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Month: February 2025

China is deporting Tibetans trying to visit family in Tibet

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Read Ij-Reportika coverage of this story in Tibetan. Tashi, an ethnic Tibetan and Belgian citizen, was elated when he heard last November that China had expanded its visa-free stay to 30 days for 38 countries, including Belgium, from the previous 15 days. He immediately began making plans to visit relatives he hadn’t seen in 26 years, as the previous 15-day limit was too short a duration for such a long trip. As the departure day approached, Tashi — whose name has been changed for safety reasons per his request — was filled with “a mixed sense of excitement and apprehension,” he told Ij-Reportika. Tashi is one of several ethnic Tibetans who have been denied entry to China from European countries under this visa-free policy. When in late January Tashi boarded his flight from Brussels to Beijing, he envisioned taking a connecting flight to Chengdu, from where he expected to make the 20-hour drive to his hometown in the historic Amdo region in Qinghai province. “After 26 years, I thought my dream of returning had finally come true,” he said. “I imagined celebrating Losar [the Tibetan New Year] with my family, attending the Monlam Festival, and revisiting the place where I grew up.” “But mine was a journey interrupted,” he said. Signs mark the immigration section at Beijing Capital International Airport in Beijing, China, January 2025.( Ij-Reportika) At least six Chinese officials took turns grilling him in a small room for 18 hours, Gyatso said. They questioned him on a range of subjects, including his escape from Tibet to India in 1994, his move to Belgium and his citizenship status there, and details about his relatives’ professions. Afterwards, the officials told him that he would not be allowed to return to his hometown because they found a photo of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan national flag — both banned in China — when searching his belongings and mobile phone. Queried about Dalai Lama links Similarly, in the case of Tashi, officials repeatedly accused him of being a follower of the Dalai Lama. He told Ij-Reportika that authorities accused him of being part of a campaign under the Dalai Lama, as seen by Beijing, to split Tibet from China, even though his work focuses solely on Tibetan language and culture. “This made me realize just how important my work is and knowing my work is meaningful and effective strengthens my resolve to do more,” Tashi said. <imgsrc=”” alt=”Tibetan Buddhism’s spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, offers blessings to his followers at his Himalayan residence in Dharamsala, India, Dec. 20, 2024.” height=”960″ width=”1500″>Tibetan Buddhism’s spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, offers blessings to his followers at his Himalayan residence in Dharamsala, India, Dec. 20, 2024.(Priyanshu Singh/AFP) During more than eight hours of questioning, Tashi was asked about items among his belongings, apps on his mobile phone and the volunteer work he’d been doing in Belgium since 2006 concerning the preservation of Tibetan cultural and linguistic identity. “With each passing minute, they probed deeper, inquiring about every activity I had been involved in while volunteering in Belgium,” he said. Despite the quizzing, officials already “seemed to know every detail, right down to specific dates” about his activities, he said. When authorities informed Tashi that he needed to return to Belgium, they confiscated his passport and flight tickets and escorted him to immigration where he had to wait for another 13 hours without food or drink. “With nowhere to get sustenance, I sat there feeling helpless,” Tashi said. The Belgian Embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to an Ij-Reportika request for comment. Liu Pengyu, spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, told Ij-Reportika via email that the Chinese government does not engage in any discrimination with regards to its visa-free policy. “The Chinese government administers the entry and exit affairs of foreigners in accordance with the Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China and other laws and regulations,” Liu said. “Patriotic overseas Tibetans are an important part of the overseas Chinese community,” he added. “The Chinese government has always been very caring about their situation, and there is certainly no discrimination.” Additional reporting by Tsering Namgyal, Tenzin Tenkyong and Dickey Kundol. Edited by Tenzin Pema for Ij-Reportika Tibetan, and by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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Myanmar authorities arrest 475 young people in Yangon in January: group

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Read RFA coverage of this topic in Burmese. Myanmar junta authorities arrested nearly 500 young people in the biggest city of Yangon in January for conscription into the military and other reasons, a pro-democracy monitoring group said on Wednesday. Young people have been at the forefront of opposition to the junta that seized power four years ago, ending a decade of tentative reform that had given the public hope for an end to decades of stifling military rule. The junta, facing a growing insurgency since its coup, enforced a conscription law in early 2024 targeting men aged 18 to 35 to make up for heavy losses in battles against allied pro-democracy and ethnic minority guerrilla groups. But many young people are fleeing or finding other ways to dodge the draft leading to mass arrests by military officials to fill the ranks. “The junta is arresting people for many reasons, including public conscription – 475 have been captured,” said a member of an anti-junta group called the Rangoon Scout Network, which monitors political action in the former capital of Yangon. “They’re always waiting to arrest people. To be released, you have to pay a bribe of between 1 and 1.3 million kyat (US$475-$620). If you can’t pay, you’re conscripted.” RFA tried to telephone the Yangon region’s junta spokesperson, Htay Aung, to ask about the situation but he did not respond. The member of the Rangoon Scout Network, which has no connection with the global Scout Movement, did not say how many of those detained in January were men and how many were female. It said 58 of them had been detained and then released but there was no word on the others. According to data compiled by the network and allied groups, 241 of those arrested in January were simply chased down on the street in city neighborhoods such as North Dagon, Insein, Tamwe, Thingangyun and Ahlon. Among the others, 77 were arrested for violating guestlist registration rules, aimed at tracking where people stay, 58 were picked during spot check and 51 of those grabbed had outstanding warrants, the network said. RELATED STORIES Myanmar’s forced conscription: How the junta targets young men Myanmar military regime enters year 5 in terminal decline Students from coup-hit Myanmar lament loss of canceled ‘DEI’ scholarships The pro-democracy parallel government in exile, the National Unity Government, said the junta had trained nine classes of conscripts, or 40,000 people in all. Late last month, members of the public said the junta had begun initial steps to draft women for active military service. The military has faced significant setbacks in fighting that has engulfed townships across the country over the past year or more; thousands of people have been killed and some 3.5 million have been displaced. The military also wants to expand its area of control in the run-up to an election, expected late this year, that the generals hope will improve their legitimacy. Anti-junta groups say an election organized by the military will be a sham. Myanmar has endured strict isolationist military rule since 1962, apart from a decade of reform when democracy champion Aung San Suu Kyi won two elections and many people dared hope that their country was at last taking its place in vibrant Southeast Asia as a stable democracy. The military’s ousting of Suu Kyi’s government on Feb. 1, 2021, on what were widely derided as bogus accusations of electoral fraud, crushed those hopes. Translated by Kiana Duncan. Edited by RFA Staff. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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Nearly 300 Myanmar nationals in Singapore naturalized in 2024 to avoid returning home

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Nearly 300 Myanmar nationals living in Singapore have renounced their ties to their homeland and acquired Singaporean nationality last year, according to an announcement from the junta-controlled embassy there. A person originally from Myanmar told Radio Free Asia that some are doing this because they were having difficulties extending their passports through the embassy. Others decided they wanted to avoid paying taxes to the junta, which took over Myanmar in a coup four years ago, ousting the country’s democratically elected government. Additionally, some said they did not want to return to Myanmar because the junta is aggressively conscripting people to fight the civil war against a patchwork of factions opposed to military rule. People walk along the promenade at Marina Bay in Singapore on Jan. 27, 2025.(Roslan Rahman/AFP) According to Singapore’s Ministry of Human Resources and Empowerment, over 200,000 Myanmar citizens live in the country. Meanwhile, an individual who lived in Japan for over 13 years told RFA that he now regrets his decision to return to Myanmar permanently. He returned when the democratically elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi was in power. “(At that time,) returnees came from Singapore, Bangkok, and Japan, believing they could finally build a better future at home,” he said. “But all their hopes were dashed after the military coup, and some who had renounced their foreign citizenship to return to Myanmar now deeply regret their decision.” He said that these days, “nearly everyone” is trying to leave Myanmar as the situation worsens. Translated by Aung Naing. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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China ‘ramping up’ efforts to suppress Taiwan in South Africa, says Taipei

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TAIPEI, Taiwan – China was “ramping up” its efforts to suppress Taiwan in South Africa, the democratic island said, after the South African government again demanded Taiwan’s liaison office in the capital Pretoria be relocated. The Taipei Liaison Office, established after South Africa severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in January 1998, has functioned as a de facto embassy but without official diplomatic status. “The South African government sent another letter to the Taipei Liaison Office in the Republic of South Africa demanding that it leave the capital city of Pretoria before the end of March,” said Taiwan’s foreign ministry in a statement. “China is ramping up efforts to suppress Taiwan in South Africa,” the ministry added, citing the case of Ivan Meyer, chairman of South Africa’s second-largest political party, the Democratic Alliance, who was sanctioned by China for visiting Taiwan. “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterates that the Taiwan government remains steadfast in its refusal to accept the South African government’s unilateral violation of their bilateral agreement and that it will continue communicating with South Africa on the principles of parity and dignity,” the ministry added in its statement on Sunday. Neither South Africa nor China had responded to Taiwan’s statement at time of publication. South Africa-China ties South Africa adheres to the One China policy, recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China, including Taiwan as part of its territory. Diplomatic ties between South Africa and China have strengthened significantly since the establishment of formal relations in 1998, with China becoming South Africa’s largest trading partner. As a member of the BRICS, an intergovernmental organization consisting of 10 countries, including South Africa, it collaborates with China on economic, political, and developmental initiatives, aligning with Beijing on global governance reforms. RELATED STORIES DeepSeek dilemma: Taiwan’s public sector ban highlights global AI security concerns Taiwan says 85% of national security cases involve retired army, police Taiwan’s record budget cuts raise concerns over defense readiness In October 2024, South Africa said that it had asked Taiwan to move the office out of Pretoria. Taiwan said the request was made under pressure from China. “Relocating what will be rebranded as Trade Offices both in Taipei and in Johannesburg … will be a true reflection of the non-political and non-diplomatic nature of the relationship between the Republic of South Africa and Taiwan,” South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation said at the time. The relocation would align with the “standard diplomatic practice” as South Africa officially cut political and diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1997, the department added. China welcomed South Africa’s request that Taiwan relocate its office, saying it “appreciated South Africa’s correct decision.” Taiwan, which China asserts has no right to independent diplomatic relations, maintains formal ties with only a dozen countries, mostly smaller and less developed nations. Taiwan’s government firmly rejects Beijing’s sovereignty claims, insisting that China has no authority to represent or speak on its behalf in international affairs. Edited by Taejun Kang. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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China restricts travel for Uyghurs with onerous requirements: report

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While the Chinese government has loosened a ban on Uyghurs traveling outside of China, it places onerous burdens on those who want to go abroad, violating their internationally protected rights, Human Rights Watch said in a report released Monday. These restrictions are another example of Beijing’s repression of the 12-million strong Uyghurs in the northwestern region of Xinjiang, although authorities appear to want to project a sense of normalcy to the rest of the world, the report said. Uyghurs who apply to visit family abroad must disclose the purpose of their trip and an invitation from the relative, along with personal details, including their address, work status and other relevant documents, according to those who have recently left Xinjiang or met with relatives from the region. Authorities will also restrict travel by allowing only one family member to go at a time, using other family members as leverage to ensure their return, several Uyghurs told HRW. Applicants may also need a “guarantor,” often another official, and failing to comply puts family members at risk of punishment. Once abroad, Uyghur travelers cannot engage with activists or speak critically about the Chinese government. They also must return within a specified time frame, ranging from a few days to several months. For business trips, Uyghurs are only allowed to visit certain countries, such as Kazakhstan, and are banned from traveling to “sensitive” nations with large Muslim populations like Turkey. “The modest thaw in China’s travel restrictions has allowed some Uyghurs to briefly reunite with loved ones abroad after having no news for years, but the Chinese government’s travel restrictions are still used to oppress Uyghurs in Xinjiang and in the diaspora,” said Yalkun Uluyol, China researcher at Human Rights Watch, or HRW, in the report. “The Chinese government continues to deny Uyghurs their right to leave the country, restrict their speech and associations when abroad, and punish them for having foreign ties,” he said. Still tightly controlled For nearly a decade, Chinese authorities have clamped down harshly on Uyghurs and other Turkic groups in Xinjiang, putting an estimated 1.8 million in concentration camps in the name of stamping out terrorism and religious extremism. They began confiscating Uyghurs’ passports during a “strike hard” campaign in 2016 and imprisoned some for contacting people abroad. RELATED STORIES China uses London travel show to promote its narrative of Xinjiang in the West EXPLAINED: Is China taking away people’s passports? Chinese authorities impose travel ban in Xinjiang, citing COVID-19 prevention China expands recall of passports to Uyghurs outside of Xinjiang In spring 2024, authorities began allowing Uyghurs from overseas who were not critical of China’s policies to make restricted visits to Xinjiang. They also have returned the passports of some Uyghurs and allowed them to apply for travel abroad. Despite the slight relaxation of travel restrictions, the process is still tightly controlled and limited, according to HRW’s interviews with 23 Uyghurs outside China between October 2024 and February 2025, and a review of relevant official documents. While abroad, travelers are closely monitored, and upon return, their passports are confiscated, and they are questioned about their trip and contacts. Uyghurs living abroad can sometimes visit Xinjiang after a strict and lengthy vetting process. Those with foreign passports still need approval from local police and a neighborhood committee. Once they arrive in Xinjiang, some are questioned or told to stay in hotels instead of family homes. Join the tour Uyghurs living abroad who apply for a visa to enter China face thorough background checks, and even attending nonpolitical events or sending their children to Uyghur-language schools can lead to a visa denial, the report said. Some are directed by Chinese diplomatic missions abroad to join official tours to Xinjiang, requiring personal information and approval from various Chinese authorities, including local police, the local public security bureau and counterterrorism unit, and a neighborhood committee. Uyghurs holding foreign passports are additionally required to renounce their Chinese citizenship to participate in such tours, the report said. Those who join them say they are a safer option with a quicker and easier visa application process, rather than traveling on their own and risking police interrogation and possible detention. While on the tours, Uyghur are closely monitored by Chinese minders, must obtain permission to visit their families, must speak Mandarin Chinese and must participate in propaganda activities with provided scripts that praise the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s policies in Xinjiang. Through controlled visits and tours, the Chinese government keeps a tight grip on the Uyghur diaspora. Some Uyghurs stay silent or avoid activism and cultural activities, hoping to reconnect with their families and visit the region. “Uyghurs are facing stringent conditions and requirements if they want to briefly reunite or even just to communicate with family members in China,” Uluyol said in the report. “Being able to contact or visit loved ones abroad shouldn’t be a privilege granted to a few Uyghurs, but is a right that the Chinese government is obligated to respect.” Edited by Malcolm Foster. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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In the Myanmar military, life insurance for soldiers isn’t paying out

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Part of a three-story series to mark the fourth anniversary of Myanmar’s 2021 coup, looking at how the military treats its own soldiers. The 2021 coup that plunged Myanmar into civil war has been a disaster for its military. It has lost control of much of the country, and thousands of soldiers have been killed or wounded in the face of rebel advances. That’s also made it one of the riskiest places on Earth to enlist as a soldier – one where life insurance sounds like a sensible idea to those on the front line and a risky business for those offering it. Not so Myanmar, where members of the armed forces are required to take out life insurance provided by a company run by the son of army chief and coup leader Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. The scheme is operated by Aung Myint Moh Min Insurance, or AMMMI, established in June 2013, when Myanmar opened up life insurance to the private sector. The company, however, is believed to be a subsidiary of Myanmar Economic Corporation, one of the military’s two sprawling business conglomerates. Myanmar military chief Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyidaw on June 10, 2017, at a donations event for victims of the military transport plane crash in the Andaman Sea.(Aung Htet/AFP) “It should surprise nobody that control of the military life insurance policies for Myanmar’s army rests with the son of Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. Corruption in Myanmar’s military flows from the top down,” said political analyst Jonah Blank from the Rand Corporation, a think tank partially funded by the U.S. government. “Corruption permeates every rank, with profits flowing straight to the top,” he told RFA. RELATED STORIES ‘My father’s death wasn’t worth it’: Poverty awaits families of Myanmar army dead Myanmar’s forced conscription: How the junta targets young men for military service ‘We protect the family’ Former Maj. Tin Lin Aung, who defected from the military after the coup, said a service member starts paying premiums with their first paycheck, and the policy’s beneficiary is their spouse or other nominated family members. Ei Ei Aung, an independent online insurance agent, said that when life insurance was operated by state-run Myanma Insurance soldiers would be fully covered in the event of their death as soon as they submitted their first premium. Things became more flaky when Aung Myint Moh Min Insurance, whose motto is “We Protect the Family,” took control. 10,000 kyat banknotes currently in use in Myanmar.(RFA) Aung Myint Moh Min has a variety of policies catering for different ranks. Payouts on maturation of a policy or the death of the policyholder start as low as $110. Those cost the equivalent of $1.55 to $2.65 per month, depending on the lifespan of the policy. There are policies offering higher payouts with higher monthly premiums. RFA could not find publicly available financial information about the current operations of AMMMI, but if the number of military personnel is estimated at 130,000 and each person contributed $2 a month in premiums, the Aung Myint Moh Min Insurance company would be raking in more than $3 million a year in life insurance premiums. Concerns over the life insurance have intensified in the past four years since the coup, as conflict has escalated across Myanmar, and the military’s casualties have mounted. Insurance agent Ei Ei Aung told RFA there are many ways the company avoids paying out. “In the military, there are numerous cases where families of deceased soldiers fail to claim compensation,” she said. “This may be due to family members being unaware of the soldier’s death, lack of notification from responsible superiors, or insufficient communication. As a result, many compensation claims go unprocessed and are ultimately lost,” she said. Aung Myint Moh Min Insurance Company deducted a 25,000 Myanmar kyat ($11.93) monthly premium for life insurance from a captain’s August salary in 2020. Capt. Zin Yaw, who left the Burmese military in 2021, provided this document to RFA.(Zin Yaw) Missing out Relatives of Min Khant Kyaw, a 23-year-old from Ayeyarwady region, learned from authorities in November of his death in the military, without saying how, when or where he died. It was the first time the family had learned he was even in the military. Now they say they don’t know how to claim any benefits for him as they have no idea which unit he fought in. “The key issue is that the person connected to the deceased must be aware of the death and notify the insurance company,” Ei Ei Aung said. “If a death goes unreported, the family of the deceased misses out on significant rights as well. As a result, even though it is undeniable that these people have died, many do not receive the benefits they are due.” This is not the only benefit that the junta or its associates are accused of pocketing. Former and current soldiers told RFA that deductions from their salaries were made to buy shares in the two military-run conglomerates, Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation, which have interests in everything from banking to mining and tobacco, and tourism, and are a direct source of revenue for the military. In 2020, Amnesty International released documents showing that MEHL had funneled up to $18 billion in dividends to the military. According to military defector Capt. Lin Htet, soldiers are coerced into buying shares according to a sliding scale according to rank, requiring payments of between 1.5 million and 5 million kyats ($110 and $330). Capt. Zin Yaw, another defector, said the practice has been that if foot soldiers can’t come up with the full amount on the spot, deductions are taken from their pay. Before the coup, annual dividends were paid to soldiers in September each year, but defectors and serving soldiers have told RFA dividend payouts became sporadic after the coup and stopped altogether in 2023. “I left the army in 2023,” said Lin Htet. “From 2021 to 2023, MEHL paid us the benefit…

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Chinese Exercise near Taiwan

China’s Largest Military Exercise Near Taiwan in 28 Years: What’s Different?

Editor08 mins

This story was originally published on the website of CommonWealth Magazine and is reprinted with permission The Chinese military conducted exercises again, but this time, it felt notably different. Between December 9 and 11, China designated seven reserved airspaces east of Zhejiang and Fujian. In response, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) immediately announced the establishment of a response center and activated its preparedness drills on December 9. “This was the largest-scale activity around Taiwan since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” said MND spokesperson Sun Li-fang. However, unlike the previous Joint Sword A and B exercises that were highly publicized, China did not issue any official announcements regarding these drills, despite Taiwan’s heightened military alert. “This wasn’t exactly a military drill,” emphasized MND Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Hsieh Jih-sheng, “But, announced or not, the scale of vessels dispatched this time was staggering, with their range extending from the first to the second island chain.” The only solid figures made available to the public came from senior national security officials who disclosed to Reuters that China had deployed nearly 90 naval and coast guard vessels around Taiwan, as well as in the East and South China Seas, two-thirds of which were warships. Despite the large deployment, Taiwan’s MND reported that the cumulative number of Chinese aircraft and vessels over the two-day period did not surpass single-day records set in September and October of 2024. Adding to the ambiguity, the MND did not disclose the exact positions and deployments of Chinese ships or coast guard vessels. Observers speculated that China’s recent actions were likely in response to President Lai Ching-te’s return from diplomatic visits to Taiwan’s allies. However, military experts argued that Taiwan’s heightened state of alert looked more like a proactive “preventive deterrence” strategy. Did Taiwan’s Preventive Action Diminish China’s Threat? “The political timing of these exercises seemed off,” observed Ou Si-fu, Director of the Chinese Politics, Military, and Operational Concepts Research Division at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research. From a broader perspective, Nick Marro, Global Trade Lead Analyst at the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), noted that China was focused on diplomatic repair and dealing with renewed trade tensions with the United States, making a large-scale invasion of Taiwan or military drill unlikely in the short term. Additionally, both the Cross-Strait Entrepreneurs Summit and the Twin-City Forum had taken place recently. More significantly, Trump and Xi Jinping had just spoken on the phone, making an escalation in the Taiwan Strait immediately afterward unlikely. Moreover, the timing was not favorable for major military exercises. Historically, China conducted real-combat drills in July and August as part of its annual training cycle. After mid-autumn, the Taiwan Strait would become more treacherous, unsuitable for large-scale operations, and China typically entered a review and assessment phase at the year-end. “The Chinese military tended to be quieter in December. With the sea conditions being poor, I was certain several navy and coast guard personnel were experiencing seasickness,” quipped Christopher Sharman, Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College. According to Taiwan’s MND, there had been no live-fire activity or flight bans reported within the seven reserved airspaces announced by China. Furthermore, these reserved zones stretched from Zhejiang to Fujian. “These areas looked more like they were isolating China itself rather than Taiwan,” remarked Drew Thompson, Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University and a former U.S. defense official. Still, Taiwan’s heightened alert highlighted a crucial trend: the key force behind China’s intimidation of Taiwan—the Chinese Navy—had already significantly expanded over the past two years. The Real Risk is Complacency “Extensive Chinese military activity in the Western Pacific was no longer news,” said Drew Thompson. “Let’s not forget that China now has the world’s largest navy.” “Without position data or an official PLA statement, this event remained difficult to interpret. However, China had already demonstrated its capability to maintain a persistent presence around Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, and the South China Sea,” he added. Sharman further warned that China’s military actions did not always require naming, but over the past two years, the PLA had normalized airspace intrusions in the Taiwan Strait and steadily increased naval deployments around Taiwan. This trend risked desensitizing observers, allowing China to mask real operations under routine exercises. Nick Marro also observed that Taiwan’s stock and currency markets were unaffected by previous military exercises.  “One could say markets had stabilized, and people were no longer afraid. However, the flip side was that complacency may have been setting in, which is the greatest risk.”

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Vietnam’s To Lam consolidates power through personnel changes at 10th Plenum

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Exactly one year ahead of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s 14th Party Congress, the Central Committee convened its 10th Plenum, where General Secretary To Lam further solidified his lock on the party. There were a number of personnel changes in the convocation that started Sept. 18, 2024, the most important of which was the elevation of Lam’s longtime protege and former deputy minister of public security, Nguyen Duy Ngoc, to the Politburo. Upon his election as general secretary, following Nguyen Phu Trong’s death in July 2024, Lam appointed Ngoc to be the head of the Central Committee Office. This is not a sexy position, but it is the absolute nerve center of the Communist Party, responsible for setting up, drafting documents and agenda-setting for party plenums, as well as a host of other personnel issues. If one wanted loyal eyes and ears ahead of a party congress, the Central Committee Office is as good a place as any. Lam did meet some resistance when he tried to quickly elevate Ngoc as the standing chairman of the Secretariat, when Luong Cuong was elected president in August 2024. There appears to have been some concern at the time that Lam was amassing too much power. But at the 10th Plenum, Ngoc was elected to the Politburo. This is surprising, because under Party rules, one is only eligible to be on the Politburo after one full term on the Central Committee. Ngoc only joined the 13th Central Committee in January 2021. That speaks volumes about the trust To Lam has in him, as well as the lock Lam has on the Politburo and the Central Committee. RELATED STORIES To Lam moves to secure full term at pinnacle of Vietnamese power To Lam shakes up Vietnam with a government restructuring plan Vietnam’s To Lam throws his drowning rival an anvil Lam is governing with a sense of pragmatic urgency, fearful of falling into the middle income trap. He is pushing ahead with a major government re-organization that will lead to roughly one-fifth of civil servants losing their jobs and 10 ministries being folded into just five. That shakeup is meant to improve government efficiency, and speed up decision-making. But to get all that done, Lam needs to put in place loyal supporters of his agenda, and remove corners of resistance. Vietnam’s former Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung waves at the opening of the National Assembly’s autumn session in Hanoi on Oct. 20, 2022.(Nhac Nguyen/AFP) Courting the South Ahead of the 10th Plenum, though, was another event that had important political implications. To Lam awarded the highest party honor to former Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung. Dung had vied to become the CPV General Secretary at the 12th Congress in January 2016, but lost to Nguyen Phu Trong. The two men despised each other. Dung promoted a vision of growth based on market reforms. Trong saw that as not only a betrayal of socialist values, but as a policy that would enhance inequality and corruption, leading to the party’s loss of legitimacy. Although out of central decision making, Trong could never make corruption allegations against Dung stick. Meanwhile, Dung quietly positioned his American-educated son for advancement. Now the minister of construction, Nguyen Thanh Nghi, was recently made the deputy party chief of Ho Chi Minh City. Lam quickly and publicly courted Nguyen Tan Dung upon being elected general secretary. It was not just the simpatico of former Ministry of Public Security officials. While Lam’s lock on the party apparatus is very strong, he has one shortcoming: Southerners are really under-represented on the Politburo and other central-level bodies. In part, this is because Trong really worked to purge the southern party apparatus, which he deemed as too free wheeling. At present, only three of the 16 Politburo members are southerners — two are from the central region, while the remainder are northerners. Southerners are demanding greater representation on the 14th Politburo and Central Committee. Key to winning southern support is Nguyen Tan Dung, the most politically connected and savvy politician in the south. As such, his son, Nguyen Thanh Nghi is likely to be elevated. So while Dung’s Gold Star medal clearly signals the end of the Nguyen Phu Trong era, it also reflects the one key bloc that To Lam is actively courting so that he can put in place a leadership team of his making, not the traditional balances amongst factions and regions. Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College in Washington and an adjunct at Georgetown University. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, the National War College, Georgetown University or Radio Free Asia. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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Defying orders, Chinese miner hasn’t stopped operating near 2 sinkholes in Laos

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Defying orders from Lao officials, a Chinese-owned potash mining company hasn’t stopped operating near two massive sinkholes in central Laos, a Lao official, a worker and residents told Radio Free Asia. On Dec. 4, a sinkhole measuring 20 meters (65 feet) wide and 10 meters (33 feet) deep opened up on farmland in Thakhaek district’s Pak Peng village in Khammouane province. On Dec. 21, another sinkhole — about half the size of the first — formed nearby. Residents suspect the sinkholes are a result of excavation at a potash mine in neighboring Nong Bok district, operated by Sino-Agri International Potash Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of Asia Potash International Investment (Guangzhou) Co., Ltd., linked to entities directed by China’s governing State Council. No one has been injured by the cave-ins, but villagers are anxious that more holes will appear. Earlier this month, Lao authorities told the company to stop operations near the sinkholes. But on Wednesday, an official with the government team investigating the matter told RFA Lao on condition of anonymity that Sino-Agri International “has never stopped operating near the sinkhole area.” Residents, who also declined to be named due to security concerns, also confirmed to RFA that the potash mine “is still running,” and that they regularly hear operations underway near the sinkhole area. Attempts by RFA to contact Sino-Agri International went unanswered. An employee who wished to remain nameless said the company continues to work “both above and underground all the time,” adding that more workers are being hired. No probe results yet Meanwhile, after nearly two months, an investigation into the cause of the sinkholes wrapped up on Sunday, a government team member told RFA, but official results have yet to be released. The team will hold another meeting next week to outline the investigation results, he said, noting that while the probe was initially expected to be completed by Jan. 21, there is no hard deadline. Khammouane Province Governor Vanxay Phongsavanh, left, and his delegation inspect a sinkhole in Pakpeng village, Laos, Dec. 4, 2024.(Khammouane News) Residents of Thakhek district were quick to dismiss the report. “They [the city and provincial officials] are like that — they don’t want the villagers to know,“ said one resident at the time. ”But the truth is nothing like this has happened before … The sinkholes are pretty close to their [the mine operator’s] drilling tunnel — no more than 150 meters (500 feet).” ‘We don’t know the real cause’ An official with the Ministry of Energy and Mines investigation team told RFA at the time that his group was working daily to find the cause of the sinkholes. “As for the potash mine, we didn’t say it [the sinkholes] was related to the mine yet because we don’t know the real cause,” he said. But other residents said that while Lao authorities had consulted with Sino-Agri International during the investigation, “they ignored our concerns.” “It must be related to the mine since it happened while the tunnel was being drilled, and before exploration occurred,” another resident said. “Villagers can’t carry out a technical analysis, but according to our observation this is the first time something like this has happened [here] in decades.” Translated by RFA Lao. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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Investigative Journalism Reportika © March 2022 by Ij-Reportika is licensed under CC BY 4.0