IOC: North Korean athletes never received sanctions-violating smartphones

The 14 North Korean Olympic athletes in Paris have not received the smartphones that were gifts to all athletes, the games’ authority told Radio Free Asia in a revised statement after it was questioned whether such gifts would be a sanctions violation. The International Olympic Committee previously told RFA Korean on Wednesday that the phones – manufactured by South Korean maker Samsung – were picked up by the North Korean delegation, but said on Thursday that “We can confirm that the athletes of the NOC of DPRK have not received the Samsung phones.” The DPRK, or Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, is the official name of North Korea. If the phones were to be brought back from Paris into North Korea, they would violate sanctions that prohibit import of industrial machinery, Lee Jaewoong, spokesperson for the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told a news conference. A participant films Samsung Electronics’ Galaxy Z Flip 6 during the Galaxy unpacked products media preview in Seoul, South Korea, July 8, 2024. (Lee Jin-man/AP) “In accordance with Paragraph 7 of Resolution 2397, the UN Security Council prohibits the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer of all industrial machinery to North Korea,” he said. “Smartphones are prohibited goods under this resolution.”  The IOC did not respond to an additional RFA inquiry as to whether the phones were simply not distributed to the athletes by the North Korean Olympic Committee or if they were returned. IOC spokesman Mark Adams also did not clearly answer related questions at the press conference on Thursday, saying that he would have to find out more information about the subject. Ashley Hess, a former member of the UN Security Council’s North Korea Sanctions Committee panel of experts, pointed out to RFA Thursday that the smartphones could also violate sanctions on luxury goods. “It could fall under the luxury goods ban (UNSCR 1718) – a list of which is up to Member States to define for their own implementation purposes, but my reading of the EU luxury goods list is that smartphones are explicitly included, so if the Samsung phones are smartphones, as is reported by the media, then they would likely fall under the luxury goods ban, given that the Olympics are in France,” she said. There has been controversy in the past regarding North Korean athletes receiving Samsung smartphones at the Olympics. At the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics, the Olympic organizing committee was concerned about violating sanctions and offered to provide North Korean athletes with Samsung phones under the condition that they return them before returning home. The North Korean delegation refused to receive them. Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong.

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Philippines joins US-led allies in multilateral maneuvers in South China Sea

The Philippines joined the United States, Australia and Canada in a two-day “maritime cooperative activity” from Wednesday to press for freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea amid maritime tensions with China. The navies and air force units of the four nations will operate alongside each other to enhance “cooperation and interoperability” in the disputed waterway, a joint statement said. “We stand together to address common maritime challenges and underscore our shared dedication to upholding international law and the rules-based order,” it said. “The activity will be conducted in a manner that is consistent with international law and with due regard to the safety of navigation and the rights and interests of other States.”  The statement was signed by Gen. Romeo Brawner, the military chief of the Philippines, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command chief Adm. Samuel Paparo, Australian Defence Force chief Admiral David Johnston and Gen. M. A. Jennie Cargian, the chief of Canada’s Defence Staff. “Australia, Canada, the Philippines, and the United States uphold the right to freedom of navigation and overflight, other lawful uses of the sea and international airspace, as well as respect for maritime rights under international law, as reflected in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),” they said. The aim of the multilateral sail was to demonstrate a “collective commitment” to boosting international cooperation. The statement did not specifically say where the drills would be held, only that the maneuvers would take place “within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone” in the South China Sea.  The Philippines last week carried out similar joint sails with Japan and with the U.S. separately in Philippine areas of the South China Sea. Coast guards from the Philippines and Vietnam meanwhile are scheduled to hold their own joint drills on Friday. In related news, China on Wednesday conducted air and sea patrols near Scarborough Shoal, a flashpoint in territorial tensions between Beijing and Manila, according to a report by Agence France-Presse. Analysts praise multinational maneuvers Chester Cabalza, president of International Development and Security Cooperation, a Philippine think-tank, hailed the defense deals with various allies.  He noted that prior to this, Manila had also signed a groundbreaking Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with Japan, another country with a territorial dispute with China. That deal would allow the exchange of troops for joint training with each other. He said the multilateral sails this week show the “global recognition” of Manila’s international arbitration award in 2016 in its territorial dispute with China over Scarborough Shoal. “It shows the legitimacy of  its sovereignty rights in the disputed maritime domains of the South China Sea,” Cabalza told BenarNews. “It reaffirms the bone of contention that China alone is not the sole owner of these important sea lanes of communications and trade,” he said. He said the joint sails should work to “solidify” the belief that countries should follow the rules-based order in the disputed sea region, a key shipping route where experts say more than 60% of global maritime trade passes. Geopolitical analyst, Don McClain Gill at the De La Salle University in Manila, said the joint sails affirm the 2016 ruling but he emphasized that such activities need to be done on a regular basis. “Patrols and exercises are very important in ensuring the freeness and openness of the maritime domain, but it must be supplemented by other activities as well, such as capacity building and more robust and permanent deterrence posture in our area in the West Philippine Sea,” Gill told BenarNews, referring to South China Sea waters within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. “This is a very good indication that like-minded countries, three of which are part of the exercise, recognize that the Philippines is legitimately entitled to its sovereign rights and sovereignty based on UNCLOS and the 2016 arbitral ruling,” Gill said, alluding to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. “This is significant in that regard and must be continued,” he said. “As we can see, the Philippines has become a fulcrum for maritime cooperation.”  Countries such as Canada, which are far removed from the conflict, are also concerned because they are worried it may affect global trade and affect the stability in a “very critical maritime space,” he said. While global partnerships like the joint sail are important, he said this had not deterred Beijing from continuing with its activities in the South China Sea. But this should not be taken negatively by the Philippines, but rather as an “opportunity to explore what else could be done.” Last week, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken met their Filipino counterparts in Manila and announced a U.S. $500 million infusion to help Manila defend its shores from threats posed by China.  The funds would go towards strengthening Manila’s defenses in the South China Sea, and the monies came shortly after tensions and confrontations surrounding Ayungin Shoal or Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea. Manila maintains a rusting World War II-era ship in Ayungin, and a violent confrontation there in June saw a Filipino serviceman lose a thumb.  Both sides have subsequently worked towards de-escalating the tensions, but it remains unclear how China would react to the joint sails this week. Jeoffrey Maitem contributed to this report from Manila. BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated online news organization.

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Myanmar rebels claim capture of town on road to China

An insurgent group fighting the Myanmar military has captured a northeastern town on a main road to China, seizing the last junta military bases after weeks of fighting, a senior official of the rebel group said on Tuesday. The Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, is a member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which is battling the junta that seized power in a 2021 coup across Shan state.   The group captured the headquarters of two junta battalions and the Operation Command Headquarters No. 1 in Kyaukme, a town on the road between the cities of Mandalay and Lashio on Monday, the TNLA official who wished to remain anonymous told Radio Free Asia.  He said the TNLA now had complete control of Kyaukme. RFA tried to contact Shan state’s junta spokesperson, Khun Thein Maung, to ask about the situation in Kyaukme but he did not respond by the time of publication.  If confirmed, the capture of Kyaukme by the TNLA would be another major setback for the forces of the junta, coming just days after another member of the insurgent alliance captured the headquarters of the military’s Northeast Regional Command in Lashio. Lashio is about half-way between Myanmar’s second city of Mandalay and the Chinese border. RELATED STORIES Myanmar rebel group vows to protect China’s interests Myanmar’s junta extends state of emergency for another six months China’s frustration with Myanmar junta’s incompetence is mounting Mines and bombs A Kyaukme resident who witnessed the fighting confirmed that the TNLA had captured the junta’s positions that were defended by trenches, bunkers and mine fields. “The junta dug trenches around all of the bases, including their Operation Command Headquarters, and built concrete bunkers everywhere,” said the resident, who declined to be identified, in fear of reprisals. TNLA fighters had used drones to drop bombs on the junta’s defenses, the resident said. “The whole hill has been turned into a  bunker. The TNLA troops had to first clear mines slowly and the junta had the upper hand.” Neither the TNLA nor the junta released estimates of casualty figures.  Kyaukme residents said junta forces had fled to a position about 6 km (4 miles) away. While some civilians who had fled earlier were returning to their homes, others were staying away in fear of junta airstrikes, said another resident. Junta forces have launched numerous airstrikes in Shan state and elsewhere, inflicting a heavy toll on civilians. “We can’t hear any shooting and the TNLA have been securing the area,” the resident said. “The morning market is even operating normally. The only thing people are worried about is airstrikes. Everyone is afraid, the whole country is afraid of planes.” The Three Brotherhood Alliance launched the second round of an offensive begun late last year, codenamed Operation 1027, in June after two China-brokered ceasefires between the junta and rebel groups broke down.   Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn. 

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Top Myanmar army officers seized by rebels, junta says

A Myanmar insurgent group has captured senior army officers after seizing their headquarters, a military spokesperson announced on Monday, in a stunning setback for the embattled junta that seized power in a 2021 coup. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, or MNDAA, insurgent group said it captured the junta’s Northeast Regional Military Headquarters in the Shan state town of Lashio last week. It is the first such headquarters that rebels fighting to end military rule have captured. “We had communication with the senior officers until 6:30 in the evening on Aug. 3, but we’ve been out of contact until now,” junta spokesperson Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun said in a statement. “According to unconfirmed reports, some senior officers have been arrested by terrorist insurgents,” he said. The junta spokesperson did not say how many officers had been captured or give any names or ranks but media reported that the commander of the Northeast Regional Military Headquarters, Maj. Gen. Soe Tint, Regional Chief of Staff Brigadier General Thant Htin Soe and chief of the Kyaukme-based Operation and Command Headquarters, Brigadier General Myo Min Htwe were in MNDAA custody. Radio Free Asia tried to contact MNDAA spokesperson Li Kyar Win to confirm the reports but he did not respond. RELATED STORIES Myanmar insurgents free political prisoners in northern Shan state cityMyanmar rebel group vows to protect China’s interestsNorthern Myanmar cut off by state-wide communications blackout Myanmar has been in turmoil since the military overthrew an elected government led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi in early 2021. Ethnic minority insurgents battling the military for decades have been joined by pro-democracy activists, and they’ve made significant gains in several parts of the country, particularly since large last year when several groups launched offensives. On Saturday evening, the MNDAA, a member of a three-party rebel alliance that has made big gains against the military, announced it had captured Lashio’s Northeast Regional Military Headquarters after a month of fighting. Myanmar has 14 such regional military command headquarters. The MNDAA did not mention the capture of senior officers but said more than 470 wounded junta soldiers and their family members had been evacuated from the headquarters’ hospital on Thursday. Neither side has announced casualty figures but at least nine civilians have been killed in the fighting and thousands of Lashio residents have fled from the battered city. The junta-backed Myanmar Alinn newspaper said on Monday that MNDAA fighters had attacked the military hospital, killing civilian patients, staff and relatives of junta troops.  The junta commander-in-chief of the Defense Service Office also announced on Monday that several women serving in the junta’s police force had been killed in the battle, as well as many of their family members.  Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn. 

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Taking over from the inside: China’s growing reach into local waters

On March 14, 2016, Argentina’s coast guard detected a Chinese vessel fishing illegally in national waters. When the ship attempted to ram the coast-guard cutter, the Argentinians opened fire on the vessel, which soon sank.  The Lu Yan Yuan Yu 10 was one of eleven Chinese squid vessels that the Argentine navy has chased for suspected illegal fishing since 2010, according to the government.  But one year after the incident, Argentina’s Fishing Council announced that it would grant fishing licenses to two vessels owned by the same Chinese operator that owned the ship the Argentine navy had chased the previous year. These ships would sail under the Argentine flag through a local front company.  The decision seemed to violate Argentine regulations that not only forbid foreign-owned ships from flying Argentina’s flag or fishing in its waters but also prohibit granting licenses to operators with records of illegal fishing. The move may have been a contradiction, but it is an increasingly common one around the world. Over the past three decades, China has gained supremacy over global fishing by dominating the high seas with more than 6,000 distant-water ships. When it came to targeting other countries’ fishing grounds, Chinese fishing ships typically sat “on the outside,” in international waters along sea borders, running incursions across the line into domestic waters.  In recent years, from South America to Africa to the far Pacific, China has increasingly taken a “softer” approach, gaining control from the inside through legal means by paying to flag in their ships so they can fish in domestic waters without the risk of political clashes, bad press, or sunken vessels.  Infographic by The Outlaw Ocean Project This method typically involves going around prohibitions on foreign shipowners by partnering with local residents and giving them majority ownership stakes. Through these partnerships, Chinese companies can register their ships under the flag of another country, gaining permission to fish in that nation’s territorial waters.  Sometimes Chinese companies sell or lease their ships to locals but retain control over decisions and profits. In other places, these companies pay fees to gain fishing rights through “access agreements.” From Micronesia to Iran Chinese companies now control nearly 250 flagged-in vessels in the waters of countries including Micronesia, Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, Morocco, and even Iran. Many of these companies have been tied to a variety of fishing crimes.  Trade records show that some of the seafood caught on these vessels is exported to countries including the United States, Canada, Italy, and Spain. Mar del Plata is Argentina’s largest fishing port and the headquarters for many fishing companies. Many Argentine-owned fishing vessels have, however, been neglected in recent years. In some parts of Mar del Plata’s port, those vessels now sit neglected or sunken, unused and unsalvageable. (Pete McKenzie/The Outlaw Ocean Project) Most countries require ships to be owned locally to keep profits within the country and make it easier to enforce fishing regulations. “Flagging in” undermines those aims. And aside from the sovereignty and financial concerns, food security and local livelihoods are also undermined by the export of this vital source of affordable protein, often to Western consumers.  In the Pacific Ocean, Chinese ships comb the waters of Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Micronesia, according to a 2022 report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service.  “Chinese fleets are active in waters far from China’s shores,” the report warned, “and the growth in their harvests threatens to worsen the already dire depletion in global fisheries.”  The tactic of “flagging in” is not unique to the Chinese fleet. American and Icelandic fishing companies have also engaged in the practice.  But as China has increased its control over global fishing, Western nations have jumped at the opportunity to focus attention on its misdeeds.  Even frequent culprits can also be easy scapegoats. When criticized in the media, China pushes back, not without reason, by dismissing their criticism as politically motivated and by accusing its detractors of hypocrisy.  Still, China has a well-documented reputation for violating international fishing laws and standards, intruding on the maritime territory of other countries and abusing its fishing workers.  Two local men fish in Mar del Plata, Argentina, in March 2024. (Pete McKenzie/The Outlaw Ocean Project) History of misbehavior In the past six years, more than 50 ships flagged to a dozen different countries but controlled by Chinese companies have engaged in crimes such as illegal fishing and unauthorized transshipments, according to an investigation by the Outlaw Ocean Project.  China’s sheer size, ubiquity and history of misbehavior is raising concerns.  In Africa, Chinese companies operate flagged-in ships in the national waters of at least nine countries. In the Pacific, an inspection in 2024 by local police and the U.S. Coast Guard found that six Chinese flagged-in ships in the waters of Vanuatu had violated regulations requiring them to record their catch in logbooks. In August 2019, a reporting team inspected a Chinese fishing vessel off the coast of West Africa. (Fábio Nascimento/The Outlaw Ocean Project) China’s control over local resources is not constrained to domestic waters. In Argentina, China has provided billions of dollars in currency swaps, providing an economic lifeline amid domestic inflation and hesitancy from other lenders.  China has also made or promised billion-dollar investments in Argentina’s railway system, hydroelectric dams, lithium mines, and solar and wind power plants.  This money has bought Beijing the type of influence that intervened in the fate of the crew from the Lu Yan Yuan Yu 10. When the ship sank, most of the crew were scooped up by another Chinese fishing ship and returned to China.  However, four of them, including the captain, were brought to shore, put under house arrest and charged with a range of crimes by a local judge who said the officials had endangered their own crew and the coast guard officers who chased them. China’s foreign ministry soon pushed back against the arrest. Three days later, Argentina’s foreign minister told reporters that the charges had “provoked a reaction of great concern…

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Cambodia’s Hun Dynasty stakes reputation on the Funan Techo Canal

Ground will be broken on the Funan Techo Canal on August 5 – strongman Hun Sen’s 72nd birthday. The waterway will be carved through the eastern regions of the country, eventually connecting the capital Phnom Penh to new deep-water ports in Sihanoukville and Kampot, on the Gulf of Thailand.  The Cambodian government believes the $1.7 billion waterway will reduce Cambodia’s dependency on Vietnam, through whose ports much of Cambodia’s imports and exports are transported.  They expect an economic boon for the country, with cheaper transportation making Cambodian goods more competitive, fostering overall economic growth. But the megaproject has been controversial, to say the least.  Initially, much of the controversy centered on Vietnam’s apparent fear that Cambodia might allow its “ironclad friend” China military access to the canal. The security dimension was played up. Villager Sok Rom looks at excavators being used on the construction of the Funan Techo canal along the Prek Takeo channel in Kandal province, July 9, 2024. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) However, there are more significant concerns. The first is environmental. There are genuine concerns, especially if you’re a Vietnamese resident of the Mekong Delta, about the potential ecological impact. Carving out the canal could lead to further intrusion of salt water into the Mekong’s distributaries and create a massive levee between Cambodia and Vietnam’s floodplains.  As Brian Eyler of the Stimson Center has put it: “the canal will disconnect the floodplain, creating a dry zone to its south and a wetter zone to the north.” Much remains unknown since Phnom Penh hasn’t yet publicly released any environmental impact assessment on the canal. The second concern is economic, and this is a bit more hazy.  David Brown, an economic analyst, argued recently that “there is no plausible economic argument for digging a canal.” I disagree.  Economic logic There is some economic logic to the project if it’s done properly. It will make domestic transport of goods cheaper, benefiting consumers and  make Cambodian exports more competitive in international markets.  Yes, Cambodia has new expressways and wants to re-do its aged railways, but moving goods by water is many times cheaper than by road or rail.  It will mean more business for Cambodia’s new ports in Sihanoukville and Kampot, boosting these local economies. It should bring some investment to the rural areas where the canal passes through.  And it does make Cambodia more economically self-sufficient—no one can say with 100% certainty that Vietnam won’t in the future deny access to its ports, which would effectively mean an economic blockade for Cambodia. Residential homes along the Prek Ta Hing channel, where the proposed second phase of the Funan Techo canal is set to be built, in Kandal province, July 9, 2024. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) None of this is to say that Phnom Penh has gone about this the right way. The entire process has lacked transparency.  The government was too hubristic at the beginning, thinking that China would fund everything, and has over-egged the patriotic angle of the canal, choosing not to have a decent dialogue with the public about the complexity of the scheme.  Indeed, Prime Minister Hun Manet, who inherited the premiership from his father Hun Sen last year, has presented it as a nationalistic project.  As Hun Manet put it, the canal will give Cambodia “a nose to breathe through.” Of course, this rhetoric comes slightly unstuck once you recall that the China Road and Bridge Corporation will have a lengthy build-operate-transfer contract on the project, so it will only pass into Cambodian ownership sometime in the second half of this century.  Even so, Phnom Penh’s propaganda machines are in full swing: anyone who criticizes the scheme is unpatriotic or despises Cambodia, and those who support it are the true adherents of national sovereignty. Legacy building The inherent problem is that the whole thing is essentially a vanity project.  That doesn’t mean it’s entirely illogical or uneconomical. But you have to remember that this isn’t a normal project. It’s far more symbolic than the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway, the country’s first proper motorway, or your bog-standard hydro dam. It’s a way for Hun Sen, who is still the kingpin despite resigning last year after nearly four decades in power, to give himself a physical legacy. The Hun dynasty is physically cutting an artery through the country, a landmark to the power of the Hun family that they hope will last for centuries. “Our ancestors built the Angkor Temple and other great monuments, but unfortunately we used to be divided. Now, we are once again united and we are building new achievements,” Hun Manet said earlier this year. Construction will begin on August 5, Hun Sen’s birthday.  Kavi Chongkittavorn, a veteran Thai journalist, has called the Funan Techo Canal a “litmus test for Hun Manet’s leadership.” Another analyst put it: the government has to “complete it by all means, at all costs.” Workers dig the Funan Techo canal at Prek Takeo in Kandal province, July 9, 2024. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) Indeed, the Hun family has staked its reputation, though not its power, on the project.  When trying to defend the canal during a speech in May, Hun Sen, referring to himself in the third person, tried to reassure Cambodians: “Hun Sen has never made a wrong decision in the past 47 years”. (He has; many.) For Hun Manet, it offers an opportunity for drums, flags and loyalty-parades. His first year in power has been somewhat dull.  He isn’t as bombastic, as in-your-face, as his father. His speeches aren’t as wild and rambling; his rhetoric is more measured and consensus-based. His focus is policy, often of the boring sort.  The ruling party framed his succession as a technocratic shift, the transition from a generation of rulers who literally fought to save the country from genocide to a generation that will make slow, incremental improvements to the progress they inherited.  Take a moment to read more Cambodian canal project to kick off on Hun Sen’s birthday Vietnam urges Cambodia to cooperate…

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Food shortages reported in rebel-controlled areas of Myanmar’s Chin state

Food and medicine shortages in two townships in Myanmar’s Chin state have worsened in the six months since the Arakan Army took control, causing most residents to leave the area, aid workers and residents said. The ethnic rebel Arakan Army, or AA, drove junta forces out of Paletwa and Samee townships on Jan. 14.  A Paletwa resident, who requested not to be named for security reasons, told Radio Free Asia that people in the township’s urban area have been trading pigs and cattle for rice and other consumer goods over the last several months. “People living in the urban areas can’t travel at all,” he said. “They have no salt, cooking oil or fish paste. They are facing many difficulties in traveling and living.” The AA has been fighting the military junta as it seeks self-determination for the Buddhist ethnic Rakhine population in western Myanmar. Bags of rice are donated to Kaki Swar Refugee Camp in Palatwa township, June 19, 2024. (Paletwa IDPs and Humanitarian Supporting via Facebook) In Paletwa, ethnic Chin residents have had to seek permission from the AA to travel from their homes to their farms in the township’s rural areas, residents told RFA. That has created difficulties for residents trying to make a living, they said. RFA was unable to contact AA spokesperson Khaing Thukha for comment on the shortages.  For the last seven years, Paletwa and Samee township residents have been importing fuel and basic consumer goods from India’s Mizoram state through the Kaladan River, which flows into Myanmar. But last month, an influential Indian civil society organization – the Central Young Lai Association – called for a halt to the transport of goods from Mizoram state to AA-controlled areas in Chin state, citing the AA’s treatment of ethnic Chin people. That has caused a severe shortage of fuel and basic foodstuffs in northern Rakhine state and in some areas of Chin state, residents said. Since January, many residents have since taken refuge in Mizoram state, while others have moved through neighboring Rakhine state to Myanmar’s commercial capital, Yangon. Due to unstable phone lines and internet communication, the exact number of residents left in Paletwa and Samee townships was unknown. But relief workers said only one-third of residents are still living in the urban areas of the two townships. Translated by Aung Naing. Edited by Matt Reed.

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Authorities in Xinjiang rearrest son of prominent Uyghur businessman

Authorities in Xinjiang rearrested the son of a prominent Uyghur businessman two days after he was released from “re-education” in March and days before before his wedding, two relatives with knowledge of the situation told Radio Free Asia. Abuzer Abdughapar, 24, who worked at a car dealership in Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi, was rearrested on March 25 by public security authorities, said his uncle Abdusattar Abdurusul, citing information from other relatives in Almaty, Kazakhstan. He was supposed to get married on May 11, an event to which his relatives in Almaty had been invited, Abdusattar said. The reason for Abuzer’s arrest is unknown, and authorities have not informed Abuzer’s family about his whereabouts. Abuzer was first arrested and detained in 2017 in his hometown of Ghulja – or Yining in Chinese – after spending a year studying Turkey. He was sent to a “re-education” camp and released nearly a year later.   His rearrest is an example of how authorities are apprehending Uyghur detainees, who have already served time in “re-education” camps or prisons, under various pretexts to eliminate what Chinese authorities deem “threats to national security.”  Among those rearrested are entrepreneurs and philanthropists, and Uyghurs who have traveled abroad, especially to Muslim countries. Abdughapar Abdurusul in an undated photo. (Courtesy of Abdusattar Abdurusul) “I heard there [was] a 100-day clearance going on which entailed the rearrest of people who were arrested and released before,” Abdusattar said. “The Chinese government is trying to erase us.”   Mutallib, the Almaty-based older brother of Abuzer’s grandmother, confirmed the young Uyghur’s rearrest. “We heard he was arrested on March 25 and that he has not been released,” he said. “The wedding was paused as well. Up to now, we don’t know his whereabouts or the reason for his arrest.” Chinese police officers at the Public Security Bureau in Urumqi refused to answer questions about Abuzer’s rearrest when contacted by RFA. Father arrested in 2018 His father tried to bribe authorities in Urumqi to release Abuzer, but they lied to him and disappeared after receiving the money, Abdusattar said. In 2018, authorities also arrested Abuzer’s father, Abdughapar Abdurusul, a prominent philanthropist and owner of a multimillion-dollar import-export company in Ghulja that does business with Kazakhstan, for taking an unsanctioned Muslim pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia and “tax evasion,” Abdusattar said. They also detained Abuzer’s mother, Merhaba. The family’s fixed assets, companies and houses worth more than several hundred million dollars were confiscated, he said. Merhaba later died in a “re-education” camp. Abdughapar had been sentenced to death, but was released in 2020, said his older brother Abdusattar, a businessman who lives in Europe. Abdusattar said he believes that Abuzer and Abdughapar were released after he went public about their detentions via Western media, including RFA. Authorities re-arrested Abdughapar a second time in summer 2021, but released him a few months later, his brother said. The cause of his arrest is unknown. Translated by RFA Uyghur. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Matt Reed.

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Floods force 20,000 people from homes in Myanmar’s Bago

Flooding triggered by torrential downpours has forced about 20,000 people from their homes in the Myanmar city of Bago and they now face a dire shortage of water and food with more rain expected, aid workers and residents said on Monday. A child was swept away and drowned near Bago, which is famous for its Buddhist temples, about 80 km (50 miles) north of the former capital of Yangon, after days of relentless rain, residents said. The flooding has compounded misery for many people struggling to get by in an economic crisis in the wake of a 2021 military coup that plunged the country into bloody turmoil. “The flood hasn’t subsided. I don’t know how to express the hardships, the flooding amidst the political crisis. We’re facing shortages of food and medicine,” a Bago resident, who declined to be identified for fear of reprisals for talking to the media, told Radio Free Asia. Floods in Bago in Myanmar on July 29, 2024. (RFA) Aid groups said 20,000 people have been forced from their homes since Friday, with residents of the Ah Htet Zaing Ga Naing Gyi, Kyun Tharyar, Kyauk Gyi Su and Pon Nar Su neighborhoods particularly hard hit. “Those neighborhoods are flooded up to the height of bamboo,” said an official with a Bago-based social aid group, who also declined to be identified. “There’s an urgent need for clean drinking water and food for the evacuees,” said the official, adding that some people who had sought shelter in a relief camp were forced to move again when the waters kept rising. The junta that seized power in 2021 said in a notice in the state-owned Myanmar Alin newspaper that 27 flood relief camps had been opened and military authorities in Bago had helped 18,210 people evacuate and were providing assistance to them. A child from a family already displaced by fighting was killed in the town of Mone, to the north of Bago, when fast-flowing flood waters washed away a river bank, residents said. “They were fleeing the war and were sheltering in the forest when the child was washed away. The body was found near Kyaung Su village,” said the first Bago resident. Meteorological officials said early on Monday that the flood waters in Bago could rise by another six inches over the next day and would remain above the danger level for some time.  Floods in Bago on July 29, 2024. (RFA) To the east of Bago, the Sittaung River, one of the main rivers flowing south through central Myanmar to the ocean, had overflowed and flooded communities along its banks, residents of the area said. Even further to the east, flooding in Myawaddy township on the border with Thailand killed three people – a child and two men – on Saturday when a border river burst its banks, residents said. Flooding in northern Myanmar’s Kachin state displaced thousands of people early this month. The military council’s Meteorological Department and the Hydrological Directorate announced on Sunday that 12 cities across Myanmar faced flooding.  Editing by RFA staff.

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Rights group, senator speak up for dissident fighting extradition from Thailand

Pressure built on Thailand Thursday over the detention of a detained Vietnamese dissident fighting extradition back home with one human rights official warning of a stain on the government if it deported him. Y Quynh Bdap, from Vietnam’s Ede minority, was detained on June 11 and is being held in a special prison in Bangkok while a court decides his fate.  In January, Vietnam sentenced the 32-year-old to 10 years in prison in absentia on terrorism charges, accusing him of involvement in 2023 attacks on two public agencies in Dak Lak province in which nine people were killed.  Bdap has been in Thailand since 2018 and denied any involvement in the 2023 attacks. The U.N. refugee agency has recognised him as a “person of concern”. “Put simply, if he is sent back, chances are he dies, disappears, is tortured. That will stain the hands of the Thai government,” Sunai Phasuk, senior researcher at Human Rights Watch, told a seminar in Bangkok. The Thai government did not respond to a request for comment from Radio Free Asia. RELATED STORIES Thai court postpones Vietnamese activist’s extradition hearing Rights groups call on Thailand not to extradite Vietnamese activist 10 defendants given life sentences for Dak Lak attacks Sunai said the terrorism charges that Bdap is facing at home did not meet international standards of justice. Referring to a previous military government in Thailand that was intolerant of dissent, he said he questioned the behavior of the civilian administration that replaced it. On July 15, a Bangkok court postponed Bdap’s extradition hearing until Aug. 1, He is also facing an immigration offense related to overstaying his visa. Bdap’s lawyer, Nadthasiri Bergman, told a hearing this month the case reflected intensified transnational repression, through which governments exert their influence across borders to silence dissent. A Thai senator, Angkhana Neelapaijit, told the seminar that Thailand should live up to international standards on human rights, ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention, update its immigration law to take into account enforced disappearance and torture, and insist that all extradition requests from other countries go through its Court of Justice. Thailand and Vietnam have not signed an extradition treaty but regularly exchange each other’s nationals on a reciprocal basis.  Vietnamese officials have not made a public comment on Bdap’s case but Sunai and Bergman said they believed Vietnam was exerting pressure for the extradition case to be resolved in their country’s favor. Edited by Mike Firn.   

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