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Month: March 2024

Australia pledges new funds for maritime cooperation as ASEAN summit begins

Editor06 mins

Updated March 04, 2024, 03:05 a.m. ET. Canberra will invest $64 million Australian dollars (US$41.8 million) over the next four years, including A$40 million in new funding, to expand maritime cooperation with Southeast Asia, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong said on Monday. Wong made the pledge at a forum on the sidelines of the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit 2024 in Melbourne, which will celebrate 50 years of partnership between Australia and the regional bloc. The summit is being held against a backdrop of increasingly assertive posturing by China in the South China Sea and the intensifying civil war in Myanmar, both of which are likely to be high on the agenda. Wong said the new funds for maritime cooperation would contribute to security and prosperity within the region. “What happens in the South China Sea, in the Taiwan Strait, in the Mekong subregion, across the Indo-Pacific, affects us all,” she said in her keynote address Monday. She said the “region’s character” was under challenge and that no country must dominate. “We face destabilizing, provocative and coercive actions, including unsafe conduct at sea and in the air and militarisation of disputed features,” Wong said, without singling out a specific nation. China asserts sovereignty over almost all of the South China Sea, through which trillions of dollars in trade passes each year, putting it at odds with the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, and Taiwan.  In 2016, an international tribunal refuted the legal basis for nearly all of China’s expansive maritime and territorial claims in the waterway. It said that Beijing’s insistence on holding “historic rights” to the waters were inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS. Beijing has never recognized the 2016 arbitration or its outcome. Speaking at the same forum, Philippines Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo said the rule of law and especially UNCLOS was the fundamental starting point for maritime cooperation in the region. “The shared stewardship of the seas and oceans in the region behooves us to unite in preserving the primacy of international law so we can ensure equitable and sustainable outcomes for all,” he said. “It also calls for us to stand firmly together in opposing actions that contradict or are inconsistent with international law.” The Philippines under the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has taken a stronger stance in dealing with Beijing on the South China Sea. Marcos has also pursued warmer ties with the United States, a traditional ally, reversing the policies of his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte. In recent months, tensions between Manila and Beijing have led to numerous run-ins, including the China Coast Guard’s alleged harassment of Filipino vessels delivering provisions to troops at its military outpost on Ayungin (Second Thomas) Shoal in the South China Sea. On Monday, the Philippine Coast Guard deployed a patrol vessel to Benham Rise, a huge resource-rich underwater plateau off the eastern coast of the archipelago, amid reports of Chinese research vessels there. The 83-meter (272 foot) long BRP Gabriela Silang will also visit the northern Batanes islands, near Taiwan, the coast guard said. Benham Rise, which is part of the Philippines’ extended continental shelf, does not fall within Beijing’s “nine-dash line” territorial claims in the South China Sea but that has not stopped China from conducting surveying missions in the area. Camille Elemia in Manila contributed to this report. BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated online news organization. Updated to include Monday’s developments in the South China Sea.

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Why Laos’ Communists cannot do anti-corruption

Editor017 mins

Corruption is often seen as a byproduct, a quirk, of a political system. But in many authoritarian states, it is actually the modus operandi.  Consider what binds a political structure together. How do you make sure that lowly officials in the provinces listen to their masters in the capital? How do you instill the sense that everyone is working together for the same cause, that all participants aren’t just a bunch of self-interested, warring individuals? One way is through terror. Officials listened to Joseph Stalin, the Soviet dictator, and his Politburo because they feared for their lives.  Another is through a common sense of purpose. This could be ideological. Everyone works towards the same goals because they believe they are creating a better world. Or it could be existential, such as everyone pulling together during wartime. Or it could be transactional, as we see in meritocracies, with everyone accepting the norms and hierarchies of the political structure because doing so means they stand a chance of advancing up the political ladder.  Cambodia’s King Norodom Sihamoni, front center, and members of Cambodia’s government pose with newly elected members of parliament during the opening ceremony at the National Assembly building in Phnom Penh on Aug. 21, 2023. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) However, another method is through corruption, what some academics would call “rent-seeking”. Low-ranking officials in the provinces pay heed to their superiors in the capital because they are all part of vast patronage networks. Low-ranking officials are loyal to their patrons in return for financial benefits and promotion, while the higher-ranking patrons in government are able to get others to follow their policies because they control the fortunes of those lower down the hierarchy.  Moreover, corruption provides something of a common purpose, a common understanding, amongst all levels of the political structure. Everyone knows how the game is rigged and that they have to pay fealty to those who control the most important patronage networks in order to advance up the hierarchy. Indeed, graft instills a sense of loyalty.  When harmonized, as in Cambodia, a rent-seeking system ensures that all political grandees have just enough access to financial rewards and that graft is spread somewhat equitably so that there are no major internal frictions.  That begs the question of how anti-corruption campaigns can work in authoritarian states that previously had rent-seeking systems. Vietnam is a good example. Before 2016, the Communist Party of Vietnam held its hierarchy together in large part through corruption.  This was partly because of the decentralization that occurred in the 2000s, which made it much more difficult for the central party apparatus to control what was happening in the provinces and districts. More importantly, ideological factors that had previously held the Communist Party together began to fade.  Rent-seeking cadres By the early 1990s, when Hanoi made peace with Beijing, Vietnam was for the first time in half a century unthreatened by a foreign power. No longer could the CPV compel internal cohesion within its ranks through rally-around-the-flag appeals to cohesion and unity At the same time, because the Vietnamese government became more professionalized, it meant bringing in non-communist officials.  This, added to the public’s disinterest in socialist ideals, especially after the capitalist reforms in 1986, meant that communist ideology no longer functioned as a way to bind the political structure together. And the CPV was no longer the sole arbitrator of nationalism. In the early 2000s, a popular strain of nationalism emerged among the public that accused the party of being unpatriotic for selling Vietnamese land to foreign (mainly Chinese) investors, which culminated in the momentous Bauxite protests of 2009.  Amid these social changes, a new generation of rent-seeking apparatchiks emerged – personified by Nguyen Tan Dung, who became prime minister in 2006 – who cast aside ideology and nationalism and instead embraced graft as a way of building their own personal power and binding the splintering party apparatus. This led to a reaction, however, from the more ideological factions of the party, led by Nguyen Phu Trong, who became party chief in 2012.  Vietnam’s Communist Party general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, left, gestures as he arrives at the National Assembly in Hanoi on Jan. 15, 2024. (Nhac Nguyen/AFP) However, it was only when he defeated Dung in the 2016 National Congress that Trong launched his anti-corruption campaign. Even then, dismissing or jailing the corrupt was only one side of the coin. Far more important, as Trong has acknowledged, has been his so-called “morality campaign”. Since 2016, he has reinstated socialist ideology and ethics as the defining factor of party membership.  To be promoted now, an official must at least rhetorically profess fealty to socialism and demonstrate a clean, hard-working lifestyle. At the same time, Trong has re-centralized power, taking away authority from the provincial officials and giving it to his small clique in Hanoi, which is one reason why he has struggled to find a successor, given that he has now cloaked his own position in so much power — perhaps the most since 1986 — that it has become even more precarious and existential if the CPV selects an unfit successor.  So what about next-door Laos?  Similar to Vietnam, it embraced decentralization in the 1990s, stripping the apparatchiks in Vientiane of some of their authority. Given its geography, the central party apparatus in Laos has always been unable to fully control what local officials do. Its capitalist reforms in the late 1980s also stripped socialist ideology as a common cause within Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP). In fact, the LPRP has long been less ideological than its Vietnamese counterpart.  Anti-corruption failure Nationalism, too, has disappeared. Indeed, the growing anti-Chinese chorus of Laotians has led many to regard the LPRP with disdain, believing it has allowed foreign businesses to destroy the environment and made Laotians second-class citizens.  Unlike in Vietnam, however, anti-corruption efforts have failed in Laos.  When he became prime minister in 2016, Thongloun Sisssoloth vowed to unleash a vast anti-graft campaign, but it had…

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State-funded film set during Indochina war attracts surprising interest

Editor06 mins

A state-funded film about a 1947 battle between French troops and Vietnamese resistance forces has attracted a surprising level of interest from theatergoers who have lined up to watch the movie and requested a wider distribution. “Dao, Pho va Piano” – or “Peach, Pho and Piano” in English (with pho referring to the famous Vietnamese noodles) – was released on Feb. 10, the first day of Tet, the Vietnamese Lunar New Year holiday. Vietnam’s government often uses the state budget to fund films about historical topics for propaganda purposes. But those movies often fail to attract viewers and are usually pulled from theaters after a short run. They sometimes later air on state television. Despite little advertising, word got out on social media that the film was worth watching. Last week, ticket requests crashed the website of Hanoi’s National Cinema Center and long lines were seen outside a Ho Chi Minh City theater. Battle of Hanoi The movie is set during the final days of the Battle of Hanoi, the first battle of the First Indochina War fought between the French and the Viet Minh, an independence-seeking coalition led by Vietnamese Communists. A key scene in the movie shows a barricade in Hanoi’s ancient quarter where Vietnamese militiamen use lunge mines – a type of suicide bomb used against tanks – to resist an attack by French forces.  The self-sacrifice allowed Viet Minh units to withdraw from the city to a region north of Hanoi, where they regrouped and later defeated the French. A scene in the film “Dao, Pho and Piano.” (Thanhuytphcm) The film’s director, Phi Tien Son, noted that Vietnam has produced a dearth of good historical films over the years. “The country’s cinema industry still owes the audience a lot regarding films about historical topics,” he told Vietnam Television. “I hope my colleagues will gradually pay that debt in the coming time.” Hanoi resident Nguyen Hoang Anh said the movie does a nice job of depicting the elegant, tragic and romantic characteristics of living in Hanoi in the 1940s.  But there are unrealistic battle scenes, some over-the-top theatrical dialogue and many illogical details, she told Radio Free Asia. The filmmakers should have made it clear that the story was a fictional reenactment of an historical event, she said. “What worried me is that the film made viewers wrongly think that the French planned to kill all residents and whoever stayed back [in Hanoi] would die,” she said.  “My family – both my mother’s and father’s sides – lived through that time in Hanoi,” she said. “In fact, there were options for those who decided to stay or leave.” Wider screenings The government spent 20 billion dong (US$812,000) to make the film, but didn’t allocate much funding for advertising or distribution, according to the state-affiliated VietNamNet, one of the country’s largest news portals. In response to demand, the few theaters showing the movie have increased the number of screenings from three times per day to 15 daily, according to state media.  As of Feb. 20, it has generated a revenue of more than 1 billion dong (US$40,600) – a surprising amount for a government-funded historical film. Last week, distribution company BETA Media agreed to show the movie in theaters nationwide, the head of Vietnam’s Cinema Department, Vi Kien Thanh, told VietNamNet. Translated by Anna Vu. Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster.

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Ford vans seen in Kim Jong Un’s entourage

Editor04 mins

North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency released at least two photos of vans used in Kim Jong Un’s motorcade that appeared to be made by Ford Motor Co., suggesting that Pyongyang has again evaded U.N. sanctions. One Feb. 29 photo of a groundbreaking ceremony shows Kim walking on a red carpet lined with soldiers at attention with the black passenger vans in the background.  Another shows the four of the vans bearing the Ford logo on the front driving behind a luxury black sedan.  The vehicles appear to be fourth generation Ford Transit vans that have been manufactured in North America since 2021. The photos didn’t show any passengers in the vans. A 2013 U.N. sanctions resolution bans the import of luxury cars into North Korea. Another U.N. resolution in 2017 banned the import of all means of transportation. But it’s widely believed that luxury goods are still being smuggled into North Korea. Two black Ford Transit vans are seen in the background during North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s visit to air force headquarters on Dec. 1, 2023. (KCNA)   T.R. Reid, director of corporate and public policy communications for Ford, told Radio Free Asia that Ford “fully complies” with sanctions against North Korea and other countries, and “doesn’t provide products or services in, to or through agents of the country.” “How these vehicles were procured for use in and brought to North Korea is unknown,” he said. In January 2023, a vehicle presumed to be a Mercedes-Benz Maybach GLS 600 belonging to Kim was revealed in images from North Korea’s Korean Central Television.  And at the end of last year, Kim and other top North Korean officials were seen arriving at Party Central Committee headquarters in a Mercedes-Benz S-Class car. Allowing the Ford vans to be photographed was a demonstration by Kim that he can still access luxury items from all over the world, said Bruce Bennett, a senior researcher at the Rand Institute. “American things like a Ford. German things, like a Mercedes,” he said. “He’s basically demonstrating his power and access that his people can get around all of these sanctions.” Translated by Jisoo Kim. Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster.

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Vietnamese police detain journalist Nguyen Vu Binh, family say

Editor04 mins

Authorities in Hanoi have detained a journalist and long-time critic of the Vietnamese government, a relative told RFA Vietnamese on Friday, in the latest sign of the squelching of dissent in the communist-ruled nation. Police took Nguyen Vu Binh, 55, into custody on Thursday. He was then briefly brought home to pack some clothes and his house searched on the basis of a warrant, the relative said.  His family was informed that he was being arrested but not provided any documents, before Binh departed with the police. The reason for his arrest was not immediately clear. “The police brought Nguyen Vu Binh home, read out the search warrant, a list of confiscated items and other documents, and took him away,” said the relative, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to security concerns. “However, he was not handcuffed.” Binh worked for 10 years as a reporter with the official Tap Chi Cong San, or Communist Review, before becoming a prominent activist in Hanoi. In December 2003, the Hanoi People’s Court sentenced him to seven years in jail for “espionage,” accusing him of collecting and composing documents “distorting” the democratic and human rights situation in Vietnam and sending them to “reactionary organizations” overseas. He was released in early 2007 as part of an amnesty order, after which he continued to participate in peaceful activities promoting human rights. Binh has been a regular contributor of blogs published on the RFA Vietnamese web site.  Running for re-election Nguyen Van Dai, a Germany-based human rights lawyer, told RFA that on Wednesday Binh had received a summons from the Hanoi Security Investigation Agency ordering him to attend a meeting on Thursday regarding his participation in video livestreams on the YouTube channel TNT Media Live, owned by San Jose, CA-based radio station Tieng Nuoc Toi, or My Country’s Language.  But Dai said that Binh had stopped participating in those programs in June 2022. Vietnam is ruled by a communist government that is intolerant of dissent. It is currently running for re-election as a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council. Vietnam sits 178th out of 180 nations on the Reporters Without Borders press freedom index. The Paris-backed watchdog says Vietnam is the world’s third largest jailer of journalists. New York-based Human Rights Watch presented Binh with the Hellman-Hammett Award twice, in 2002 and 2007, for writers around the world “who have been victims of political persecution and are in financial need.” He is also an honorary member of the International PEN organization.  Three bloggers who contributed to RFA Vietnamese are currently serving prison terms in Vietnam: Truong Duy Nhat, Nguyen Tuong Thuy, and Nguyen Lan Thang. Translated by Anna Vu. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Mat Pennington.

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Burmese city of Mongmit left ravaged after months of battles

Editor04 mins

Months of intense battles between anti-junta groups and junta forces have ravaged the city of Mongmit in Myanmar’s Shan state, resulting in widespread displacement, lootings and arson, according to locals.  Currently under junta control, the city was once a battleground where the Three Brotherhood Alliance clashed with junta forces. A ceasefire between the two, mediated by China, was established on Jan. 11, but battles persisted with the Kachin Independence Army, which did not partake in the ceasefire agreement. After launching attacks on Jan. 18, the KIA, in alliance with the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front and People’s Defense Forces, temporarily took over the city, residents told Radio Free Asia on Friday.  However, on Jan. 29, the junta forces recaptured the city through a fierce counterattack involving airstrikes and heavy artillery. This offensive led to the destruction of over 200 buildings, including key structures like the market, monasteries, and a school, as well as 100 residential homes. In this tumultuous period, close to 10,000 inhabitants evacuated the city, abandoning their homes and businesses for extended durations. The resulting void has triggered a wave of robberies throughout the urban neighborhoods, according to locals.  The Kachin Independence Army joint forces and the military junta fought in Mongmit city in northern Shan state on Jan. 28, 2024. (Citizen journalist) A resident, among those who have returned to the city, told RFA that he saw a group of people holding sticks and swords looting houses.  “They took everything without leaving anything behind. It was a group of people in plain clothes and most of them were criminals in the past,” said the resident who wished to remain anonymous for security reasons. “They did not even leave the fence door. They took it away and no one dared to say anything. Then they burned homes. It’s already like a ruined city.” Another woman from Mongmit said that nearly all the shops in the city had been looted, including her own. “Our shop has been looted and there is nothing left, just like every shop in the city now. It was broken into and our goods were stolen,” she said, declining to be identified for fear of reprisals. “It’s worse where there are no people now, some of them are returning to the city.” Mongmit and its neighboring city Mabein have been under martial law since Wednesday.  Shan state’s junta spokesperson, Khun Thein Maung, did not respond to RFA’s inquiries. According to the Shan Human Rights Foundation’s statement on Tuesday, a total of 27 civilians were killed by heavy artillery and airstrikes from Jan. 1 to Feb. 2, including two mass killings. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Taejun Kang.

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Exclusive: Kim Jong Un is now ‘Great Comrade,’ no longer ‘Great Leader’

Editor07 mins

North Korea’s supreme leader Kim Jong Un has received a new title, “Great Comrade,” signaling that the leadership wants to emphasize his achievements over his predecessors, father Kim Jong Il and grandfather Kim Il Sung, residents told Radio Free Asia. The shift from “Great Leader” to “Great Comrade” occurred sometime this month, as the country circulated a five-point oath – shared exclusively with RFA Korean – that must be sworn by all North Koreans to pledge their loyalty. The oath, sent to all organizations and institutions in the country, is read by officials at various events, including holidays and national anniversaries, and repeated by the people, said a North Korean resident who requested anonymity for security reasons Each of the five parts of the oath contains the title “Great Comrade.” The promise commits the speaker to “support and defend” Kim Jong Un “politically and ideologically,” and pledges that they will remain “loyal and obedient” to his sole leadership “at all costs,” and will only follow the “Mt. Paektu bloodline,” which refers to the Kim Dynasty. National founder Kim Il Sung and the ruling Kim family is said to have strong connections to Mt. Paektu, the tallest mountain on the Korean peninsula and a sacred peak in Korean mythology. The oath goes on to say the speaker is armed with the “revolutionary ideology of Great Comrade Kim Jong Un” and commits them to “vigorously participate in the construction of socialism,” and fight against anti-socialism. It concludes by pledging to dedication “to the final victory of the Juche revolution and National Unification.” Juche is North Korea’s founding ideology of self-reliance. Elevating his status The five points are preceded by a singular statement about working towards the socialist theory known as “Great Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism” – but after that, neither Kim’s father nor grandfather are mentioned. The lack of emphasis on Kim’s predecessors suggests that the government wants to elevate his status above them, according to Jiro Ishimaru of the Osaka-based Asia Press, a news outlet that specializes in North Korea. The cover of the oath administered to all North Korean residents. (RFA) “In the past there were consistent messages saying that we should not forget the leadership of Grand Marshal Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and carry out their instructions,” Ishimaru said.  “But in this oath, these messages have almost disappeared. It refers to ‘Great Comrade Kim Jong Un’ and only mentions that Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism is to be maintained,” he said. “It certainly seems like a lot has changed.” The new oath places unique emphasis on Kim Jong Un, whereas previously the government included adherence to the ideologies of the predecessors to project a sense of continuity to enhance the perception of his legitimacy, Cheong Seong-chang, the director of the Center for Korean Peninsula Strategy at the Sejong Institute, told RFA.  “In the past, they expressed their stance to inherit the ideology and policies of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. But there are many differences between Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il’s policies and Kim Jong Un’s policies,” he said. “This oath basically puts Kim Jong Un’s instructions and guidance forward as the absolute standard. So, it seems that Kim Jong Un’s leadership is firmly rooted now.” Dropping national unification  Recently, the North Korean government has reversed its official stance on reunification, and no longer considers it a priority. This makes the fifth clause of the oath, which mentions national unification, obsolete. Experts therefore believe that this oath was written in 2021 or earlier. A resident of North Korea who requested anonymity for safety reasons said that instructions were given to officials to skip the part about national unification when reading the oath.  Experts expect that a revised version of this oath will be circulated soon to reflect the shift away from the South, which in recent months North Korea has defined as its “primary enemy.”  Additionally, Pyongyang has ended economic cooperation with Seoul, and has stopped using language that considers Koreans on both sides of the DMZ as belonging to the same race of people.  Translated by Claire Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.

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Investigative Journalism Reportika © March 2022 by Ij-Reportika is licensed under CC BY 4.0