offenders and afforded the government sweeping new powers to crack down on all forms of dissent on the grounds of treason, insurrection, sabotage that endangers national security, external interference in Hong Kong’s affairs, and espionage and theft of state secrets.  “National security” in Article 23 is defined as identical to the first law, by China’s definition, which journalists and critics viewed as vague and heightened uncertainties.  In both laws, national security refers to “the status in which the state’s political regime, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the welfare of the people, sustainable economic and social development, and other major interests of the state are relatively free from danger and internal or external threats, and the capability to maintain a sustained status of security.”  Henry Tong, an exiled Hong Kong activist who is currently living in Taiwan, tears a a piece of cardboard with 23 on it, during a protest against Hong Kong’s Article 23 law in Taipei, Taiwan, March 23, 2024. (Ann Wang/Reuters) Under Article 23, insurrection and sabotage can be punished with life imprisonment. Jail terms for sedition are increased from two years to seven, or 10 if alleged perpetrators are found to have colluded with a foreign force. The law also allows for a lengthening detention period without charge from 48 hours to two weeks, as well as expanded the British colonial-era offense of “sedition” to include inciting hatred against the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The Hong Kong government had not responded to Radio Free Asia’s request for comment on Article 23’s effect on journalists at the time of publication. When uncertain, self censor Journalists who remained in the field observed that self censorship is now second nature in the profession and on the increase in Hong Kong, once Asia’s bastion of free press and expression, and one of the very virtues that helped propel the city to an international financial center. “Before, you just report the news; as balanced as you can be, after getting all sides of the issue. Now, you would think twice and more times, whether to even report. It’s become a collective decision involving more editors and often lawyers,” said the seasoned journalist. “Or you simply don’t report.”  Article 23 can also apply to actions that take place outside Hong Kong – by both residents and businesses – a move seen as key to what critics described as China’s “long arm” to hunt down overseas pro-democracy activists and “anti-China elements.” “It also makes reporting about overseas protests as journalists previously did, risky because you might be seen as providing a platform to these organizations abroad,” pointed out the veteran journalist, adding that these days, the approach is to wait for an official line from the Hong Kong government before publication of such types of news. Indeed, Hong Kong media outlets were sparing in coverage of overseas protests against the first day of Article 23’s implementation on Saturday. When they did, the angle was to convey the annoyance of citizens of foreign cities unsettled by the chaos created by the demonstrations.  A case in point: HK01, an online news portal in Hong Kong, reported Saturday on disgruntled Taiwanese people who told protesters, many of whom were immigrants from Hong Kong, at a Taipei rally to “go back to Hong Kong” and not to mess up Taiwan.  Robert Tsao, founder of United Microelectronics Corp., speaks with his staff after a news conference in Taipei on Sept. 1, 2022. (Ann Wang/Reuters) At the same reported Taipei event in the bustling Ximen district, demonstrators were joined by Robert Tsao, founder of chip-making giant United Microelectronics Corporation and former Hong Kong resident, who blasted the Chinese Communist Party for upholding authoritarianism in the guise of national security and through the “laughable” concept of “subverting the nation” when the country and regime are separate notions.  “The CCP has tied the political regime with the country, which is a scam and extremely absurd,” Tsao said, as he warned that the fate of Taiwan and Hong Kong…

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Indonesia recovers bodies of 11 Rohingya from capsized boat off Aceh coast

Indonesian search-and-rescue officials said Monday they had recovered the bodies of 11 Rohingya refugees, mostly women, who were on a boat that capsized off the coast of Aceh province last week. Some of the 75 Rohingya who were rescued had told officials that the wooden boat was carrying around 150 members of the stateless minority group from Myanmar, but an Indonesian official, who declared an end to the search operation on Thursday, later pushed back at reports that people had died. On Friday, the United Nations refugee agency UNHCR said it feared that more than 70 refugees were dead or had gone missing from the boat that overturned in waters off West Aceh regency last Wednesday. Of the 11 bodies recovered from the capsized boat, six were found relatively close to each other in waters off Jaya district in West Aceh, on Monday afternoon, said Mirza Safrinadi, an operations commander at the local Search and Rescue Task Force. “The bodies were initially spotted by local fishermen and reported to authorities. Because the location was near Banda Aceh, the [search-and-rescue] team quickly responded to evacuate the victims,” he said. The bodies were transported to Calang City and then transferred to Teuku Umar General Hospital in Aceh Jaya district. One body was discovered by fishermen who were searching for turtle eggs at a beach in Arongan Lambalek District, West Aceh, on Monday morning, Mirza said. “After discussions with UNHCR and IOM [International Organization for Migration], we can confirm that these individuals were Rohingya refugees who were victims of the capsized boat incident,” Mirza said. The bodies were laid to rest in the mass cemetery in West Aceh for victims of the 2004 tsunami in Aceh, an official said. Two more bodies of Rohingya refugees, found on Saturday and Sunday, were also laid to rest in the same cemetery. Of the 11 dead refugees, nine were women, said Faisal Rahman, a UNHCR protection associate. Boat originated in Bangladesh Of the 75 Rohingya rescued, six were saved on March 20, and 69 others, who had been clinging to their wooden boat for nearly a day and were suffering from hunger and dehydration, were brought ashore the next day.  Supriadi, the captain of the search-and-rescue ship that saved 69 refugees, on Friday took issue with the UNHCR and IOM’s contention that 76 people may have perished or were missing at sea. He said he didn’t believe this was the case because the 69 (of 75) refugees rescued Thursday “had clear coordinates provided by fishermen who witnessed the refugees in distress.”  “If there are still victims, where are they located?” he had said. Meanwhile, UNHCR’s Faisal said the agency was able to get more clarity on how many passengers were on the boat and where it had originated. Faisal said that after collecting more data the agency concluded that there were 142 Rohingya refugees and seven crew members on the boat. Additionally, he said the boat had not originated in Malaysia with Australia as the planned destination as they were originally told, he said. The boat had left from Cox’s Bazar in southwestern Bangladesh, where the refugee camps host some 1 million Rohingya, including 740,000 who fled a brutal military crackdown  by the Myanmar military in 2017. “Through our interviews with several refugees, we can confirm that they departed from Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh,” Faisal said. “Initially, they were headed to Malaysia, where some of their family members already resided. Others had plans to reach Indonesia.” This latest incident occurred amid the increasing arrival of Rohingya refugee boats in Indonesia.  “In 2023 alone, more than 2,300 Rohingya refugees arrived [in Indonesia], with a significant increase from November onwards. This number exceeds the number of arrivals in the previous four years as a whole,” UNHCR and IOM said. The Rohingya have been accommodated in locations across Aceh, according to the UNHCR. UNHCR reported that 569 Rohingya refugees had died or gone missing at sea last year, as they made the perilous journey by sea to oppression in their home country or the crowded and violent refugee camps in southwestern Bangladesh to get to Southeast Asia. Pizaro Gozali Idrus in Jakarta contributed to this report. BenarNews is an online news outlet affiliated with Radio Free Asia.

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