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Category: Europe

Taking over from the inside: China’s growing reach into local waters

Editor012 mins

On March 14, 2016, Argentina’s coast guard detected a Chinese vessel fishing illegally in national waters. When the ship attempted to ram the coast-guard cutter, the Argentinians opened fire on the vessel, which soon sank.  The Lu Yan Yuan Yu 10 was one of eleven Chinese squid vessels that the Argentine navy has chased for suspected illegal fishing since 2010, according to the government.  But one year after the incident, Argentina’s Fishing Council announced that it would grant fishing licenses to two vessels owned by the same Chinese operator that owned the ship the Argentine navy had chased the previous year. These ships would sail under the Argentine flag through a local front company.  The decision seemed to violate Argentine regulations that not only forbid foreign-owned ships from flying Argentina’s flag or fishing in its waters but also prohibit granting licenses to operators with records of illegal fishing. The move may have been a contradiction, but it is an increasingly common one around the world. Over the past three decades, China has gained supremacy over global fishing by dominating the high seas with more than 6,000 distant-water ships. When it came to targeting other countries’ fishing grounds, Chinese fishing ships typically sat “on the outside,” in international waters along sea borders, running incursions across the line into domestic waters.  In recent years, from South America to Africa to the far Pacific, China has increasingly taken a “softer” approach, gaining control from the inside through legal means by paying to flag in their ships so they can fish in domestic waters without the risk of political clashes, bad press, or sunken vessels.  Infographic by The Outlaw Ocean Project This method typically involves going around prohibitions on foreign shipowners by partnering with local residents and giving them majority ownership stakes. Through these partnerships, Chinese companies can register their ships under the flag of another country, gaining permission to fish in that nation’s territorial waters.  Sometimes Chinese companies sell or lease their ships to locals but retain control over decisions and profits. In other places, these companies pay fees to gain fishing rights through “access agreements.” From Micronesia to Iran Chinese companies now control nearly 250 flagged-in vessels in the waters of countries including Micronesia, Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, Morocco, and even Iran. Many of these companies have been tied to a variety of fishing crimes.  Trade records show that some of the seafood caught on these vessels is exported to countries including the United States, Canada, Italy, and Spain. Mar del Plata is Argentina’s largest fishing port and the headquarters for many fishing companies. Many Argentine-owned fishing vessels have, however, been neglected in recent years. In some parts of Mar del Plata’s port, those vessels now sit neglected or sunken, unused and unsalvageable. (Pete McKenzie/The Outlaw Ocean Project) Most countries require ships to be owned locally to keep profits within the country and make it easier to enforce fishing regulations. “Flagging in” undermines those aims. And aside from the sovereignty and financial concerns, food security and local livelihoods are also undermined by the export of this vital source of affordable protein, often to Western consumers.  In the Pacific Ocean, Chinese ships comb the waters of Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Micronesia, according to a 2022 report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service.  “Chinese fleets are active in waters far from China’s shores,” the report warned, “and the growth in their harvests threatens to worsen the already dire depletion in global fisheries.”  The tactic of “flagging in” is not unique to the Chinese fleet. American and Icelandic fishing companies have also engaged in the practice.  But as China has increased its control over global fishing, Western nations have jumped at the opportunity to focus attention on its misdeeds.  Even frequent culprits can also be easy scapegoats. When criticized in the media, China pushes back, not without reason, by dismissing their criticism as politically motivated and by accusing its detractors of hypocrisy.  Still, China has a well-documented reputation for violating international fishing laws and standards, intruding on the maritime territory of other countries and abusing its fishing workers.  Two local men fish in Mar del Plata, Argentina, in March 2024. (Pete McKenzie/The Outlaw Ocean Project) History of misbehavior In the past six years, more than 50 ships flagged to a dozen different countries but controlled by Chinese companies have engaged in crimes such as illegal fishing and unauthorized transshipments, according to an investigation by the Outlaw Ocean Project.  China’s sheer size, ubiquity and history of misbehavior is raising concerns.  In Africa, Chinese companies operate flagged-in ships in the national waters of at least nine countries. In the Pacific, an inspection in 2024 by local police and the U.S. Coast Guard found that six Chinese flagged-in ships in the waters of Vanuatu had violated regulations requiring them to record their catch in logbooks. In August 2019, a reporting team inspected a Chinese fishing vessel off the coast of West Africa. (Fábio Nascimento/The Outlaw Ocean Project) China’s control over local resources is not constrained to domestic waters. In Argentina, China has provided billions of dollars in currency swaps, providing an economic lifeline amid domestic inflation and hesitancy from other lenders.  China has also made or promised billion-dollar investments in Argentina’s railway system, hydroelectric dams, lithium mines, and solar and wind power plants.  This money has bought Beijing the type of influence that intervened in the fate of the crew from the Lu Yan Yuan Yu 10. When the ship sank, most of the crew were scooped up by another Chinese fishing ship and returned to China.  However, four of them, including the captain, were brought to shore, put under house arrest and charged with a range of crimes by a local judge who said the officials had endangered their own crew and the coast guard officers who chased them. China’s foreign ministry soon pushed back against the arrest. Three days later, Argentina’s foreign minister told reporters that the charges had “provoked a reaction of great concern…

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Cambodia’s Hun Dynasty stakes reputation on the Funan Techo Canal

Editor014 mins

Ground will be broken on the Funan Techo Canal on August 5 – strongman Hun Sen’s 72nd birthday. The waterway will be carved through the eastern regions of the country, eventually connecting the capital Phnom Penh to new deep-water ports in Sihanoukville and Kampot, on the Gulf of Thailand.  The Cambodian government believes the $1.7 billion waterway will reduce Cambodia’s dependency on Vietnam, through whose ports much of Cambodia’s imports and exports are transported.  They expect an economic boon for the country, with cheaper transportation making Cambodian goods more competitive, fostering overall economic growth. But the megaproject has been controversial, to say the least.  Initially, much of the controversy centered on Vietnam’s apparent fear that Cambodia might allow its “ironclad friend” China military access to the canal. The security dimension was played up. Villager Sok Rom looks at excavators being used on the construction of the Funan Techo canal along the Prek Takeo channel in Kandal province, July 9, 2024. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) However, there are more significant concerns. The first is environmental. There are genuine concerns, especially if you’re a Vietnamese resident of the Mekong Delta, about the potential ecological impact. Carving out the canal could lead to further intrusion of salt water into the Mekong’s distributaries and create a massive levee between Cambodia and Vietnam’s floodplains.  As Brian Eyler of the Stimson Center has put it: “the canal will disconnect the floodplain, creating a dry zone to its south and a wetter zone to the north.” Much remains unknown since Phnom Penh hasn’t yet publicly released any environmental impact assessment on the canal. The second concern is economic, and this is a bit more hazy.  David Brown, an economic analyst, argued recently that “there is no plausible economic argument for digging a canal.” I disagree.  Economic logic There is some economic logic to the project if it’s done properly. It will make domestic transport of goods cheaper, benefiting consumers and  make Cambodian exports more competitive in international markets.  Yes, Cambodia has new expressways and wants to re-do its aged railways, but moving goods by water is many times cheaper than by road or rail.  It will mean more business for Cambodia’s new ports in Sihanoukville and Kampot, boosting these local economies. It should bring some investment to the rural areas where the canal passes through.  And it does make Cambodia more economically self-sufficient—no one can say with 100% certainty that Vietnam won’t in the future deny access to its ports, which would effectively mean an economic blockade for Cambodia. Residential homes along the Prek Ta Hing channel, where the proposed second phase of the Funan Techo canal is set to be built, in Kandal province, July 9, 2024. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) None of this is to say that Phnom Penh has gone about this the right way. The entire process has lacked transparency.  The government was too hubristic at the beginning, thinking that China would fund everything, and has over-egged the patriotic angle of the canal, choosing not to have a decent dialogue with the public about the complexity of the scheme.  Indeed, Prime Minister Hun Manet, who inherited the premiership from his father Hun Sen last year, has presented it as a nationalistic project.  As Hun Manet put it, the canal will give Cambodia “a nose to breathe through.” Of course, this rhetoric comes slightly unstuck once you recall that the China Road and Bridge Corporation will have a lengthy build-operate-transfer contract on the project, so it will only pass into Cambodian ownership sometime in the second half of this century.  Even so, Phnom Penh’s propaganda machines are in full swing: anyone who criticizes the scheme is unpatriotic or despises Cambodia, and those who support it are the true adherents of national sovereignty. Legacy building The inherent problem is that the whole thing is essentially a vanity project.  That doesn’t mean it’s entirely illogical or uneconomical. But you have to remember that this isn’t a normal project. It’s far more symbolic than the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway, the country’s first proper motorway, or your bog-standard hydro dam. It’s a way for Hun Sen, who is still the kingpin despite resigning last year after nearly four decades in power, to give himself a physical legacy. The Hun dynasty is physically cutting an artery through the country, a landmark to the power of the Hun family that they hope will last for centuries. “Our ancestors built the Angkor Temple and other great monuments, but unfortunately we used to be divided. Now, we are once again united and we are building new achievements,” Hun Manet said earlier this year. Construction will begin on August 5, Hun Sen’s birthday.  Kavi Chongkittavorn, a veteran Thai journalist, has called the Funan Techo Canal a “litmus test for Hun Manet’s leadership.” Another analyst put it: the government has to “complete it by all means, at all costs.” Workers dig the Funan Techo canal at Prek Takeo in Kandal province, July 9, 2024. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) Indeed, the Hun family has staked its reputation, though not its power, on the project.  When trying to defend the canal during a speech in May, Hun Sen, referring to himself in the third person, tried to reassure Cambodians: “Hun Sen has never made a wrong decision in the past 47 years”. (He has; many.) For Hun Manet, it offers an opportunity for drums, flags and loyalty-parades. His first year in power has been somewhat dull.  He isn’t as bombastic, as in-your-face, as his father. His speeches aren’t as wild and rambling; his rhetoric is more measured and consensus-based. His focus is policy, often of the boring sort.  The ruling party framed his succession as a technocratic shift, the transition from a generation of rulers who literally fought to save the country from genocide to a generation that will make slow, incremental improvements to the progress they inherited.  Take a moment to read more Cambodian canal project to kick off on Hun Sen’s birthday Vietnam urges Cambodia to cooperate…

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Food shortages reported in rebel-controlled areas of Myanmar’s Chin state

Editor04 mins

Food and medicine shortages in two townships in Myanmar’s Chin state have worsened in the six months since the Arakan Army took control, causing most residents to leave the area, aid workers and residents said. The ethnic rebel Arakan Army, or AA, drove junta forces out of Paletwa and Samee townships on Jan. 14.  A Paletwa resident, who requested not to be named for security reasons, told Radio Free Asia that people in the township’s urban area have been trading pigs and cattle for rice and other consumer goods over the last several months. “People living in the urban areas can’t travel at all,” he said. “They have no salt, cooking oil or fish paste. They are facing many difficulties in traveling and living.” The AA has been fighting the military junta as it seeks self-determination for the Buddhist ethnic Rakhine population in western Myanmar. Bags of rice are donated to Kaki Swar Refugee Camp in Palatwa township, June 19, 2024. (Paletwa IDPs and Humanitarian Supporting via Facebook) In Paletwa, ethnic Chin residents have had to seek permission from the AA to travel from their homes to their farms in the township’s rural areas, residents told RFA. That has created difficulties for residents trying to make a living, they said. RFA was unable to contact AA spokesperson Khaing Thukha for comment on the shortages.  For the last seven years, Paletwa and Samee township residents have been importing fuel and basic consumer goods from India’s Mizoram state through the Kaladan River, which flows into Myanmar. But last month, an influential Indian civil society organization – the Central Young Lai Association – called for a halt to the transport of goods from Mizoram state to AA-controlled areas in Chin state, citing the AA’s treatment of ethnic Chin people. That has caused a severe shortage of fuel and basic foodstuffs in northern Rakhine state and in some areas of Chin state, residents said. Since January, many residents have since taken refuge in Mizoram state, while others have moved through neighboring Rakhine state to Myanmar’s commercial capital, Yangon. Due to unstable phone lines and internet communication, the exact number of residents left in Paletwa and Samee townships was unknown. But relief workers said only one-third of residents are still living in the urban areas of the two townships. Translated by Aung Naing. Edited by Matt Reed.

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Authorities in Xinjiang rearrest son of prominent Uyghur businessman

Editor05 mins

Authorities in Xinjiang rearrested the son of a prominent Uyghur businessman two days after he was released from “re-education” in March and days before before his wedding, two relatives with knowledge of the situation told Radio Free Asia. Abuzer Abdughapar, 24, who worked at a car dealership in Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi, was rearrested on March 25 by public security authorities, said his uncle Abdusattar Abdurusul, citing information from other relatives in Almaty, Kazakhstan. He was supposed to get married on May 11, an event to which his relatives in Almaty had been invited, Abdusattar said. The reason for Abuzer’s arrest is unknown, and authorities have not informed Abuzer’s family about his whereabouts. Abuzer was first arrested and detained in 2017 in his hometown of Ghulja – or Yining in Chinese – after spending a year studying Turkey. He was sent to a “re-education” camp and released nearly a year later.   His rearrest is an example of how authorities are apprehending Uyghur detainees, who have already served time in “re-education” camps or prisons, under various pretexts to eliminate what Chinese authorities deem “threats to national security.”  Among those rearrested are entrepreneurs and philanthropists, and Uyghurs who have traveled abroad, especially to Muslim countries. Abdughapar Abdurusul in an undated photo. (Courtesy of Abdusattar Abdurusul) “I heard there [was] a 100-day clearance going on which entailed the rearrest of people who were arrested and released before,” Abdusattar said. “The Chinese government is trying to erase us.”   Mutallib, the Almaty-based older brother of Abuzer’s grandmother, confirmed the young Uyghur’s rearrest. “We heard he was arrested on March 25 and that he has not been released,” he said. “The wedding was paused as well. Up to now, we don’t know his whereabouts or the reason for his arrest.” Chinese police officers at the Public Security Bureau in Urumqi refused to answer questions about Abuzer’s rearrest when contacted by RFA. Father arrested in 2018 His father tried to bribe authorities in Urumqi to release Abuzer, but they lied to him and disappeared after receiving the money, Abdusattar said. In 2018, authorities also arrested Abuzer’s father, Abdughapar Abdurusul, a prominent philanthropist and owner of a multimillion-dollar import-export company in Ghulja that does business with Kazakhstan, for taking an unsanctioned Muslim pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia and “tax evasion,” Abdusattar said. They also detained Abuzer’s mother, Merhaba. The family’s fixed assets, companies and houses worth more than several hundred million dollars were confiscated, he said. Merhaba later died in a “re-education” camp. Abdughapar had been sentenced to death, but was released in 2020, said his older brother Abdusattar, a businessman who lives in Europe. Abdusattar said he believes that Abuzer and Abdughapar were released after he went public about their detentions via Western media, including RFA. Authorities re-arrested Abdughapar a second time in summer 2021, but released him a few months later, his brother said. The cause of his arrest is unknown. Translated by RFA Uyghur. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Matt Reed.

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Floods force 20,000 people from homes in Myanmar’s Bago

Editor05 mins

Flooding triggered by torrential downpours has forced about 20,000 people from their homes in the Myanmar city of Bago and they now face a dire shortage of water and food with more rain expected, aid workers and residents said on Monday. A child was swept away and drowned near Bago, which is famous for its Buddhist temples, about 80 km (50 miles) north of the former capital of Yangon, after days of relentless rain, residents said. The flooding has compounded misery for many people struggling to get by in an economic crisis in the wake of a 2021 military coup that plunged the country into bloody turmoil. “The flood hasn’t subsided. I don’t know how to express the hardships, the flooding amidst the political crisis. We’re facing shortages of food and medicine,” a Bago resident, who declined to be identified for fear of reprisals for talking to the media, told Radio Free Asia. Floods in Bago in Myanmar on July 29, 2024. (RFA) Aid groups said 20,000 people have been forced from their homes since Friday, with residents of the Ah Htet Zaing Ga Naing Gyi, Kyun Tharyar, Kyauk Gyi Su and Pon Nar Su neighborhoods particularly hard hit. “Those neighborhoods are flooded up to the height of bamboo,” said an official with a Bago-based social aid group, who also declined to be identified. “There’s an urgent need for clean drinking water and food for the evacuees,” said the official, adding that some people who had sought shelter in a relief camp were forced to move again when the waters kept rising. The junta that seized power in 2021 said in a notice in the state-owned Myanmar Alin newspaper that 27 flood relief camps had been opened and military authorities in Bago had helped 18,210 people evacuate and were providing assistance to them. A child from a family already displaced by fighting was killed in the town of Mone, to the north of Bago, when fast-flowing flood waters washed away a river bank, residents said. “They were fleeing the war and were sheltering in the forest when the child was washed away. The body was found near Kyaung Su village,” said the first Bago resident. Meteorological officials said early on Monday that the flood waters in Bago could rise by another six inches over the next day and would remain above the danger level for some time.  Floods in Bago on July 29, 2024. (RFA) To the east of Bago, the Sittaung River, one of the main rivers flowing south through central Myanmar to the ocean, had overflowed and flooded communities along its banks, residents of the area said. Even further to the east, flooding in Myawaddy township on the border with Thailand killed three people – a child and two men – on Saturday when a border river burst its banks, residents said. Flooding in northern Myanmar’s Kachin state displaced thousands of people early this month. The military council’s Meteorological Department and the Hydrological Directorate announced on Sunday that 12 cities across Myanmar faced flooding.  Editing by RFA staff.

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Rights group, senator speak up for dissident fighting extradition from Thailand

Editor04 mins

Pressure built on Thailand Thursday over the detention of a detained Vietnamese dissident fighting extradition back home with one human rights official warning of a stain on the government if it deported him. Y Quynh Bdap, from Vietnam’s Ede minority, was detained on June 11 and is being held in a special prison in Bangkok while a court decides his fate.  In January, Vietnam sentenced the 32-year-old to 10 years in prison in absentia on terrorism charges, accusing him of involvement in 2023 attacks on two public agencies in Dak Lak province in which nine people were killed.  Bdap has been in Thailand since 2018 and denied any involvement in the 2023 attacks. The U.N. refugee agency has recognised him as a “person of concern”. “Put simply, if he is sent back, chances are he dies, disappears, is tortured. That will stain the hands of the Thai government,” Sunai Phasuk, senior researcher at Human Rights Watch, told a seminar in Bangkok. The Thai government did not respond to a request for comment from Radio Free Asia. RELATED STORIES Thai court postpones Vietnamese activist’s extradition hearing Rights groups call on Thailand not to extradite Vietnamese activist 10 defendants given life sentences for Dak Lak attacks Sunai said the terrorism charges that Bdap is facing at home did not meet international standards of justice. Referring to a previous military government in Thailand that was intolerant of dissent, he said he questioned the behavior of the civilian administration that replaced it. On July 15, a Bangkok court postponed Bdap’s extradition hearing until Aug. 1, He is also facing an immigration offense related to overstaying his visa. Bdap’s lawyer, Nadthasiri Bergman, told a hearing this month the case reflected intensified transnational repression, through which governments exert their influence across borders to silence dissent. A Thai senator, Angkhana Neelapaijit, told the seminar that Thailand should live up to international standards on human rights, ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention, update its immigration law to take into account enforced disappearance and torture, and insist that all extradition requests from other countries go through its Court of Justice. Thailand and Vietnam have not signed an extradition treaty but regularly exchange each other’s nationals on a reciprocal basis.  Vietnamese officials have not made a public comment on Bdap’s case but Sunai and Bergman said they believed Vietnam was exerting pressure for the extradition case to be resolved in their country’s favor. Edited by Mike Firn.   

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North Korea brushes off any hope of better U.S. ties under Trump

Editor04 mins

North Korea dismissed on Tuesday a suggestion by former U.S. President Donald Trump that he could improve relations if he were to win November’s election, saying it did not expect any change in U.S. hostility and it was ready for confrontation. Trump spearheaded an unprecedented diplomatic push on North Korea when he was president in an effort to get it to abandon its nuclear and missile programs. He met North Korean leader Kim Jong Un three times, including once at the Joint Security Area in the Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas. But the effort brought no tangible progress and North Korea has been relentlessly building up its nuclear arsenal and developing the missiles with which to carry the bombs. As Trump prepares for his bid to win the presidency for a second term, he has referred to his efforts on North Korea, implying he could make progress if he returned to the White House.  He said in a speech at the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee last week: “It’s nice to get along with somebody who has a lot of nuclear weapons.” RELATED STORIES Surprise Trump-Kim DMZ Meeting Wins Applause, But Raises Doubts About Real Progress Rumors of Breakdown in US-North Korea Summit Spread in North Korea Abrupt End to US-North Korean Summit Disappoints Experts, But Some See Prospect of Future Negotiations But the state Korean Central News Agency, or KCNA, appeared to rule out in a commentary any hope for warming ties, even if Trump becomes president again. “No matter what administration takes office in the U.S., the political climate, which is confused by the infighting of the two parties, does not change and, accordingly, we do not care about this,” said the news agency, which reflects official thinking. “It is true that Trump, when he was president, tried to reflect the special personal relations between the heads of state but he did not bring about any substantial positive change,” it said. The KCNA said the U.S. had pursued “the most vicious and persistent hostile policy” towards it for decades and it was prepared to defend itself. “The DPRK has bolstered its self-defensive capabilities to safeguard its ideology, social system, dignity and life and is fully ready for all-out confrontation with the U.S.,” it said, referring to North Korea by the initials of its official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  The U.S. has long argued that North Korea’s nuclear program is illegal and subject to U.N. sanctions aimed at pressing it into disarmament talks, while backing staunch U.S. ally South Korea. Edited by Taejun Kang.

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Nguyen Phu Trong left Vietnam’s Communist Party ripe for strongman rule

Editor015 mins

On July 19, the Vietnamese Communist Party announced the death of its general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong. The previous day, it announced that Trong, 80, ostensibly the most powerful politician in the country, had been relieved of his duties for health reasons.  He had missed several key meetings in recent months, and even when he did attend, he appeared shaky and unwell. He suffered a stroke a few years ago but seemingly bounced back.  However, his near-unprecedented third term in office has been cut short.  To Lam, the public security minister and promoted to state President last month, will now assume Trong’s duties. Having led the party since 2011, Trong attempted to reinvigorate an institution that, by the early 2010s, had become bogged down by individual rivalries, profit-seeking, and self-advancement.  A man rides past a poster for the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in Hanoi on Jan. 22, 2021. (Nhac Nguyen/AFP) Corruption was so rampant the public was mutinous. Ideology and morality had fallen by the wayside. Pro-democracy movements threatened its monopoly on power. The private sector was not just fantastically wealthy, but desired more political power. But in what condition does Trong leave the institution he sought to fix?  Externally, its monopoly on power is safer. It has increased repression of activists and democrats while appeasing the public through its high-profile takedown of the corrupt.  The private sector has been constrained, too, so poses no threat to the party’s political authority. The economy has insulated the party from any meaningful repercussions from the West over human rights. ‘Blazing Furnace’ Within the Communist Party, however, Trong leaves behind a mess.  Lam, as public security minister, and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, artfully used Trong’s signature “Blazing Furnace” anti-corruption campaign to advance their own interests, effectively purging anyone who might rival them for Trong’s job in 2026.  More Politburo members have been sacked than at any time in memory. Two presidents have “resigned” in as many years. The Politburo is now filled mostly with military personnel and securocrats, the only two factions – and sometimes rivals – left with power.  Lam, if he does formally become acting general secretary, which the Politburo will have to vote on, is in a prime position to maintain the job in 2026. One imagines he has very different ideas about the nature of the Communist Party than Trong. Early in the anti-corruption campaign, Trong remarked that he did not want to “break the vase to catch the mice.” That metaphor implied that tackling corruption should shield a delicate Communist Party, not smash it to pieces.  Vietnam’s President To Lam, front right, and Cambodia’s Defense Minister Tea Seiha, back right, pay their respects in front of honor guards at the Independence Monument in Phnom Penh on July 13, 2024. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) However, in his quest to rid corruption from a corrupt institution, he eroded almost every check the Communist Party of Vietnam had to prevent a supreme leader figure from rising to the top. Trong violated the three major “norms” that the party introduced in the early 1990s.  Politburo members were expected to retire at 65, and individuals could only occupy the most senior positions for a maximum of two terms. More importantly, no one person could hold at the same time two of the four most powerful positions: General Secretary, State President, Prime Minister, and Chair of the National Assembly.  This “four pillar” (tu tru) system  created a form of succession plan. Regular reshuffles and a separation of powers amongst the political elite would prevent the Communist Party from tilting towards dictatorship.  Shattering the norms The norms created a structure in which politicians could fight over policies, often brutally, but without the entire apparatus collapsing because of division. There could be a regular rotation between different factions and geographic networks, meaning no one group was ascendant for too long.  Hanoi called this “democratic centralism.” Of course, it’s not democracy, but it’s a form of pluralism that, in theory, had prevented the party from descending into dictatorships like North Korea, Cuba, or China under Xi Jinping. Trong broke every one of these rules.  Between 2018 and 2021, he held the posts of party general secretary and state president simultaneously, the first person to do so since 1986. (Lam seems likely to repeat that.)  Trong passed away during his third term as party chief, the first leader since Le Duan to have that record. He not only constantly had the party flout retirement-age limits for himself – he should have stepped down in 2021, if not earlier – but such exemptions have been handed out like confetti during his tenure. Vietnam’s Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong addresses a press conference after the closing ceremony of the Communist Party of Vietnam 13th National Congress in Hanoi on Feb. 1, 2021. (Manan Vatsyayana/AFP) At the same time, his anti-graft campaign has centralized power among an increasingly small number of Politburo members. Provincial party politics have been purged and constrained to give more power to the central party apparatus. The party dominates the government. The public security ministry is all-seeing.  This was always going to happen. How else do you clean up an uncleanable organization in which power flows up and discipline is enforced only by those above you?  The campaign increases the necessity of one section of the party to maintain power indefinitely.  Who designates what is the true morality and which cadres are truly moral? Well, a certain clique of the party running the anti-corruption campaign In one speech on the theme, Trong urged the party to “strengthen supervision of the use of the power of leading cadres, especially the heads, push up internal supervision within the collective leadership; make public the process of power use according to law for cadres and people to supervise.”  The purge is designed to enforce the view that no one has absolute power above the party. Anyone who uses the power must serve the…

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Pacific Ocean Islands and Japan

A palm reading: Japan’s navigation plan for Pacific waters

Editor07 mins

The triennial meeting of the Japanese Prime Minister with the leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum  – referred to as PALM – is normally not much of an attention grabber. But this year’s meeting, which has just concluded in Tokyo, makes it clear that Japan is looking to significantly ramp up its presence in the region. This comes on the back of increased bilateral engagement – think new embassies in Kiribati and Vanuatu – and a reinvigorated QUAD with a focus on resource and burden sharing among the membership of the strategic security partnership (Australia, India, Japan, USA). The joint declaration from this their tenth meeting, known as PALM10, with its associated action plan sets out what we can expect from Japanese engagement with the Pacific over the next three years. The use of the seven pillars of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent as a structure for future engagement is notable. The Blue Pacific concept was developed by Pacific nations as a home-grown framing to address their challenges. Other partners have inserted the term Blue Pacific into announcements and documents. However, this takes the recognition of the Pacific’s own framework to another level. It is particularly significant given that Japan’s former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe coined the term Indo-Pacific, which many in the Pacific islands region have resisted. Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum Baron Waqa (L) and Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida shake hands during the opening session of the 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM10) in Tokyo on July 18, 2024. (AFP) PALM10 sees a move to an “All Japan” approach to working with Pacific partners. Whilst several Japanese agencies are referenced in the outcome documents, the most notable is the prominence of the Japanese Self-Defense Force in future engagement. Japan’s military impacts in the Pacific islands region are well known and loom large in the regional memory. While the PALM10 action plan references the continuation of activities related to World War II, such as retrieval of remains and clearance of unexploded ordnance, new activities will see the Japanese presence in the region take on a markedly military aspect. This will add to what is an already crowded environment in which defense diplomacy has been increasing in recent years. However, Japan’s use of this strategy has been relatively limited until now. The PALM10 action plan refers to increased defense “exchanges” to consist of port calls by Japanese Defense Force aircraft and vessels. This may not be as easy to achieve as Tokyo officials might like. At the same time as PALM10 was in session in Tokyo, Vanuatu’s National Security Advisory Board refused a request for a Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force vessel to dock in Port Vila. The reasons for the refusal remain unclear. Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (C) speaks during the opening session of the 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM10) in Tokyo on July 18, 2024. (AFP) Other examples of increased use of the JSDF are the provision of capacity building to Pacific personnel for participation in peace-keeping operations and inclusion of a Self-Defense Unit in disaster relief teams to be deployed to Pacific island countries at their governments’ request. At the end of the Action Plan are items for “clarification.” Included in the list (of three) for Japan to clarify are two that continue this push for increased defense diplomacy. They are: a proposal to accept Pacific cadets into the National Defense Academy of Japan and to use the Japan Pacific Islands Defence Dialogue to foster “mutual understanding and confidence building.” The JPIDD has met twice, most recently earlier this year. We are now into the Pacific meeting season and in six weeks the 53rd Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting will convene in Nuku’alofa, Tonga. Japan is a longstanding dialogue partner of the forum. The ongoing review of regional architecture includes revisions to how dialogue partners are selected and accommodated. What was discussed and agreed at PALM10 will play a role in determining where at the Blue Pacific table Japan will sit.

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North Korea’s Kim in military talks with Russian vice defense minister

Editor05 mins

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has discussed the “importance and necessity” of military cooperation with Russia’s vice defense minister to “defend mutual security interests,” the North’s state media reported on Friday. Kim met a Russian military delegation, led by the vice minister, Aleksey Krivoruchko, in Pyongyang on Thursday, according to the Korean Central News Agency, or KCNA. “The talk shared recognition of the importance and necessity of the military cooperation between the two countries to defend mutual security interests,” the KCNA said. Kim reiterated his firm support and solidarity for Russia’s war with Ukraine and stressed the need for the militaries of the two countries to “get united more firmly” to develop bilateral relations, the news agency added. Krivoruchko is the first known ranking Russian military official to visit North Korea since a summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kim.   The two met in Pyongyang for talks aimed at bolstering their economic and security relations and underscoring their shared defiance of Western sanctions. Under a new partnership treaty announced at their summit they  agreed to offer each other military assistance “without delay” if either were attacked. Russia has been cozying up to North Korea since Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The United States has accused North Korea of sending Russia weapons for use in its Ukraine war but both North Korea and Russia deny that. RELATED STORIES North Korea, Russia agree to offer military assistance if either is attacked North Korea’s Kim hails Russia alliance, promises Putin support on Ukraine Putin arrives in North Korea, vows to boost cooperation and fight sanctions More balloons The military in U.S. ally South Korea resumed propaganda loudspeaker broadcasts toward North Korea in response to the North’s latest launch of trash-carrying balloons into the South. The broadcasts took place from Thursday evening to early Friday in areas near where the balloons were launched, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, or JCS, said on Friday. Since late May, North Korea has sent more than 2,000 trash-carrying balloons into the South in retaliation for the launch by anti-North Korea activists of balloons carrying propaganda leaflets towards the North. “The military’s response going forward will fully depend on North Korea’s actions,” the JCS said, without providing further details.  On Thursday, the JCS said the latest North Korean balloons appeared to be traveling toward the northern part of Gyeonggi Province that surrounds Seoul, advising the public to not touch any fallen balloon and to report them to the military or police. South Korea resumed loudspeaker broadcasts last month as it fully suspended a  2018 inter-Korean military tension reduction agreement in response to the North’s launch of waves of trash-carrying balloons. Edited by Mike Firn.

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Investigative Journalism Reportika © March 2022 by Ij-Reportika is licensed under CC BY 4.0