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Category: East Asia
Laos, Thailand mark first direct passenger train between Bangkok, Vientiane
The first direct passenger train between Bangkok and Vientiane arrived earlier this month. Previously, passengers could ride from Bangkok to the Thai city of Nongkhai on the border with Laos. But now they can travel straight into Vientiane – and also have the option of transferring to the high-speed rail line that travels north to Kunming in southwest China. The first State Railway of Thailand train began servicing the route on July 19. A return train on July 20 left Vientiane at about 6:25 p.m. and arrived in Bangkok at about 7:35 a.m. the next day. Prices ranged from between 158,000 kip (US$7) to 560 million (US$24) kip. It was so popular that officials added an additional carriage after passengers bought most of the available tickets. “I always commuted by train when I was studying,” one Lao passenger told Radio Free Asia. “I wanted my kids to take this train, so they could experience it.” Eventually, passengers could travel from Bangkok and Vientiane on a high-speed rail line. Earlier this year, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told Thailand’s prime minister that he hopes to speed up construction of a high-speed rail line in Thailand that would connect with Laos’ high speed line, which China built in 2021 as part of its Belt & Road Initiative. China has said that it plans to construct and connect a 3,000-kms (1,864-miles) pan-Asian railway network, in which Chinese rail lines would extend all the way to the tip of the Malay Peninsula, linking Beijing to Singapore. Edited by Matt Reed.
Another day, another fraud case in Vietnam
The week that Vietnam was in an official state of mourning for Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, whose tenure was centered on a “Blazing Furnace” anti-corruption campaign that toppled dozens of top officials, another big corporate fraud trial began in a Hanoi court. While its scale and scope pale in comparison to the Van Thinh Phat scandal orchestrated by businesswoman Truong My Lan, who was convicted and sentenced to death in April 2024, the FLC (Finance, Land, and Commerce) scandal is garnering significant media attention. Trinh Van Quyet, was a young, brash, high-flying tycoon, and briefly in 2021, the country’s wealthiest person. Established in 2010, his property company, FLC, quickly grew into a sprawling conglomerate with some 17 subsidiaries and affiliated companies in real estate, resorts and golf courses, as well as Bamboo Airways, once the second largest privately-owned airline in the country. Quyet, 49, was arrested in March 2022 along with his two sisters for stock market manipulation, appropriation of property, and fraud. Authorities arrested 47 other people, including FLC executives and several regulators. In all, 15 relatives are on trial. At least one other FLC executive is at large. FLC Group CEO Trinh Van Quyet holds a model of a Boeing Dreamliner passenger jet at his office in Hanoi, July 30, 2018. (Nhac Nguyen/AFP) Perhaps more importantly, police arrested the former chairman of the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange, Tran Dac Sinh, its director, Le Hai Tra, and two other bourse executives. The four were charged with “abusing positions and powers while performing official duties.” Quyet is accused of running $156 million “pump and dump” stock fraud between May 2017 and January 2022. He had his two sisters and 43 other family members establish some 500 different brokerage accounts. False documents Quyet and his family members traded FLC stock amongst themselves at a frenzied pace, creating the perception of demand and causing the price to soar. On many occasions, his sister would cancel a stock purchase at the last minute, having already created the impression that the shares were in demand. In another scheme, from 2014-2016, Quyet had family members and employees at another subsidiary, FLC Faros Construction, falsify documents to make it look as though they were making investments and increasing the firm’s charter capital from VNĐ1.5 billion ($59,000) to VND4.3 trillion ($169 million). Thus when the once loss-making private company was publicly listed, which was only possible because of the intervention of corrupt bourse officials, it appeared to be worth significantly more than it was. Police escort FLC Group CEO Trinh Van Quyet to court on July 22, 2024, for his trial on fraud charges in Hanoi. (Anh Tuc/AFP) Quyet and other defendants quickly sold the 391 million of 430 million shares that they controlled, netting $142 million, and collapsing the stock price for other investors. All in all, the various schemes resulted in the six listed FLC companies seeing the value of their shares rise between 70% and 1,700%. In addition to the fraud, Quyet sold large shareholdings without notifying financial regulators, a requirement for corporate executives. In January 2022, he sold nearly 75 million shares of FLC stock, collapsing share prices, and prompting the Ministry of Public Security to open an investigation. RELATED STORIES Mendicant monk Thích Minh Tuệ offers an embarrassing contrast to Vietnam elites Breaking the laws of the land: Vietnam’s real estate scandals Ouster of parliament chief bares Vietnam corruption, power struggle Cleaning house in the Communist Party of Vietnam ahead of Tet Meet To Lam, Vietnam’s Communist Party chief and successor to Nguyen Phu Trong Regulatory shortfalls The FLC case matters for three reasons. First, it was only possible because the regulators were in on the fraud. As was the case in Truong My Lan’s massive fraud case at Saigon Commercial Bank, the scheme was abetted by poorly paid regulators. This once again raises the question “who regulates the regulators?” If Vietnam cannot get a baseline financial regulatory system running, it will negatively impact its domestic capital markets, corporate governance, and deter foreign investment. While the Ministry of Public Security did a good job in investigating the fraud, as they did with Lan’s Van Thinh Phat (VTP) and Saigon Commercial Bank, it never would have gotten to this point if there was proper regulatory oversight. Second, while Vietnam’s stock market is not that large, it stands as one of the few opportunities for Vietnamese citizens to invest their money. With a lack of confidence in their currency, Vietnamese tend to buy gold. In fact, in the past half year, the price of gold in Vietnam was trading well above international prices. The government had to auction off some of its gold reserves just to cool the market. A woman displays gold at a shop in Hanoi, Oct. 11, 2009. (Kham/Reuters) Vietnamese also buy real estate, but that’s not always a safe investment. The domestic real estate market in Vietnam resembles China’s in many ways. Many property firms are saddled with debt and have defaulted, especially on dollar-denominated bonds. A domestic credit crunch caused by the VTP scandal in late 2022 led to even more defaults and stalled real estate projects. Many Vietnamese were left paying mortgages on unfinished real estate that they could neither inhabit, nor rent. The third place Vietnamese park their savings is in the stock market. The majority of shares in the Vietnam stock market are owned by individual, not institutional, investors. So when there is widespread fraud, it really hurts the burgeoning middle-class. Quyet’s fraud was fairly simple, but the effects were widespread: There were nearly 100,000 victims. Although Quyet has paid some $8.3 million in restitution, it’s a drop in the bucket. Cost to taxpayers Third, the FLC fraud trial has an impact on the larger economy. The company – which is one of the largest private companies in the country – is still in operation, but barely. The Ho Chi Minh Stock exchange delisted the company due to the fraud. Trading…
North Korea to sell gambling rights at vacant 105-floor Ryugyong Hotel in Pyongyang
A North Korean hotel which has been under construction for 37 years has plans to sell the rights to operate a casino on the premises if the operator promises to complete construction of the building’s interiors, a resident of the capital Pyongyang told Radio Free Asia. The 105-floor Ryugyong Hotel began construction in 1987 and at 330 meters (1,080 feet), it is the tallest building in North Korea and the most iconic structure in Pyongyang’s skyline. Though it was supposed to open in 1992, the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the steady stream of aid from Moscow, and the North Korean economy entered a period of crisis that culminated in the 1994-1998 famine, so finishing the hotel became less of a priority. External construction was completed in 2011 and the Ryugyong was supposed to open partially in 2013, but those plans fell through. Though it remains vacant, LEDs have been installed on one side of the building’s facade, converting it into one of the world’s largest displays. It’s currently used to show propaganda signage, visible from much of the city at nighttime. Gamblers play a slot machine in Pyongyang, April 12, 2012. (Pedro Ugarte/AFP) “A plan to install a casino at the Ryugyong Hotel has been reviewed,” a resident of the capital told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons. “The plan is to try to attract foreign investment.” The review happened after the country’s leader Kim Jong Un ordered that the government take practical measures to promote tourism, according to the resident. “The authority to determine the location of the casino to be installed at the hotel and the right to operate the casino will be granted to a foreign entrepreneur who invests in the cost of internal construction,” he said. “This project was approved by the Central Committee after reviewing and discussing the profitability of the casino installed at the Yanggakdo Hotel, also in Pyongyang.” The Yanggakdo is North Korea’s first luxury hotel, opened in 1996. It is perhaps most well known as the site of the 2016 Otto Warmbier banner-stealing incident that led to the U.S. citizen’s detention and eventual conviction and 15-year prison term. Warmbier was repatriated in a vegetative state in June 2017 and died shortly afterward. Authorities hope to capture the success of the foreigners-only casino at the Yanggakdo in the Ryugyong. Light designer Kim Yong Il smiles during an interview with the Associated Press as his creation, the light show displaying propaganda messages on the facade of the pyramid-shaped Ryugyong Hotel, is seen in the background in Pyongyang, North Korea, Dec. 20, 2018. (Dita Alangkara/AP) Casinos in North Korea are very profitable for the government, as they siphon away foreign currency from international tourists, a resident from the northwestern province of North Pyongan told RFA on condition of anonymity to speak freely. Currently the country has two such casinos, at the Yanggakdo in Pyongyang and the Bipa Hotel in the Rason Special Economic Zone in the northeast near the border with China and Russia. The 105-storey Ryugyong Hotel, the highest building under construction in North Korea, is seen lit up ahead of 70th anniversary of country’s foundation in Pyongyang, September 6, 2018. (Danish Siddiqui/Reuters) “When the casino is built at the Ryugyong Hotel in Pyongyang and the hotel’s accommodations, restaurants, swimming pool, and billiards room are finally completed … tourism in Pyongyang is expected to be revitalized,” the North Pyongan resident said. “This is why overseas investment is desperately needed.”. He said trade representatives would advertise the investment opportunity at a Chinese government-sponsored product exhibition event involving North Korea, China, Russia and Mongolia scheduled to start on Saturday in the Chinese city of Dandong, which lies across the Yalu River from North Korea’s Sinuiju. Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong.
North Korea bans hit war movie 5 months after release
A hit North Korean big budget film that took four years to make and was intended to usher in a new era of high quality movie production has been banned only five months after its release, residents in the country told Radio Free Asia. The blockbuster “72 Hours” tells the story of the opening moments of the 1950-53 Korean War – which it says South Korea started – and it details how the North Korean army captured Seoul in only three days. In reality it was the North that attacked first, but Pyongyang maintains that the first sacking of Seoul during the conflict–it changed hands four times–was part of a counteroffensive. The government has not announced a reason why the film has been mothballed, but a resident of the northwestern province of North Pyongan said on condition of anonymity for safety reasons that it might be because of the government’s recent crackdown on the term “unification,” in line with leader Kim Jong Un’s policy of considering South Korea a separate hostile country, rather than part of the same race of people. She also said it might be because the government is trying to scrub media that has references to South Korean place names. The word “Seoul” is spoken many times in the film, for example. “The movie is about our army advancing south after we were attacked … on June 25, 1950, which makes residents think that it was actually us who lit the fuse of war,” she said. The resident also said the plot of the film blames military commanders for resting on their laurels after taking the capital, when they should have advanced and taken all of South Korea before it could catch its breath. “Usually, the price of a movie ticket is 1,000 (10 US cents) won, or 3,000 won (30 cents) if it’s new,” she said. “However, ‘72 Hours’ … cost 18,000 won ($1.80)” That amount is an enormous sum, equivalent to about half a month’s salary for the lowest paid government jobs. Related Stories In new movie, the South started the Korean War, as Pyongyang has always claimed North Korea bans more than 100 patriotic songs that refer to reunification Kim Jong Un to revise constitution, label S Korea as ‘primary enemy’ “The authorities suddenly banned the screening of the movie ‘72 Hours’ and issued a policy to retrieve all copies of ‘72 Hours’ that had spread among residents,” she said. “They did not specify the reason for banning it and they just suddenly designated it as prohibited.” Most copies of the film were distributed from person to person on USB flash drives, so the crackdown not only forbids viewings of “72 Hours,” but also distribution, a resident of the northeastern province of North Hamgyong told RFA on condition of anonymity to speak freely. “The movie ‘72 Hours,’ which was first released in February this year, attracted a lot of attention from residents from the beginning,” he said. “It is on an entirely different level than previous movies and has been highly anticipated since its production.” It was supposed to be a film that represented the priorities of the Kim Jong Un era, he said. The high ticket price made it a premium film that poorer residents could not afford to see in theaters. “The Party said the movie would not be aired on television until all production costs were recovered. And now, the movie has been banned,” he said. Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong.
North Korea brushes off any hope of better U.S. ties under Trump
North Korea dismissed on Tuesday a suggestion by former U.S. President Donald Trump that he could improve relations if he were to win November’s election, saying it did not expect any change in U.S. hostility and it was ready for confrontation. Trump spearheaded an unprecedented diplomatic push on North Korea when he was president in an effort to get it to abandon its nuclear and missile programs. He met North Korean leader Kim Jong Un three times, including once at the Joint Security Area in the Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas. But the effort brought no tangible progress and North Korea has been relentlessly building up its nuclear arsenal and developing the missiles with which to carry the bombs. As Trump prepares for his bid to win the presidency for a second term, he has referred to his efforts on North Korea, implying he could make progress if he returned to the White House. He said in a speech at the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee last week: “It’s nice to get along with somebody who has a lot of nuclear weapons.” RELATED STORIES Surprise Trump-Kim DMZ Meeting Wins Applause, But Raises Doubts About Real Progress Rumors of Breakdown in US-North Korea Summit Spread in North Korea Abrupt End to US-North Korean Summit Disappoints Experts, But Some See Prospect of Future Negotiations But the state Korean Central News Agency, or KCNA, appeared to rule out in a commentary any hope for warming ties, even if Trump becomes president again. “No matter what administration takes office in the U.S., the political climate, which is confused by the infighting of the two parties, does not change and, accordingly, we do not care about this,” said the news agency, which reflects official thinking. “It is true that Trump, when he was president, tried to reflect the special personal relations between the heads of state but he did not bring about any substantial positive change,” it said. The KCNA said the U.S. had pursued “the most vicious and persistent hostile policy” towards it for decades and it was prepared to defend itself. “The DPRK has bolstered its self-defensive capabilities to safeguard its ideology, social system, dignity and life and is fully ready for all-out confrontation with the U.S.,” it said, referring to North Korea by the initials of its official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The U.S. has long argued that North Korea’s nuclear program is illegal and subject to U.N. sanctions aimed at pressing it into disarmament talks, while backing staunch U.S. ally South Korea. Edited by Taejun Kang.
Second Thomas Shoal: deal or no deal?
China and the Philippines said they have achieved a “provisional arrangement” on resupply missions by the Philippines to the Second Thomas Shoal, where it maintains an outpost that China objects to, but their accounts of the agreement differed. The shoal, known in China as Ren’ai Jiao and in the Philippines as Ayungin Shoal, has been at the center of sharply rising tension and confrontation between the two countries, with China being accused of blocking access to Filipino troops stationed there. On June 17, a Filipino soldier was wounded in an encounter with Chinese coast guard personnel who also confiscated some Philippine guns during a Philippine rotation and resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre – an old navy ship that Manila deliberately grounded on the reef in 1999 to serve as its outpost to reinforce its claim. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs said in a statement on Sunday that both countries had “recognized the need to de-escalate the situation in the South China Sea and manage differences through dialogue and consultation.” The provisional arrangement for the resupply of daily necessities and rotation missions to the BRP Sierra Madre was achieved following the “frank and constructive” discussions at the 9th Bilateral Consultation Mechanism meeting on the South China Sea on July 2, the foreign ministry said, noting that it would not prejudice either side’s position in the disputed waters. It did not provide any further details. The hot-headed June 17 encounter raised fears of a more serious clash between U.S. ally the Philippines and China, but both sides agreed at the early July consultation to “de-escalate tensions” in the waters. RELATED STORIES Philippines reports fewer Chinese ships in South China Sea Philippine military chief demands China pay US$1 million in damages for clash Tensions simmer near a shoal both China and the Philippines claim China’s version On Monday, a spokesperson at China’s foreign ministry said Beijing continued to demand that the Philippines tow away the BRP Sierra Madre and restore the state of hosting no personnel or facilities at the Second Thomas Shoal. In the meantime, China would allow the Philippines to send living necessities to the personnel on the warship “in a humanitarian spirit” if the Philippines informed it in advance and after on-site verification was conducted, according to the spokesperson. But if the Philippines were to send large amounts of construction materials to the warship and attempted to build fixed facilities or a permanent outpost, China would “absolutely not accept it and will resolutely stop it,” the spokesperson added. A Chinese think tank – the South China Probing Initiative – said that with this statement, the two sides may agree to return to the situation between 1999 and 2022 when the Philippines promised not to send construction materials to the Second Thomas Shoal and China would continue to let humanitarian supplies go there. Analyst Collin Koh from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore wrote on the X social media platform that China’s version of the agreement “draws more questions than not about whether it will hold at all even before the ink is dry.” In this handout image provided by Armed Forces of the Philippines, a Chinese Coast Guard holds an axe as they approach Philippine troops on a resupply mission in the Second Thomas Shoal at the disputed South China Sea on June 17, 2024. (Armed Forces of the Philippines/AP) Shortly after the Chinese side issued its statement, Philippine foreign ministry spokesperson Teresita Daza denied that such arrangements as prior notification and on-site confirmation had been made. “I want to stress that the agreement was concluded with the clear understanding by both sides that it will not prejudice our respective national positions,” she said. “For the Philippines, this means that we will continue to assert our rights and jurisdiction in our maritime zones as entitled under UNCLOS (U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea).” The Second Thomas Shoal lies well inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone but also within the self-proclaimed nine-dash line that China draws on its maps to claim historic rights to almost the entire South China Sea. Maritime expert Ray Powell at Stanford University in the United States said that given the latest exchanges, he was “not sure there is a deal at this point.” A meeting of foreign ministers from Southeast Asian countries is to take place this week in Vientiane, Laos, and Daza said the Philippines would continue to articulate its positions on the South China Sea issue there. Edited by Taejun Kang.
Nguyen Phu Trong left Vietnam’s Communist Party ripe for strongman rule
On July 19, the Vietnamese Communist Party announced the death of its general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong. The previous day, it announced that Trong, 80, ostensibly the most powerful politician in the country, had been relieved of his duties for health reasons. He had missed several key meetings in recent months, and even when he did attend, he appeared shaky and unwell. He suffered a stroke a few years ago but seemingly bounced back. However, his near-unprecedented third term in office has been cut short. To Lam, the public security minister and promoted to state President last month, will now assume Trong’s duties. Having led the party since 2011, Trong attempted to reinvigorate an institution that, by the early 2010s, had become bogged down by individual rivalries, profit-seeking, and self-advancement. A man rides past a poster for the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in Hanoi on Jan. 22, 2021. (Nhac Nguyen/AFP) Corruption was so rampant the public was mutinous. Ideology and morality had fallen by the wayside. Pro-democracy movements threatened its monopoly on power. The private sector was not just fantastically wealthy, but desired more political power. But in what condition does Trong leave the institution he sought to fix? Externally, its monopoly on power is safer. It has increased repression of activists and democrats while appeasing the public through its high-profile takedown of the corrupt. The private sector has been constrained, too, so poses no threat to the party’s political authority. The economy has insulated the party from any meaningful repercussions from the West over human rights. ‘Blazing Furnace’ Within the Communist Party, however, Trong leaves behind a mess. Lam, as public security minister, and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, artfully used Trong’s signature “Blazing Furnace” anti-corruption campaign to advance their own interests, effectively purging anyone who might rival them for Trong’s job in 2026. More Politburo members have been sacked than at any time in memory. Two presidents have “resigned” in as many years. The Politburo is now filled mostly with military personnel and securocrats, the only two factions – and sometimes rivals – left with power. Lam, if he does formally become acting general secretary, which the Politburo will have to vote on, is in a prime position to maintain the job in 2026. One imagines he has very different ideas about the nature of the Communist Party than Trong. Early in the anti-corruption campaign, Trong remarked that he did not want to “break the vase to catch the mice.” That metaphor implied that tackling corruption should shield a delicate Communist Party, not smash it to pieces. Vietnam’s President To Lam, front right, and Cambodia’s Defense Minister Tea Seiha, back right, pay their respects in front of honor guards at the Independence Monument in Phnom Penh on July 13, 2024. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) However, in his quest to rid corruption from a corrupt institution, he eroded almost every check the Communist Party of Vietnam had to prevent a supreme leader figure from rising to the top. Trong violated the three major “norms” that the party introduced in the early 1990s. Politburo members were expected to retire at 65, and individuals could only occupy the most senior positions for a maximum of two terms. More importantly, no one person could hold at the same time two of the four most powerful positions: General Secretary, State President, Prime Minister, and Chair of the National Assembly. This “four pillar” (tu tru) system created a form of succession plan. Regular reshuffles and a separation of powers amongst the political elite would prevent the Communist Party from tilting towards dictatorship. Shattering the norms The norms created a structure in which politicians could fight over policies, often brutally, but without the entire apparatus collapsing because of division. There could be a regular rotation between different factions and geographic networks, meaning no one group was ascendant for too long. Hanoi called this “democratic centralism.” Of course, it’s not democracy, but it’s a form of pluralism that, in theory, had prevented the party from descending into dictatorships like North Korea, Cuba, or China under Xi Jinping. Trong broke every one of these rules. Between 2018 and 2021, he held the posts of party general secretary and state president simultaneously, the first person to do so since 1986. (Lam seems likely to repeat that.) Trong passed away during his third term as party chief, the first leader since Le Duan to have that record. He not only constantly had the party flout retirement-age limits for himself – he should have stepped down in 2021, if not earlier – but such exemptions have been handed out like confetti during his tenure. Vietnam’s Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong addresses a press conference after the closing ceremony of the Communist Party of Vietnam 13th National Congress in Hanoi on Feb. 1, 2021. (Manan Vatsyayana/AFP) At the same time, his anti-graft campaign has centralized power among an increasingly small number of Politburo members. Provincial party politics have been purged and constrained to give more power to the central party apparatus. The party dominates the government. The public security ministry is all-seeing. This was always going to happen. How else do you clean up an uncleanable organization in which power flows up and discipline is enforced only by those above you? The campaign increases the necessity of one section of the party to maintain power indefinitely. Who designates what is the true morality and which cadres are truly moral? Well, a certain clique of the party running the anti-corruption campaign In one speech on the theme, Trong urged the party to “strengthen supervision of the use of the power of leading cadres, especially the heads, push up internal supervision within the collective leadership; make public the process of power use according to law for cadres and people to supervise.” The purge is designed to enforce the view that no one has absolute power above the party. Anyone who uses the power must serve the…
A palm reading: Japan’s navigation plan for Pacific waters
The triennial meeting of the Japanese Prime Minister with the leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum – referred to as PALM – is normally not much of an attention grabber. But this year’s meeting, which has just concluded in Tokyo, makes it clear that Japan is looking to significantly ramp up its presence in the region. This comes on the back of increased bilateral engagement – think new embassies in Kiribati and Vanuatu – and a reinvigorated QUAD with a focus on resource and burden sharing among the membership of the strategic security partnership (Australia, India, Japan, USA). The joint declaration from this their tenth meeting, known as PALM10, with its associated action plan sets out what we can expect from Japanese engagement with the Pacific over the next three years. The use of the seven pillars of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent as a structure for future engagement is notable. The Blue Pacific concept was developed by Pacific nations as a home-grown framing to address their challenges. Other partners have inserted the term Blue Pacific into announcements and documents. However, this takes the recognition of the Pacific’s own framework to another level. It is particularly significant given that Japan’s former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe coined the term Indo-Pacific, which many in the Pacific islands region have resisted. Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum Baron Waqa (L) and Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida shake hands during the opening session of the 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM10) in Tokyo on July 18, 2024. (AFP) PALM10 sees a move to an “All Japan” approach to working with Pacific partners. Whilst several Japanese agencies are referenced in the outcome documents, the most notable is the prominence of the Japanese Self-Defense Force in future engagement. Japan’s military impacts in the Pacific islands region are well known and loom large in the regional memory. While the PALM10 action plan references the continuation of activities related to World War II, such as retrieval of remains and clearance of unexploded ordnance, new activities will see the Japanese presence in the region take on a markedly military aspect. This will add to what is an already crowded environment in which defense diplomacy has been increasing in recent years. However, Japan’s use of this strategy has been relatively limited until now. The PALM10 action plan refers to increased defense “exchanges” to consist of port calls by Japanese Defense Force aircraft and vessels. This may not be as easy to achieve as Tokyo officials might like. At the same time as PALM10 was in session in Tokyo, Vanuatu’s National Security Advisory Board refused a request for a Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force vessel to dock in Port Vila. The reasons for the refusal remain unclear. Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (C) speaks during the opening session of the 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM10) in Tokyo on July 18, 2024. (AFP) Other examples of increased use of the JSDF are the provision of capacity building to Pacific personnel for participation in peace-keeping operations and inclusion of a Self-Defense Unit in disaster relief teams to be deployed to Pacific island countries at their governments’ request. At the end of the Action Plan are items for “clarification.” Included in the list (of three) for Japan to clarify are two that continue this push for increased defense diplomacy. They are: a proposal to accept Pacific cadets into the National Defense Academy of Japan and to use the Japan Pacific Islands Defence Dialogue to foster “mutual understanding and confidence building.” The JPIDD has met twice, most recently earlier this year. We are now into the Pacific meeting season and in six weeks the 53rd Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting will convene in Nuku’alofa, Tonga. Japan is a longstanding dialogue partner of the forum. The ongoing review of regional architecture includes revisions to how dialogue partners are selected and accommodated. What was discussed and agreed at PALM10 will play a role in determining where at the Blue Pacific table Japan will sit.
North China Bridge Collapse: 11 Dead, Over 30 Missing
Shangluo, Shaanxi Province – A tragic bridge collapse in northern China has resulted in 11 fatalities and left more than 30 individuals unaccounted for, according to state media reports on Saturday. The incident occurred amidst torrential rains that have been battering the region, leading to flash floods. The bridge, spanning a river in Shangluo, Shaanxi Province, succumbed to the sudden downpour and flash floods at approximately 8:40 PM on Friday (1240 GMT), as reported by the state news agency Xinhua, citing the provincial public relations department. State broadcaster CCTV reported that nearly 20 vehicles and more than 30 individuals remain missing after the highway bridge collapsed into the river below. All 11 confirmed victims were recovered from five vehicles that had been pulled from the water. Images broadcast on state television depicted a partially submerged bridge section with the river coursing over it. A witness, identified by his surname Meng, recounted the chaos as he approached the bridge: “Other drivers started yelling at me to brake and stop the car.” Meng observed a truck ahead of him failing to stop and plunging into the river. Chinese President Xi Jinping has called for “all-out efforts” to locate the missing individuals, according to CCTV. Extensive rescue operations are ongoing as authorities strive to mitigate the disaster’s impact. Widespread Flooding and Damage Northern and central China have been subjected to relentless rainfall since Tuesday, causing extensive flooding and significant damage. Shaanxi Province has been particularly hard-hit, with state media reporting at least five deaths and eight individuals missing due to flooding and mudslides in Baoji city. Television footage has shown entire neighborhoods submerged in muddy waters, with residents and excavators working to clear the debris. Extreme Weather Patterns The semi-desert province of Gansu, neighboring Shaanxi, and Henan Province in central China have also experienced severe rainfall this week. In Nanyang city, Henan, the rainfall volume was equivalent to a year’s worth within just a few days, according to CCTV reports. Additionally, in southwestern Sichuan Province, heavy rains have triggered landslides, resulting in two deaths and seven missing individuals as of Friday, reported by Xinhua. China is experiencing a summer marked by extreme weather conditions, with heavy rains affecting the east and south while much of the north faces successive heatwaves. Scientists attribute the increasing frequency and intensity of such extreme weather events to climate change exacerbated by greenhouse gas emissions. In May, a highway collapse in southern China, following days of rain, resulted in 48 fatalities. Earlier this month, a tornado struck a town in eastern China, causing one death, injuring 79, and inflicting substantial damage. Conclusion The devastating bridge collapse in Shaanxi Province highlights the urgent need for enhanced infrastructure resilience and effective emergency response mechanisms in the face of increasingly volatile weather patterns. The ongoing search and rescue efforts underscore the determination to save lives and support affected communities during this challenging time. For further updates, please refer to state media broadcasts and official announcements.
Hun To went after the press; who really won?
ANALYSIS He is the notorious playboy cousin of Cambodia’s prime minister, and has long been viewed as the family’s fixer for all things they would rather not come into public view. Hun To has reportedly been investigated by Australian police for heroin trafficking; faced questions in connection to threats against the family of slain political analyst Kem Ley, which fled to Australia in 2016 and; in recent years, reporting by Al Jazeera and The Australian newspaper has tied him to cyber slavery, scam compounds and drug smuggling. But in bringing lawsuits against those news organizations, he inadvertently highlighted how Australia – a key regional partner for Cambodia – is running out of patience for the Hun dynasty’s antics. Earlier this month, Hun To scored an apparent victory after he secured an out-of-court settlement over a years-long dispute with The Australian. The outlet agreed to retract a 2-year-old story it had published about Hun To that “some readers may have understood” to have alleged that he “was linked to human trafficking, cyber scams and drug importation,” the paper wrote. “The Australian did not intend to make any such allegations against Mr Hun and accepts his denials of such conduct.” The retraction marked the conclusion of a defamation case Hun To had brought against The Australian in December 2022. It came just after the Australian government had declined to renew his visa, RFA has learned – even though he had spent decades living part-time in the country and he and his family owned extensive business and property interests around Melbourne. While Canberra gave no reason for its decision, Hun To’s lawyers insisted in court complaints seen by RFA that the rejection was spurred by news stories from The Australian and Al Jazeera linking him to organized crime, fraud factories and human trafficking in his native Cambodia. A case launched in parallel by Hun To against Al Jazeera is ongoing. The Qatari state-funded outlet did not respond to a request for comment. Australian libel law is notoriously plaintiff-friendly, particularly in cases where the defendant is a news organization. This growing reputation led the author of a 2019 New York Times op-ed to dub the island nation “the defamation capital of the world.” In Australian defamation cases, the burden of proof uniquely rests with the defendants. No other type of case places such burden on the party being sued. In such a legal environment, defendants run higher risks of losing and incurring hefty damages, and that has often encouraged news organizations to settle out of court. The retraction might have gone little noticed until Hun To’s lawyer, Adam Lopez – who has been known for taking on controversial defamation cases – took to LinkedIn to gloat about his victory. The dispute with The Australian had been “resolved on a confidential basis,” he noted, suggesting that the newspaper had made further concessions beyond the retraction. Cambodia press and social media users quickly picked up the story, with some simply reporting on the retraction and others criticizing The Australian or the Australian court system. With the scrubbing of the controversial story, Hun To enjoyed precisely one day of victory. On July 10, news broke suggesting Hun To’s business interests were neck deep in exactly the type of allegations for which The Australian had just apologized. Elliptic, a financial compliance firm specializing in tracing cryptocurrencies, published a report alleging that a “Cambodian conglomerate with links to Cambodia’s ruling Hun family” had laundered more than US$11 billion for cyber scammers. The name of the company was Huione Pay, and Hun To is one of its three directors. A subsequent report by Reuters found evidence that Huione Pay had processed cryptocurrency worth $150,000 that had been stolen by the sanctioned North Korean hacking collective known as Lazarus. In response to the allegations, National Bank of Cambodia, the country’s central bank, told Reuters that it “would not hesitate to impose any corrective measures” on Huione, although it said so “without saying if such action was planned,” the news agency drily noted. Following the revelations, digital finance company Tether announced that it had frozen $29 million of cryptocurrency held by Huione following a “a direct request from law enforcement.” Whether the latest news make Hun To reconsider going after the press, however, seems unlikely, said Phil Robertson, director of Asia Human Rights and Labor Advocates. Hun To “would be wise to abandon his case since all the dirt has come out on Huione, but he won’t because he’s a shameless, arrogant, rights-abusing tycoon who believes that whatever he does, the ruling Hun family will have his back.” Neither Huione’s nor Hun To’s lawyer had responded to requests for comment as of publication. These allegations are far from the first time Hun To has caught negative publicity. Australian MP Julian Hill spoke in Parliament last March arguing that Hun To and other politically connected Cambodian figures “should never again be granted visas to visit Australia.” His speech charted Hun To’s long and checkered links to Australia, noting that as early as 2003 Australian police had sought to arrest him on suspicion of heroin trafficking. Since then, Hun To and his wife acquired millions of dollars’ worth of property in Australia, Hill added, “with seemingly no legitimate explanation for where their wealth has come from.” “It’s no secret that Hun To has his finger in lots of pies — drug trafficking, illegal deforestation, animal trafficking, illegal gambling,” Hill said. “Most recently, we’ve heard reports he’s dipping his toes into human trafficking, as well. That’s diversifying, isn’t it?”
