North Korea brushes off any hope of better U.S. ties under Trump

North Korea dismissed on Tuesday a suggestion by former U.S. President Donald Trump that he could improve relations if he were to win November’s election, saying it did not expect any change in U.S. hostility and it was ready for confrontation. Trump spearheaded an unprecedented diplomatic push on North Korea when he was president in an effort to get it to abandon its nuclear and missile programs. He met North Korean leader Kim Jong Un three times, including once at the Joint Security Area in the Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas. But the effort brought no tangible progress and North Korea has been relentlessly building up its nuclear arsenal and developing the missiles with which to carry the bombs. As Trump prepares for his bid to win the presidency for a second term, he has referred to his efforts on North Korea, implying he could make progress if he returned to the White House.  He said in a speech at the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee last week: “It’s nice to get along with somebody who has a lot of nuclear weapons.” RELATED STORIES Surprise Trump-Kim DMZ Meeting Wins Applause, But Raises Doubts About Real Progress Rumors of Breakdown in US-North Korea Summit Spread in North Korea Abrupt End to US-North Korean Summit Disappoints Experts, But Some See Prospect of Future Negotiations But the state Korean Central News Agency, or KCNA, appeared to rule out in a commentary any hope for warming ties, even if Trump becomes president again. “No matter what administration takes office in the U.S., the political climate, which is confused by the infighting of the two parties, does not change and, accordingly, we do not care about this,” said the news agency, which reflects official thinking. “It is true that Trump, when he was president, tried to reflect the special personal relations between the heads of state but he did not bring about any substantial positive change,” it said. The KCNA said the U.S. had pursued “the most vicious and persistent hostile policy” towards it for decades and it was prepared to defend itself. “The DPRK has bolstered its self-defensive capabilities to safeguard its ideology, social system, dignity and life and is fully ready for all-out confrontation with the U.S.,” it said, referring to North Korea by the initials of its official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  The U.S. has long argued that North Korea’s nuclear program is illegal and subject to U.N. sanctions aimed at pressing it into disarmament talks, while backing staunch U.S. ally South Korea. Edited by Taejun Kang.

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Nguyen Phu Trong left Vietnam’s Communist Party ripe for strongman rule

On July 19, the Vietnamese Communist Party announced the death of its general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong. The previous day, it announced that Trong, 80, ostensibly the most powerful politician in the country, had been relieved of his duties for health reasons.  He had missed several key meetings in recent months, and even when he did attend, he appeared shaky and unwell. He suffered a stroke a few years ago but seemingly bounced back.  However, his near-unprecedented third term in office has been cut short.  To Lam, the public security minister and promoted to state President last month, will now assume Trong’s duties. Having led the party since 2011, Trong attempted to reinvigorate an institution that, by the early 2010s, had become bogged down by individual rivalries, profit-seeking, and self-advancement.  A man rides past a poster for the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in Hanoi on Jan. 22, 2021. (Nhac Nguyen/AFP) Corruption was so rampant the public was mutinous. Ideology and morality had fallen by the wayside. Pro-democracy movements threatened its monopoly on power. The private sector was not just fantastically wealthy, but desired more political power. But in what condition does Trong leave the institution he sought to fix?  Externally, its monopoly on power is safer. It has increased repression of activists and democrats while appeasing the public through its high-profile takedown of the corrupt.  The private sector has been constrained, too, so poses no threat to the party’s political authority. The economy has insulated the party from any meaningful repercussions from the West over human rights. ‘Blazing Furnace’ Within the Communist Party, however, Trong leaves behind a mess.  Lam, as public security minister, and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, artfully used Trong’s signature “Blazing Furnace” anti-corruption campaign to advance their own interests, effectively purging anyone who might rival them for Trong’s job in 2026.  More Politburo members have been sacked than at any time in memory. Two presidents have “resigned” in as many years. The Politburo is now filled mostly with military personnel and securocrats, the only two factions – and sometimes rivals – left with power.  Lam, if he does formally become acting general secretary, which the Politburo will have to vote on, is in a prime position to maintain the job in 2026. One imagines he has very different ideas about the nature of the Communist Party than Trong. Early in the anti-corruption campaign, Trong remarked that he did not want to “break the vase to catch the mice.” That metaphor implied that tackling corruption should shield a delicate Communist Party, not smash it to pieces.  Vietnam’s President To Lam, front right, and Cambodia’s Defense Minister Tea Seiha, back right, pay their respects in front of honor guards at the Independence Monument in Phnom Penh on July 13, 2024. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) However, in his quest to rid corruption from a corrupt institution, he eroded almost every check the Communist Party of Vietnam had to prevent a supreme leader figure from rising to the top. Trong violated the three major “norms” that the party introduced in the early 1990s.  Politburo members were expected to retire at 65, and individuals could only occupy the most senior positions for a maximum of two terms. More importantly, no one person could hold at the same time two of the four most powerful positions: General Secretary, State President, Prime Minister, and Chair of the National Assembly.  This “four pillar” (tu tru) system  created a form of succession plan. Regular reshuffles and a separation of powers amongst the political elite would prevent the Communist Party from tilting towards dictatorship.  Shattering the norms The norms created a structure in which politicians could fight over policies, often brutally, but without the entire apparatus collapsing because of division. There could be a regular rotation between different factions and geographic networks, meaning no one group was ascendant for too long.  Hanoi called this “democratic centralism.” Of course, it’s not democracy, but it’s a form of pluralism that, in theory, had prevented the party from descending into dictatorships like North Korea, Cuba, or China under Xi Jinping. Trong broke every one of these rules.  Between 2018 and 2021, he held the posts of party general secretary and state president simultaneously, the first person to do so since 1986. (Lam seems likely to repeat that.)  Trong passed away during his third term as party chief, the first leader since Le Duan to have that record. He not only constantly had the party flout retirement-age limits for himself – he should have stepped down in 2021, if not earlier – but such exemptions have been handed out like confetti during his tenure. Vietnam’s Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong addresses a press conference after the closing ceremony of the Communist Party of Vietnam 13th National Congress in Hanoi on Feb. 1, 2021. (Manan Vatsyayana/AFP) At the same time, his anti-graft campaign has centralized power among an increasingly small number of Politburo members. Provincial party politics have been purged and constrained to give more power to the central party apparatus. The party dominates the government. The public security ministry is all-seeing.  This was always going to happen. How else do you clean up an uncleanable organization in which power flows up and discipline is enforced only by those above you?  The campaign increases the necessity of one section of the party to maintain power indefinitely.  Who designates what is the true morality and which cadres are truly moral? Well, a certain clique of the party running the anti-corruption campaign In one speech on the theme, Trong urged the party to “strengthen supervision of the use of the power of leading cadres, especially the heads, push up internal supervision within the collective leadership; make public the process of power use according to law for cadres and people to supervise.”  The purge is designed to enforce the view that no one has absolute power above the party. Anyone who uses the power must serve the…

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Pacific Ocean Islands and Japan

A palm reading: Japan’s navigation plan for Pacific waters

The triennial meeting of the Japanese Prime Minister with the leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum  – referred to as PALM – is normally not much of an attention grabber. But this year’s meeting, which has just concluded in Tokyo, makes it clear that Japan is looking to significantly ramp up its presence in the region. This comes on the back of increased bilateral engagement – think new embassies in Kiribati and Vanuatu – and a reinvigorated QUAD with a focus on resource and burden sharing among the membership of the strategic security partnership (Australia, India, Japan, USA). The joint declaration from this their tenth meeting, known as PALM10, with its associated action plan sets out what we can expect from Japanese engagement with the Pacific over the next three years. The use of the seven pillars of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent as a structure for future engagement is notable. The Blue Pacific concept was developed by Pacific nations as a home-grown framing to address their challenges. Other partners have inserted the term Blue Pacific into announcements and documents. However, this takes the recognition of the Pacific’s own framework to another level. It is particularly significant given that Japan’s former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe coined the term Indo-Pacific, which many in the Pacific islands region have resisted. Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum Baron Waqa (L) and Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida shake hands during the opening session of the 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM10) in Tokyo on July 18, 2024. (AFP) PALM10 sees a move to an “All Japan” approach to working with Pacific partners. Whilst several Japanese agencies are referenced in the outcome documents, the most notable is the prominence of the Japanese Self-Defense Force in future engagement. Japan’s military impacts in the Pacific islands region are well known and loom large in the regional memory. While the PALM10 action plan references the continuation of activities related to World War II, such as retrieval of remains and clearance of unexploded ordnance, new activities will see the Japanese presence in the region take on a markedly military aspect. This will add to what is an already crowded environment in which defense diplomacy has been increasing in recent years. However, Japan’s use of this strategy has been relatively limited until now. The PALM10 action plan refers to increased defense “exchanges” to consist of port calls by Japanese Defense Force aircraft and vessels. This may not be as easy to achieve as Tokyo officials might like. At the same time as PALM10 was in session in Tokyo, Vanuatu’s National Security Advisory Board refused a request for a Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force vessel to dock in Port Vila. The reasons for the refusal remain unclear. Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (C) speaks during the opening session of the 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM10) in Tokyo on July 18, 2024. (AFP) Other examples of increased use of the JSDF are the provision of capacity building to Pacific personnel for participation in peace-keeping operations and inclusion of a Self-Defense Unit in disaster relief teams to be deployed to Pacific island countries at their governments’ request. At the end of the Action Plan are items for “clarification.” Included in the list (of three) for Japan to clarify are two that continue this push for increased defense diplomacy. They are: a proposal to accept Pacific cadets into the National Defense Academy of Japan and to use the Japan Pacific Islands Defence Dialogue to foster “mutual understanding and confidence building.” The JPIDD has met twice, most recently earlier this year. We are now into the Pacific meeting season and in six weeks the 53rd Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting will convene in Nuku’alofa, Tonga. Japan is a longstanding dialogue partner of the forum. The ongoing review of regional architecture includes revisions to how dialogue partners are selected and accommodated. What was discussed and agreed at PALM10 will play a role in determining where at the Blue Pacific table Japan will sit.

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North Korea’s Kim in military talks with Russian vice defense minister

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has discussed the “importance and necessity” of military cooperation with Russia’s vice defense minister to “defend mutual security interests,” the North’s state media reported on Friday. Kim met a Russian military delegation, led by the vice minister, Aleksey Krivoruchko, in Pyongyang on Thursday, according to the Korean Central News Agency, or KCNA. “The talk shared recognition of the importance and necessity of the military cooperation between the two countries to defend mutual security interests,” the KCNA said. Kim reiterated his firm support and solidarity for Russia’s war with Ukraine and stressed the need for the militaries of the two countries to “get united more firmly” to develop bilateral relations, the news agency added. Krivoruchko is the first known ranking Russian military official to visit North Korea since a summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kim.   The two met in Pyongyang for talks aimed at bolstering their economic and security relations and underscoring their shared defiance of Western sanctions. Under a new partnership treaty announced at their summit they  agreed to offer each other military assistance “without delay” if either were attacked. Russia has been cozying up to North Korea since Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The United States has accused North Korea of sending Russia weapons for use in its Ukraine war but both North Korea and Russia deny that. RELATED STORIES North Korea, Russia agree to offer military assistance if either is attacked North Korea’s Kim hails Russia alliance, promises Putin support on Ukraine Putin arrives in North Korea, vows to boost cooperation and fight sanctions More balloons The military in U.S. ally South Korea resumed propaganda loudspeaker broadcasts toward North Korea in response to the North’s latest launch of trash-carrying balloons into the South. The broadcasts took place from Thursday evening to early Friday in areas near where the balloons were launched, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, or JCS, said on Friday. Since late May, North Korea has sent more than 2,000 trash-carrying balloons into the South in retaliation for the launch by anti-North Korea activists of balloons carrying propaganda leaflets towards the North. “The military’s response going forward will fully depend on North Korea’s actions,” the JCS said, without providing further details.  On Thursday, the JCS said the latest North Korean balloons appeared to be traveling toward the northern part of Gyeonggi Province that surrounds Seoul, advising the public to not touch any fallen balloon and to report them to the military or police. South Korea resumed loudspeaker broadcasts last month as it fully suspended a  2018 inter-Korean military tension reduction agreement in response to the North’s launch of waves of trash-carrying balloons. Edited by Mike Firn.

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vietnam Brides on sale

To Lam: The man with the golden steak is now leading Vietnam

In the West, he may be best known for eating a gold-covered steak while his countrymen survive on an average of about US$10 a day. But in Hanoi, Vietnam’s new top leader To Lam has for years been seen as an operator whose decades in politics long paved the way for his ascent. On Thursday, that climb reached a new zenith after Vietnamese state media announced that Lam, 67, would take over the duties for Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. It comes less than two months after Lam was elevated to the Vietnamese presidency – a move that put him in pole position for the general secretary job, the most powerful in the country. Vietnamese President To Lam attends a press briefing with Russian President Vladimir Putin (not pictured), at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 20, 2024. (Minh Hoang/Pool via Reuters) The son of a Vietnamese police colonel, Lam began his career in public security in 1979. He joined the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1981, eventually rising to become the minister for public security – the country’s top security official – in 2016.  In 2019, he was awarded the rank of general by then-president Trong. Security czar In his capacity as security minister, he focused on internal politics and counter-intelligence – areas that may well have helped him to later cement his political powers. The stint was not without controversy. In 2017, Lam was accused of being involved in the kidnapping of Trinh Xuan Thanh, a fugitive oil executive and former provincial official, in Berlin.  Thanh later returned to Hanoi through Slovakia. The government denied kidnapping but the case led to a temporary rift in diplomatic relations between Germany and Vietnam.  But it would fit a larger pattern of alleged transnational repression and quashing of dissent overseen by Lam.  His term as security minister saw the arrests and suspected kidnappings of journalist critics, including RFA blogger Truong Duy Nhat, who disappeared in Thailand in 2019 but is now in jail in Vietnam serving a 10-year sentence. Golden steak and ‘Onion Bae’ In 2021, Lam was involved in another controversy after he was caught on video eating a piece of gold-plated steak at a luxury restaurant in London.  A video clip of the general being fed a US$2,000 steak by celebrity chef Salt Bae went viral, causing a public outcry at home.  This was followed by a draconian crackdown, including the arrest and jailing of a noodle-seller nicknamed “Onion Bae” who had dared to ridicule Lam by posting a parody of the incident to social media. He remains in jail. Lam subsequently ramped up anti-corruption crackdowns that saw off potential rivals within the party in what critics have said were clearly politically motivated investigations. Vietnamese President To Lam, left on red carpet, and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, right on red carpet, review the guard of honor at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 20, 2024. (Minh Hoang/AP) Lam’s enthusiastic implementation of this so-called “Burning Furnace” campaign led to the sacking of half a dozen senior ministers and Politburo members within the span of months beginning in 2022. Yet Lam and Trong, the ally he succeeds, are also said to have questionable hidden interests. In May, the Tiếng Dân newspaper revealed that a younger brother of To Lam, To Dung, was the chairman of the construction and real estate firm Xuan Cau Group, noting that the company had been conspicuously absent from any investigation even as it has won projects worth billions of Vietnamese dong with little oversight.  Private man Little else is known about the private life of Vietnam’s new top man.  He does not appear to have ever given any remarks to Western media and nothing in English has been written of his immediate family, though Vietnamese reports say he has been twice married, first to Vu Hong Loan, the sister of a Vietnamese police major general and currently to Ngo Phuong Ly.  He appears to have several children. One daughter was revealed to have graduated from London’s prestigious School of Oriental and Asian Studies, or SOAS, in 2023.  On the global stage, Lam has made clear his endorsement of the so-called “Bamboo diplomacy” Hanoi has undertaken to balance its relations between East and West.  In June, he welcomed Russian President Vladimir Putin, weeks after his swearing in as president, calling him “comrade” and hailing a successful visit.  Hanoi saw visits from Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden within the previous nine months. Whether his caretaker role becomes a more permanent one, there seems little likelihood that Lam would veer from the established path. At his presidential swearing-in in May, he promised to “continue to strengthen the party’s capabilities, its ruling power and combat prowess.” He may well be looking to strengthen the same in himself.  Edited by Malcolm Foster.

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Thai natural gas project suspended after pipeline explosions in Myanmar

Anti-junta forces capture camps in central Myanmar township

An anti junta group in Myanmar’s Mandalay region is continuing to make gains in a key township following the collapse of a truce between insurgent armies and the military who seized power in a 2021 coup. The Mandalay People’s Defense Force, or PDF, captured a junta camp at the Alpha cement factory in Madaya township on July 14, and one at Taung Ta Ngar two days later, it said in a statement on Tuesday. Madaya is just 30 km (19 miles) north of Mandalay, the capital of the region and Myanmar’s second-largest city. The Mandalay PDF has been fighting alongside the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, since late October 2023.  The TNLA, which has also teamed up with the Arakan Army and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army as part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, pushed back junta forces in several regions before agreeing a shaky China-brokered truce with the junta in January. When the ceasefire collapsed on June 25, the TNLA attacked Mandalay’s Mogoke township and several towns in Shan state to the region’s east, while the Mandalay PDF focused much of its attention on Madaya and Singu townships in Mandalay region. The defense force said it had captured 28 junta camps as of Wednesday. Weapons and ammunition seized after Mandalay PDF captured the junta base at the Alpha cement factory in Madaya township, Mandalay region in a photograph released on July 16, 2024. (Mandalay PDF) Mandalay PDF spokesman Osmon, who goes by one name, told Radio Free Asia Myanmar’s military suffered heavy losses in the battle for Madaya. “There were many casualties on the side of the junta in these operations. We have seized corpses and arrested junta soldiers,” he said. “There were some casualties on the side of Mandalay PDF.”  Osmon didn’t disclose the numbers of casualties on either side but said the PDF took more than 150 prisoners. He added the group is now engaged in a fierce battle with junta forces at Madaya’s Kyauk Ta Dar base. RELATED STORIES Myanmar junta steps up security in Mandalay as fighting spreads across region  Thousands stuck between checkpoints on Myanmar road amid renewed fighting Thousands displaced in Myanmar’s Mandalay region On Tuesday, three people were killed when a shell hit Madaya town, close to its train station and main market. “It happened around 8 a.m.,” said a resident who didn’t want to be named for fear of reprisals. “A 44-year-old woman, a 30-year-old woman and a two-year-old girl were killed.” The man said he didn’t know which side had fired the shell, while another resident said the blast happened close to where junta troops were stationed. “It was about 10 to 14 meters away from them,” he said, also requesting anonymity for security reasons. “It was also close to where the junta soldiers always come to drink tea.” RFA phoned the junta spokesman for Mandalay region, Thein Htay, for details on the fighting in Madaya, but he did not answer calls. The National Unity Government, a shadow government formed by members of the civil administration ousted in the 2021 coup, said on June 27 that PDFs and their allies have made sweeping gains in Mandalay region and Shan state to the east, in a campaign it dubbed “Operation Shan-Man.” The Mandalay PDF said it had captured 11 junta camps in Singu township,  80 km (50 miles) north of Mandalay city, by July 7. Now the junta is fighting back, damaging around 100 houses and injuring more than 20 people in airstrikes on July 16, as it seeks to flush PDF forces out of Singu town. The PDF’s Singu-based head of information, Than Ma Ni, said the junta carried out more than 20 airstrikes on Tuesday and also bombarded the town with heavy artillery.  “The junta’s air force has been striking all day as Mandalay-PDF has taken over Singu town,” he said Wednesday. “There were no deaths, but those who were hit by shrapnel have been moved to a safe place and are receiving medical treatment. The entire town was pretty much destroyed.” Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Mike Firn and Taejun Kang.

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Myanmar junta steps up security in Mandalay as fighting spreads across region

Junta forces have tightened security in Myanmar’s second-biggest city, Mandalay, while shelling civilians elsewhere in the region, after coming under renewed attack from an alliance of insurgent forces battling to end military rule. A shell killed a seven-year-old boy and a woman in her 30s after it exploded in a residential area of Mandalay region’s Mogoke town on Monday evening, residents told Radio Free Asia Tuesday.  Another four-year-old girl and a 60-year-old woman, as well as a woman and man both in their 30s, are in critical condition, said one Mogoke resident, asking to remain anonymous for security reasons. “A child and a grandmother were seriously injured by shrapnel that hit them in the neck,” he said. “It was not easy to send them to the hospital, so they were treated at home by people who have some medical knowledge.” The shells were fired from a junta camp on Strategic Hill in eastern Mogoke, a ruby-mining town about 200 km (120 miles) north of Mandalay city. Over half the town’s population has fled after fighting intensified between junta troops and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, which has taken control of western Mogoke, residents said.  RELATED STORIESMyanmar rebel army calls ceasefire after junta airstrikeThousands stuck between checkpoints on Myanmar road amid renewed fightingMyanmar insurgent allies capture strategic Shan state town from junta The TNLA is part of an alliance of three ethnic minority insurgent forces known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The alliance launched an offensive last October, codenamed Operation 1027 for the date it began, and pushed back junta forces in several regions. After a five-month ceasefire ended on June 25, the TNLA, and allied forces attacked junta camps in Madaya, Singu and Mogoke townships in Mandalay region, and Hsipaw, Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Lashio towns in Shan state to the east. Stepping up Security The TNLA and its allies have also turned their attention to junta bases near Mandalay region’s capital, causing the military to step up security in Mandalay city, residents said.  One city resident, who wished to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals. told RFA that after Operation 1027 resumed in late June, the junta had increased the number of outposts around Mandalay and its historic palace. “We’re getting a sense that the areas around the palace are more secure. They also installed heavy weapons on top of Mandalay Hill and also on Yankin Hill,” he said. “Security has been increased a lot. If there was a place with four or five soldiers before, there are about 10 soldiers now.” Troops are also stationed on top of high-rise buildings in the city’s Chanmyathazi township, one resident said, also asking for anonymity to protect his identity.   “The junta troops are stationed on the top floors of Ma Ma-29 and No. 49 buildings,” he said, adding that soldiers also occupied buildings in the Myayenanda, and Aungpinlel neighborhoods, as well as Mandalay’s industrial zone. “The troops asked residents to leave in order for soldiers to be stationed there.”  Army personnel are also stationed in Inwa (Inn Wa) town, 32 km (20 miles) south of Mandalay city, which is close to a junta air force base, he added. On Monday, the junta closed the Mandalay-Madaya Road after fighting with allied rebel forces near Madaya township’s Kyauk Ta Dar village, which is just 27 km (17 miles) away from Mandalay city. According to the Mandalay People’s Defense Force, the group had captured 25 junta camps in Madaya township and 11 in Singu township as of July 7.  RFA called Mandalay region’s junta spokesperson Thein Htay for more information on increased security and the attack on Mogoke, but he did not answer phone calls. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn. 

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‘People’s court’ issues arrest warrant for Xi Jinping

A citizens’ tribunal has issued a symbolic arrest warrant for Chinese President Xi Jinping after issuing a nonbinding verdict that he committed crimes of aggression against Taiwan, crimes against humanity in Tibet, and genocide against Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The Court of the Citizens of the World — a “people’s court” dedicated to universal human rights and based in The Hague, the Netherlands — issued the arrest warrant on July 12 after four days of hearings, which included expert witness testimonies and victim accounts. Members of the China Tribunal included Stephen Rapp, former U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues; Zak Yacoob, a retired judge who served on the Constitutional Court of South Africa; and Bhavani Fonseka, constitutional lawyer and human rights lawyer and activist in Sri Lanka. RELATED STORIES Uyghurs mark 2 years since ‘genocide’ finding Uyghur Tribunal finds China committed genocide in Xinjiang Uyghur Tribunal wraps up in London with eye on December ruling on genocide allegations Uyghur Tribunal determination could change paradigm for China relations: experts Experts and witnesses detailed widespread human rights abuses in Tibet and Xinjiang, including intrusive surveillance, repression, torture and restrictions on free expression and movement, as well as what they described as efforts to eradicate their distinct cultural and religious identities.   Some witnesses were survivors of mass detention camps in Xinjiang, where torture and the forced sterilization of Uyghur women occurred. Though the unofficial body has no legal powers, its proceedings highlighted the plight of aggrieved parties and provided a model for prosecution in international or national courts under the principle of universal jurisdiction.    The court said it “obtained sufficient legal grounds” for Xi’s arrest on the charges laid out against him and called on the international community to support its decision, though it is unclear how governments will react. Judge Zak Yacoob (L) speaks with presiding judge Stephen Rapp during the China Tribunal at the Court of the Citizens of the World, in The Hague, the Netherlands, July 12, 2024. (Court of the Citizens of the World via YouTube) “The tribunal’s core findings are of significant importance, revealing the extent of human rights abuses committed by the Chinese state,” said a report by JURIST, a nonprofit news organization that highlights rule-of-law issues around the world. There was no immediate response from the Chinese government. Former prisoners speak Former Tibetan political prisoners, including Dhondup Wangchen and Tenpa Dhargye, recounted the torture they experienced in Chinese jails and the impact of China’s repressive policies in Tibet. Tibetan filmmaker and human rights activist Jigme Gyatso, also known as Golog Jigme, who has been jailed by Chinese authorities on at least three occasions, highlighted Xi Jinping’s efforts to completely eradicate the use of Tibetan language and culture.  He also outlined what he said was the systematic torture and persecution of political prisoners after their release and the coercive control of Tibetans’ movements in greater Tibet.  Gulbahar Haitiwaji, a Uyghur former internment camp detainee who now lives in France, testified before the tribunal about being chained to beds and tortured in Xinjiang.  She told Radio Free Asia that she felt immense excitement when called upon to testify, seeing it as a crucial opportunity to speak for the hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs who endured China’s concentration camps.  “Back then, while in the camp, I often wondered if there was any justice in the world capable of punishing those responsible for our people’s suffering,” she said. The Chinese government tried to dissuade some Uyghurs from providing testimony in The Hague. Abdurehim Gheni, a Uyghur activist who now lives in the Netherlands, said Chinese police contacted him via Telegram, a WeChat-style communication app banned in China, as recently as two days before he was scheduled to appear before the court. The police also had his brother leave voice messages telling him not to attend the hearing, he said. Judges Bhavani Fonseka (L) and Zak Yacoob (C) and presiding judge Stephen Rapp hold court during the China Tribunal at the Court of the Citizens of the World in The Hague, the Netherlands, July 12, 2024. (Court of the Citizens of the World via YouTube) Gheni recounted that his brother said: “Do not do anything against the government. If you return here, the government will be lenient on you. We can also go there to see you.” The tribunal reported that it faced attempts to shut it down in the form of a phony cease-and-desist order, and said a spy disguised as a legal volunteer provoked staff and other volunteers to resign, JURIST reported.   ‘First meaningful step’ Abduweli Ayup, a Uyghur rights activist and researcher based in Norway, who also testified at the China Tribunal, said the verdict holds significant importance for Uyghurs. “It’s the first meaningful step to stop the Uyghur genocide,” he said. “The court has completed the accusation against the perpetrator and judged at the trial. The verdict implicates the criminal, Xi Jinping. He should be arrested and punished,” he said. In December 2021, an independent, nonbinding Uyghur Tribunal in London found that China committed genocide against Uyghurs in Xinjiang and that Xi Jinping shared primary responsibility for the atrocities. Though the panel had no state backing or power to sanction China, its conclusion added to the growing body of evidence at the time that Beijing’s persecution of Uyghurs constituted a crime against humanity that deserved an international response. In February 2023, the Court of the Citizens of the World issued an indictment against Russian President Vladimir Putin for the crime of aggression in Ukraine and called for his arrest.  A month later, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Putin along with Maria Lvova-Belova, Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights, for alleged war crimes involving accusations that Russia had forcibly taken Ukrainian children. Additional reporting by RFA Mandarin. Translated by RFA Uyghur and RFA Tibetan. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Joshua Lipes.

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Interview: White House ‘extremely concerned’ about closer Russia-North Korea ties

Mira Rapp-Hooper is the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania at the White House National Security Council, or NSC.  During this week’s NATO Summit in Washington, she spoke with RFA Korean’s Lee Sangmin, touching on points related to increased cooperation between Russia and North Korea, following Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea last month. The summit included representatives from the Indo-Pacific Four, or IP4, an informal grouping of South Korea, Japan, New Zealand and Australia, and Rapp-Hooper said that it was important to include those countries in discussions with NATO, especially considering that the partnership between North Korea and Russia concerns security in both the North Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific. The interview has been edited for length and clarity. RFA: So how much are you concerned about the recent deepening relationship between Russia and North Korea? Rapp-Hooper: We are extremely concerned about the relationship between Russia and North Korea. Of course, we have been for about a year as that relationship has grown closer and closer, and it has become clear that both Russia and North Korea are exchanging extremely worrisome forms of support with one another.  On the one hand, of course, we know that the (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) has been providing Russia with millions of rounds of ammunition, as well as missiles that have been used on the battlefield in Ukraine to devastating effect fueling Russia’s war machine, and taking the lives of innocent civilians, all over the conflict. And that’s deeply disturbing.  But one of the things that is also very troubling about this relationship is the fact that we know that Russia is probably providing the DPRK with technical assistance, sophisticated forms of support for some of its military programs. But those forms of cooperation are much harder to track. So while we know what the DPRK is giving to Russia, we know less than we would like to about what Russia is giving to the DPRK. And that is something that should concern not only the countries of the Indo-Pacific who care about peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and beyond.  Mira Rapp-Hooper, Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania, National Security Council, at the Asia Center in Washington, Sept. 13, 2023. (U.S. Institute of Peace via Flickr) But countries in Europe are increasingly understanding that this relationship affects them, too. Now, of course, this has all become more prominent recently because of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang, when the two countries released a declaration that looks very much like an alliance treaty.  But really, what this does is capture something that we knew the whole time, which is the fact that this is not just a marriage of convenience where these two powers are cooperating so that Russia can get help in its war against Ukraine. There is political buy-in at the highest levels, from both of these governments.  The piece of optimism that I would offer today, however, is that it is not just the ROK, the United States and Japan who are worried about this problem. We have very good trilateral cooperation amongst the three of us to share intelligence and to coordinate our policy actions.  But part of what you’re seeing here at NATO today is that all of our NATO allies also care about this problem, because Russia has brought DPRK technology to Europe in the form of ballistic missiles being used on the battlefield in Ukraine. So we’ve never seen our European allies more engaged in DPRK issues, more wanting to cooperate, to address, and limit, this relationship. And we are hopeful that that cooperation will have a stabilizing effect in the face of all of this destabilizing behavior.  RFA: In what ways can NATO and its allies counter cooperation between North Korea and Russia? Rapp-Hooper: Well, there are, you know, certain areas where cooperation, unfortunately, is quite difficult to affect. We know that many of the shipments that take place between DPRK and Russia take place within their territorial seas or over rail lines. So there’s very few options for the international community there.  But there are other areas, where we do cooperate, and we will continue to do so. And that relates to things like financial sanctions that may run at the heart of their cooperation, and other measures that we can take, such as intelligence sharing, information sharing that might allow one country to be more empowered to limit this cooperation wherever they can.  There is also, of course, the role that we all play diplomatically, not just in putting pressure on both Pyongyang and Russia, but on additional countries, who might be able to take action to try to limit this relationship.  The world is, of course, watching (the People’s Republic of China, or PRC) and the question looms large, what Beijing will do about this relationship, given that it is so destabilizing and not in China’s interests either. But we’ve yet to see a clear answer to that question. RFA: What kind of a role can China play in dealing with North Korea issues? Rapp-Hooper: That’s really up to China. In the past, the PRC has long played a role on the Korean Peninsula. Obviously, it is a key continued trading partner of Pyongyang and a longtime political partner. There is obviously a very close political relationship as well, between Beijing and Moscow – which is its own cause for concern.  But there’s no doubt that if Beijing was interested in doing so, it could play a stabilizing and responsible role, to encourage in particular, the worst (aspects of the) DPRK-Russia cooperation to come to an end. But again, all eyes are on Beijing to see if it will make that choice.  RFA: Why is it significant that the IP4 are participating in the NATO Summit? Rapp-Hooper: Our IP4 partners in the (Republic of Korea, or ROK), Japan, Australia and New Zealand have been at the last three NATO summits. And…

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Laos can feed itself, but its food security is complicated

Can Laos feed itself?  The short answer: Yes. It can grow enough rice.  Per capita rice consumption is one of the highest in the world, at 206 kilograms (453 pounds) per person per year. The Lao Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry reckons the country can produce, at maximum, 3.7 million tons of rice annually. That’s around 510 kilograms (1,222 pounds) of rice per person.  However, when it comes to other foods, things become a little more complicated.  A few weeks ago, Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone laid out new plans for self-sufficiency, the latest buzzword in Vientiane – and most Southeast Asian capitals. It’s a very optimistic goal, but what else can the Lao government do?  A tree is seen in rice fields in Laos, July 16, 2022. (Reuters) RELATED STORIES Weak governance, poor economy drive the hollowing out of Laos Lao central bank governor removed amid economic crisis China’s dependency on potash imports could give tiny Laos rare leverage Lao farmers worry about upcoming rice season as heat wave kills crops A monetary crisis since 2021 has kept inflation rates among the highest in Asia and seen the kip, the local currency, depreciate by as much as half against the U.S. dollar. Much of this crisis stems from Laos’ dependency on imports — mainly fuel — and because it foreign currency reserves are almost depleted.  Sonexay wants Laos to be self-sufficient in finance and energy — an unlikely prospect. His third pillar is food. A joint report by the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Program warned that food insecurity affected more than a million people out of the 7.2 million population in 2022. The situation could have been worse.  Geography and transport Since the economic crisis began in 2021, Laotians have responded in two ways: many have left for Thailand, where work is more plentiful and better paid, while others have returned to their family farms.  If Laos wants to industrialize and raise GDP per capita above the current $US 2,600, de-urbanization isn’t a long-term solution. And the policy ideas Vientiane is now talking about come up against structural problems.  First, consider geography. Most of Laos is mountainous and forested—there’s a reason why it has been a buffer region between the Thais, Burmese, and Vietnamese for centuries.  Never able to sustain a large population, Laos remains the least densely populated country in Southeast Asia, with 33 people per square kilometer (.38 square miles). Cambodia is the next least densely populated, with around 98 people per square kilometer (.38 square miles). A vendor, right, fills rice in a plastic bag for her customer, January 27, 2024, in Luang Prabang, Laos. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) Only Laos’ southern panhandle and some northern provinces – chiefly Xayaburi – are suitable for agriculture. The country has just 0.16 hectares (0.4 acres)of arable land per person, below the world average and well below what Thailand, Cambodia, and Myanmar have.  Geography and poor government management create the second problem: transport. For centuries, because the terrain made it difficult to move around, farms were small, serving only the immediate vicinity.  That remains so today, with four out of every five people still engaged in low-productivity, smallholder rice cultivation. This prevented the formation of larger farms, meaning not enough capital was generated for private-funded infrastructure works, namely roads or railways. Moreover, the Mekong River flows along the Thai-Lao border, so it has never been feasible to ship food by waterway from the hinterland to population centers.  Selling to China In more recent decades, the Lao government has barely invested in rural infrastructure. Only 12 percent of the cultivated rice area is irrigated, so the remainder can only be planted once a year during the rainy season. Irrigation would allow for two harvests a year. By 2019, it was cheaper to import rice than grow it domestically, primarily due to transport costs. In 2022, Laos exported $US44 million worth of rice but imported $US 29 million worth.  Laos needs more capital for farmers to expand, irrigate, and diversify, and more investment to build roads or rail networks in the hinterland. But Laos is far less self-sufficient in capital than in anything else. The national debt is now around 130 percent of GDP.  The Lao state simply cannot afford to finance these projects itself. Vientiane must instead rely on external capital. Indeed, massive Chinese investment has recently flooded into Laos, but this creates two big problems.  A farmer and his son harvest their rice field on a Chinese made tractor, Oct. 13, 2009, in Muang Sing, northern Laos. (Voishmel/AFP) Chinese firms invest in agricultural production in Laos to grow products for export to China, where prices are higher and food insecurity is a more pressing issue.  Why would Chinese firms invest hundreds of millions of dollars in building roads in, say, Phongsaly Province, the least accessible region, when they can lease Laos’ most fertile farms in regions like Xayaburi and Vientiane provinces, which already have great transport links to China? There are now excellent transport links from Laos to China, like the Vientiane-Kunming railway. This has made it easier for farmers to sell their produce in China than within Laos. Because of this export potential, many farms, including the most productive ones in the more arable provinces, have shifted to cash crops, mainly cassava. In January alone, Laos exported $98 million worth of cassava, making it the second-largest export after energy. Rising fertilizer imports Yet, because Laos’ soil is so poor, tons of artificial fertilizers and pesticides need to be dumped on it to achieve even minimum production standards. Until recently, Laos used barely any artificial fertilizers. In 2010, per hectare of land, Laos used less than a tenth of what Thailand used. Now, it uses about half.  Laos now uses more fertilizers per hectare than Cambodia, which produces far more food— around 2 to 3 times more rice per year. Phosphate fertilizer use per hectare of cropland rose from 2.4 kg in 2000 to around 3.2…

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