Category: East Asia
Has China not launched a war since 1949?
A claim emerged in Chinese-language social media posts that China has not launched a war since 1949. But the claim is misleading as it is a one-sided historical interpretation. A review of events shows that China has been involved in several major conflicts since 1949, and there are different views about how much of a role it played in starting them. The claim was shared on X, formerly known as Twitter, on Aug. 24, 2024. “While the U.S. has launched 469 conflicts since 1789, China has launched none since 1949,” the claim reads in part. Multiple Chinese accounts on X have reposted an infographic comparing the number of wars initiated by the U.S. and China. (Screenshots/X) The claim has also been shared by several Chinese diplomats on X. Even Chinese President Xi Jinping said during a telephone call with U.S. President Joe Biden in 2021 that his country had not started a conflict since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Several Chinese diplomats also reposted the image and further spread on the narrative of the U.S. as a warhawk (Screenshots/X) But the claim is misleading as it is a one-sided historical interpretation. A review of historical events shows that China has been involved in several major conflicts since 1949 and there are different views about how much of a role Beijing played in starting them. Below is what AFCL found. The Sino-Indian War The month-long Sino-Indian War of 1962 was a conflict rooted in disputes with India over China’s attempts to build a military road linking its Xinjiang region with Tibet after China occupied the Tibet area in 1950, according to Encyclopædia Britannica, the world’s oldest continuously published encyclopedia. The road was scheduled to pass through Aksai Chin, an area that overlaps parts of Tibet and Xinjiang but is also claimed by India as part of its northern Ladakh region. The war was preceded by intermittent skirmishes beginning in 1959, which culminated in an attack by Chinese forces against the region on Oct. 20, 1962. But some scholars, including Wang Hongwei, a Chinese academic expert on South Asia, said that the campaign originated from an arbitrary border demarcation by India’s government in 1961. Wang listed the advance of India’s army into territory that China claimed, attacks on Chinese posts, the killing of Chinese border guards and a 1962 Indian order for its forces to expel the Chinese from the North-East Border Special Region as evidence that the war was imposed on China. China has officially described the conflict as a war of self-defense ever since. The Sino-Vietnamese War Internationally known as the Sino-Vietnamese War, the conflict that broke out when 220,000 Chinese soldiers struck along the 800-mile border with Vietnam early on Feb. 17, 1979. While at the time both neighbors had communist political systems, Vietnam’s decision to sign a mutual defense pact with the Soviet Union in 1978 provoked the ire of many Chinese leaders, given that at the time Beijing and Moscow were struggling for leadership of the global communist movement. This tension was later exacerbated by Vietnam’s invasion of neighboring Cambodia at the end of 1978 and the overthrow of the Beijing-backed Khmer Rouge government, an event that served as the catalyst for the conflict between Beijing and Hanoi. The conflict has been called an aggressive war launched by China by scholars such as Miles Yu, the director of the Hudson Institute’s China Center, who emphasized that the conflict is portrayed completely differently in Vietnam and in China. Vietnam portrays the conflict as a struggle against Chinese expansion, while China frames it as a war of self-defense. In line with this interpretation, a Chinese government webpage commemorating soldiers killed in the conflict, lists several actions by Vietnam in the mid-1970s – implementing discriminatory policies against Chinese minorities in Vietnam and conducting provocative border raids in which several Chinese citizens were wounded – as evidence that Vietnam came to view China as an enemy and gradually adopted a warlike posture towards it. However, Hsiao-Huang Shu, a scholar of Chinese military tactics at Taiwan’s Tamkang University, told AFCL that while the official Chinese government position paints the war as a punitive conflict rather than as an “invasion,” the war was clearly initiated by China. Sino-Soviet border clashes In March 1969, Chinese and Soviet forces engaged in a series of clashes on an island called Zhenbao on a border river. Subsequent border skirmishes in the months following the conflict resulted in an unknown number of casualties. In order to end the dispute, Moscow adopted a carrot-and-stick approach, proposing negotiations on the border dispute while at the same time threatening military action if Beijing did not cooperate. The Soviet Union said that an initial ambush by Chinese army units of Soviet border guards on March 2 was followed by a larger clash on March 15. However, an article published by China’s state-run CCP Review said that the initial skirmish broke out when a Chinese patrol was obstructed and later shot at by Soviet troops. But according to the noted historian of Sino-Soviet relations, Li Danhui, Chinese soldiers initially stabbed and fired upon a Soviet patrol on the day fighting broke out. He cited statements by Chen Xilian, the Chinese commander at Zhenbao, as evidence. Michael S. Gerson, a former analyst at the U.S. Center for Naval Analyses, published a study of the incident, saying that territorial disputes over the strategically unimportant island largely arose as a byproduct of the larger Sino-Soviet ideological split in the 1960s. As part of the split, China said that the Soviet Union’s control of the island was a direct result of unequal treaties China had been coerced to sign, while the Soviet Union argued that China had no legal claim to the island. ‘Illogical comparison’ Michael Szonyi, a professor of Chinese history at Harvard University, told AFCL that while the U.S. has been involved in several wars around the world, the notion that China had “never started a war” was “absurd,”…
Satellite photos show expansion of suspected North Korean uranium enrichment site
A suspected North Korean uranium enrichment facility that may have been toured by leader Kim Jong Un recently has grown significantly since construction was first spotted there in February, satellite imagery has revealed.
Vietnam coast guard holds rare live fire exercise
Vietnam’s coast guard has held a rare live fire exercise to test responses to security threats, in an area off its central coast on the South China Sea. The Sept. 5-11 exercise was conducted by the Vietnam Coast Guard Region 3, in the waters off Binh Thuan province, the force said in a press release. Coast Guard Region 3 with headquarters in Ba Ria-Vung Tau province is one of Vietnam’s four coast guard zones, responsible for safeguarding its claims in the South China Sea as tensions are rising in the regional waterway. The tactical training and live five exercise – aimed at boosting combat readiness – is “one of the top priorities” of the coast guard, Col. Nguyen Minh Khanh, Region 3’s deputy commander, was quoted as saying. Coast guard personnel were responding to multiple scenarios such as “threats to sovereignty and security,” illegal incursions into Vietnam’s waters by foreign vessels, piracy and search-and-rescue and disaster relief. Vietnam coast guard personnel during live fire exercises Sept. 5-11, 2024. (Vietnam Coast Guard) Photographs and video clips released by the coast guard show troops, equipped with artillery, anti-aircraft guns and rocket launchers, shooting at airborne targets as well as firing water cannons and warning off foreign ships. “They have accomplished all the tasks with excellence,” Col. Khanh said. Vietnam rarely publicizes such activities despite having invested heavily in developing its coast guard in recent years. RELATED STORIES Philippine coast guard ship leaves disputed shoal in South China Sea Vietnam, Philippines to sign defense cooperation agreement Vietnam’s coast guard to hold first drills with Philippines The U.S. coast guard is reportedly planning to transfer the last of three Hamilton-class cutters to Vietnam in the near future. Maritime security is a defense priority for Vietnam, one of six parties that claim parts of the South China Sea, along with China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan. Vietnam coast guard personnel during live fire exercises Sept. 5-11, 2024. (Vietnam Coast Guard) China, however, holds the most expansive claim and its authorities have become more aggressive against neighboring countries in disputed waters. This month, coast guard vessels from Vietnam and the Philippines took part in their first joint drills off Manila but they limited their activity to firefighting and search-and-rescue as Vietnam is careful not to be seen as siding militarily with any country. The Philippines and China have this year been in a tense standoff over disputed features in the South China Sea. The Philippines last week recalled a coast guard vessel from the disputed Sabina Shoal but officials pledged never to “abandon our sovereign rights over these waters.” Edited by Mike Firn. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika
Shortages in Myanmar lead to ‘socialist-era’ economy
Read RFA coverage of these stories in Burmese. The queue for cooking oil stretches down a Yangon street. Householders turn up before dawn to fill a plastic bottle at a subsidized rate in Myanmar’s commercial capital – the latest evidence of a tanking economy. “If you can come early, you will get your quota early. If you are late, you might end up with nothing … and have to start all over again the next day,” Daw Htoo, whose real name was changed in order to protect her identity, told RFA Burmese. “You have to wait for your turn for about two and a half hours everyday,” she said of the palm oil, which costs 20% less than the price of peanut oil sold outside government-subsidized shops. “Some have been waiting since 5 a.m.” Daw Myint, a resident of Yangon’s Thaketa township in her 70s, told RFA that with the price of peanut oil now more than 20,000 kyats (US$4) per viss, which is equal to about 1.7 kilograms or 3.5 pounds, “we simply can’t afford to use it anymore.” In a country wracked by conflict since the military takeover three-and-a-half years ago, basic products are becoming more scarce. People wait in line to purchase palm oil, Sept. 4, 2024 in Yangon. (RFA) Also, import restrictions are impeding the supply of basic medicines, deepening a humanitarian crisis. “It’s like we’re going back in time to when you had to line up for everything,” said a Yangon businessman who requested anonymity to avoid trouble with authorities. “Palm oil isn’t a rare product … This commodity is abundant and sold competitively around the world, but it’s being rationed in Myanmar.” Older residents say it reminds them of life under a previous military regime, led by Ne Win, when Myanmar followed a socialist political model. Under the system, all major industries were nationalized, including import-export trade, leading to price controls and the expansion of the black market to account for as much as 80% of the national economy. RELATED STORIES Red Cross chief calls for greater aid access after visit to Myanmar Political instability since coup prompts foreign investment exit from Myanmar Pumps run dry in Myanmar as forex crisis pushes up prices In late July, junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing announced that the country’s current situation is “most suited to socialist-era cooperative systems,” implying that, with Myanmar’s economy in freefall, the population should prepare to make sacrifices. One such sacrifice is cooking oil, according to residents and business owners in the country’s largest city Yangon. Major inconvenience Amid the conflict that has engulfed Myanmar since the military’s February 2021 coup d’etat, local production of vegetable oils from peanuts, sunflower seeds and sesame has dwindled or ceased entirely, forcing consumers to rely on imported palm oil to prepare their meals. But the junta has put restrictions on the hard currency needed to import palm oil, creating a shortage and a price jump in local markets. Yangon residents told RFA Burmese that the price of one viss container of palm oil now costs 16,000 kyats (US$3.20) – up from 8,000 kyats in January and 6,500 kyats in December 2023. Meanwhile, the value of the kyat has dropped from 3,500 kyats to 5,600 kyats per U.S. dollar over the same period. Early this month, a ration system went into effect, through which residents can purchase a maximum of half a viss each day at the subsidized price. An elderly woman buys palm oil Sept. 4, 2024. (RFA) An elderly woman in Yangon’s Lanmadaw township told RFA that the ration system is a major inconvenience. “If we were able to buy one viss at a time, we would only need to line up once a week,” said the woman who, like others interviewed for this report, spoke on condition of anonymity due to security concerns. A restaurant owner in Yangon’s North Dagon township told RFA that she has had to buy palm oil from the local market to supplement what she can buy through the junta’s ration system, because half a viss is not enough to meet her business’s daily needs. “Not only does it take time for us to buy palm oil [under the ration plan], but we can only buy a half viss at a time, which is only enough to cook five portions of rice,” she said. Attempts by RFA to contact the office of the junta’s Department of Consumer Affairs in Yangon for further clarification about the palm oil ration plan went unanswered. ‘Life-threatening’ Meanwhile, it has become increasingly difficult for people displaced by conflict to access essential medical supplies due to the junta’s restrictions on medical imports and a national shortage, According to aid workers and those who have fled fighting, the demand for medicine is particularly acute among those displaced by conflict in Sagaing region, Chin state, Kachin state, northern Shan state, Magway region and Rakhine state. “We are dealing with cases of seasonal flu and diarrhea here – it’s definitely a life-threatening situation,” said a displaced person from Chin state’s Kanpetlet township. “Access to medicine would be helpful, but it’s simply not available. The biggest challenge is the inability to purchase the necessary medication.” A pharmacy in Yangon, Myanmar, Jan. 12, 2008. (Patrik M. Loeff via Flickr) Aid workers said that the transportation of medicine to Chin state, where approximately 250,000 war displaced are located, has become difficult due to road blockades imposed by the junta. “The main issue is that the junta shuts down the roads whenever fighting intensifies, making transportation extremely difficult,” said one person assisting the displaced. “Pharmacy owners … are required to submit a list of their products to the junta’s General Administration Department and under these conditions, they are reluctant to sell openly. Everything is operating in secrecy right now.” According to a July 1 statement from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, more than 3 million people are internally displaced across Myanmar due to ongoing military…
An overdue farewell to Southeast Asia’s pro-democracy icons
A decade ago, Southeast Asia seemed poised for democratic transformation, spearheaded by three icons: Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi, Cambodia’s Sam Rainsy and Malaysia’s Anwar Ibrahim. Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy was on the cusp of a historic election victory, potentially gaining entry into government for the first time in the army-run nation. Sam Rainsy’s Cambodia National Rescue Party had narrowly lost to the ruling party in the 2013 elections, but momentum hinted at a possible win at the next ballot. Meanwhile, Anwar’s People’s Pact coalition won the popular vote in Malaysia’s 2013 elections, marking the start of a new political era. During a late 2013 visit, Sam Rainsy suggested in a meeting with his fellow pro-democracy icons that they should “work together to promote democracy in our region.” Fast forward to today, and all three have either fallen from power or seen their legacies tarnished—and the region’s democratic transformation now seems more distant than ever. Cambodian exiled political opponent and leader of the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), Sam Rainsy, in Paris, on July 27, 2023. (Joel Saget/AFP) Suu Kyi, ousted in early 2021, saw her international reputation go up in smoke for her defense of the military’s genocide against her country’s Muslim Rohingya minority. Sam Rainsy went into exile in 2015 and his party dissolved two years later as the ruling Cambodian People’s Party tightened its authoritarian chokehold. Rainsy now writes financial updates with little hope of returning to Cambodia. Anwar became Malaysia’s prime minister in 2022 but has abandoned his once-professed liberal, secular ideals. His government has launched “lawfare” campaigns against opponents. In August, Malaysian prosecutors charged Muhyiddin Yassin, the leader of the opposition, with sedition for complaining that the king hadn’t asked him to form a government last year. Anwar’s pluralist appeal has gone out of the window. He’s unpopular with Malays, he has defended a deputy prime minister accused of corruption, his speeches are flecked with anti-Semitism and anti-Western vitriol, and he has drawn Malaysia closer to China and Russia. Anwar visited Moscow this month and now declares support for China’s “reunification” of Taiwan. “Anwar had been a favorite of Western reporters and officials, heralded as a man who could liberalize Malaysian politics,” the Economist recently wrote. Since taking power, he has been “a very different kind of leader.” A milder form of tyranny One shouldn’t mourn the passing of Southeast Asia’s icons, the disappearance of a handful of individuals who were supposed to drag the region by their own sweat and sacrifice into a freer future. There was too much focus on personalities rather than policies; too much about a single person’s fate to become premier and not on the people they were supposedly fighting for. Suu Kyi was the National League for Democracy; she was destined to save Myanmar because her father had done the same when Burma emerged from British colonial rule in the 1940s. Even before Sam Rainsy’s party was dissolved, it had become cleaved between the factions loyal to him and another leader. They, too, saw themselves as the embodiments of salvation for an entire country. Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi in Oslo on June 15, 2012. (Markus Schreiber/AP) As Suu Kyi and Anwar showed, you sacrifice your entire life in exile, imprisonment, scorn and harassment, and once you finally attain power, you believe you damn well need to stay there, whatever it costs. After all, losing power means a return to tyranny and the bad old times—so a milder form of tyranny is justifiable to prevent that. Southeast Asia isn’t unique; the worst leaders are those who have taken a long walk to power. Seldom does a revolutionary not become a counter-revolutionary. Rarely does the liberal in opposition remain a liberal in power. Suu Kyi gambled – badly – that publicly defending the military’s genocidal actions against the Rohingya was the price worth paying to prevent a military coup. She should sacrifice up the few for the apparent benefit of the majority, she reasoned. The end of idolatry should allow Southeast Asian democrats to focus on strengthening political institutions rather than idolizing individuals. A new example in Thailand The region should look at what’s happening in Thailand. Unique in Southeast Asia, Thailand’s progressive movement has created a pro-democracy “archetype”— someone young, Western-educated, good-looking, conversant in English, ideally with a business background, and very social media savvy. Pita Limjaroenrat, who employed this archetype to make his Move Forward Party the country’s largest at last year’s elections, was more of a character than an icon. Pita played this role with Move Forward, but it was the same character that Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit played before him with the Future Forward party, Move Forward’s predecessor party, and that Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut now plays as leader of People’s Party, the successor to Move Forward. This is a clever tactic. If the leader is disbarred from politics, as Thanathorn and Pita were, then someone else can easily assume the role, as Natthaphong has done. If the party is dissolved, as Future Forward and Move Forward were, you make a new one led by the same character with the same script. This prevents a party from being consumed by one person – à la Suu Kyi. It turns the dissolution of a party into an inconvenience, instead of the death knell of an entire movement, as was the case with Sam Rainsy and the Cambodia National Rescue Party. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in Berlin, Germany, March 11, 2024. (Liesa Johannssen/Reuters) It means that if the leader wins power, he knows he is there because of the script he has been given, not the one he’s written. The rest of Southeast Asia would be better off developing their own archetypes, not waiting for the next icons to appear. Neither is the end of Southeast Asia’s pro-democracy icons a bad thing for the West, which was too quick in the 1990s and 2000s to put its faith in a few personalities being able to drive…
Philippine coast guard ship leaves disputed shoal in South China Sea
UPDATED AT 5:30 ET on Sept. 15, 2024 The Philippines has withdrawn a coast guard vessel at the center of a standoff with China at a disputed shoal in the South China Sea, saying it had played a crucial role in “countering illegal activities” but had to return to port because of bad weather, low supplies and the need to get medical care for some of those on board. The Sabina Shoal, about 140 km (85 miles) west of Palawan island, is claimed by both countries but is entirely within the Philippine exclusive economic zone, or EEZ, where the Philippines holds rights to explore for natural resources. The five-month standoff with China at the shoal resulted in several collisions between Philippine and Chinese vessels, especially during Philippine resupply missions to its ship, the BRP Teresa Magbanua, raising fears of a more serious conflict between the Philippines, a close U.S. ally, and an increasingly assertive China. “Their steadfast presence has played a crucial role in countering illegal activities that threaten our marine environment and thwarting attempts by other state actors to engage in surreptitious reclamation in the area,” the Philippine coast guard said in a statement, referring to the officers and men on board the ship. Ship tracking specialists earlier told Radio Free Asia the 2,200-ton coast guard flagship left the hotly disputed shoal, known in the Philippines as Escoda, at around 1 p.m. on Friday. Data provided by the website MarineTraffic, which uses automatic identification system (AIS) signals to track ships, show that the BRP Teresa Magbanua (MRRV-9701) was back in the Sulu Sea near the Philippines’ Balabac island, about 200 km (125 miles) to the south of the shoal. There was no immediate comment from China on the ship’s withdrawal from the shoal. The BRP Teresa Magbanua is one of the largest and most modern vessels of the Philippine coast guard. It was deployed to Sabina Shoal in April to monitor what the Philippines fears is a Chinese plan to reclaim land there, as China has done elsewhere in the South China Sea. Philippine officials insisted that the vessel could remain there for as long as necessary but China denounced what it saw as the “illegal grounding” of the BRP Teresa Magbanua and deployed a large number of ships there to keep watch. The Philippines denied that the vessel had been grounded. Beijing feared that by maintaining the vessel’s semi-permanent presence at the shoal, Manila aimed to establish de-facto control over it, similar to what it has done at the Second Thomas Shoal, where an old Philippine warship, BRP Sierra Madre, was deliberately run aground to serve as an outpost. For its part, the Philippines is worried that without the presence of its authorities, Chinese ships will swarm the area and effectively take control of it, as happened at Scarborough Shoal – another disputed South China Sea feature – where China has had control since 2012. Sabina Shoal is close to an area believed to be rich in oil and gas, and also served as the main staging ground for resupply missions to the Sierra Madre at the Second Thomas Shoal. Lower the tension The Philippine coast guard said in its statement on Sunday that it was “firmly committed and determined in protecting the Philippines’ sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the West Philippine Sea, including in Escoda Shoal.” But Ray Powell, director of the U.S.-based SeaLight project at Stanford University, said China was likely to deploy to the area as it did at the Scarborough Shoal. “The parallels are unavoidable,” said Powell, who monitors developments in the South China Sea. “China is also likely to declare victory – hard to avoid that conclusion,” added the maritime security analyst. The withdrawal comes days after Philippine Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Maria Theresa P. Lazaro met China’s Vice Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong to discuss the situation at the shoal. The Chinese side reportedly urged the Philippines to immediately withdraw its vessels while “Lazaro reaffirmed the consistent position of the Philippines and explored ways to lower the tension in the area,” the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs said in a statement after the Sept. 12 talks. The Philippine coast guard made no mention of the talks in its statement. Philippine analyst Chester Cabalza, president of the International Development and Security Cooperation think tank, described the withdrawal of the ship as “anti-climactic,” adding that he thought both sides should withdraw from the vicinity of the shoal, which is in an important sea lane. Cabalza said if the Philippines and China had reached any agreement in their Sept. 12 consultation, that would become evident in the absence of any “swarming of Chinese armada” at the shoal. “The ball is with China now,” the analyst told RFA’s affiliate BenarNews. RELATED STORIES China, Philippines trade blame over ‘ramming’ at disputed shoal https://www.rfa.org/english/news/southchinasea/china-philippines-ramming-sabina-08312024064753.html China releases report to fortify claim over disputed shoal in South China Sea https://www.rfa.org/english/news/southchinasea/china-sabina-shoal-report-08302024043714.html Philippines, China clash near disputed shoal in South China Sea https://www.rfa.org/english/news/southchinasea/china-philippines-shoal-clash-08262024023722.html *Jason Guterriez in Manila contributed to this report.” Editing by RFA Staff This story has been updated to include comment from the Philippine coast guard. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika
EXCLUSIVE: Dissident Chinese journalist works on her next book from exile in Thailand
Read this interview in Mandarin. At the far end of a quiet garden courtyard in Chiang Mai, home to a small “village” of exiled Chinese writers and intellectuals, is a communal study room with books lining the walls. Veteran investigative journalist Dai Qing, 83, once one of the Chinese Communist Party’s most influential critics, is often there, reading and writing as she enjoys a quiet life of contemplation in Thailand — as well as working on her forthcoming book, “Notes on History.” Dai, a former reporter for the party’s Guangming Daily, was an early and prominent critic of China’s flagship Three Gorges Dam project, publishing a book Yangtze! Yangtze! arguing against the move. She also served time in Beijing’s notorious Qincheng Prison for supporting the students during the 1989 pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square. Now part of a community of exiled Chinese writers and researchers in the northern Thai resort town, Dai spoke to RFA Mandarin — after her daily swim — about what led her there: RFA: Why Chiang Mai? Dai Qing: I should say that Chiang Mai wasn’t actually my choice. I’ve always lived in big cities, ever since I was a child. When they asked me where I was from, I said I was Chinese. For example, I was born in the wartime capital Chongqing, and later I worked in a Beijing high school. I have always been in big cities. I really don’t like big cities, I don’t like the bustle and prosperity — I like the quiet: trees and grass, blue sky and white clouds. When we set up this courtyard, it was as a small community of friends. We all shared the same values and common hobbies, like reading. We set up a research center and invited people from foreign universities with an interest in China to come. We have so many people here who can talk to them, share our experiences, and they can stay here too. RFA: How many homes are here? Dai Qing: Today, there are 31 houses that were designed by [independent writer] Ye Fu. Many of the people here are his friends, and they just sort of came here. It costs less than one-fifth of the price of a place in Beijing, right? But they don’t all live here. Some are rented out. Who do they rent to? That’s another question. People who are dissatisfied with the Chinese education system, who want to bring their children here to study and enroll in the British education system. We rent houses to them. There are several families like that. You can see that the most lively ones are full of kids. Dissident journalist Dai Qing swims near her home in Chiang Mai, Thailand, Sept. 2024. (RFA) RFA: Did they come before or after the COVID years? Dai Qing: Some came before and some came after, so there are basically two groups. The first group is people who are dissatisfied with China’s education system and come here to have their children attend school. The second group is Ye Fu, Tang Yun, and Wang Ji, all people who have suffered political discrimination and oppression in China and can’t go back. RFA: So you came here because you were dissatisfied with Chinese politics? Dai Qing: It’s not that simple. It’s just that … before Hu Yaobang’s death in 1989, civil society in China hadn’t achieved a modern transformation, but it was actually much more relaxed than it is now. We could do a lot of things. Then Hu Yaobang died, and 58 days later, the crackdown continued, until it became what it is today. RFA: What happened to you in 1989? Dai Qing: Well, I was a journalist, so of course I was in contact with people from all walks of life. I told [1989 student leader] Chai Ling, do you think that just because you’re a good student of Chairman Mao that you can gather a bunch of heroes just by raising your arms, and be a leader? That’s not how things are. I kept telling them that they kept resisting and calling for democracy and demanding concessions even though the leaders had already made concessions. I told them it wasn’t right. I was trying to bring about peace, and they wound up putting me in Qincheng. RFA: When you left China, did the police warn you not to give interviews, or make other demands? Dai Qing: The police actually let me leave in 2023 because I had so many friends and relatives in the United States, and I wanted to go visit them now that my daughter had retired. She retired on her 55th birthday in 2023. I felt that I was in the later stages of my life, and I made an agreement with them that I wouldn’t give interviews or take part in activism, and they let me leave. Then, when I went to various universities, everyone wanted to talk to me, but it had to be in closed-door meetings. Participants weren’t allowed to record audio or take photos or video with their phones. No one was allowed to publicize it. When I got back to Hong Kong and then to Beijing, the police were very happy. As far as they were concerned, I’d stuck to the deal. Later I asked … their boss who came to visit me whether he knew what I’d done back in the 1980s. He said they hadn’t bothered to research it. But they know now. RFA: How are you getting along here in Chiang Mai? Dai Qing: Actually it’s a question of “three noes and two don’ts” – that’s the way I describe my situation right now. I have no pension, no social security and no medical insurance, which is the “three noes” part. The “two don’ts” are: don’t get sick, and don’t hire help. I do all of the housework myself. RFA: Do you still follow what’s going on back in China, culturally, economically and politically? Dai Qing: Not so much. I…
Beijing is Training 3,000 Foreign Police Officers : The Hidden Agenda
China plans to train 3,000 foreign police officers, raising concerns over its global security ambitions and potential influence on law enforcement practices abroad.
Civilians killed as Myanmar rebels attack junta forces in the north
Read RFA coverage of this story in Burmese. Thousands of people have fled from fighting between ethnic minority guerrillas and Myanmar junta troops that entered a fifth day on Thursday, and at least 10 civilians have been killed, residents told Radio Free Asia. The autonomy-seeking Kachin Independence Army, or KIA, and allied militias loyal to a shadow civilian administration, have made significant gains in Myanmar’s northernmost Kachin state since launching an offensive in March. The insurgents have forced junta troops in the resource-rich region on the border with China into dwindling areas of control, mirroring setbacks elsewhere in Myanmar for the military that seized power in a 2021 coup. A resident of Hpakant township, a major jade-producing region, said at least 10 civilians were killed in crossfire between insurgents and the military in Hseng Taung village since the anti-junta forces surrounded it and launched an attack on Sunday. “People died after being hit by both heavy and small weapons. There are a lot of wounded,” said the resident who declined to be identified for safety reasons. “Many, many houses have been destroyed. Bullets were raining down.” Junta airstikes also sparked major fires in the town, witnesses said. Most of those killed were men, he said, adding that a peace activist named Yup Zau Hkawng, who was wounded in shelling on Monday. By Thursday, the KIA-led attackers had seized and burned down the Hseng Taung police station, sources close to an anti-junta People’s Defense Force, or PDF, allied with the KIA told RFA. RFA telephoned Kachin state’s junta spokesperson, Moe Min Thein, for comment but he did not respond by the time of publication and a telecommunications outage in the area made it difficult to check accounts of the fighting. About 60 soldiers were at the police station when the attack was launched, said another resident, who also asked to remain anonymous. “The Hseng Taung police station was captured but fighting has been going on after they set it on fire,” he said. “Some junta soldiers are dead, others were caught alive, and the rest were able to flee.” KIA fighters had sealed off all roads in and out of the village, said the KIA spokesman, Col. Naw Bu. Residents said about 10,000 people had fled from the village over the five days of fighting, many seeking refuge in Nam Hmaw, Hseng Awng and Hpakant towns. The KIA and allied forces control most roads in and out of Hpakant town and have captured all but five junta bases in the township, anti-junta forces say. RELATED STORIES Red Cross chief calls for greater aid access after visit to Myanmar Myanmar rebels capture last junta base in township on Chinese border China fires into Myanmar after junta airstrike on border, group says Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika
Floods swamp Myanmar’s capital, stranding thousands in typhoon’s aftermath
Floodwaters as high as five meters (15 feet) submerged parts of Myanmar’s capital Naypyidaw on Wednesday, sweeping away houses and trapping thousands of residents, as the remains of Typhoon Yagi swept inland and dumped rain after battering Vietnam over the weekend. After torrential rains that started Monday, water levels rose to the roofs of hundreds homes in villages around the capital, where the military junta’s top officers live. Some people were stranded on their rooftops. “Floods have swept away some houses,” a resident of Tatkon township told Radio Free Asia. “We remain trapped in the village. We cannot go anywhere. We have called rescue teams, but no one has come.” In Vietnam, the number of people killed or missing from Typhoon Yagi and related natural disasters rose to 292 people, including 152 confirmed deaths, according to Vietnam’s Disaster and Dike Management Authority. The storm – the biggest this year to hit Southeast Asia – battered northern Vietnam and southeastern China on Saturday, causing landslides and a bridge collapse northwest of Hanoi that was captured in dramatic dashcam footage. Brimming rivers Heavy rainfall over the last several days has dumped water into already brimming rivers in Vietnam, Laos and elsewhere. In Laos, the Mekong River Commission issued a flood warning for Luang Prabang, a popular tourist destination that sits at the confluence of the Mekong River and a major tributary, the Nam Khan. More rain was forecast for Thursday in Luang Prabang and on Friday and Saturday in the capital, Vientiane. The Mekong River Commission on Wednesday warned of flooding in northeastern Cambodia as water makes its way downriver from overflowing dams in Laos. In Myanmar’s northern Shan state, towns have also been affected by rising waters that have left people without electricity or phone service. Further south in Kayin state, the Thaungyin River burst its banks in the important border town of Myawaddy on Tuesday, according to a rescue worker who spoke to RFA on condition of anonymity for security reasons. Several residential areas were quickly flooded, and people have since taken shelter at monasteries and schools, he said. About 5,000 have been affected by the flood. “The water level is rising faster and stronger than before in Myawaddy township,” the rescue worker said. “The flood has reached to rooftops in lowland areas.” More flooding is likely to take place in southern Myanmar’s delta region as water makes its way downriver on the Ayeyarwady river, according to meteorologist Win Naing. RFA wasn’t able to contact the junta’s Department of Disaster Management to ask about the status of rescue operations throughout the country. Hanoi evacuations Flooding in the streets of Hanoi prompted the evacuation of thousands of residents near the Red River on Wednesday. In Vietnam’s northern industrial zones, some factories have been forced to close and may not reopen for several weeks, according to Reuters, which cited business executives. Many factories in Quang Ninh and Hai Phong are without power and water, Bruno Jaspaert, CEO of industrial parks in Hai Phong, told Reuters. Several Samsung and Foxconn factories in Thai Nguyen and Bac Giang are also facing the risk of flooding due to rising floodwaters, according to Reuters. Flooding in some areas of northern Vietnam was also being affected by the release of water from a hydropower plant along China’s section of the Lo River, which is a tributary of the Red River. The Vietnamese government said it has asked Beijing to reduce the discharge. Translated by Aung Naing, Anna Vu and Sum Sok Ry. Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster. RFA Vietnamese and RFA Khmer contributed to this report. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika