Government overconfidence could cloud a brighter future for Laos

It may sound  perverse to say – given that inflation in Laos has been at one of the highest rates in Asia since 2022, the national debt stands at more than 130 percent of GDP – but the second-poorest nation in Southeast Asia has many reasons for optimism. Tourism is likely to return to pre-pandemic levels this year. Its ASEAN chairmanship this year is greatly boosting its international profile—and, thus, international trade prospects.  Vientiane has sensibly bet on food exports to China, since China’s demographics are arguably the worst in the world and is set to have the fastest population decline in human history. Even today, China cannot feed itself. It imports around 65.8 percent of all foodstuff.   Although that was down from 93.6 percent in 2000, external demand is likely to rise in the coming years as its working-age population collapses, forcing even more rural folk into the cities and industries. It is therefore a solid bet by Vientiane that agriculture exports to China will grow in the coming decades. Its exports increased to $1.4 billion in 2023, up by a quarter from the previous year.  The Vientiane-Kunming railway has already expanded export opportunities into China. If Laos can attract interest from consumers further west, in Central Asia and Europe, it can use the railway links through China to increase trade.  Better still, if Laos can extend its rail network down to Thailand’s ports, again thanks to Chinese investment, that would make it easier and cheaper to export its goods further afield.  Travelers walk toward the first Beijing-Laos cross-border tourist train at the Beijing Railway Station on March 18, 2024. (Jia Tianyong/China News Service/VCG via Getty Images) Better than that, Vietnam has pledged to connect Laos via railways to its port in Vung Ang, which would make it easier for trans-Pacific exports, opening up Laos’ producers to the U.S. market.  Politically, too, the communist Lao People’s Revolutionary Party can be confident in its own monopoly on power. There is no meaningful resistance group among the diaspora or at home. Unlike communist Vietnam, there is nothing like a pro-democracy movement.  Perhaps most heartening for Vientiane, and something often overlooked, Laos has the youngest population of all the ASEAN states and the healthiest-looking demographics over the coming three decades.  Just 4.7 percent of the population is aged above 65. Some 65.4 percent are of working age (15-64) and 29.9 percent are below the age of 15. By 2050, the working age population will actually grow to 68 percent, while just a tenth will be of retirement age by that year.  Aged versus aging societies By comparison, in 2050, a fifth of Vietnam’s population will be aged 65 and over. In Thailand it will be around a third.  Laos won’t become an “aging society” – when 7 percent of the population is aged above 65 – until 2035. It won’t become an “aged society” – when the over-65 cohort is above 14 percent) – until 2059. One reason for this, however, is the country’s shorter life expectancy. Vietnam became an “aging” society in 2011; Thailand became “aged” in 2020. Moreover, when Thailand became an “aging” society in 2002 its GDP per capita was $2,091. Vietnam reached it in 2011 when its GDP per capita was $1,953.  Laos’ GDP per capita stands at $2,535, and it still has another decade or so before it touches “aging” society status. This means that Laos has at least 30 years before demographics start to bite, and even by 2050 there will still be double the number of youngsters aged 0-15 than retirees.  That gives Laos three decades to expand industry and output. For these reasons, political leaders in Vientiane often give off the air of extreme patience, as though they’re sitting pretty on borrowed time.  On the trade front, Laos achieved above 7 percent growth rates in the 2010s when its trade was almost entirely with its immediate neighbors. New infrastructure could open up vastly more markets and attract far more investment in industry and manufacturing, which remains nascent.  Young people splash water at each other in celebration of the Songkran festival in Vientiane, April 14, 2023. (Kaikeo Saiyasane/Xinhua via Getty Images) Railway connections to ports in neighboring countries can help Laos overcome its landlocked confinement at the same time as its workforce booms in number – with around 2 million Laotians to be added to the workforce by 2050.    However, not all is well. The economy has been shockingly bad since 2020, not all of which was caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.  The government and central bank have been incompetent in constraining inflation—and just about all other economic ailments.  The national debt started to climb to unmanageable levels by 2018. Laos imports too much and has barely any control over exports.  The government admits that close to a third of export revenue doesn’t reenter the country. Mostly it is funneled to foreign-owned companies, or profits are hidden, denying Laos a massive chunk of available taxes.  Education, tax collection concerns It’s unlikely that Laos can fully weaken itself off imports. Dispensing of its petroleum dependency would be sensible, given that Laos produces more than enough energy through its hydropower dams. But that means converting most transport and machinery to electric battery-powered, which is simply too expensive for most countries, not least Laos. It still also relies massively on imports for agricultural inputs such as fertilizers.  Since 2020, ever greater numbers of Laotians have left to find work abroad, mainly in Thailand. This has depopulated many rural communities, leaving the elderly to tend to the young. Many of those who have left are the better-educated.  At the same time, the education sector is now in poorer health than pre-2020, although government spending on education began to fall as a percentage of GDP much earlier. Non-attendance or absentee rates are high among students, and teacher numbers are dwindling.  It’s difficult to see how this generation of children, buffeted by the pandemic and shoddy schooling, will become as…

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Young activists recall abuse at Hong Kong juvenile correctional facility

Young political activists jailed under a crackdown on public dissent have described a litany of physical and sexual abuse inside one of Hong Kong’s juvenile offender facilities, according to recent online reports and interviews with RFA Mandarin and The Reporter magazine. While accounts of abuse and sexual assault by police officers and prison guards have emerged in recent years among former protesters and activists, not many have been confirmed or even fully investigated. But on Jan. 19, a Correctional Services officer and five young inmates at the Pik Uk Correctional Institution were remanded in custody on charges of causing “serious bodily harm” to an 18-year-old inmate, including causing rectal perforations with a wooden implement, online court news service The Witness reported. The victim required surgery and a stoma bag as a consequence of the attack, the report said. The case prompted another young activist who had been detained in the same juvenile facility under the 2020 National Security Law to speak about another unreported incident there. Wong Yat Chin, of the activist group Student Politicism, took to Facebook to talk about a rape and abuse and anal assault with a toothbrush perpetrated on a 15-year-old boy in Pik Uk, which houses young male inmates up to the age of 21. “The 15-year-old boy was under duress and didn’t dare to tell his family about the anal rape,” Wong wrote. “It wasn’t until he was hospitalized for persistent bleeding that Correctional Services officers called the police.” “A few months later, the police gave up the prosecution, saying there was insufficient evidence,” wrote Wong, who was serving a three-year jail term in Pik Uk at the time. The Correctional Services Department then issued a statement accusing Wong of “slander.” But the Ming Pao newspaper later reported that a case sounding much like the one he described was reported to police on Jan. 30, 2022. According to Wong, prison guards don’t always carry out assaults themselves, but allow certain inmates known as “B Boys” special privileges to “discipline” fellow inmates. He also described bullying and physical assaults he and his fellow inmates suffered at the hands of guards and other inmates acting under duress. Youth prison population growing Since the pro-democracy movement of 2014, the authorities have prosecuted large numbers of young people for taking part in “illegal” public gatherings, “rioting” and other protest-related charges, as well as more serious offenses like “terrorism” and “subversion” for peaceful activism under the 2020 National Security law. According to the Hong Kong Correctional Services Department, the number of people in custody under the age of 21 rose from 4% to 6% of the total population, with a total juvenile prison population of around 450 as of the end of 2022. Hong Kong democracy activist Tony Chung poses in a bedroom in Britain on December 29, 2023 (Ben Stansall/AFP) A former Pik Uk inmate who gave only the pseudonym Cheung Tz Hin for fear of reprisals told RFA and The Reporter that he recalls an incident in which guards had a group of seven cellmates squat down in a stairwell that wasn’t covered by surveillance cameras after they sang the banned protest anthem “Glory to Hong Kong” in their cell the night before. To their shock, Cheung and the others were slapped around by the guard. “At first I thought he would stop short,” he said. “I never expected he would actually hit us.” From time to time after that, guards would also shove Cheung and another cellmate around at random times, elbowing them and hitting them on the palms or the soles of the feet with a metal ruler, Cheung recalled. Prison rules bar singing by inmates, but Cheung said exceptions were made for inmates who sang songs with no political content, for their own entertainment. “It felt like the correctional officers were really selective, and targeted us in particular,” he said. Beaten within earshot He said guards and their proxies used to take their victims to the stairwell behind the daily activities room, where the sounds of them being beaten would drift through for the other young inmates to hear. One inmate would walk around on crutches after these assaults, he said. “We could see a little [of what was going on] through a gap, but mostly we could just hear the sound of hitting, which was very regular,” Cheung said. “We would see him walking around on crutches because the soles of both feet had been beaten.” Hong Kong activist Wong Yat-chin, who founded a group called Student Politicism in 2020, poses during an interview with AFP in Hong Kong July 14, 2021. (Anthony Wallace/AFP) The attacks were to have tragic consequences. After four nights of this treatment, Cheung heard the guards gossiping about the boy’s suicide attempt by drinking detergent. He fell to the ground foaming at the mouth, and had to be sent to an external hospital for gastric lavage, Cheung heard them saying. He was later transferred to a forensic psychiatric facility at Castle Peak Hospital, but never returned. “Usually, he would have come back to Pik Uk 14 days later,” Cheung said, “but I never saw him again, and I heard from the staff that he never came back from Castle Peak Hospital.” Hong Kong independence activist Tony Chung, who has served a 21-month jail term for “secession” under the 2020 National Security Law, spent some time after his release campaigning for the rights of other prisoners in Hong Kong. He told RFA Mandarin and The Report that he once tried to help a teenage inmate “forced to have oral sex to the point of ejaculation” by another inmate at Pik Uk to file a complaint. But he was never allowed to meet with the youth alone, only with another inmate who he suspected was actually the perpetrator of the alleged assault. “The older inmate who was rumored to be the perpetrator asked him in a provocative tone of voice: ‘Has someone been treating you badly? Tell me!’ and…

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Returning from China, North Korean workers are paid in dubious IOUs

North Korean workers returning from China with hopes of a big payday are incensed because the government is not paying them in cash. Instead, it’s giving them bank-issued money vouchers, which the workers are worried might end up being worthless, residents told Radio Free Asia. The vouchers, essentially IOUs, were issued in 2021 in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic. Authorities explained that they could be used just like cash, and that they would be phased out once the pandemic ended.  Until then, the vouchers – printed on lower quality paper than the currency –  are supposed to be traded with cash on a 1:1 ratio, but nobody knows how long they will be good. North Koreans are already distrustful of their government on money matters because in 2009 it revalued the won, issued new currency and limited the amount of older currency that could be traded for the newer one, wiping out the life savings of many.  Since then, faith in the won has been shaky, so dollars, euros and yuan are therefore freely traded in North Korean marketplaces. Faith in the vouchers is even shakier than the won. “Most of the workers feel like they have returned empty-handed, so they are angry,” a resident of the northwestern province of North Pyongan told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons. “Although the party emphasizes that the money vouchers should be used without restrictions like cash, people distrust them because the authorities clearly stated that they are a temporary measure due to the prolonged COVID-19 crisis,” she said. Assumptions When workers are sent overseas – mostly to China – there’s already an understanding that the lion’s share of their wages will be forwarded to the cash-strapped government in Pyongyang.  The remainder, however, is several times more than what they would earn doing the same job in North Korea.  So the Chinese companies get cheap labor, the government gets a lot of foreign cash, and the workers still come out ahead – or such was the assumption. The workers, mostly young women working in factories, had been in China since before the pandemic, some for six years or more. Because they were earning yuan in China the workers thought they would be paid in yuan upon their return. But they are now told to accept payment in money vouchers, which the people have very little confidence in, the North Pyongan resident said. Red tape and unfair exchange rates On top of this, the government appears to be exploiting the workers further through red tape and unfair exchange rates, the sources said.  “The market exchange rate is 1,700 to 1,800 won per Chinese yuan,” she said. “But the announced rate is fixed at 1,260 won per yuan, so the workers are getting screwed.” The Chinese companies paid 2,500 yuan (about US$350) for each worker every month, but about two-thirds of this money was sent to the state.  The workers were said to be earning about 800 yuan ($110) per month, but then red tape fees cut into even that amount. “There’s management fees at headquarters, maintenance costs at the consular department, insurance costs, social subsidies, and accommodation fees,” the resident said. “When all is said and done the workers are said to be getting between 100 and 300 yuan (US$13-41) for the whole month.” Remarkably, that is still above the paltry salaries for government-assigned jobs in North Korea. Another North Pyongan resident said that the workers are getting a raw deal after putting in 14-hour days in China and now have to accept payment in money vouchers. “The selection of workers dispatched overseas is still ongoing these days, but not many workers are willing to go to China,” she said. “The poor working environment and intensive labor exploitation in China, as well as the fact that the payment is not properly compensated, have become widely known facts.” She said that some of the workers who returned this time gave up all of their wages and returned with nothing, after the authorities compelled them to donate to various funds and subsidies. These include supporting national and local construction projects, condolence donations for the late former leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il on their death anniversaries, and funds to strengthen national defense. “They won’t see even a single yuan coin for all their hard work in China,” the first resident said.  Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.

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Ethnic army seizes major trade route on Myanmar-Chinese border

An ethnic army seized five military junta camps near the Myanmar-Chinese border, residents told Radio Free Asia on Friday. During an offensive, the Kachin Independence Army, or KIA, captured encampments under junta Battalion 366 near Kachin state’s Momauk township. The seizure also gave the ethnic armed group partial control of a China-Myanmar border trade road after the Thursday offensive. Since Myanmar’s February 2021 coup, fighting between the KIA and junta forces has raged for weeks at a time over the state’s lucrative jade mines and the rebel army’s historical stronghold near its headquarters on the Myanmar-China border. The KIA now controls portions of two major trade roads in the state since its partial capture of the domestic Myitkyina-Bhamo highway in early March, in addition to a junta camp under Battalion 142 in Momauk township. A battle further north in Lai Zar caused shells to land in China, burning down several houses, residents said.  One resident told RFA that the junta retaliated with air strikes after Yaw Yung Artillery and Hpaleng Hill camps were captured Thursday. “Yaw Yung was entirely captured and Hpaleng camp was also captured yesterday,” he said, asking to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals. “The junta’s air force came to open fire while KIA troops were confiscating things in these camps after the captures.” Yaw Yung is an important strategic camp because of the high-level commander stationed there and its proximity to trading posts with China, residents living near the captured camps said.  Kachin army troops are currently stationed in Lwegel city, about 11 kilometers (seven miles) from Yaw Yung Artillery camp, residents said, adding that they are negotiating with junta troops and administration staff on their exit from the city. RFA contacted Kachin state’s junta spokesperson Moe Min Thein and KIA spokesperson Col. Naw Bu on the junta’s surrender, but neither responded. A statement on the KIA’s Facebook page on March 28, said three camps were captured on the 27th and two on the 28th, namely Shan Tai, Bang Yau, Law Mun, Hpaleng and Yaw Yung. The KIA and joint guerilla armies have captured over 40 junta camps in Momauk and Waingmaw townships near the KIA’s headquarters in Lai Zar city in Kachin state as of Thursday.  Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn.

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Rohingya activists call for more control of aid money

Rohingya Muslim activists representing fellow refugees forced out of Myanmar and into “prison-like” camps in Bangladesh said in Washington on Thursday that foreign aid to the camps would go further if some of it was given directly to refugee-run groups. But a representative of the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, said little money was left over after aid cuts that currently see the refugees provided with only $10 worth of food a month. About 90% of the 1.2 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh struggled to have “acceptable food consumption” late last year, according to the World Food Programme, when their monthly ration of food was bumped up from about $8 to about $10 per person.  Speaking at an event on Capitol Hill to mark two years since the United States labelled Myanmar’s atrocities in 2017 against the Rohingya a “genocide,” the activists said aid was not always spent in ways most helpful for the Rohingya refugees living in Cox’s Bazar. “There are ways to do it effectively,” said Yasmin Ullah, a Canada-based rights activist born in Myanmar’s Rakhine state and the director of the Rohingya Maiyafuinor Collaborative Network. Yasmin Ullah of the Rohingya community is interviewed outside the International Court in The Hague, Netherlands, Jan. 23, 2020. (Peter Dejong/AP) The activist said her group had raised $20,000 through crowdfunding to be disbursed by refugee-run groups in the camp to improve livelihoods there. But she noted global aid flows were far larger. “We know our issues. We know how and where to put this money. We can run with $10,000 farther than any other humanitarian groups can,” she said. “We are asking for aid to be utilized and to directly go to refugee-led initiatives and refugee-led organizations.” Unsolved problems Aid for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh has dwindled, with less than two-thirds of the approximately $850 million in annual aid requested by aid agencies in the country being fulfilled, a U.N. report said. Lucky Karim, a Rohingya refugee who resettled in the U.S. state of Illinois in 2022 and now works with the International Campaign for the Rohingya, said that any international aid sent to help people in the camps “means a lot to us as refugees” and was appreciated. But she questioned why the hundreds of millions of dollars flowing into the camps each year were not improving conditions. “It’s not about how many years the U.S. has been supporting Rohingya,” Karim said. “What are you guys able to solve?” “Did you solve the labor issue? Did you solve the sexual and domestic and the other violence in the camps? Did you solve the human trafficking issue? Did you figure out the security risks at the camp? Did you figure out and identify the gangs and the nonstate actors in the camp at night?” she said. “Those are the only questions we have.” Requests for more help, she added, were “not just about increasing funding,” with many Rohingyas understanding funds are limited.  “When it comes to the funding issue, when I talked to USAID, for example, they’re like, ‘Oh no Lucky, we have other places in war, like Gaza, for example, and Ukraine, for example,’” Karim recounted, noting there were “many other cases coming up every few years.” Like Ullah, she said some aid could be spent more effectively. “The amount of funding you’re sending to Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar and elsewhere should go to the right people at the right time to the needed situations,” she said. “How do you ensure it without Rohingya’s involvement in the decision making process?” Limited funds Peter Young, the USAID director for South and Central Asia, told the event that the United States had sent more than $1.9 billion in aid to support Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh since the 2017 genocide. Brothers Mohammed Akter, 8, and Mohammed Harun, 10, pose for a photograph on the floor of their burned shelter after a fire damaged thousands of shelters at the Balukhali refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, March 25, 2021. (Mohammad Ponir Hossain/Reuters) But he acknowledged the global aid being made available “is not sufficient to meet the needs of people” in the refugee camps. What was once a $12 monthly food ration to the refugees, he explained, was cut to just $8 last year before the eventual bump back to $10. At the end of the day, he said, aid groups were left grappling with the fact they have few funds left after disbursing those meager rations. “We certainly agree with – as Lucky said – the importance of working with and through the Rohingya community,” Young said. “We do make sure our projects that are implemented there are staffed by Rohingya there [or] developed in consultation with community leaders.” “At the same time, if you do the math, $10 a month for a million people consumes our entire budget pretty quickly,” he said. “So the bandwidth that we have to do other programming besides food is limited.” One of the first priorities for the refugee camps outside of food would be “durable shelters,” Young said, due to both the propensity of the camps to be hit by devastating disasters and the “understanding that there will be a lot of people there for some time into the future.” But for the Rohingya activists, that’s only a start. Karim, the Illinois-based refugee, said little will change in the camps until Rohingyas are given some decision-making powers – and “not just coming to D.C. every six months” for forums on Capitol Hill. “You take a bunch of notes, you leave us, you forget us,” the activist said. “We want a specific seat at the table.” Edited by Malcolm Foster.

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Vietnam police suspend officer in connection with suspicious death

Police in Vietnam’s Dong Nai province have suspended an officer involved in the case of Vu Minh Duc who died just hours after being summoned for investigation. His family told Radio Free Asia his body bore signs of torture after it was released from hospital on March 22, the day he died. On March 27, Tien Phong (The Pioneers) newspaper reported that Capt. Thai Thanh Thuong, deputy head of the Police Team for Social Order Crimes Investigation of Long Thanh District Police had been suspended. The female officer signed the notice to summon Duc to the local police station on the morning of March 22. The decision to temporarily suspend the officer, signed by the director of Dong Nai Provincial Police, took effect on March 24. It did not specify why she was suspended. As reported by RFA, Duc, was accompanied by his relatives to the district police’s headquarters in accordance with the summons notice, to work with investigator Thai Thanh Huong or investigator Luu Quang Trung regarding a case of “disrupting public order” in connection with a fight on Oct. 7, 2023 in An Phuoc commune. On the afternoon of March 22, his family was informed that Duc had fainted during the interrogation and was sent to Long Thanh District’s General Hospital for emergency care. He later was transferred to a hospital in Ho Chi Minh City, and when his family arrived, the doctors told them Duc had died. According to the death certificate of Cho Ray Hospital, Duc died because of a coma, acute kidney failure, acute liver failure, and injuries to the soft parts of his left and right thigh. The National Forensic Institute worked with the Dong Nai Provincial Police and the Long Thanh District Police to conduct an autopsy on the afternoon of March 23, 2024, to find out the cause of his death. His family was not allowed either to take photos of the autopsy or to receive the autopsy report. “His chest area, his skin had swellings and dents, and his thighs and buttocks were swollen. In addition, the level of bruising was noteworthy. Taking a deep look inside when he was operated on, I saw a lot of blood clots inside, penetrating deep into the bone. They were not normal bruises,” Vu Hoang Phu, who witnessed the autopsy told RFA on March 27. “On his two wrists there were scratches forming circle shapes, our family believe they were handcuffs traces. “Together with other traces on his body, the family thought there seemed to have been some kind of great force put on his body.” Phu said his family had received many calls and messages, saying that in addition to Thai Thanh Huong and Luu Quang Trung three other district police officers had also taken part in Duc’s interrogation. His family arrived at Cho Ray Hospital, around 9:50 p.m. on March 22 and a doctor informed that Mr. Duc had passed away. However, the hospital’s death certificate said he died at 11:00 p.m. “Our family is now very sad and cannot understand, plus terrified by the level of pain he had suffered. We still don’t know who beat Duc to such an extent, and what objects were used to investigate/interrogate him,” Phu said. He said his family had sent petitions to multiple agencies, asking them to clarify where and when his brother died, who participated in his interrogation, and why there were bruises on his body. Translated by Anna Vu. Edited by Mike Firn and Taejun Kang.

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Vietnam arrests Buddhist abbot from Khmer Krom minority

Vietnamese police on Tuesday arrested a Buddhist abbot and two followers – all members of the Khmer Krom ethnic minority – for their alleged roles in two separate incidents involving a pagoda in the country’s south. The nearly 1.3-million strong Khmer Krom ethnic group live in a part of Vietnam that was once southeastern Cambodia. They face discrimination in Vietnam and suspicion in Cambodia, where they are often perceived not as Cambodians but as Vietnamese.  The arrested abbot, Thach Chanh Da Ra, born in 1990, is head of the Dai Tho Pagoda in Tam Binh district in Vinh Long province.  He and Kim Khiem, born in 1978, had posted allegedly slandering and insulting videos on social media and were charged with “abusing the rights to democratic freedom,” in violation of Article 331, a law that rights groups have said is vaguely written and often used to stifle dissent.  Ra was dismissed from the government-recognized Vietnam Buddhist Sangha in December. Police also arrested Thach Ve Sanal, another member of the pagoda, on charges of “illegally arresting, holding, or detaining people,” for his alleged role in an incident that occurred when a task force entered the pagoda to investigate on Nov. 22, 2023. The arrests took place just a week after authorities sentenced two other Khmer Krom to prison for “abusing democratic freedoms,” and about a month after a third was given three-and-a-half years on the same charge. False accusations The government’s accusations about the three men arrested Tuesday are fabricated, Duong Khai, a monk at the pagoda, told RFA Vietnamese. “They distorted and slandered us, not the other way around,” he said. “They constantly come to harass us and disrupt security and public order. They disturbed our indigenous Khmer Krom community and gave us no days of peace.” Khai said that the Vietnamese authorities arrest whoever they dislike, especially if they dare to speak up and tell the truth about the government’s wrongdoings. “They arrested Kim Khiem because he had spoken out about their repression (of Khmer Krom,)” he said. “As for the abbot, Thach Chanh Da Ra, the authorities have repeatedly harassed (him) since the tree-cutting incident.” Vietnamese authorities have arrested Thach Ve Sanal on charges of “illegally arresting, holding or detaining people” under Article 157 of the Penal Code. (congan.vinhlong.gov.vn) More than a year ago, the Buddhist followers elected Ra to replace the former abbot of the pagoda, Thach Xuoi, because they believed Xuoi had colluded with authorities to cut down a 700-year-old tree in the pagoda that had become a community symbol.  Ra and Khiem were arrested when they were returning to the pagoda after conducting services elsewhere, the monk said. International condemnation The Vietnamese government is unfairly targeting Ra as a means to force the pagoda to join the officially recognized Sangha, the U.S.-based Kampuchea Krom Khmers Federation said in a press release Tuesday. The organization called on authorities to drop all charges and release all three of the arrested people, and said the United Nations and the international community should condemn Vietnam – a member of the U.N. Human Rights Council – for its suppression of religious freedom. RFA attempted to contact the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Embassy of Vietnam in Cambodia for comment but received no response. The charges against Ra are “bogus” according to Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at New York-based Human Rights Watch. “The Vietnamese government is deliberately harassing, discriminating against, and abusing the Khmer Krom leaders who stand up for their language, culture, and Theravadan Buddhism, and this crackdown is extending to senior Buddhist monks asserting their right to freedom of religion and belief,” Robertson said. He said that Ra’s arrest showed that government officials have no respect for the religious beliefs of the Khmer Krom. Robertson said that the U.S. Department of State should recognize the severity of Vietnam’s repression and designate it a country of particular concern for its violations of religious freedom. Translated by Anna Vu and Samean Yun. Edited by Eugene Whong.

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Junta helicopter crashes during training exercise in Myanmar

A junta-owned military helicopter crashed in northern Myanmar, according to a statement by officials on Wednesday.  The accident was caused by mechanical failure during a training exercise in Mandalay region’s Meiktila city on Tuesday, the press release stated, adding that the pilot and trainee onboard were not injured during the crash. Meiktila is home to the junta’s Air Force Central Command. Former junta air force sergeant Zayya told Radio Free Asia crashes have become more frequent because military aircraft are constantly in use by junta officials.  “We have seen more aircraft crashes and the use of helicopters has increased,” said the man, who goes by one name. “Many of the aircraft that have come to us have weaknesses. Overuse of the aircraft will continue to happen.” It’s important to check the condition of aircraft after each use, he added, but the junta can no longer do that because of the frequency they are being used in carrying out attacks all over the nation. According to a September report by the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, airstrike attacks increased in Myanmar by 324% between 2021 and 2023.  On Feb. 29, a fighter jet crashed near Magway region’s Kyu Wun village in central Myanmar. Just weeks earlier, a military plane repatriating troops who fled to India skidded off the runway at Mizoram state’s Lengpui Airport. These crashes were preceded by more infrequent crashes in earlier years of the coup. In November 2022, a training pilot plane crashed in Tanintharyi region’s Thayetchaung township. In June 2021, a junta passenger plane crash killed 12 people at Pyinoolwin’s nearby Anisakhan Airport in Mandalay region. The dead included a monk, two army majors, a captain and a corporal. According to data compiled by RFA, rebel armies in Kachin, Kayin and Karenni states, as well as guerilla armies, or People’s Defense Forces, claim to have shot down seven transport helicopters and fighter jets in the three years since the 2021 coup. Five additional junta aircraft have crashed due to technical or human error. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn.

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Sign says Phnom Penh land dispute is settled – but residents disagree

A long-running land dispute in Cambodia’s capital of Phnom Penh took another twist Tuesday when authorities posted a big sign saying that evicted residents have agreed to move to another location – even though most residents said that wasn’t true. The dispute began nearly five years ago when former Prime Minister Hun Sen gave residential land near Tamok Lake to developers who plan to build a high-rise building.  Ever since, authorities have been trying to evict about 200 families from their homes in the Samrong Tbong community in the capital’s Prek Pnov district. Land disputes are common in Cambodia and other Southeast Asian countries. Government officials routinely seize land for lucrative real estate ventures, leaving displaced local residents with little or no recourse. About three weeks ago, about 50 residents began a protest on the land – some of them in waist-deep muddy water around the construction site – to demand that President Hun Manet’s government grant them the right to keep their land. On Tuesday, district authorities put up a metal sign nearly two meters, or 6 feet, wide, saying: “This location has been settled according to [government] policy.” A view of some of the houses in the Tamok Lake area of Phnom Penh, Cambodia, March 26, 2024. (Citizen journalist) But representatives of the community say the sign does not reflect the will of the majority. Samrong Tbong community representative Sea Davy told Radio Free Asia that 27 families accepted land swaps with the authorities, while 70 others refused the deal, wanting to remain on their land and build houses.  She asked the government to grant residents, who do not want land in a different area, the right to build on their own land. The land dispute has left some of the people impoverished and with high debt, while some children have dropped out of school to help their parents earn a living.  RFA was unable to reach Phnom Penh Gov. Khuong Sreng or district Gov. Them Sam An for comment. Residents say they will continue to protest until a solution is found. Translated by Yun Samean for RFA Khmer. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.

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Hong Kong journalists’ new norm is to do a job under ‘unclear’ laws

For Hong Kong journalists, there is absolutely no room for old habits, even if they die hard.  The city’s second national security law passed swiftly last week has widened the scope of what constitutes a breach of national security. It has also raised the  risk of news reporting which has already increased since the Beijing-imposed first law came in 2020 and  China increasingly encroached on the city. “What had been habitually acceptable, normal practice before, is no longer the case,” said a veteran journalist who declined to be named. “Journalists have to relearn and recalibrate.” This means throwing into the wind best practices in journalism. In their place, the most experienced practitioners are learning by reviewing daily how government officials posture and how the court rules, the veteran journalist told Radio Free Asia. Another seasoned journalist who also spoke on condition of anonymity said while the immediate effects of the new law officially known as the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance have yet to be seen, the editorial process – from a journalist reporting the news to editors editing the story for publication – has become much more complex. “For instance, if you have a scoop on a new government policy – would you report and publish that or would it be a breach of law? We don’t know what is considered lawful or what can become questionable,” the seasoned journalist explained, echoing the veteran journalist’s view of the unease that has been clouding the media since 2020. The change in journalistic practices started nearly four years ago, after China’s parliament passed the National Security Law. However, the introduction of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance last week, also referred to as Article 23  based on a clause in Hong Kong’s mini constitution, the Basic Law – has intensified the concerns and uncertainties that Hong Kong journalists have faced over the past few years. While there are overlaps with the first law, Article 23 has also created new offenses, given increased punishment for offenders and afforded the government sweeping new powers to crack down on all forms of dissent on the grounds of treason, insurrection, sabotage that endangers national security, external interference in Hong Kong’s affairs, and espionage and theft of state secrets.  “National security” in Article 23 is defined as identical to the first law, by China’s definition, which journalists and critics viewed as vague and heightened uncertainties.  In both laws, national security refers to “the status in which the state’s political regime, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the welfare of the people, sustainable economic and social development, and other major interests of the state are relatively free from danger and internal or external threats, and the capability to maintain a sustained status of security.”  Henry Tong, an exiled Hong Kong activist who is currently living in Taiwan, tears a a piece of cardboard with 23 on it, during a protest against Hong Kong’s Article 23 law in Taipei, Taiwan, March 23, 2024. (Ann Wang/Reuters) Under Article 23, insurrection and sabotage can be punished with life imprisonment. Jail terms for sedition are increased from two years to seven, or 10 if alleged perpetrators are found to have colluded with a foreign force. The law also allows for a lengthening detention period without charge from 48 hours to two weeks, as well as expanded the British colonial-era offense of “sedition” to include inciting hatred against the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The Hong Kong government had not responded to Radio Free Asia’s request for comment on Article 23’s effect on journalists at the time of publication. When uncertain, self censor Journalists who remained in the field observed that self censorship is now second nature in the profession and on the increase in Hong Kong, once Asia’s bastion of free press and expression, and one of the very virtues that helped propel the city to an international financial center. “Before, you just report the news; as balanced as you can be, after getting all sides of the issue. Now, you would think twice and more times, whether to even report. It’s become a collective decision involving more editors and often lawyers,” said the seasoned journalist. “Or you simply don’t report.”  Article 23 can also apply to actions that take place outside Hong Kong – by both residents and businesses – a move seen as key to what critics described as China’s “long arm” to hunt down overseas pro-democracy activists and “anti-China elements.” “It also makes reporting about overseas protests as journalists previously did, risky because you might be seen as providing a platform to these organizations abroad,” pointed out the veteran journalist, adding that these days, the approach is to wait for an official line from the Hong Kong government before publication of such types of news. Indeed, Hong Kong media outlets were sparing in coverage of overseas protests against the first day of Article 23’s implementation on Saturday. When they did, the angle was to convey the annoyance of citizens of foreign cities unsettled by the chaos created by the demonstrations.  A case in point: HK01, an online news portal in Hong Kong, reported Saturday on disgruntled Taiwanese people who told protesters, many of whom were immigrants from Hong Kong, at a Taipei rally to “go back to Hong Kong” and not to mess up Taiwan.  Robert Tsao, founder of United Microelectronics Corp., speaks with his staff after a news conference in Taipei on Sept. 1, 2022. (Ann Wang/Reuters) At the same reported Taipei event in the bustling Ximen district, demonstrators were joined by Robert Tsao, founder of chip-making giant United Microelectronics Corporation and former Hong Kong resident, who blasted the Chinese Communist Party for upholding authoritarianism in the guise of national security and through the “laughable” concept of “subverting the nation” when the country and regime are separate notions.  “The CCP has tied the political regime with the country, which is a scam and extremely absurd,” Tsao said, as he warned that the fate of Taiwan and Hong Kong…

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