ASEAN Archives - Page 22 of 139 - Investigative Journalism Reportika

Laos, Thailand mark first direct passenger train between Bangkok, Vientiane

Editor6 months ago03 mins

The first direct passenger train between Bangkok and Vientiane arrived earlier this month. Previously, passengers could ride from Bangkok to the Thai city of Nongkhai on the border with Laos. But now they can travel straight into Vientiane – and also have the option of transferring to the high-speed rail line that travels north to Kunming in southwest China. The first State Railway of Thailand train began servicing the route on July 19. A return train on July 20 left Vientiane at about 6:25 p.m. and arrived in Bangkok at about 7:35 a.m. the next day. Prices ranged from between 158,000 kip (US$7) to 560 million (US$24) kip. It was so popular that officials added an additional carriage after passengers bought most of the available tickets. “I always commuted by train when I was studying,” one Lao passenger told Radio Free Asia. “I wanted my kids to take this train, so they could experience it.” Eventually, passengers could travel from Bangkok and Vientiane on a high-speed rail line. Earlier this year, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told Thailand’s prime minister that he hopes to speed up construction of a high-speed rail line in Thailand that would connect with Laos’ high speed line, which China built in 2021 as part of its Belt & Road Initiative. China has said that it plans to construct and connect a 3,000-kms (1,864-miles) pan-Asian railway network, in which Chinese rail lines would extend all the way to the tip of the Malay Peninsula, linking Beijing to Singapore. Edited by Matt Reed.

Another day, another fraud case in Vietnam

Editor6 months ago012 mins

The week that Vietnam was in an official state of mourning for Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, whose tenure was centered on a “Blazing Furnace” anti-corruption campaign that toppled dozens of top officials, another big corporate fraud trial began in a Hanoi court. While its scale and scope pale in comparison to the Van Thinh Phat scandal orchestrated by businesswoman Truong My Lan, who was convicted and sentenced to death in April 2024, the FLC (Finance, Land, and Commerce) scandal is garnering significant media attention. Trinh Van Quyet, was a young, brash, high-flying tycoon, and briefly in 2021, the country’s wealthiest person. Established in 2010, his property company, FLC, quickly grew into a sprawling conglomerate with some 17 subsidiaries and affiliated companies in real estate, resorts and golf courses, as well as Bamboo Airways, once the second largest privately-owned airline in the country. Quyet, 49, was arrested in March 2022 along with his two sisters for stock market manipulation, appropriation of property, and fraud. Authorities arrested 47 other people, including FLC executives and several regulators. In all, 15 relatives are on trial. At least one other FLC executive is at large. FLC Group CEO Trinh Van Quyet holds a model of a Boeing Dreamliner passenger jet at his office in Hanoi, July 30, 2018. (Nhac Nguyen/AFP) Perhaps more importantly, police arrested the former chairman of the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange, Tran Dac Sinh, its director, Le Hai Tra, and two other bourse executives. The four were charged with “abusing positions and powers while performing official duties.” Quyet is accused of running $156 million “pump and dump” stock fraud between May 2017 and January 2022. He had his two sisters and 43 other family members establish some 500 different brokerage accounts. False documents Quyet and his family members traded FLC stock amongst themselves at a frenzied pace, creating the perception of demand and causing the price to soar. On many occasions, his sister would cancel a stock purchase at the last minute, having already created the impression that the shares were in demand. In another scheme, from 2014-2016, Quyet had family members and employees at another subsidiary, FLC Faros Construction, falsify documents to make it look as though they were making investments and increasing the firm’s charter capital from VNĐ1.5 billion ($59,000) to VND4.3 trillion ($169 million). Thus when the once loss-making private company was publicly listed, which was only possible because of the intervention of corrupt bourse officials, it appeared to be worth significantly more than it was. Police escort FLC Group CEO Trinh Van Quyet to court on July 22, 2024, for his trial on fraud charges in Hanoi. (Anh Tuc/AFP) Quyet and other defendants quickly sold the 391 million of 430 million shares that they controlled, netting $142 million, and collapsing the stock price for other investors. All in all, the various schemes resulted in the six listed FLC companies seeing the value of their shares rise between 70% and 1,700%. In addition to the fraud, Quyet sold large shareholdings without notifying financial regulators, a requirement for corporate executives. In January 2022, he sold nearly 75 million shares of FLC stock, collapsing share prices, and prompting the Ministry of Public Security to open an investigation. RELATED STORIES Mendicant monk Thích Minh Tuệ offers an embarrassing contrast to Vietnam elites Breaking the laws of the land: Vietnam’s real estate scandals Ouster of parliament chief bares Vietnam corruption, power struggle Cleaning house in the Communist Party of Vietnam ahead of Tet Meet To Lam, Vietnam’s Communist Party chief and successor to Nguyen Phu Trong Regulatory shortfalls The FLC case matters for three reasons. First, it was only possible because the regulators were in on the fraud. As was the case in Truong My Lan’s massive fraud case at Saigon Commercial Bank, the scheme was abetted by poorly paid regulators. This once again raises the question “who regulates the regulators?” If Vietnam cannot get a baseline financial regulatory system running, it will negatively impact its domestic capital markets, corporate governance, and deter foreign investment. While the Ministry of Public Security did a good job in investigating the fraud, as they did with Lan’s Van Thinh Phat (VTP) and Saigon Commercial Bank, it never would have gotten to this point if there was proper regulatory oversight. Second, while Vietnam’s stock market is not that large, it stands as one of the few opportunities for Vietnamese citizens to invest their money. With a lack of confidence in their currency, Vietnamese tend to buy gold. In fact, in the past half year, the price of gold in Vietnam was trading well above international prices. The government had to auction off some of its gold reserves just to cool the market. A woman displays gold at a shop in Hanoi, Oct. 11, 2009. (Kham/Reuters) Vietnamese also buy real estate, but that’s not always a safe investment. The domestic real estate market in Vietnam resembles China’s in many ways. Many property firms are saddled with debt and have defaulted, especially on dollar-denominated bonds. A domestic credit crunch caused by the VTP scandal in late 2022 led to even more defaults and stalled real estate projects. Many Vietnamese were left paying mortgages on unfinished real estate that they could neither inhabit, nor rent. The third place Vietnamese park their savings is in the stock market. The majority of shares in the Vietnam stock market are owned by individual, not institutional, investors. So when there is widespread fraud, it really hurts the burgeoning middle-class. Quyet’s fraud was fairly simple, but the effects were widespread: There were nearly 100,000 victims. Although Quyet has paid some $8.3 million in restitution, it’s a drop in the bucket. Cost to taxpayers Third, the FLC fraud trial has an impact on the larger economy. The company – which is one of the largest private companies in the country – is still in operation, but barely. The Ho Chi Minh Stock exchange delisted the company due to the fraud. Trading…

Thousands flee junta raids in central Myanmar

Editor6 months ago04 mins

Myanmar junta forces raided a string of villages in central Myanmar killing three civilians and sending some 10,000 fleeing from their homes after anti-junta insurgents attacked a nearby military base, residents told Radio Free Asia on Friday. The Sagaing region has been regularly battered by airstrikes and artillery bombardments as junta forces crack down on insurgent groups that have stepped up attacks in the past nine months. On Thursday, about 150 junta soldiers in a convoy of vehicles raided at least nine villages in Kanbalu township, residents said, following an attack on an army camp by members of an anti-junta People’s Defense Force allied with the shadow National Unity Government, which was formed by civilians after the military seized power in a 2021 coup. “After the Kyi Kone Bridge camp was attacked, the army launched an offensive on the villages,” said one resident who declined to be identified in fear of his safety. “The junta troops stationed at Tha Yet Khaung village are burning houses this morning. Revolutionary groups are monitoring the situation,” he said, referring to anti-junta fighters.” Three civilians in Tha Yet Khaung and Tha Pyay Thar villages were killed in junta artillery and drone attacks. Kanbalu district and Ye-U township-based People’s Defense Forces said they killed 16 soldiers and seized weapons in their attack on the army camp. RFA has not been able to independently verify the claim. RFA called Nyunt Win Aung, the junta spokesman for the Sagaing region, to request comment on the incident, but he did not answer the phone. RELATED STORIES Junta deploys first round of military recruits to Myanmar’s frontlinesSome 13,700 schools in Myanmar are closed due to civil warMyanmar airstrike on monastery where villagers were sheltering kills 17 activists Sagaing, for years a peaceful heartland region of central Myanmar, inhabited mostly by members of the majority Burman community, has seen unprecedented opposition to the military since the 2021 coup dashed hopes for reform. In the months that followed, the junta crushed protests against military rule and many activists then took up arms, some linking up with ethnic minority insurgents who have battled for self-determination from remote border lands for decades. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn.

Lao Christian pastor shot dead in home by masked men

Editor7 months ago05 mins

A Christian pastor was shot and killed Tuesday evening in his home in northwestern Laos by two men dressed in black suits, according to a relative and provincial police. Thongkham Philavanh, in his 40s, was a Khmu, an ethnic group in Southeast Asia, the majority of whom live in northern Laos. As a religious leader, he often participated in Christian church activities in Oudomxay province. The pair fired twice at Thongkham at his home in Vanghay village in the province’s Xai district, according to a statement his wife gave to police. She took him to the provincial hospital, but he died upon arrival. Police said they are investigating the incident and could not provide further details. Assaults and legal action against Christians in the one-party communist state with a mostly Buddhist population are not uncommon, despite a national law protecting the free exercise of their faith. Those who practice Christianity are objects of suspicion by authorities and subject to persecution. RELATED STORIES Lao house church reopens after being attacked Burned Bibles and broken homes Officials tell Lao Christians to remove videos of attack by authorities, villagers Lao Christians fearful after police report no progress in pastor’s suspected homicide Christians attacked, driven from their home in southern Laos Christian communities in Oudomxay province and other parts of Laos told Radio Free Asia on Thursday they were mourning Thongkham’s loss. “Last night, our community was shattered by the tragic loss of our beloved pastor, who was senselessly taken from us in an act of violence,” some of them wrote in English on Facebook. “His profound wisdom, unwavering faith, and boundless compassion touched the lives of so many.” A relative of the pastor, who didn’t want to be identified for safety reasons, said the two men wore face masks and rode motorcycles, though she didn’t know where they came from. “I am not sure why they killed him, but I believe that it must be because he serves Jesus Christ,” she said. “One thing that I am sure of is that there are some groups of people who dislike what Thongkham does as Christian pastor.” Thongkham’s funeral will be held on July 27 at the village cemetery, his family said. Lao Christian pastor Thongkham Philavanh is seen in photos in a July 23, 2024, Facebook post. (Bong Vip via Facebook) One Christian believer told RFA that it appears as though Thongkham was killed because he was a Christian pastor and religious leader, and that some people may not have liked that. Another believer who knew Thongkham some years ago said he was unhappy to learn about the pastor’s passing via social media. Other Christian communities in Laos expressed concern about the safety of their pastors and members, fearing they too may be killed. A member of the Lao Evangelical Church said anti-Christian groups in the country seek opportunities to harm Christians. In October 2022, Christian pastor Sy Sengmany was found dead near a forest in Khammouane province after two men visited his house earlier in the day, and village authorities warned him to stop his religious activities. The case remains unsolved. Translated by Phouvong for RFA Lao. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Matt Reed.

Rights group, senator speak up for dissident fighting extradition from Thailand

Editor7 months ago04 mins

Pressure built on Thailand Thursday over the detention of a detained Vietnamese dissident fighting extradition back home with one human rights official warning of a stain on the government if it deported him. Y Quynh Bdap, from Vietnam’s Ede minority, was detained on June 11 and is being held in a special prison in Bangkok while a court decides his fate. In January, Vietnam sentenced the 32-year-old to 10 years in prison in absentia on terrorism charges, accusing him of involvement in 2023 attacks on two public agencies in Dak Lak province in which nine people were killed. Bdap has been in Thailand since 2018 and denied any involvement in the 2023 attacks. The U.N. refugee agency has recognised him as a “person of concern”. “Put simply, if he is sent back, chances are he dies, disappears, is tortured. That will stain the hands of the Thai government,” Sunai Phasuk, senior researcher at Human Rights Watch, told a seminar in Bangkok. The Thai government did not respond to a request for comment from Radio Free Asia. RELATED STORIES Thai court postpones Vietnamese activist’s extradition hearing Rights groups call on Thailand not to extradite Vietnamese activist 10 defendants given life sentences for Dak Lak attacks Sunai said the terrorism charges that Bdap is facing at home did not meet international standards of justice. Referring to a previous military government in Thailand that was intolerant of dissent, he said he questioned the behavior of the civilian administration that replaced it. On July 15, a Bangkok court postponed Bdap’s extradition hearing until Aug. 1, He is also facing an immigration offense related to overstaying his visa. Bdap’s lawyer, Nadthasiri Bergman, told a hearing this month the case reflected intensified transnational repression, through which governments exert their influence across borders to silence dissent. A Thai senator, Angkhana Neelapaijit, told the seminar that Thailand should live up to international standards on human rights, ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention, update its immigration law to take into account enforced disappearance and torture, and insist that all extradition requests from other countries go through its Court of Justice. Thailand and Vietnam have not signed an extradition treaty but regularly exchange each other’s nationals on a reciprocal basis. Vietnamese officials have not made a public comment on Bdap’s case but Sunai and Bergman said they believed Vietnam was exerting pressure for the extradition case to be resolved in their country’s favor. Edited by Mike Firn.

Police in Vietnam fine YouTuber for filming pagodas

Editor7 months ago02 mins

Police in Vietnam fined a YouTuber 7.5 million dong (US$300) for filming activities at a local pagoda. According to a police announcement, residents in the southern province of Dong Thap reported suspicious filming activities at a pagoda in Cao Lanh city’s Ward 4 on July 5. The police then summoned Nguyen Binh Dan, born in 1984, to the police station and issued him the fine for “abusing social media to share and post numerous false information, insulting the prestige of organizations/damaging the reputation of organization.” During the meeting with police, Dan said that he regularly recorded videos of local pagodas and uploaded them to his personal YouTube channel, which has more than 11,000 subscribers. The police said Dan’s videos contained false and religion-dividing content which generated offensive and negative comments. The announcement did not specify any details about the videos or the name of Dan’s YouTube channel. Translated by Anna Vu. Edited by Eugene Whong.

Myanmar flooding destroys 20,000 acres of crops

Editor7 months ago03 mins

Flooding has devastated crops and forced schools to close in 30 villages across central Myanmar, residents told Radio Free Asia on Wednesday. The rain-swollen Ayeyarwady River in the Magway region flowed over its banks , destroying 20,000 acres of green beans, peanuts and sesame in the key agricultural region, where most households farm as a primary means of income, one resident of Kamma township said. “Flooding this year is very bad,” said the resident, who declined to be identified for fear of reprisals due to the military regime’s crackdown on independent media. “Most of the bean fields are flooded and that’s the primary crop in this area.” Yae Lel Taung village school in Kamma township in Magway region flooded on July 23, 2024.(Facebook: Aung Kyaw Thu) About 20 schools have been closed, he said, adding that five more townships in Magway are also experiencing rainy-season flooding. Since the beginning of July, flooding has displaced tens of thousands in the region, washed away homes and killed several people, residents and relief workers said. RFA telephoned Magway region’s junta spokesperson, Myo Myint, for comment but he did not respond by the time of publication. RELATED STORIES Myanmar floods displace thousands, destroy hundreds of homesFloods in Myanmar force 10,000 from their homes, many trappedCollapse at notorious Myanmar rare earth mine kills 15 people The rainy season is not due to end until late October but for now, the worst may be over. The junta’s Department of Meteorology and Hydrology reported early on Wednesday that water levels had receded below the danger level in Mandalay’s Nyaung-U township, to the north of Magway, and in areas to the south, near the river’s delta including in the towns of Seik Thar, Hinthada and Zalun. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn.

Second Thomas Shoal: deal or no deal?

Editor7 months ago08 mins

China and the Philippines said they have achieved a “provisional arrangement” on resupply missions by the Philippines to the Second Thomas Shoal, where it maintains an outpost that China objects to, but their accounts of the agreement differed. The shoal, known in China as Ren’ai Jiao and in the Philippines as Ayungin Shoal, has been at the center of sharply rising tension and confrontation between the two countries, with China being accused of blocking access to Filipino troops stationed there. On June 17, a Filipino soldier was wounded in an encounter with Chinese coast guard personnel who also confiscated some Philippine guns during a Philippine rotation and resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre – an old navy ship that Manila deliberately grounded on the reef in 1999 to serve as its outpost to reinforce its claim. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs said in a statement on Sunday that both countries had “recognized the need to de-escalate the situation in the South China Sea and manage differences through dialogue and consultation.” The provisional arrangement for the resupply of daily necessities and rotation missions to the BRP Sierra Madre was achieved following the “frank and constructive” discussions at the 9th Bilateral Consultation Mechanism meeting on the South China Sea on July 2, the foreign ministry said, noting that it would not prejudice either side’s position in the disputed waters. It did not provide any further details. The hot-headed June 17 encounter raised fears of a more serious clash between U.S. ally the Philippines and China, but both sides agreed at the early July consultation to “de-escalate tensions” in the waters. RELATED STORIES Philippines reports fewer Chinese ships in South China Sea Philippine military chief demands China pay US$1 million in damages for clash Tensions simmer near a shoal both China and the Philippines claim China’s version On Monday, a spokesperson at China’s foreign ministry said Beijing continued to demand that the Philippines tow away the BRP Sierra Madre and restore the state of hosting no personnel or facilities at the Second Thomas Shoal. In the meantime, China would allow the Philippines to send living necessities to the personnel on the warship “in a humanitarian spirit” if the Philippines informed it in advance and after on-site verification was conducted, according to the spokesperson. But if the Philippines were to send large amounts of construction materials to the warship and attempted to build fixed facilities or a permanent outpost, China would “absolutely not accept it and will resolutely stop it,” the spokesperson added. A Chinese think tank – the South China Probing Initiative – said that with this statement, the two sides may agree to return to the situation between 1999 and 2022 when the Philippines promised not to send construction materials to the Second Thomas Shoal and China would continue to let humanitarian supplies go there. Analyst Collin Koh from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore wrote on the X social media platform that China’s version of the agreement “draws more questions than not about whether it will hold at all even before the ink is dry.” In this handout image provided by Armed Forces of the Philippines, a Chinese Coast Guard holds an axe as they approach Philippine troops on a resupply mission in the Second Thomas Shoal at the disputed South China Sea on June 17, 2024. (Armed Forces of the Philippines/AP) Shortly after the Chinese side issued its statement, Philippine foreign ministry spokesperson Teresita Daza denied that such arrangements as prior notification and on-site confirmation had been made. “I want to stress that the agreement was concluded with the clear understanding by both sides that it will not prejudice our respective national positions,” she said. “For the Philippines, this means that we will continue to assert our rights and jurisdiction in our maritime zones as entitled under UNCLOS (U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea).” The Second Thomas Shoal lies well inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone but also within the self-proclaimed nine-dash line that China draws on its maps to claim historic rights to almost the entire South China Sea. Maritime expert Ray Powell at Stanford University in the United States said that given the latest exchanges, he was “not sure there is a deal at this point.” A meeting of foreign ministers from Southeast Asian countries is to take place this week in Vientiane, Laos, and Daza said the Philippines would continue to articulate its positions on the South China Sea issue there. Edited by Taejun Kang.

Nguyen Phu Trong left Vietnam’s Communist Party ripe for strongman rule

Editor7 months ago015 mins

On July 19, the Vietnamese Communist Party announced the death of its general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong. The previous day, it announced that Trong, 80, ostensibly the most powerful politician in the country, had been relieved of his duties for health reasons. He had missed several key meetings in recent months, and even when he did attend, he appeared shaky and unwell. He suffered a stroke a few years ago but seemingly bounced back. However, his near-unprecedented third term in office has been cut short. To Lam, the public security minister and promoted to state President last month, will now assume Trong’s duties. Having led the party since 2011, Trong attempted to reinvigorate an institution that, by the early 2010s, had become bogged down by individual rivalries, profit-seeking, and self-advancement. A man rides past a poster for the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in Hanoi on Jan. 22, 2021. (Nhac Nguyen/AFP) Corruption was so rampant the public was mutinous. Ideology and morality had fallen by the wayside. Pro-democracy movements threatened its monopoly on power. The private sector was not just fantastically wealthy, but desired more political power. But in what condition does Trong leave the institution he sought to fix? Externally, its monopoly on power is safer. It has increased repression of activists and democrats while appeasing the public through its high-profile takedown of the corrupt. The private sector has been constrained, too, so poses no threat to the party’s political authority. The economy has insulated the party from any meaningful repercussions from the West over human rights. ‘Blazing Furnace’ Within the Communist Party, however, Trong leaves behind a mess. Lam, as public security minister, and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, artfully used Trong’s signature “Blazing Furnace” anti-corruption campaign to advance their own interests, effectively purging anyone who might rival them for Trong’s job in 2026. More Politburo members have been sacked than at any time in memory. Two presidents have “resigned” in as many years. The Politburo is now filled mostly with military personnel and securocrats, the only two factions – and sometimes rivals – left with power. Lam, if he does formally become acting general secretary, which the Politburo will have to vote on, is in a prime position to maintain the job in 2026. One imagines he has very different ideas about the nature of the Communist Party than Trong. Early in the anti-corruption campaign, Trong remarked that he did not want to “break the vase to catch the mice.” That metaphor implied that tackling corruption should shield a delicate Communist Party, not smash it to pieces. Vietnam’s President To Lam, front right, and Cambodia’s Defense Minister Tea Seiha, back right, pay their respects in front of honor guards at the Independence Monument in Phnom Penh on July 13, 2024. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) However, in his quest to rid corruption from a corrupt institution, he eroded almost every check the Communist Party of Vietnam had to prevent a supreme leader figure from rising to the top. Trong violated the three major “norms” that the party introduced in the early 1990s. Politburo members were expected to retire at 65, and individuals could only occupy the most senior positions for a maximum of two terms. More importantly, no one person could hold at the same time two of the four most powerful positions: General Secretary, State President, Prime Minister, and Chair of the National Assembly. This “four pillar” (tu tru) system created a form of succession plan. Regular reshuffles and a separation of powers amongst the political elite would prevent the Communist Party from tilting towards dictatorship. Shattering the norms The norms created a structure in which politicians could fight over policies, often brutally, but without the entire apparatus collapsing because of division. There could be a regular rotation between different factions and geographic networks, meaning no one group was ascendant for too long. Hanoi called this “democratic centralism.” Of course, it’s not democracy, but it’s a form of pluralism that, in theory, had prevented the party from descending into dictatorships like North Korea, Cuba, or China under Xi Jinping. Trong broke every one of these rules. Between 2018 and 2021, he held the posts of party general secretary and state president simultaneously, the first person to do so since 1986. (Lam seems likely to repeat that.) Trong passed away during his third term as party chief, the first leader since Le Duan to have that record. He not only constantly had the party flout retirement-age limits for himself – he should have stepped down in 2021, if not earlier – but such exemptions have been handed out like confetti during his tenure. Vietnam’s Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong addresses a press conference after the closing ceremony of the Communist Party of Vietnam 13th National Congress in Hanoi on Feb. 1, 2021. (Manan Vatsyayana/AFP) At the same time, his anti-graft campaign has centralized power among an increasingly small number of Politburo members. Provincial party politics have been purged and constrained to give more power to the central party apparatus. The party dominates the government. The public security ministry is all-seeing. This was always going to happen. How else do you clean up an uncleanable organization in which power flows up and discipline is enforced only by those above you? The campaign increases the necessity of one section of the party to maintain power indefinitely. Who designates what is the true morality and which cadres are truly moral? Well, a certain clique of the party running the anti-corruption campaign In one speech on the theme, Trong urged the party to “strengthen supervision of the use of the power of leading cadres, especially the heads, push up internal supervision within the collective leadership; make public the process of power use according to law for cadres and people to supervise.” The purge is designed to enforce the view that no one has absolute power above the party. Anyone who uses the power must serve the…

Hun To went after the press; who really won?

Editor7 months ago7 months ago09 mins

ANALYSIS He is the notorious playboy cousin of Cambodia’s prime minister, and has long been viewed as the family’s fixer for all things they would rather not come into public view. Hun To has reportedly been investigated by Australian police for heroin trafficking; faced questions in connection to threats against the family of slain political analyst Kem Ley, which fled to Australia in 2016 and; in recent years, reporting by Al Jazeera and The Australian newspaper has tied him to cyber slavery, scam compounds and drug smuggling. But in bringing lawsuits against those news organizations, he inadvertently highlighted how Australia – a key regional partner for Cambodia – is running out of patience for the Hun dynasty’s antics. Earlier this month, Hun To scored an apparent victory after he secured an out-of-court settlement over a years-long dispute with The Australian. The outlet agreed to retract a 2-year-old story it had published about Hun To that “some readers may have understood” to have alleged that he “was linked to human trafficking, cyber scams and drug importation,” the paper wrote. “The Australian did not intend to make any such allegations against Mr Hun and accepts his denials of such conduct.” The retraction marked the conclusion of a defamation case Hun To had brought against The Australian in December 2022. It came just after the Australian government had declined to renew his visa, RFA has learned – even though he had spent decades living part-time in the country and he and his family owned extensive business and property interests around Melbourne. While Canberra gave no reason for its decision, Hun To’s lawyers insisted in court complaints seen by RFA that the rejection was spurred by news stories from The Australian and Al Jazeera linking him to organized crime, fraud factories and human trafficking in his native Cambodia. A case launched in parallel by Hun To against Al Jazeera is ongoing. The Qatari state-funded outlet did not respond to a request for comment. Australian libel law is notoriously plaintiff-friendly, particularly in cases where the defendant is a news organization. This growing reputation led the author of a 2019 New York Times op-ed to dub the island nation “the defamation capital of the world.” In Australian defamation cases, the burden of proof uniquely rests with the defendants. No other type of case places such burden on the party being sued. In such a legal environment, defendants run higher risks of losing and incurring hefty damages, and that has often encouraged news organizations to settle out of court. The retraction might have gone little noticed until Hun To’s lawyer, Adam Lopez – who has been known for taking on controversial defamation cases – took to LinkedIn to gloat about his victory. The dispute with The Australian had been “resolved on a confidential basis,” he noted, suggesting that the newspaper had made further concessions beyond the retraction. Cambodia press and social media users quickly picked up the story, with some simply reporting on the retraction and others criticizing The Australian or the Australian court system. With the scrubbing of the controversial story, Hun To enjoyed precisely one day of victory. On July 10, news broke suggesting Hun To’s business interests were neck deep in exactly the type of allegations for which The Australian had just apologized. Elliptic, a financial compliance firm specializing in tracing cryptocurrencies, published a report alleging that a “Cambodian conglomerate with links to Cambodia’s ruling Hun family” had laundered more than US$11 billion for cyber scammers. The name of the company was Huione Pay, and Hun To is one of its three directors. A subsequent report by Reuters found evidence that Huione Pay had processed cryptocurrency worth $150,000 that had been stolen by the sanctioned North Korean hacking collective known as Lazarus. In response to the allegations, National Bank of Cambodia, the country’s central bank, told Reuters that it “would not hesitate to impose any corrective measures” on Huione, although it said so “without saying if such action was planned,” the news agency drily noted. Following the revelations, digital finance company Tether announced that it had frozen $29 million of cryptocurrency held by Huione following a “a direct request from law enforcement.” Whether the latest news make Hun To reconsider going after the press, however, seems unlikely, said Phil Robertson, director of Asia Human Rights and Labor Advocates. Hun To “would be wise to abandon his case since all the dirt has come out on Huione, but he won’t because he’s a shameless, arrogant, rights-abusing tycoon who believes that whatever he does, the ruling Hun family will have his back.” Neither Huione’s nor Hun To’s lawyer had responded to requests for comment as of publication. These allegations are far from the first time Hun To has caught negative publicity. Australian MP Julian Hill spoke in Parliament last March arguing that Hun To and other politically connected Cambodian figures “should never again be granted visas to visit Australia.” His speech charted Hun To’s long and checkered links to Australia, noting that as early as 2003 Australian police had sought to arrest him on suspicion of heroin trafficking. Since then, Hun To and his wife acquired millions of dollars’ worth of property in Australia, Hill added, “with seemingly no legitimate explanation for where their wealth has come from.” “It’s no secret that Hun To has his finger in lots of pies — drug trafficking, illegal deforestation, animal trafficking, illegal gambling,” Hill said. “Most recently, we’ve heard reports he’s dipping his toes into human trafficking, as well. That’s diversifying, isn’t it?”

Category: ASEAN