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What was Vietnam thinking, welcoming Putin?

Editor1 year ago012 mins

Why did Hanoi welcome Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, for a state visit this past week? Sure, invite him. Allow Russian state media to speculate on a visit. Meet with his underlings. But to actually unfurl the red carpet for a leader whose global travel has been sharply curbed by an International Criminal Court arrest warrant ? From geopolitical, domestic, economic, and ideological points of view, it makes little sense – unless the rising security faction is dictating what happens within the Communist Party of Vietnam. Some 15 deals on economic, educational, and political cooperation were signed. But those items could have been agreed upon without Putin’s presence. That was the smokescreen, however. General Secretary of Vietnam’s Communist Party Nguyen Phu Trong, fourth from right, meets with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, center left, in Hanoi, June 20, 2024. (Vietnam News Agency via AFP) RELATED STORIES Putin visits Vietnam, aiming to renew Cold War ties Vietnam’s fraternal ties with Russia are put to the test Bear East: RFA Special report on Russia’s influence in Asia The deepening ‘securitization’ of Vietnamese politics Russia was the largest provider of military equipment to Vietnam until 2022, but that was before it invaded Ukraine and depleted much of its arsenal. Sales to Vietnam have tanked since. Nobody should look at how Russian equipment is faring in Ukraine and conclude, “I need some of that.” However, that’s apparently what the Vietnamese military is thinking. According to a finance ministry document leaked to the media last year, Vietnam thinks it can buy weapons from Russia via payments to a joint Vietnamese and Russian oil venture in Siberia, which would allow it to avoid U.S. sanctions. Missiles in mind The New York Times cited a Vietnamese official saying the secret deal will be worth $8 billion over the next two decades. Some reckon this is now Vietnamese government policy, which might explain Putin’s visit. Some observers believe Hanoi wants aircraft and new naval vessels from Russia. Its navy badly needs an upgrade. And it really wants BrahMos cruise missiles developed by a joint Russian and Indian venture. Beijing has apparently pressured Moscow not to sell to Hanoi. Given that Russia is now utterly dependent on China, it’s unlikely that Moscow would agree to the sale. Maybe Hanoi thought that by giving Putin some international publicity and support through the visit, Putin would return the favor with missiles. Maybe Hanoi thought it needed Putin to be there in person to drive a hard bargain: “If you don’t give us what we want, we’ll go to South Korea for military equipment.” Cargo containers are seen in Quy Nhon port in Vietnam’s Binh Dinh province on March 29, 2024. (Tran Thi Minh Ha/AFP) But it’s a risky business. It’s hard to imagine the U.S. not responding to any such deal to buy Russian weapons, however cleverly it’s designed to get around sanctions, with very forceful sanctions. Indeed, it’s hard to imagine this not impacting Vietnam’s economy more generally. The economy isn’t spectacular at the moment, and Hanoi really cannot afford to jeopardize relations with the U.S., its second-largest trade partner and primary export destination. It certainly cannot afford to do so when Donald Trump, who famously remarked that Vietnam is the “worst abuser” of the U.S. on trade, could soon return to the presidency. ‘Securocrats’ in charge But this risk-taking may be the consequence of the “securocrats” having taken over the Communist Party of Vietnam, having used party chief Nguyen Phu Trong’s signature anti-corruption campaign to purge their rivals over the past 12 months. Trong, now 80, did not look very well in his meeting with Putin. It’s still uncertain if he’ll make it to the next party congress in early 2026. My guess is that Trong is no longer the arbitrator he seemed to be until very recently. In this vacuum, the “securocrats” – officials of the security ministry – have quickly forged a stranglehold over the party. After last month’s changes to the Politburo, there are now just two economics-minded technocrats in the 16-member elite decision-making body, the lowest number in decades. Vietnam Communist Party official Dinh Tien Dung, left, meets with Chinese Communist Party official Wang Huning in Beijing, Sept. 28, 2023. (Yan Yan/Xinhua via Getty Images) To Lam, the former public security minister and now president, is tipped to become the next party chief. There is talk that the securocrats aren’t yet finished purging the party of their economic-minded rivals—those who would put up a fight within the party against any major military deal with the Russians. Dinh Tien Dung, the Hanoi party chief and former finance minister, “resigned” this week and will likely soon exit the Politburo. It was probably the securocrats who lobbied hard for the Putin visit to happen, silencing those who we know from leaks were dead against it. Flow of information The anti-graft campaign has certainly weakened the bureaucracy. Civil servants are so petrified of being reprimanded for potentially making mistakes, especially when it comes to using state money, that they’ve simply stopped making hard choices, leading to a bureaucratic slowdown and major problems in state capacity. The bigger concern should be whether bureaucratic fear has also impacted the flow of information within the party. Are underlings still willing to give their superiors unwelcome but honest news? According to Nguyen Khac Giang, of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, “the new [politburo] leaders…are more ‘thinkers’ than ‘doers,’ lacking significant achievements that justify their promotions. This reinforces the belief that in the uncertain context of the anti-corruption campaign, it is wiser for bureaucrats to play safe by doing less and surviving rather than taking risks.” To Lam is sworn in as Vietnam’s president at the National Assembly in Hanoi, May 22, 2024. (Nghia Duc/National Assembly via AP) Look north of the border and Xi Jinping, China’s paramount leader, has fully centralized power and thoroughly purged anyone competent or honest from the bureaucracy. It’s not that he has surrounded himself with…

Putin visits Vietnam aiming to renew Cold War ties

Editor1 year ago09 mins

Russian President Vladimir Putin was given a grand welcome with a 21-gun salute on Thursday after arriving in old ally Vietnam on a trip that is likely to be promoted by Moscow as more evidence of the West’s failure to isolate him over the invasion of Ukraine. Presiding over the ceremony was Vietnam’s new president, To Lam, and not the Communist Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong, due to the latter’s ailing health. The two presidents saluted their countries’ flags before inspecting the guard of honor, who cheered “We wish the president good health!” In later talks, Lam congratulated Putin on his re-election and praised Russia’s achievements, including “domestic political stability,” Reuters reported. The Vietnamese president told a press briefing that both Vietnam and Russia were committed to the principle of “not forming alliances nor agreements with third parties to take actions that harm each other’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and fundamental interests.” Putin arrived in Hanoi in the early hours from Pyongyang, where he and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un signed an agreement that pledges “mutual assistance in the event of aggression” against one of them. He was met at Hanoi’s airport by the head of Communist Party’s external affairs commission and a deputy prime minister in a much more low-key reception compared with the lavish fanfare laid on for him in North Korea. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Vietnam’s President To Lam at the welcome ceremony hosted at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 20, 2024. (Athit Perawongmetha/Reuters) No major agreement is expected during the Russian president’s 24 hours in Hanoi but he’s scheduled to meet with, besides President To Lam, the general secretary of the Communist Party, the prime minister and the National Assembly’s chairman. Putin, who has been on a U.S. sanction list since 2022 for ordering the invasion of Ukraine, is also wanted by the International Criminal Court, or ICC. Vietnam is not a member of the ICC and so is under no obligation to act on its arrest warrant. “Few countries now welcome Mr. Putin,” Australian Ambassador to Vietnam Andrew Goledzinowski wrote on social media platform X in a rare post by a foreign envoy. “But he needs to demonstrate that he is still a ‘world leader’. So Vietnam is doing him a huge favour and may expect favours in return.” No nuclear power, for now Ahead of his arrival in Hanoi, Putin praised the close ties between the two countries, who he said share “the same, or similar approaches” to current issues on the international agenda. “We are grateful to our Vietnamese friends for their balanced position on the Ukrainian crisis and for their desire to help find tangible ways to resolve it peacefully,” he wrote in an article on Vietnamese Communist Party’s mouthpiece Nhan Dan. Hanoi has declined to denounce the Russian invasion of Ukraine and did not take part in last weekend’s Ukraine peace summit in Switzerland, to which Russia was not invited. The Russian president said that trade and investment, especially in the energy industry sectors, were the two governments’ priorities. Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom is “ready to help Vietnamese partners develop their national nuclear power industry,” he said. Russia maintains a strong global influence in nuclear power and is the world’s leading exporter of nuclear power plants. Yet Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh told Rosatom’s Director General Alexey Likhachev on Wednesday that his country “has not had any policy to return to developing nuclear power but will continue to research and consider nuclear energy as an important solution to achieve net zero emissions by 2050,” according to the Vietnam News Agency. Hanoi shelved a plan to build its first nuclear power plant in 2016, citing lack of resources and concerns of safety. Vietnam’s President To Lam welcomes Russia’s President Vladimir Putin at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 20, 2024. (Athit Perawongmetha/Reuters) Rosatom, however, is helping construct a nuclear science and technology research center in the southern province of Đồng Nai. Putin’s visit is generally seen as symbolic and could help strengthening interactions in traditional areas such as economy and investment, science and technology, education and training, culture and tourism, and also defense and security. Vietnam is one of the largest buyers of Russian arms and still relies on Moscow to maintain and upgrade its arsenal but no contract signing is envisaged during the visit. Russia is a traditional ally and supported Vietnam throughout the Cold War but the dynamics of the relationship have changed as Vietnam adopts a new multilateral, diversified foreign policy that enabled it to forge new partners such as the U.S. and Japan. “Russia will never again be a strategic partner for Vietnam. Moscow has chosen a different partner and a different strategic destiny,” the Australian Ambassador Goledzinowski wrote, apparently referring to Vietnam’s neighbor China. Hanoi and Beijing are at odds over their sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, an important waterway shared by several countries but China claims having historic rights to more than 80% of it. Russia has maintained a neutral position in the South China Sea and is involved in many oil and gas projects in the region but it has recently voiced support for China’s rejection of “external interference”, or in other words, the role of the U.S. and its allies, in the region’s maritime disputes. Edited by Taejun Kang.

Putin to visit Vietnam to affirm traditional partnership

Editor1 year ago011 mins

On the afternoon of March 2, 2001, the packed hall at Hanoi’s Vietnam-Russia Friendship Palace erupted in cheers and applause as President Vladimir Putin walked in. The energetic 49-year-old shook hands and chatted with members of the audience before delivering a warm address. A similar gathering of alumni of Russian universities and institutes is planned in Hanoi on Wednesday for Putin, who is in his fifth term as Russia’s president, and will be on his fifth visit to Vietnam. Yet it’s hard to expect an equally enthusiastic welcome for the Russian leader this time in a country where, though fondness for Russia remains strong, its invasion of Ukraine has eroded some support, analysts say. A crowd of Hanoi’s residents try to reach visiting Russian President (L) for a hand-shake as the Russian leader leaves the temple of the Literature in Hanoi on March 2, 2001. (Hoang Dinh Nam/AFP) Russia has a close, long-standing relationship with Vietnam and is one of Hanoi’s few comprehensive strategic partners. However, after more than 20 years, the relationship between the old allies has changed substantially. Vietnam has adopted an open-door policy since the mid-1980s and has since normalized relations with countries it fought in the past, including China and the United States. Hanoi takes great pride in its so-called bamboo diplomacy, that enables it to befriend former foes while maintaining old friendships. “Putin’s visit is highly symbolic,” said Nguyen Ngoc Truong, a senior Vietnamese diplomat turned foreign affairs analyst. “It reflects Vietnam’s independent, self-reliant and multilateral foreign policy.” RELATED STORIES North Korea’s Kim promises Putin full support for Russia’s Ukraine war Vietnam’s fraternal ties with Russ are put to the test Bear East: RFA Special report on Russia’s influence in Asia “Vietnam invited U.S. and Chinese top leaders to visit last year so this visit shows once again that Hanoi is pursuing its foreign affairs principles without exception,” Truong told RFA. “There is still a part of Vietnam’s society that is deeply Russophile, but it is shrinking. The Ukraine war has also led to a shift in the way the Vietnamese public view Russia, and Putin personally,” the analyst added. ‘Low expectations’ Putin is set to arrive in Hanoi from Pyongyang where he held talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to boost the ties of two countries both at odds with the West. The Russian president is expected to spend about 24 hours in Hanoi and to meet the four most senior Vietnamese leaders – the general secretary of the Communist Party, the state president, the prime minister and the National Assembly’s chairman. Putin’s delegation will discuss cooperation projects in various areas, including energy and defense, but no major agreements are expected. Vietnamese police officers stand guard near the Opera House in preparation for the security rehearsal ahead of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Vietnam, in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 19, 2024. (Athit Perawongmetha/Reuters) Trade between Vietnam and Russia stands at just US$3.7 billion, lagging far behind that with the United States — to the tune of US$97 billion — and with China — US$131 billion. Russia is still Vietnam’s biggest supplier of weapons but purchases have decreased markedly over the past five years and Hanoi did not place any new orders last year. U.S. sanctions have also made payment to Russia difficult so the two sides would have to “discuss a new financial mechanism,” according to Nguyen The Phuong, a Vietnamese political scientist at the University of New South Wales in Australia. “It is impossible for Vietnam to wean off Russia’s weapons overnight,” Phuong said. “It still has to rely on Russia for a long time to come as it’s very hard to find alternative sources.” Russian experts said Vietnam will also be mindful not to irk the United States too much with Putin’s trip. “Vietnam as an export-oriented economy depends much more on the U.S. so it will act with an eye on Washington, and Beijing as those countries are much more important for Vietnam than Russia these days,” Kirill Kotkov, head of the Center for Far Eastern Countries Studies in St. Petersburg, told Russian media. “If there is a conflict with China, for instance, Russia will not be able to support Vietnam like we did in 1979 and the Vietnamese know that,” Kotkov added, referring to a brief but bloody Sino-Vietnam border war. Valuable partner Vietnam is not a member of the International Criminal Court, or ICC, and so has no obligation to act on an arrest warrant it issued for in 2023 over alleged war crimes in Ukraine. Still, a spokesperson for the U.S. embassy in Hanoi, voiced disapproval of Putin’s visit. “No country should give Putin a platform to promote his war of aggression and otherwise allow him to normalize his atrocities,” the spokesperson told Reuters when asked about the impact of the visit on ties with the U.S. “If he is able to travel freely, it could normalize Russia’s blatant violations of international law.” Despite such U.S. misgivings, Hanoi remains a steadfast friend and partner to Moscow, analysts say. “Vietnam has never joined any anti-Russian forces and blocs, nor has it supported any embargoes or sanctions aimed at isolating Russia,” Russian analyst Grigory Trophymchuk, told the Vietnam News Agency. “For the Russian Federation, this is particularly valuable from a geopolitical point of view.” Vietnamese children play near Lenin statue in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 29, 2023. (Tran Viet Duc/RFA) Putin’s visit comes as Vietnam is going through an unprecedented upheaval in its domestic politics, largely because of an anti-corruption campaign, called “blazing furnace”, initiated by Communist Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong. The campaign, and the infighting it has generated, has led to the departure of six members of the party’s Politburo and the ascent of To Lam, a former minister of public security, to state president. General Secretary Trong – and not Vietnam’s president – is the host of Putin’s trip, as well as of the previous trips by U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi…

Thai Senate adopts historic bill legalizing same-sex marriage

Editor1 year ago09 mins

People rejoiced in the streets of Bangkok and other Thai cities on Tuesday after the Senate passed a bill that puts Thailand on the cusp of becoming the first Southeast Asian nation to legalize same-sex marriage. With the two houses of the Thai legislature having now adopted legislation that provides equal marriage rights to LGBTQ people, the bill will become law within 120 days after the king signs it and it is published in the Royal Gazette. The legislation is expected to unlock previously denied legal rights for Thai same-sex and non-traditional couples, such as adoption or the ability to make health care decisions for their partners’ behalf, human rights activists said. A majority of senators attending the session voted in favor of its passage. About 100 of the 250-member Senate were not present for the vote. Out of 152 voters, 130 approved, four disapproved and 18 abstained, said Gov. Singsuk Singprai, the first vice president of the Senate, who chaired Tuesday’s session. The scene outside Government House in Bangkok was filled with rainbow colors of the Pride flag as gay people and others gathered to celebrate this landmark moment for Thailand’s LGBTQ community. “As an LGBTQ person who is in love and wants to marry another woman, we have long hoped that we would have equal rights and dignity, just like the heterosexual couples who can marry and start families,” Ann “Waaddao” Chumaporn, an LGBTQ organizer and community spokesperson, said during Tuesday’s Senate deliberations on the Marriage Equality Bill. _________________________________RELATED STORYTogether three decades, Thai same-sex couple hopes for legal recognition _________________________________ The bill proposes replacing terms such as “husband” and “wife” with “spouse” in Section 1448 of Thailand’s Civil and Commercial Code. “We hope that changes in Thailand will ignite a spark for other countries in Asia. Although this law is not 100% perfect, from an international human rights organization’s perspective, it makes Thai law more aligned with international standards,” Mookdapa Yangyuenpradorn, a Southeast Asian human rights associate at Fortify Rights, told BenarNews, an affiliate of Radio Free Asia. If and when the bill becomes law, Thailand would join Taiwan and Nepal as the only countries in Asia to recognize the rights of same-sex couples to wed. Members of the LGBTQ+ community celebrate after Thailand’s Senate passed a marriage equality bill to legalize same-sex unions, outside Government House in Bangkok, June 18, 2024. (Patipat Janthong/Reuters) Isa Gharti, a public policy researcher at Chiang Mai University, said the vote demonstrates progress in accepting sexual diversity. “This shows the societal advancement in Thailand in terms of accepting sexual diversity and safeguarding the rights of the LGBTQ community to equality both legally and in human dignity. This is a positive sign that will make Thai society more open, although there are still some voices of opposition,” Isa said. “Going forward, Thailand must also address deeply entrenched gender discrimination and biases in education, employment, and public health,” Isa said. “It’s essential to educate the public to foster understanding and reduce stigmatization of sexual diversity.” ‘Beautiful and powerful’ In Thailand, a Buddhist-majority politically conservative country, legislation around same-sex marriage has been more than two decades in the making. An earlier marriage equality bill, introduced by opposition lawmakers from the progressive Move Forward Party, reached its second reading in November 2022, but didn’t move beyond that because of a series of legislative delays. It died when Parliament dissolved in March 2023 ahead of the general election two months later. This year, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved the current bill, with 400 of 415 lawmakers present endorsing it at its final reading in March. Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, who is a backer of marriage equality, has said his government was working toward Bangkok hosting World Pride 2028. “We have fought a long time because we believe in all equal rights,” Srettha wrote on his X account after the vote. “Today is our day. We celebrate to ‘diverse’ love, not ‘different’ [love]. Love is beautiful and powerful.’ Supporters of LGBTQ+ rights march toward Government House in Bangkok as they celebrate the Senate’s approval of a same-sex marriage bill, June 18, 2024. (James Wilson-Thai News Pix/BenarNews) The movement for legal recognition of same-sex marriage began during the Thaksin Shinawatra government in 2001. At the time, the Ministry of Interior proposed amendments to the marriage law, but dropped them because of public opposition. A military coup forced Thaksin from the prime minister’s office in 2006. In 2012, the government of Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, introduced the Civil Partnership Bill for consideration. While this bill did not grant full marriage rights to same-sex couples, its progress was halted by another military coup in 2014 that drove her from the same office. The Move Forward Party proposed the Marriage Equality Bill in the lower House in 2022. Simultaneously, the administration of then-Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha submitted the Civil Partnership Bill for consideration. While the two bills shared similarities, the Civil Partnership Bill would have established a “life partnership” status for same-sex couples, granting them fewer legal rights than “marriage.” The House term ended before either bill could be passed. After Tuesday’s Senate vote, Plaifah Kyoka Shodladd, an 18-year-old who identifies as non-binary, took the floor and thanked everyone who supported the legislation, calling it a “force of hope” that will help Thailand become more accepting of diversity, the Associated Press reported. “Today, love trumps prejudice,” Plaifah said. BenarNews is an online news outlet affiliated with Radio Free Asia.

Myanmar’s junta takes desperate measures to stem capital flight

Editor1 year ago014 mins

The rumors were everywhere: A politically connected crony, U Thein Wai, better known as Serge Pun, was called in for questioning. While he was not arrested, the military’s questioning of the CEO of Yoma Bank and eight directors of other subsidiaries under his control is another indicator of just how dire Myanmar’s economic situation is. The 71-year old Sino-Burmese tycoon sits atop a massive business empire of some 50 different interrelated companies. The most important of these are First Myanmar Investment Company (FMI), Serge Pun and Associates (SPA), and, of course, Yoma Bank. While largely invested in real estate through Yoma Land, SPA is one of the largest conglomerates in the country, with investments in real estate, construction, banking and financial services, Suzuki automobile assembly, the KFC franchise and healthcare. Yoma Bank is one of the largest private banks in Myanmar and has been in important overseas conduit, especially after the US government sanctioned two state banks in June 2023. Yoma Bank has ties to the military, lending to both the military-owned Mytel and Pinnacle Asia, which is owned by Min Aung Hlaing’s daughter, Khin Thiri Thet Mon. Yoma Bank CEO U Thein Wai, also known as Serge Pun, smiles as electronic trading commences during the opening day of trading at Yangon Stock Exchange, March 25, 2016. (Gemunu Amarasinghe/AP) In November 2022, the State Administrative Council, as the junta is formally called, bestowed on him the honorific Thiri Pyanchi, granted for outstanding performance. Pun’s ties to the military are deep enough that the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation divested their 4.55% equity stake in Yoma Bank in December 2022, selling it to FMI. This is not to say that Pun has been completely pro-military. Compared to other cronies, he’s been much less so. He’s hedged his bets and incorporated holdings in Singapore and Hong Kong. Arguably he would be a lot wealthier were it not for the coup, but he’s worked within the reality of the coup. So what prompted the Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs, the feared military intelligence service, to come calling? In short, facilitating capital flight. Real estate roadshow In late May, a group of five executives of a real estate firm, Minn Thu Co., held an unauthorized roadshow, selling Bangkok condominiums. Minn Thu had allegedly established unauthorized bank accounts in Thailand to facilitate the sales. Thai real estate is being pitched to Burmese as a safe investment at a time when the kyat has fallen to a record low of over 5,000 kyat per dollar, while soaring inflation eats into the currency’s purchasing power. Gold has reached record rates: 5.8 million kyat per tical (15.2 grams, .54 oz) – 4.5 times the pre-coup rate of 1.3 million kyat. Over 20 gold dealers have been arrested recently, accused of engaging in speculation. The beleaguered middle class is desperately searching for a place to park what’s left of their assets after more than three years of conflict. Four of the five businessmen who staged the roadshow have been arrested, and one other executive is at large. A customer waits to withdraw money at Yoma Bank in Yangon, June 17, 2013. (Soe Zeya Tun/Reuters) To serve as a deterrent to others, the junta arrested three people who purchased the condos, having illegally transferred assets overseas. Yoma Bank is believed to have assisted in financing the purchases by transferring assets to Bangkok in violation of the junta’s currency controls. Military intelligence officials are also investigating whether Yoma Bank is offering what are de facto mortgages for overseas real estate, as an investment vehicle, in contravention of Myanmar law. In recent days, the junta has expanded their investigation into over 100,000 private bank transfers. Capital flight began immediately after the coup. Radio Free Asia reported the purchase of THB2.5 billion (US$69 million) and THB 3.7 billion (US$100 million) in Thai real estate in 2022 and 2023, respectively. In the first quarter of 2024, Burmese were the second largest group of foreign nationals to invest in Thai real estate, according to the Bangkok Post, having purchased at least 384 units, worth THB2.2 billion ($60 million). Estimates, though, are far higher, as many properties are believed to have been purchased using Thai nominees. Focus on funds And of course, the revelation that junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s own children have moved their own assets to Thailand was a huge embarrassment for the regime. Aung Pyae Sone owns a condominium worth around $1 million in Bangkok, while Khin Thiri Thet Mon has two accounts at Siam Commercial Bank. Reports are emerging that Khin Sri Thet Mon purchased a condo in the ultra swank SCOPE Langsuan, which was completed in May 2023, and where a three bedroom unit sells for $4.2 million to over $15 million. The SAC has deployed uniformed personnel to both public and private banks since mid-2021 to block transfers to the civil disobedience movement, the National Unity Government, and ethnic resistance organizations. But soon after that, they also began monitoring capital flight. The junta is increasingly cracking down on the informal banking sector, known as hundi, that is used by at least 40 percent of overseas workers. In early June, the regime froze the accounts of 39 additional hundi dealers, following the crackdown on 20 others in January. The hundi system keeps desperately needed foreign exchange out of the formal banking system, where people and companies are forced to convert it to kyat at artificially low exchange rates. Given the state of the economy, capital flight is the rational choice for Burmese with the means.. Myanmar junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and his wife, Kyu Kyu Hla, visit a Buddhist monastery in Thailand in February 2018. (Myanmar military) The World Bank has reported on the dire state of the economy, which has shrunk by nearly 20% since the coup. The poverty rate is now 32%, while 2024 GDP growth estimates have been halved to 1%. The NUG estimates that the junta has printed 30 trillion kyat…

China’s dependency on potash imports could give tiny Laos rare leverage

Editor1 year ago1 year ago012 mins

Let’s start with the good news – potentially great news, in fact – for Southeast Asia: Laos could be sitting on 10 billion tons of potash, one of the three main fertilizers used in global agriculture. In 2022, a subsidiary of the Chinese company Asia-Potash International announced a $4.3 billion investment in a potash mining venture in Khammouane province. This deal grants exploration rights to 48 square kilometers for potassium ore. The company reckons it can start with producing 1 million metric tons of potash annually, scale up to 5 million tons by 2025 and eventually reach 7 to 10 million tons. For a comparison, Canada, the world’s largest potash producer, exported around 23 million metric tons, valued at approximately $6.6 billion, in 2023. In 2022, Laos’s potash exports were valued at approximately $580 million, representing about 1.7 percent of global supply. It isn’t inconceivable that Laos will become a global player. Location helps Laos Geography is key. Next door is China, the world’s largest importer of food and food inputs, and the world’s third-biggest purchaser of potash. China imports around 8 million metric tons each year, about half of its demand, although that is increasing. China is the world’s biggest producer of potatoes, which are very reliant on potassium. China’s potato heartlands – Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan provinces – are on Laos’ doorstep. Guangdong province, China’s main banana producer, isn’t too far away. There’s ample room for Laos to expand potash exports in Southeast Asia, too. Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest potash importer, bought around $2.1 billion worth in 2022, with Laos holding a 6 percent market share. Malaysia, the sixth-largest importer, spent around $1 billion on potash, with Laos having a 2 percent share. Laos is already the largest supplier of potash to Vietnam, with exports worth about $82 million in 2022. Officials with Sino-Agri International Potash Co., Ltd. and the Lao government sign a memorandum of understanding March 24, 2023, to build a smart eco-industrial city in Khammouane province. (Pathedlao) If, for instance, Laos was to replace suppliers like Jordan and Israel and capture a 20% share of China’s potash import market, its exports could rise to around US$750-800 million, making potash Laos’ second-largest export product, after energy. Right now, the spot price for potassium chloride is US$307 per metric ton. So, loosely, 10 million tons exported a year would bring in around US$3 billion. Expectations shouldn’t be that high, though. It’s one thing for a Chinese investor to promise to produce 10 million tons a year and it’s another thing for it to actually deliver it. And because it’s a Chinese firm selling the goods, most of the money won’t stay in Laos. And there are already the same complaints as with every Chinese investment: Asia-Potash International isn’t hiring local workers. Geopolitics Nonetheless, estimates vary, but there still could be between $30 million and $300 million in annual revenue for the Lao state. Almost certainly it will be towards the lower end, but it’s not to be sniffed at by the badly-indebted government. However, consider the geostrategic implications. Up until now, China hasn’t really needed Laos. It lacks the strategic importance of Cambodia, with its naval base on the Gulf of Thailand, or the trade routes offered by Myanmar, where China is developing a $7 billion port to access the Indian Ocean for oil and LNG imports from the Gulf. In 2022, Laos accounted for a mere 0.1 percent of China’s total imports; food makes up less than a tenth of that, so Laos isn’t a solution to China’s future food insecurity. A bulldozer works on a large hill of potash at the Dead Sea Works in Israel’s Sodom area, Feb. 16, 2016. (Menahem Kahana/AFP) China’s primary import from Laos is pulped paper, not energy. Instead, China constructs hydropower dams and coal-fired stations in Laos, which generate electricity sold to Thailand and Vietnam. Geostrategically, Laos is a useful ally for Beijing to have because of its ASEAN membership, but Vientiane holds little weight in the regional bloc. Should something drastic occur in Laos – such as the fall of the ruling communist party or the emergence of an anti-China government – Beijing would be displeased and Chinese investments would be at risk, but China’s national security would be unaffected. That situation changes if Laos becomes a significant supplier of potash. If projections are correct and Laos can produce between 7-10 million tons of potash annually, it could theoretically more than meet China’s entire import demand. That makes Laos a national security interest for Beijing. Food security The Chinese government is preparing itself for military conflict. It knows that in the event it launches an invasion of Taiwan or attacks a rival state in the South China Sea, the West will hammer it with economic sanctions so damaging it would make the retribution reaped on Russia look like a slap on the wrist. Self-sufficiency and diversification are the buzzwords. But it’s doubtful that China – arguably the country most dependent on world trade and on U.S. protection of shipping routes – could survive such sanctions. Even short of war, food security has long been a major concern for China., for reasons too long to go into. According to Xi Jinping, the supreme leader, food security is the “foundation for national security.” Beijing is also concerned that its reliance on imported fertilizer inputs “could pose a major threat to its food security”. There’s no way China can achieve the food self-sufficiency that Xi wants, as was spelled out in a detailed study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a U.S. thinktank. Farmers operate rice seedling transplanters in Taizhou, in eastern China’s Jiangsu province, June 12, 2024. (AFP) China can domestically produce enough nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers, the latter essential for phosphate-hungry rice. But almost all of China’s phosphate is produced in Xinjiang and Tibet, far away from the rice-growing Han heartland and where the local population is largely hostile to rule by Beijing. China will remain…

China gives 6 patrol boats to Myanmar’s military junta

Editor1 year ago04 mins

China has delivered six patrol boats to Myanmar’s military junta, fulfilling a promise made in 2020 to the country’s previous democratically elected civilian government, the Chinese Embassy said in a statement on Wednesday. The patrol boats that were handed over in Yangon on Tuesday will be used in law enforcement efforts to control gambling and drug trafficking and in rescue and water resources protection activities, the embassy said. But a former army officer, who wished not to be named for security reasons, told RFA that the vessels could also be useful for naval military operations in Rakhine state, which has several well-traveled rivers and an Indian Ocean coastline. Rakhine state has seen intense fighting between military junta troops and the ethnic minority insurgent Arakan Army since last November. “If these boats are modified a little bit, weapons could be installed,” the former army officer said. A navy patrol boat donated by China is docked at Lanmataw jetty in Yangon, Myanmar, June 12, 2024. (RFA) Four of the patrol boats are 48 meters long (157 feet), and the other two are 28 meters long (91 feet), the embassy said. The civilian government under the National League for Democracy first requested the vessels in 2018. China’s projects in Rakhine An agreement was made in 2020 during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s two-day visit to Myanmar, in which several deals were signed to implement multibillion dollar infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative. The projects include a US$1.3 billion deep-sea port in Rakhine state’s Kyaukphyu, as well as the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, a 620 km (1,000 mile) high-speed railway and road network that will run from China’s Kunming city through Myanmar’s major economic hubs and on to the port. The corridor will ultimately give China crucial access to the Indian Ocean at Kyaukphyu. The military junta removed the civilian government and seized power in February 2021. A resident of Kyaukphyu township who closely monitors the Chinese projects told RFA that the Chinese ambassador visited Kyaukphyu on Monday. Human Rights Watch found in 2022 that the Myanmar junta had used Japan-funded passenger ships during military operations in Rakhine state. “The Myanmar junta’s misuse of Japanese development aid for military purposes effectively makes Japan a backer of the junta’s military operations,” Asia program officer Teppei Kasai said at the time. When asked via email on Wednesday if the patrol boats could be used for military purposes, the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar directed RFA to a statement posted on its Facebook page. RFA’s attempts to contact junta spokesman Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun to ask about the patrol boats were unsuccessful on Wednesday. Translated by Aung Naing. Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster.

Hong Kong exiles in UK and Canada lack access to billions of their savings

Editor1 year ago012 mins

In April 2023, Hong Kong Watch found that Hong Kongers were being denied access to up to £2.2 billion (US$2.8 billion) of their hard-earned Mandatory Provident Fund retirement savings. Fast forward one year, and the number has only increased to over £3 billion (US$3.8 billion). This act of transnational repression is placing an unnecessary financial and mental strain on an estimated tens of thousands of Hong Kongers in the UK and Canada who moved abroad under British National (Overseas) (BNO) passports, set up to allow a permanent residence pathway for them. The Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) is a compulsory retirement savings scheme for the people of Hong Kong. Hong Kongers can ordinarily withdraw their entire account early if they make a statutory declaration that they have departed Hong Kong permanently with no intention of returning to resettle. However, the Mandatory Provident Fund Authority, which oversees the provision of MPF schemes, released a statement in March 2021 saying that because the BNO passport was no longer recognised by the Hong Kong government as a valid travel document and proof of identity as of Jan. 2021. This means that those trying to withdraw their savings early cannot rely on the BNO passport or visa to support an application for early withdrawal of their funds. A protester raises his British National Overseas passports during a candlelight vigil to mark the 31st anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, in Hong Kong, June 4, 2020. (Tyrone Siu/Reuters) Despite this, the MPF-related legislation, regulations, and terms of the deeds governing entitlement to MPF benefits in Hong Kong remain unchanged. Under the MPF trust deed, trustees including those based overseas like HSBC, Standard Chartered, Manulife and Sun Life, have a legal obligation to release MPF to beneficiaries who are able to provide evidence of their right to reside in a foreign country. There is no reason that a BNO passport or visa should be denied under this deed. However, the latest research from Hong Kong Watch includes case studies detailing how Hong Kongers continue to be denied access to their MPF on the grounds that they hold a BNO passport or visa. This includes many Hong Kong families in the UK, from a single mother who is unable to afford a heater for her son due to being denied £57,000 (US$70,000) worth of her MPF, to a family of five that is unable to afford a wheelchair accessible property for their severely disabled child due to the withholding of their MPF. Individual hardship Others with withheld savings struggle to adapt to their new environments for financial reasons, to assist relatives in escaping from increasing repression in Hong Kong, and to start desired business ventures in the UK or Canada. Since 2021 and as recently as last month, Hong Kong Watch has documented numerous rejection letters from MPF trustees to Hong Kongers denying the early withdrawal of their MPF on the grounds that the BNO visa or passport is not a valid form of identification per the Hong Kong government’s lawless declaration. I have spoken with a Hong Konger who has £90,000 (US$114,000) frozen in MPF assets, and another who had obtained Canadian permanent residency and was still denied access to their MPF by Manulife for simply arriving in Canada with a BNO passport. The latter case is especially concerning, particularly after Manulife’s Global Head of Government Relations for Canada, Maryscott Greenwood, testified before the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration on Monday and claimed that Manulife had never denied a Hong Konger access to their savings on the basis of holding a BNO visa. Having seen a written transcript of a call between the Hong Konger who was denied access to their MPF and Manulife, in which Manulife said, “even if you hold Canadian PR, it’s ineligible to withdraw the fund as a BNO passport holder,” this is simply not true. Maryscott Greenwood, Manulife’s global head of Government Relations for Canada, testifies via video before the Canadian Parliament’s Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, June 3, 2024. (Image from Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration video) Sun Life’s Head of Global Government Affairs and Public Policy, Laura Hewitt, also testified in the hearing. It was unfortunate but unsurprising that despite having productive meetings with Hong Kong Watch prior to the hearing, both Manulife and Sun Life executives delivered cautious, pre-prepared answers and repeatedly failed to respond to direct “yes” or “no” questions from the Canadian Parliament. Fortunately, members of the Canadian Parliament including Tom Kmiec, Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Greg McLean, Paul Chiang, Fayçal El-Khoury, and Jenny Kwan, who is herself a prior BNO visa holder, were not satisfied with these non-answers. The MPs pressed the business representatives on why they have withheld Hong Kongers’ own savings from them since 2021. Tom Kmiec asked both companies: “Why are you still operating in an autocratic, totalitarian regime that is dominated by Beijing?” The question remains unanswered. Tasks for London and Ottawa The next UK government should vow to provide clarification to UK-based MPF trustees that the BNO visa is intended to lead to “permanent settlement and British citizenship” to show their support for Hong Kongers in Britain. London should also pledge to raise and condemn this form of transnational repression with their counterparts in Hong Kong. On the campaign trail, the future UK government has the opportunity to present these pledges to 140,000 eligible Hong Kong BNO voters. The Canadian government should work with Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada to change the designation of BNO passport and visa holders from GBN )Great Britain) to CHN (China) or HKG (Hong Kong) on Canadian permanent residency cards to prevent further retaliation from the Hong Kong government. A man waves to family members before leaving for the United Kingdom at the Hong Kong International Airport, June 30, 2021. (Tyrone Siu/Reuters) With a current backlog of 9,000 permanent residency applications for Hong Kongers in Canada, this will only become a greater administrative issue in the near future if IRCC labels the nationality of…

Arakan Army treatment of Rohingya minority poses challenge to Myanmar opposition

Editor1 year ago013 mins

Evidence of Arakan Army culpability in mass arson attacks on Rohingya homes in western Myanmar’s Buthidaung township – where satellite imagery has confirmed that more than 400 homes were burnt to the ground – poses a serious challenge to the anti-junta opposition. While such attacks have ceased since the Arakan Army captured the majority Rohingya town, the rebels’ double-speak both weakens the prospects of an inclusive federal democracy, and is very shortsighted for the ethnic army’s leadership. As it is said, the truth is the first casualty in war, and so far here’s what we know happened: On May 18, the Arakan Army captured the last remaining four light infantry battalions and two border guard police camps in Buthidaung, following a multi-month siege. Immediately, over 400 homes in Rohingya residential neighborhoods were set ablaze. There is a chance of course that some of the fires were set by the retreating junta military, who had waged a genocidal campaign against the Rohingya in 2017-18. The military seems determined to stoke inter-communal tensions as it retreats from northern Rakhine state, and “false flag” operations are part of the military’s modus operandi. In a bizarre irony, the army has been conscripting Rohingya men into its depleted ranks to fight the Arakan Army, while at the same time, relying on radical groups, such as the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and the Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Army (ARSA), operating in the refugee camps in Bangladesh to recruit fighters. Despite the military’s own culpability in ethnic cleansing, they are trying to paint themselves as defenders of the Rohingya community, as the Arakan Army settles old scores. If the Arakan Army continues such attacks, they are making an alliance between the military and radical Rohingya groups including ARSA and the RSO, inevitable. Flames from burning homes in Buthidaung in Rakhine state, are seen above the treetops in this image provided by a Rohingya refugee, May 17, 2024. (Image from video via AP) While this is not surprising, it is exceptionally short-sighted in its thinking and undermines the effort to defeat Myanmar’s military and establish a federal democracy. This should not come as a surprise. The Arakan Army’s position on the Rohingya has been two faced. Its leader, Tun Mrat Naing, has a decade-long track record of referring to them as “Bengalis”, parroting the Myanmar military’s own term for the Rohingya. The arson attacks have also increased tensions between the Arakan Army leadership and the National Unity Government (NUG). Following the military coup in February 2021, the Arakan Army made a very important, if not surprising, statement in support of the NUG position that the Rohingya were a persecuted minority who were entitled to full citizenship, and that the one million refugees in Bangladesh should be repatriated. More intransigent after military gains But with military gains since the Three Brotherhood Alliance launched its offensive on October 27, 2023, the Arakan Army has become far more intransigent. Its leadership has signaled this change to their constituents, whether in social media or simply by greenlighting attacks by local units. The Arakan Army’s military gains are significant. They now claim to have seized 180 military camps and taken full control of eight of Rakhine’s 17 townships. While they have not moved on the state capital of Sittwe or the Chinese special economic zone in Kyaukphyu, they are controlling the roads in and out of them. Should the Arakan Army complete their capture of Maungdaw, they will have driven the military out of the entire northern region of Rakhine. While the ethnic Rakhine army has stated their intention to liberate the entire state, for now they are trying to control the three main entry points into the northern part of the state in order to consolidate their power. The military has scant deployments in southern Rakhine, meaning that the Arakan Army’s takeover of the entire state is not unthinkable. Arakan Army troops pose in Buthidaung, Myanmar, in an image posted to social media May 18, 2024. (AA Info Desk via VKontakte) The Arakan Army has proven itself to be amongst the most effective fighting forces among the ethnic armed organizations. Their battlefield advances have spread the military thin and not allowed the junta to redeploy troops to Kachin, Kayah or northern Shan states, where regime forces have suffered serious setbacks. Likewise, in eastern Myanmar, though opposition forces had to give up the border town of Myawaddy, the military has not been able to regain full control of the key Asia Highway. In short, military success has given the Arakan Army the opportunity to advance their short-term and parochial political interests at the expense of the national agenda to defeat the military. The Arakan Army’s stated commitments to the anti junta opposition’s long-term political goals, as stated by the NUG, should always be taken with a grain of salt. They are the only ethnic army that has flirted with independence, and their authoritarian leanings show they are hostile to democracy and any political system that would force them to share power. Prejudice with huge implications The United League of Arakan, the AA’s political arm, issued a statement on May 20 that denied any culpability for the Rohingya village torchings, apportioning the blame solely on the military. Its statements since then have been largely dismissive and continue to deny the attacks, while criticizing media reporting on civilian casualties. But evidence of their culpability is mounting, underscoring the reality that the Arakan Army does not like the Rohingya population, nor does it want to see large-scale resettlement from Bangladesh. The Arakan Army’s politics capitalize on Rakhine Buddhist prejudice against the Muslim community. The Arakan Army leadership is under intense pressure to renounce any violence towards the Rohingya. But the reality is that many of their troops were involved in the communal violence against them. This is simply a return to their default setting. The Arakan Army’s position has larger implications. While they might have moved on from the 2017 ethnic cleansing, the international community, including…

North Korea recalls documentary about Kim Jong Un’s mother

Editor1 year ago010 mins

North Korea has recalled a 2011 documentary that sang the praises of Kim Jong Un’s mother, two sources inside the country told Radio Free Asia, but the move is prompting people to wonder why the country has always maintained a level of secrecy about her identity and background. “Since her biographical information has never been officially stated, the recall on the film is actually raising suspicions,” a resident of the northeastern province of North Hamgyong told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons. Most North Koreans don’t know her name – Ko Yong Hui – or that she was born in Osaka, Japan, or that her father, Ko Gyon Taek, managed a military factory in the city prior to the end of World War II. The documentary, titled “Mother of Great Songun Korea,” leaves out all those facts, the sources said. In lieu of her name, the film referred to her as “respected mother” and showed many scenes of her at Kim Jong Il’s side during his official appearances. Screenshot of the North Korea-produced documentary ‘Mother of Great Songun Korea’. (lovepink4200 via Youtube) It was distributed internally to high-ranking officials, government agencies, and the military on VCD, or video compact disc, in 2011, the same year that Kim Jong Il died. “Recently, judicial agencies such as the Provincial State Security Department and the Social Security Department have begun rounding up copies of propaganda materials,” the resident said. “Instructions were given to retrieve and delete documentary films related to the general secretary’s biological mother,” he said, explaining that “Mother of Great Songun Korea” was on the undisclosed list of now-banned materials. The recall was also confirmed by a resident of the northern province of Ryanggang, who told RFA in the now-banned documentary that “Ko Yong Hui, is touted as having ‘accumulated great achievements that brought about a bright future’” for North Korea. Made in Japan Ko was raised in Japan as part of the Korean minority in the country, and in 1962, the family moved to North Korea as part of a repatriation program. In the early 1970s, Ko appeared as a dancer in the Mansudae Art Troupe – a popular group of musicians known for propaganda performances that glorify the state and its leaders. It is not known when she got together with Kim Jong Il, but she is believed to have met him in the early 1970s, and she bore him three children in the 1980s, including Kim Jong Un. Though most sources describe her as having been his mistress, some suggest she may have been his third wife. The government has never acknowledged any marriage between them, however. Screenshot of the North Korea-produced documentary ‘Mother of Great Songun Korea’. (lovepink4200 via Youtube) According to North Korea’s songbun caste system, Ko would be of the lowest caste because she was born in Japan, her father’s job supported the Japanese war effort, and her occupation as a dancer – which would tarnish Kim Jong Un’s image. Ko’s background does not neatly fit the nation’s founding myth that its leaders are descended from the so-called Paektu Line, named after the Korean peninsula’s tallest mountain, which is the setting of many of the Korean nation’s founding myths, including the lore of the Kim Dynasty. Kim’s grandfather, national founder Kim Il Sung is the progenitor of the line, and his first wife Kim Jong Suk – Kim Jong Il’s mother – fought alongside her husband in his guerilla army against Japanese rule prior to and during World War II, giving Kim Jong Il near mythical status as the legitimate son of two popular national heroes. “In the past, previous leaders inherited power based on the purity of the Paektu bloodline and the legitimacy of revolutionary traditions,” the North Hamgyong resident said. “Details about the birth and lives of the leaders as well as their siblings, parents, grandparents and great-grandparents, were made public and promoted as patriotic examples.” Erasing sensitive information? In contrast, Kim Jong Un, due to his mother’s background, could be seen not as a third-generation revolutionary leader, but the illegitimate son of Kim Jong Il’s Japan-born mistress whose father supported the imperialist war effort. Screenshot of the North Korea-produced documentary ‘Mother of Great Songun Korea’. (lovepink4200 via Youtube) If it becomes widely known, that support of imperial Japan could cause problems for Kim Jong Un, Bruce Bennett, a senior researcher at the California-based RAND Corporation, told RFA. “Kim is trying to wipe out anything that would potentially challenge his control of the country,” said Bennett. “So the issue of his maternal grandfather having supported the Japanese I mean that’s something that could really hurt him potentially. “And so that’s part of the history he wants to get rid of,” he said. Bennett said erasing facts about his mother might marginally help his case to stay in power, but it would be more helpful were he to improve the economy and his people’s lives. Screenshot of the North Korea-produced documentary ‘Mother of Great Songun Korea’. (lovepink4200 via Youtube) The lack of available information about Ko is causing residents to question what they have been told about their leader, Kim Jong Un, the Ryanggang resident said. “As the biography of the leader has not been made public even after him having been in power for 12 years, some are raising doubts about the identity of his mysterious birth mother,” he said. “The argument is that if there is no dishonorable family history in the pure Paektu bloodline, there is no reason not to disclose details about her.” Kim Jong Il was able to claim that his hereditary succession was legitimate because of the purity of his lineage to the Paektu bloodline, the second resident said. Kim Jong Un claims the same lineage, but the secrecy appears to be giving people doubts. “Given the actions of the authorities, who are ordering the recall and destruction of copies of the already released documentary film about his mother, people are questioning whether his…

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