Myanmar junta steps up security in Mandalay as fighting spreads across region

Junta forces have tightened security in Myanmar’s second-biggest city, Mandalay, while shelling civilians elsewhere in the region, after coming under renewed attack from an alliance of insurgent forces battling to end military rule. A shell killed a seven-year-old boy and a woman in her 30s after it exploded in a residential area of Mandalay region’s Mogoke town on Monday evening, residents told Radio Free Asia Tuesday.  Another four-year-old girl and a 60-year-old woman, as well as a woman and man both in their 30s, are in critical condition, said one Mogoke resident, asking to remain anonymous for security reasons. “A child and a grandmother were seriously injured by shrapnel that hit them in the neck,” he said. “It was not easy to send them to the hospital, so they were treated at home by people who have some medical knowledge.” The shells were fired from a junta camp on Strategic Hill in eastern Mogoke, a ruby-mining town about 200 km (120 miles) north of Mandalay city. Over half the town’s population has fled after fighting intensified between junta troops and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, which has taken control of western Mogoke, residents said.  RELATED STORIESMyanmar rebel army calls ceasefire after junta airstrikeThousands stuck between checkpoints on Myanmar road amid renewed fightingMyanmar insurgent allies capture strategic Shan state town from junta The TNLA is part of an alliance of three ethnic minority insurgent forces known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The alliance launched an offensive last October, codenamed Operation 1027 for the date it began, and pushed back junta forces in several regions. After a five-month ceasefire ended on June 25, the TNLA, and allied forces attacked junta camps in Madaya, Singu and Mogoke townships in Mandalay region, and Hsipaw, Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Lashio towns in Shan state to the east. Stepping up Security The TNLA and its allies have also turned their attention to junta bases near Mandalay region’s capital, causing the military to step up security in Mandalay city, residents said.  One city resident, who wished to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals. told RFA that after Operation 1027 resumed in late June, the junta had increased the number of outposts around Mandalay and its historic palace. “We’re getting a sense that the areas around the palace are more secure. They also installed heavy weapons on top of Mandalay Hill and also on Yankin Hill,” he said. “Security has been increased a lot. If there was a place with four or five soldiers before, there are about 10 soldiers now.” Troops are also stationed on top of high-rise buildings in the city’s Chanmyathazi township, one resident said, also asking for anonymity to protect his identity.   “The junta troops are stationed on the top floors of Ma Ma-29 and No. 49 buildings,” he said, adding that soldiers also occupied buildings in the Myayenanda, and Aungpinlel neighborhoods, as well as Mandalay’s industrial zone. “The troops asked residents to leave in order for soldiers to be stationed there.”  Army personnel are also stationed in Inwa (Inn Wa) town, 32 km (20 miles) south of Mandalay city, which is close to a junta air force base, he added. On Monday, the junta closed the Mandalay-Madaya Road after fighting with allied rebel forces near Madaya township’s Kyauk Ta Dar village, which is just 27 km (17 miles) away from Mandalay city. According to the Mandalay People’s Defense Force, the group had captured 25 junta camps in Madaya township and 11 in Singu township as of July 7.  RFA called Mandalay region’s junta spokesperson Thein Htay for more information on increased security and the attack on Mogoke, but he did not answer phone calls. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn. 

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‘People’s court’ issues arrest warrant for Xi Jinping

A citizens’ tribunal has issued a symbolic arrest warrant for Chinese President Xi Jinping after issuing a nonbinding verdict that he committed crimes of aggression against Taiwan, crimes against humanity in Tibet, and genocide against Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The Court of the Citizens of the World — a “people’s court” dedicated to universal human rights and based in The Hague, the Netherlands — issued the arrest warrant on July 12 after four days of hearings, which included expert witness testimonies and victim accounts. Members of the China Tribunal included Stephen Rapp, former U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues; Zak Yacoob, a retired judge who served on the Constitutional Court of South Africa; and Bhavani Fonseka, constitutional lawyer and human rights lawyer and activist in Sri Lanka. RELATED STORIES Uyghurs mark 2 years since ‘genocide’ finding Uyghur Tribunal finds China committed genocide in Xinjiang Uyghur Tribunal wraps up in London with eye on December ruling on genocide allegations Uyghur Tribunal determination could change paradigm for China relations: experts Experts and witnesses detailed widespread human rights abuses in Tibet and Xinjiang, including intrusive surveillance, repression, torture and restrictions on free expression and movement, as well as what they described as efforts to eradicate their distinct cultural and religious identities.   Some witnesses were survivors of mass detention camps in Xinjiang, where torture and the forced sterilization of Uyghur women occurred. Though the unofficial body has no legal powers, its proceedings highlighted the plight of aggrieved parties and provided a model for prosecution in international or national courts under the principle of universal jurisdiction.    The court said it “obtained sufficient legal grounds” for Xi’s arrest on the charges laid out against him and called on the international community to support its decision, though it is unclear how governments will react. Judge Zak Yacoob (L) speaks with presiding judge Stephen Rapp during the China Tribunal at the Court of the Citizens of the World, in The Hague, the Netherlands, July 12, 2024. (Court of the Citizens of the World via YouTube) “The tribunal’s core findings are of significant importance, revealing the extent of human rights abuses committed by the Chinese state,” said a report by JURIST, a nonprofit news organization that highlights rule-of-law issues around the world. There was no immediate response from the Chinese government. Former prisoners speak Former Tibetan political prisoners, including Dhondup Wangchen and Tenpa Dhargye, recounted the torture they experienced in Chinese jails and the impact of China’s repressive policies in Tibet. Tibetan filmmaker and human rights activist Jigme Gyatso, also known as Golog Jigme, who has been jailed by Chinese authorities on at least three occasions, highlighted Xi Jinping’s efforts to completely eradicate the use of Tibetan language and culture.  He also outlined what he said was the systematic torture and persecution of political prisoners after their release and the coercive control of Tibetans’ movements in greater Tibet.  Gulbahar Haitiwaji, a Uyghur former internment camp detainee who now lives in France, testified before the tribunal about being chained to beds and tortured in Xinjiang.  She told Radio Free Asia that she felt immense excitement when called upon to testify, seeing it as a crucial opportunity to speak for the hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs who endured China’s concentration camps.  “Back then, while in the camp, I often wondered if there was any justice in the world capable of punishing those responsible for our people’s suffering,” she said. The Chinese government tried to dissuade some Uyghurs from providing testimony in The Hague. Abdurehim Gheni, a Uyghur activist who now lives in the Netherlands, said Chinese police contacted him via Telegram, a WeChat-style communication app banned in China, as recently as two days before he was scheduled to appear before the court. The police also had his brother leave voice messages telling him not to attend the hearing, he said. Judges Bhavani Fonseka (L) and Zak Yacoob (C) and presiding judge Stephen Rapp hold court during the China Tribunal at the Court of the Citizens of the World in The Hague, the Netherlands, July 12, 2024. (Court of the Citizens of the World via YouTube) Gheni recounted that his brother said: “Do not do anything against the government. If you return here, the government will be lenient on you. We can also go there to see you.” The tribunal reported that it faced attempts to shut it down in the form of a phony cease-and-desist order, and said a spy disguised as a legal volunteer provoked staff and other volunteers to resign, JURIST reported.   ‘First meaningful step’ Abduweli Ayup, a Uyghur rights activist and researcher based in Norway, who also testified at the China Tribunal, said the verdict holds significant importance for Uyghurs. “It’s the first meaningful step to stop the Uyghur genocide,” he said. “The court has completed the accusation against the perpetrator and judged at the trial. The verdict implicates the criminal, Xi Jinping. He should be arrested and punished,” he said. In December 2021, an independent, nonbinding Uyghur Tribunal in London found that China committed genocide against Uyghurs in Xinjiang and that Xi Jinping shared primary responsibility for the atrocities. Though the panel had no state backing or power to sanction China, its conclusion added to the growing body of evidence at the time that Beijing’s persecution of Uyghurs constituted a crime against humanity that deserved an international response. In February 2023, the Court of the Citizens of the World issued an indictment against Russian President Vladimir Putin for the crime of aggression in Ukraine and called for his arrest.  A month later, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Putin along with Maria Lvova-Belova, Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights, for alleged war crimes involving accusations that Russia had forcibly taken Ukrainian children. Additional reporting by RFA Mandarin. Translated by RFA Uyghur and RFA Tibetan. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Joshua Lipes.

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Interview: White House ‘extremely concerned’ about closer Russia-North Korea ties

Mira Rapp-Hooper is the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania at the White House National Security Council, or NSC.  During this week’s NATO Summit in Washington, she spoke with RFA Korean’s Lee Sangmin, touching on points related to increased cooperation between Russia and North Korea, following Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea last month. The summit included representatives from the Indo-Pacific Four, or IP4, an informal grouping of South Korea, Japan, New Zealand and Australia, and Rapp-Hooper said that it was important to include those countries in discussions with NATO, especially considering that the partnership between North Korea and Russia concerns security in both the North Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific. The interview has been edited for length and clarity. RFA: So how much are you concerned about the recent deepening relationship between Russia and North Korea? Rapp-Hooper: We are extremely concerned about the relationship between Russia and North Korea. Of course, we have been for about a year as that relationship has grown closer and closer, and it has become clear that both Russia and North Korea are exchanging extremely worrisome forms of support with one another.  On the one hand, of course, we know that the (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) has been providing Russia with millions of rounds of ammunition, as well as missiles that have been used on the battlefield in Ukraine to devastating effect fueling Russia’s war machine, and taking the lives of innocent civilians, all over the conflict. And that’s deeply disturbing.  But one of the things that is also very troubling about this relationship is the fact that we know that Russia is probably providing the DPRK with technical assistance, sophisticated forms of support for some of its military programs. But those forms of cooperation are much harder to track. So while we know what the DPRK is giving to Russia, we know less than we would like to about what Russia is giving to the DPRK. And that is something that should concern not only the countries of the Indo-Pacific who care about peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and beyond.  Mira Rapp-Hooper, Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania, National Security Council, at the Asia Center in Washington, Sept. 13, 2023. (U.S. Institute of Peace via Flickr) But countries in Europe are increasingly understanding that this relationship affects them, too. Now, of course, this has all become more prominent recently because of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang, when the two countries released a declaration that looks very much like an alliance treaty.  But really, what this does is capture something that we knew the whole time, which is the fact that this is not just a marriage of convenience where these two powers are cooperating so that Russia can get help in its war against Ukraine. There is political buy-in at the highest levels, from both of these governments.  The piece of optimism that I would offer today, however, is that it is not just the ROK, the United States and Japan who are worried about this problem. We have very good trilateral cooperation amongst the three of us to share intelligence and to coordinate our policy actions.  But part of what you’re seeing here at NATO today is that all of our NATO allies also care about this problem, because Russia has brought DPRK technology to Europe in the form of ballistic missiles being used on the battlefield in Ukraine. So we’ve never seen our European allies more engaged in DPRK issues, more wanting to cooperate, to address, and limit, this relationship. And we are hopeful that that cooperation will have a stabilizing effect in the face of all of this destabilizing behavior.  RFA: In what ways can NATO and its allies counter cooperation between North Korea and Russia? Rapp-Hooper: Well, there are, you know, certain areas where cooperation, unfortunately, is quite difficult to affect. We know that many of the shipments that take place between DPRK and Russia take place within their territorial seas or over rail lines. So there’s very few options for the international community there.  But there are other areas, where we do cooperate, and we will continue to do so. And that relates to things like financial sanctions that may run at the heart of their cooperation, and other measures that we can take, such as intelligence sharing, information sharing that might allow one country to be more empowered to limit this cooperation wherever they can.  There is also, of course, the role that we all play diplomatically, not just in putting pressure on both Pyongyang and Russia, but on additional countries, who might be able to take action to try to limit this relationship.  The world is, of course, watching (the People’s Republic of China, or PRC) and the question looms large, what Beijing will do about this relationship, given that it is so destabilizing and not in China’s interests either. But we’ve yet to see a clear answer to that question. RFA: What kind of a role can China play in dealing with North Korea issues? Rapp-Hooper: That’s really up to China. In the past, the PRC has long played a role on the Korean Peninsula. Obviously, it is a key continued trading partner of Pyongyang and a longtime political partner. There is obviously a very close political relationship as well, between Beijing and Moscow – which is its own cause for concern.  But there’s no doubt that if Beijing was interested in doing so, it could play a stabilizing and responsible role, to encourage in particular, the worst (aspects of the) DPRK-Russia cooperation to come to an end. But again, all eyes are on Beijing to see if it will make that choice.  RFA: Why is it significant that the IP4 are participating in the NATO Summit? Rapp-Hooper: Our IP4 partners in the (Republic of Korea, or ROK), Japan, Australia and New Zealand have been at the last three NATO summits. And…

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Laos can feed itself, but its food security is complicated

Can Laos feed itself?  The short answer: Yes. It can grow enough rice.  Per capita rice consumption is one of the highest in the world, at 206 kilograms (453 pounds) per person per year. The Lao Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry reckons the country can produce, at maximum, 3.7 million tons of rice annually. That’s around 510 kilograms (1,222 pounds) of rice per person.  However, when it comes to other foods, things become a little more complicated.  A few weeks ago, Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone laid out new plans for self-sufficiency, the latest buzzword in Vientiane – and most Southeast Asian capitals. It’s a very optimistic goal, but what else can the Lao government do?  A tree is seen in rice fields in Laos, July 16, 2022. (Reuters) RELATED STORIES Weak governance, poor economy drive the hollowing out of Laos Lao central bank governor removed amid economic crisis China’s dependency on potash imports could give tiny Laos rare leverage Lao farmers worry about upcoming rice season as heat wave kills crops A monetary crisis since 2021 has kept inflation rates among the highest in Asia and seen the kip, the local currency, depreciate by as much as half against the U.S. dollar. Much of this crisis stems from Laos’ dependency on imports — mainly fuel — and because it foreign currency reserves are almost depleted.  Sonexay wants Laos to be self-sufficient in finance and energy — an unlikely prospect. His third pillar is food. A joint report by the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Program warned that food insecurity affected more than a million people out of the 7.2 million population in 2022. The situation could have been worse.  Geography and transport Since the economic crisis began in 2021, Laotians have responded in two ways: many have left for Thailand, where work is more plentiful and better paid, while others have returned to their family farms.  If Laos wants to industrialize and raise GDP per capita above the current $US 2,600, de-urbanization isn’t a long-term solution. And the policy ideas Vientiane is now talking about come up against structural problems.  First, consider geography. Most of Laos is mountainous and forested—there’s a reason why it has been a buffer region between the Thais, Burmese, and Vietnamese for centuries.  Never able to sustain a large population, Laos remains the least densely populated country in Southeast Asia, with 33 people per square kilometer (.38 square miles). Cambodia is the next least densely populated, with around 98 people per square kilometer (.38 square miles). A vendor, right, fills rice in a plastic bag for her customer, January 27, 2024, in Luang Prabang, Laos. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) Only Laos’ southern panhandle and some northern provinces – chiefly Xayaburi – are suitable for agriculture. The country has just 0.16 hectares (0.4 acres)of arable land per person, below the world average and well below what Thailand, Cambodia, and Myanmar have.  Geography and poor government management create the second problem: transport. For centuries, because the terrain made it difficult to move around, farms were small, serving only the immediate vicinity.  That remains so today, with four out of every five people still engaged in low-productivity, smallholder rice cultivation. This prevented the formation of larger farms, meaning not enough capital was generated for private-funded infrastructure works, namely roads or railways. Moreover, the Mekong River flows along the Thai-Lao border, so it has never been feasible to ship food by waterway from the hinterland to population centers.  Selling to China In more recent decades, the Lao government has barely invested in rural infrastructure. Only 12 percent of the cultivated rice area is irrigated, so the remainder can only be planted once a year during the rainy season. Irrigation would allow for two harvests a year. By 2019, it was cheaper to import rice than grow it domestically, primarily due to transport costs. In 2022, Laos exported $US44 million worth of rice but imported $US 29 million worth.  Laos needs more capital for farmers to expand, irrigate, and diversify, and more investment to build roads or rail networks in the hinterland. But Laos is far less self-sufficient in capital than in anything else. The national debt is now around 130 percent of GDP.  The Lao state simply cannot afford to finance these projects itself. Vientiane must instead rely on external capital. Indeed, massive Chinese investment has recently flooded into Laos, but this creates two big problems.  A farmer and his son harvest their rice field on a Chinese made tractor, Oct. 13, 2009, in Muang Sing, northern Laos. (Voishmel/AFP) Chinese firms invest in agricultural production in Laos to grow products for export to China, where prices are higher and food insecurity is a more pressing issue.  Why would Chinese firms invest hundreds of millions of dollars in building roads in, say, Phongsaly Province, the least accessible region, when they can lease Laos’ most fertile farms in regions like Xayaburi and Vientiane provinces, which already have great transport links to China? There are now excellent transport links from Laos to China, like the Vientiane-Kunming railway. This has made it easier for farmers to sell their produce in China than within Laos. Because of this export potential, many farms, including the most productive ones in the more arable provinces, have shifted to cash crops, mainly cassava. In January alone, Laos exported $98 million worth of cassava, making it the second-largest export after energy. Rising fertilizer imports Yet, because Laos’ soil is so poor, tons of artificial fertilizers and pesticides need to be dumped on it to achieve even minimum production standards. Until recently, Laos used barely any artificial fertilizers. In 2010, per hectare of land, Laos used less than a tenth of what Thailand used. Now, it uses about half.  Laos now uses more fertilizers per hectare than Cambodia, which produces far more food— around 2 to 3 times more rice per year. Phosphate fertilizer use per hectare of cropland rose from 2.4 kg in 2000 to around 3.2…

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Dalai Lama marks 89th birthday, allays concerns about his health

In a video released Saturday on his 89th birthday, the Dalai Lama said he was recovering from his recent knee replacement surgery, felt “physically fit” and thanked Tibetans around the world for praying for him. “I am nearly 90 now, except for the issues with my knee, I am basically in good health,” the Tibetan spiritual leader said in the five-minute video, his first public statement since undergoing successful knee surgery on June 28 at a top New York City hospital. “Despite the surgery, I feel physically fit,” the Dalai Lama said, allaying concerns about his overall health. “So, I wish to ask you to be happy and relaxed.”  “Today, Tibetans inside and outside of Tibet are celebrating my birthday with much joy and festivity,” he said, speaking in Tibetan. “I would like to thank all my fellow Tibetans, inside and outside Tibet, for your prayers on my birthday.”  Several global leaders, including Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, sent birthday greetings. “Through his promotion of nonviolence and compassion, as well as his commitment to advancing human rights for all, His Holiness serves as an inspiration for the Tibetan community and many around the world,” Blinken said in a statement. Modi wrote on X: “Sent my greetings to His Holiness the Dalai Lama on the occasion of his 89th birthday. Pray for his quick recovery after his knee surgery, good health, and long life.” The Nobel Peace Prize winner enjoys strong support in the United States, where prominent lawmakers have spoken out about human rights issues in Tibet.  China, however, considers him a separatist and has criticized those who meet with him, including a delegation of U.S. lawmakers who recently met with him in Dharamsala, India. Last month, the U.S. Congress passed a bill urging China to re-engage with the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan leaders to resolve its dispute over the status and governance of Tibet. China-Tibet talks ground to a halt in 2010. “We stand by His Holiness and the Tibetan community as they seek to preserve Tibetans’ distinct cultural, religious, and linguistic heritage,” said U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues Uzra Zeya, in a birthday greeting. Thousands converge At the Park Hyatt Hotel in New York, where the Dalai Lama is recovering, a steady stream of Tibetans and Buddhist devotees have gathered every day since his arrival in the United States on June 23, braving the heat to walk around the hotel and offer prayers. On Saturday, to mark his birthday, devotees converged in even larger numbers to offer hundreds of katags, white Tibetan silk scarves, and bouquets of flowers outside the hotel, which many referred to as their “temple.” Billboards in New York’s Times Square flash birthday greetings to the Dalai Lama just after midnight on July 6, 2024. (RFA/Nordhey Dolma) On Friday evening, on the eve of his 89th birthday, at least a thousand Tibetans gathered in New York’s Times Square to witness two giant billboards carrying birthday messages written in Tibetan and English. As the messages flashed at midnight, the crowd – many of whom were decked out in Tibetan dress and waving the Tibetan flags – cheered, sang, danced and chanted prayers. Reflecting on his life so far, the Dalai Lama said in the video he was resolved to continue to give his best to promote Buddhism and the well-being of the Tibetan people. He also acknowledged the “growing interest” in the Tibetan cause in the world today, and felt he had made a “small contribution” toward that. ‘Year of Compassion’ In Dharamsala, India, Sikyong Penpa Tsering, the leader of the Central Tibetan Administration, the Tibetan government-in-exile, announced plans to celebrate the Dalai Lama’s 90th birthday next year as the “Year of Compassion” marked by a series of year-long events starting in July 2025. The Dalai Lama has said that he will provide clarity around his succession, including on whether he would be reincarnated and where, when he turns 90. Sikyong Penpa Tsering and Sikkim Chief Minister Prem Singh Tamang cut the birthday cake at the official Central Tibetan Government-led ceremony to commemorate the Dalai Lama’s 89th birthday in Dharamsala, India on Saturday, July 6, 2024. China – which annexed Tibet in 1951 and rules the western autonomous region with a heavy hand – says only Beijing can select the next spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhists, as it seeks to control the centuries-old selection process for religious leaders, including the Dalai Lama. Tibetans, however, believe the Dalai Lama chooses the body into which he will be reincarnated, a process that has occurred 13 times since 1391, when the first Dalai Lama was born.  The 14th Dalai Lama fled Tibet amid a failed 1959 national uprising against China’s rule and has lived in exile in Dharamsala, India, ever since. He is the longest-serving Tibetan Buddhist spiritual leader in Tibet’s history. Ever since, Beijing has sought to legitimize Chinese rule through the suppression of dissent and policies undermining Tibetan culture and language.  Beijing believes the Dalai Lama wants to split off the Tibet Autonomous Region and other Tibetan-populated areas in China’s Sichuan, Qinghai, Yunnan, and Gansu provinces – which Tibetan refer to as “Amdo” and “Kham” – from the rest of the country. However, the Dalai Lama does not advocate for independence but rather proposes what he calls a “Middle Way” that accepts Tibet’s status as a part of China and urges greater cultural and religious freedoms, including strengthened language rights. Blinken said in his statement Saturday that the “The United States reaffirms our commitment to support efforts to preserve Tibetans’ distinct linguistic, cultural, and religious heritage, including the ability to freely choose and venerate religious leaders without interference.” Additional reporting by Tashi Wangchuk, Dolkar, Nordhey Dolma, Dickey Kundol, Yeshi Dawa, Sonam Singeri, Dorjee Damdul, Tenzin Dickyi for RFA Tibetan. Written and edited by Tenzin Pema, edited by Malcolm Foster.

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Workers say some 60 Cambodian rescued maids still in Saudi Arabia

Some 60 Cambodian maids who complained publicly about abuse and labor rights violations remain stranded in Saudi Arabia, several workers told Radio Free Asia, several months after pleading with diplomats and others for help. The women, who went to the Middle Eastern country for jobs, said they have been physically abused by their employers and denied food and sleep. Some said they hadn’t been paid or were told they would be required to work for longer than their contracts stipulated. The maids and other workers in Saudi Arabia first sought Cambodian government intervention and assistance in March.  In April, Cambodia’s Labor Ministry said 78 migrant workers who had been misled into working in Saudi Arabia had been placed in hotel rooms under the care of Cambodian diplomats.  Two dozen women returned home in May. Another 48 women have since been flown back to Cambodia, according to Em Bopha, one of the workers who is still in Saudi Arabia.  A total of 133 Cambodian workers have been removed from their abusive employment situations. The 60 workers still in Saudi Arabia have been staying at several different facilities while diplomats arrange for their return, she said. Cambodian company Fatina Manpower Co. Ltd. helped arrange the contracts between the workers and their Saudi employers, and is now working on their return.  The remaining workers suspect the delay in sending them back to Cambodia is rooted in Fatina Manpower’s inability to pay compensation to partner companies in Saudi Arabia, Em Bopha said.  The owner of Fatina Manpower, Man Teramizy, is a senior official at Cambodia’s Ministry of Labor. Radio Free Asia was unable to reach the ministry’s spokesperson, Katta Orn, for comment on June 24. Cambodia’s ambassador to Egypt, Uk Sarun, said a group of about a dozen maids who left one of the holding facilities for a day on June 20 has complicated diplomatic efforts to coordinate their return.  The workers have been frustrated by the delays and uncertainty, Em Bopha said. But fleeing from the facility was “insulting,” Uk Sarun told RFA. “We have tried very hard,” he said. “We are still waiting for responses [from the company]. But now it’s a little more difficult. I asked them for understanding and I told them to return to the company’s facility.”  Translated by Sovannarith Keo. Edited by Matt Reed.

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Hong Kongers in UK ‘feeling nervous’ over ID card changes

Hong Kong residents will need to replace their ID cards over the next two years, authorities say, which could force those living in the United Kingdom or elsewhere to choose between going back and risking possible arrest, or being unable to return indefinitely. Smart ID cards issued before Nov. 26, 2018, will be invalidated in two phases in 2025, the government said on June 18. Cards belonging to people born in or after 1970 will expire on May 12, 2025, while cards issued to people born in 1969 or before will expire on Oct. 12 next year. Anyone outside of Hong Kong will be given a 30-day grace period to allow them to replace their old ID card on their return, the statement said. But overseas Hong Kongers who fled a political crackdown on dissent in the wake of the 2019 protest movement said they could be forced to choose between risking arrest on their return, and losing the ability to return to the city in future, where many still have families and property. Many Hong Kongers who settled in the United Kingdom on the British government’s lifeboat program for holders of the British National Overseas, or BNO, passport also hold a Chinese passport that is specific to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.  A first-generation Hong Kong ID card (left), with a second-generation Hong Kong smart ID card issued in 2018 (right). (Illustration/Photo: Matthew Leung/RFA) But anyone seeking to renew their Chinese passport without traveling back to Hong Kong could be stymied by a lack of valid ID card, a prerequisite for passport renewal applications. When the British government launched the BNO visa program, offering a pathway to long-term residency and citizenship, China reacted angrily, and announced it would no longer recognize the BNO passport. The catch While permanent residents won’t lose their right of abode in Hong Kong, and can get back into Hong Kong with a valid ID card alone, once the card expires returning Hong Kongers will effectively need a Hong Kong-issued SAR passport or another country’s passport to be allowed in through the immigration checkpoint. “There are always worries about going back to Hong Kong,” a said Hong Konger in the U.K. who gave only the nickname Ringo for fear of reprisals. “Some people weren’t planning to go back, while others may be waiting until after naturalization [as a British citizen].” “But now they’re going to feel a lot more nervous if they need to go back to Hong Kong before their ID cards expire,” she said. Hong Kong’s deputy director of immigration Eric Wong displays Smart ID Cards in his office, Feb. 20, 2002, in Hong Kong, as Hong Kong prepares to make its 6.9 million citizens carry “smart” identity cards. (Vincent Yu/AP) “And it’s more expense because they’ll need to spend money on a flight back to Hong Kong in the next year or so, which they might not have counted on doing,” Ringo said. A former Hong Kong immigration assistant who gave only the surname Chan for fear of reprisals said the announcement was likely an attempt to intimidate people who had fled the crackdown. “It’s obvious that they’re using the ID card replacement scheme to intimidate some Hong Kongers who emigrated to the U.K., making them feel as if they could face further difficulties if they go back to Hong Kong to renew their ID cards,” Chan said. The Hong Kong government slammed last week’s report from RFA Cantonese on the move, saying that the replacement of ID cards was part of measures to combat fraud and identity theft, and not to suppress or intimidate Hong Kongers. Police form a cordon at Causeway Bay on the 35th anniversary of the crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators at Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in 1989, near where a candlelight vigil is usually held, June 4, 2024, in Hong Kong, China, (Tyrone Siu/Reuters) “The invalidation of old ID cards will not affect one’s right of abode in Hong Kong and they could still travel in and out of Hong Kong as long as holding a valid travel document,” the government said in a June 21 statement. But the statement didn’t address the status of BNO passport holders whose Hong Kong SAR passports had expired. Passports revoked Exiled Hong Kongers also told RFA Cantonese that they are also concerned that the authorities have the power to revoke a person’s Hong Kong SAR passport at any time. Earlier this month, the city government announced it had revoked the Hong Kong SAR passports of six U.K.-based activists including former pro-democracy lawmaker Nathan Law, imposing financial sanctions on them and hitting back at the British government for “deliberately discrediting” the city with spying charges against one of its officials. Secretary for Security Chris Tang revoked the Chinese passports of U.K.-based activists Christopher Mung and Finn Lau, former pro-democracy lawmaker Nathan Law, former British consular employee Simon Cheng, who co-founded the advocacy group Hongkongers in Britain, and overseas YouTube hosts Johnny Fok and Tony Choi.  And many overseas Hong Kongers fear that they could be arrested under national security laws for social media activity carried out overseas. A man waves farewell to friends as departs for a permanent move to U.K. at the Hong Kong airport, June 30, 2021. (Vincent Yu/AP) Last November, a Hong Kong court handed down a two-month jail term to former overseas student Yuen Ching-ting, 23, after she pleaded guilty to “publishing online speech with seditious intent” to social media starting in September 2018, before the national security law took effect. The case against her was based on her posting of “inflammatory remarks” to social media platforms, including the banned 2019 protest slogan “Free Hong Kong! Revolution now!” while she was studying in Japan. Yuen was arrested in March after returning to Hong Kong from Japan, where she was studying. Local media outlets reported that she was in the city to change her Hong Kong identity card. She was initially arrested on suspicion of inciting secession, a…

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Thousands welcome Dalai Lama’s arrival in US for knee surgery

Updated at 18:40 ET on June 23, 2024. The Dalai Lama was greeted by a large crowd of chanting and flag-waving Tibetans and other supporters upon his arrival Sunday in the United States for knee surgery. It was the first trip to the United States for the 88-year-old Tibetan Buddhist spiritual leader in seven years and his first overseas trip since November 2018, before the coronavirus pandemic. He lives in exile in Dharamsala, northern India,  After landing at Teterboro Airport, in New Jersey, he was greeted by people holding traditional khata white scarves, chanting, singing, waving flags and wishing him a quick recovery from the operation on his right knee. “It’s a moment of profound joy and spiritual fulfillment for us,” said Tsering Dickey, who traveled from New York with her family to see him at the airport. “Seeing His Holiness in person after such a long time brings hope and inspiration to our community and we hope and pray that his knee surgery goes well.” The Dalai Lama then traveled by car to New York, where thousands of well-wishers awaited him outside the Park Hyatt, lining up along 57th Street in Manhattan, where he will be staying. No public talks or engagements are currently planned for his visit.  The doctor suggested that successful right knee surgery would help his left knee function better as well, and that he may be able to walk properly within three weeks, Sikyong Pempa Tsering, the head of the Central Tibetan Administration, told RFA. Devotees wait for the arrival of the Dalai Lama outside of the airport in Teterboro, New Jersey, June 23, 2024. (RFA) The Dalai Lama enjoys strong support in the United States, where prominent lawmakers have spoken out about human rights issues in Tibet, though China considers him a separatist and has criticized those who meet with him.  The well-wishers included Tibetans and people from Himalayan regions, Mongolia, India, Vietnam, Bhutan and Nepal, as well as individuals from across the United States. “The presence of His Holiness here in the United States is a spiritual boon, as he is visiting after seven years,” said Tashi Kyiloe from New York. “It is a great opportunity for older people like me to receive his blessing.” The visit comes after the recent passage of a bill in the U.S. Congress that urgest the Chinese government to engage in dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, or democratically elected Tibetan leaders, to resolve the China-Tibet dispute. The Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act, also known as the Resolve Tibet Act, calls on China to cease its propagation of disinformation about the history of Tibet, the Tibetan people and the Dalai Lama. Additional reporting by Nordhey Dolma, Jolep Chophel, Yeshi Tashi and Tashi Wangchuk. Edited by Malcolm Foster.

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What was Vietnam thinking, welcoming Putin?

Why did Hanoi welcome Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, for a state visit this past week?  Sure, invite him. Allow Russian state media to speculate on a visit. Meet with his underlings. But to actually unfurl the red carpet for a leader whose global travel has been sharply curbed by an International Criminal Court arrest warrant ?  From geopolitical, domestic, economic, and ideological points of view, it makes little sense – unless the rising security faction is dictating what happens within the Communist Party of Vietnam.  Some 15 deals on economic, educational, and political cooperation were signed. But those items could have been agreed upon without Putin’s presence. That was the smokescreen, however.    General Secretary of Vietnam’s Communist Party Nguyen Phu Trong, fourth from right, meets with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, center left, in Hanoi, June 20, 2024. (Vietnam News Agency via AFP) RELATED STORIES Putin visits Vietnam, aiming to renew Cold War ties Vietnam’s fraternal ties with Russia are put to the test Bear East: RFA Special report on Russia’s influence in Asia The deepening ‘securitization’ of Vietnamese politics Russia was the largest provider of military equipment to Vietnam until 2022, but that was before it invaded Ukraine and depleted much of its arsenal.  Sales to Vietnam have tanked since. Nobody should look at how Russian equipment is faring in Ukraine and conclude, “I need some of that.” However, that’s apparently what the Vietnamese military is thinking.  According to a finance ministry document leaked to the media last year, Vietnam thinks it can buy weapons from Russia via payments to a joint Vietnamese and Russian oil venture in Siberia, which would allow it to avoid U.S. sanctions.  Missiles in mind The New York Times cited a Vietnamese official saying the secret deal will be worth $8 billion over the next two decades. Some reckon this is now Vietnamese government policy, which might explain Putin’s visit.  Some observers believe Hanoi wants aircraft and new naval vessels from Russia. Its navy badly needs an upgrade. And it really wants BrahMos cruise missiles developed by a joint Russian and Indian venture.  Beijing has apparently pressured Moscow not to sell to Hanoi. Given that Russia is now utterly dependent on China, it’s unlikely that Moscow would agree to the sale.  Maybe Hanoi thought that by giving Putin some international publicity and support through the visit, Putin would return the favor with missiles. Maybe Hanoi thought it needed Putin to be there in person to drive a hard bargain: “If you don’t give us what we want, we’ll go to South Korea for military equipment.” Cargo containers are seen in Quy Nhon port in Vietnam’s Binh Dinh province on March 29, 2024. (Tran Thi Minh Ha/AFP) But it’s a risky business. It’s hard to imagine the U.S. not responding to any such deal to buy Russian weapons, however cleverly it’s designed to get around sanctions, with very forceful sanctions.  Indeed, it’s hard to imagine this not impacting Vietnam’s economy more generally. The economy isn’t spectacular at the moment, and Hanoi really cannot afford to jeopardize relations with the U.S., its second-largest trade partner and primary export destination. It certainly cannot afford to do so when Donald Trump, who famously remarked that Vietnam is the “worst abuser” of the U.S. on trade, could soon return to the presidency.  ‘Securocrats’ in charge But this risk-taking may be the consequence of the “securocrats” having taken over the Communist Party of Vietnam, having used party chief Nguyen Phu Trong’s signature anti-corruption campaign to purge their rivals over the past 12 months.  Trong, now 80, did not look very well in his meeting with Putin. It’s still uncertain if he’ll make it to the next party congress in early 2026. My guess is that Trong is no longer the arbitrator he seemed to be until very recently. In this vacuum, the “securocrats” – officials of the security ministry  – have quickly forged a stranglehold over the party.  After last month’s changes to the Politburo, there are now just two economics-minded technocrats in the 16-member elite decision-making body, the lowest number in decades.  Vietnam Communist Party official Dinh Tien Dung, left, meets with Chinese Communist Party official Wang Huning in Beijing, Sept. 28, 2023. (Yan Yan/Xinhua via Getty Images) To Lam, the former public security minister and now president, is tipped to become the next party chief.  There is talk that the securocrats aren’t yet finished purging the party of their economic-minded rivals—those who would put up a fight within the party against any major military deal with the Russians.  Dinh Tien Dung, the Hanoi party chief and former finance minister, “resigned” this week and will likely soon exit the Politburo. It was probably the securocrats who lobbied hard for the Putin visit to happen, silencing those who we know from leaks were dead against it.  Flow of information The anti-graft campaign has certainly weakened the bureaucracy. Civil servants are so petrified of being reprimanded for potentially making mistakes, especially when it comes to using state money, that they’ve simply stopped making hard choices, leading to a bureaucratic slowdown and major problems in state capacity. The bigger concern should be whether bureaucratic fear has also impacted the flow of information within the party. Are underlings still willing to give their superiors unwelcome but honest news?  According to Nguyen Khac Giang, of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, “the new [politburo] leaders…are more ‘thinkers’ than ‘doers,’ lacking significant achievements that justify their promotions. This reinforces the belief that in the uncertain context of the anti-corruption campaign, it is wiser for bureaucrats to play safe by doing less and surviving rather than taking risks.” To Lam is sworn in as Vietnam’s president at the National Assembly in Hanoi, May 22, 2024. (Nghia Duc/National Assembly via AP) Look north of the border and Xi Jinping, China’s paramount leader, has fully centralized power and thoroughly purged anyone competent or honest from the bureaucracy. It’s not that he has surrounded himself with…

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Putin visits Vietnam aiming to renew Cold War ties

Russian President Vladimir Putin was given a grand welcome with a 21-gun salute on Thursday after arriving in old ally Vietnam on a trip that is likely to be promoted by Moscow as more evidence of the West’s failure to isolate him over the invasion of Ukraine. Presiding over the ceremony was Vietnam’s new president, To Lam, and not the Communist Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong, due to the latter’s ailing health.  The two presidents saluted their countries’ flags before inspecting the guard of honor, who cheered “We wish the president good health!” In later talks, Lam congratulated Putin on his re-election and praised Russia’s achievements, including “domestic political stability,” Reuters reported.  The Vietnamese president told a press briefing that both Vietnam and Russia were committed to the principle of “not forming alliances nor agreements with third parties to take actions that harm each other’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and fundamental interests.” Putin arrived in Hanoi in the early hours from Pyongyang, where he and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un signed an agreement that pledges “mutual assistance in the event of aggression” against one of them. He was met at Hanoi’s airport by the head of Communist Party’s external affairs commission and a deputy prime minister in a much more low-key reception compared with the lavish fanfare laid on for him in North Korea. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Vietnam’s President To Lam at the welcome ceremony hosted at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 20, 2024. (Athit Perawongmetha/Reuters) No major agreement is expected during the Russian president’s 24 hours in Hanoi but he’s scheduled to meet with, besides President To Lam, the general secretary of the Communist Party, the prime minister and the National Assembly’s chairman. Putin, who has been on a U.S. sanction list since 2022 for ordering the invasion of Ukraine, is also wanted by the International Criminal Court, or ICC. Vietnam is not a member of the ICC and so is under no obligation to act on its arrest warrant.  “Few countries now welcome Mr. Putin,” Australian Ambassador to Vietnam Andrew Goledzinowski wrote on social media platform X in a rare post by a foreign envoy. “But he needs to demonstrate that he is still a ‘world leader’. So Vietnam is doing him a huge favour and may expect favours in return.” No nuclear power, for now Ahead of his arrival in Hanoi, Putin praised the close ties between the two countries, who he said share “the same, or similar approaches” to current issues on the international agenda. “We are grateful to our Vietnamese friends for their balanced position on the Ukrainian crisis and for their desire to help find tangible ways to resolve it peacefully,” he wrote in an article on Vietnamese Communist Party’s mouthpiece Nhan Dan. Hanoi has declined to denounce the Russian invasion of Ukraine and did not take part in last weekend’s Ukraine peace summit in Switzerland, to which Russia was not invited. The Russian president said that trade and investment, especially in the energy industry sectors, were the two governments’ priorities.  Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom is “ready to help Vietnamese partners develop their national nuclear power industry,” he said. Russia maintains a strong global influence in nuclear power and is the world’s leading exporter of nuclear power plants. Yet Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh told Rosatom’s Director General Alexey Likhachev on Wednesday that his country “has not had any policy to return to developing nuclear power but will continue to research and consider nuclear energy as an important solution to achieve net zero emissions by 2050,” according to the Vietnam News Agency. Hanoi shelved a plan to build its first nuclear power plant  in 2016, citing lack of resources and concerns of safety. Vietnam’s President To Lam welcomes Russia’s President Vladimir Putin at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 20, 2024. (Athit Perawongmetha/Reuters) Rosatom, however, is helping construct a nuclear science and technology research center in the southern province of Đồng Nai. Putin’s visit is generally seen as symbolic and could help strengthening interactions in traditional areas such as economy and investment, science and technology, education and training, culture and tourism, and also defense and security. Vietnam is one of the largest buyers of Russian arms and still relies on Moscow to maintain and upgrade its arsenal but no contract signing is envisaged during the visit. Russia is a traditional ally and supported Vietnam throughout the Cold War but the dynamics of the relationship have changed as Vietnam adopts a new multilateral, diversified foreign policy that enabled it to forge new partners such as the U.S. and Japan. “Russia will never again be a strategic partner for Vietnam. Moscow has chosen a different partner and a different strategic destiny,” the Australian Ambassador Goledzinowski wrote, apparently referring to Vietnam’s neighbor China. Hanoi and Beijing are at odds over their sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, an important waterway shared by several countries but China claims  having historic rights to more than 80% of it. Russia has maintained a neutral position in the South China Sea and is involved in many oil and gas projects in the region but it has recently voiced support for China’s rejection of “external interference”, or in other words, the role of the U.S. and its allies, in the region’s maritime disputes. Edited by Taejun Kang. 

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