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Police video of detained unofficial Vietnamese monk allays fears

Supporters of an unofficial monk who had become an internet hit but then disappeared for a few days after Vietnamese authorities detained him last week breathed a sigh of relief on Monday after police published a video of him receiving a new national ID card. Monday’s video of 43-year-old Le Anh Tu, better known as Thich Minh Tue, allayed concerns after an interview with him Friday on a state-run news program had raised suspicions about his well-being, and that he was speaking under duress. For the past month, Le Anh Tu had drawn ever-increasing attention on social media for his pilgrimage across Vietnam. Along the way, he also unwittingly became a symbol of what many people say is a lack of religious freedom in the country.  Sporting a shaved head, patched garments and an alms bowl, Tue is not recognized as a monk by the state-sanctioned Buddhist group — and indeed did not claim to be a monk, just someone trying to follow Buddha’s teachings. Authorities apparently became alarmed at the attention Tue was getting, and on June 2, officials detained him, saying he stopped his trek amid concerns about threatening social stability.  But monks with him said authorities forced them to disband in a midnight raid and took him to an undisclosed location. His case has drawn attention from a U.S. lawmaker and international rights groups. Viewed with suspicion For several days, the monk wasn’t heard from, spurring public concern.  Then on Friday, June 7, the state-run Vietnam Television, or VTV, aired a three-minute news bulletin in which Tue said he was safe and had chosen to end his pilgrimage because of traffic concerns.  But the VTV video was viewed with suspicion by social media users who noted that Tue was interviewed in front of a white-painted tree trunk, which is a marker typically found in strictly controlled areas, such as military barracks and prisons. They suggested Tue’s hand movements indicated that he was under stress and alleged that there was no reflection of his interviewer in his eyes. In that interview, Tue tells reporter Lien Lien that he “would have continued to cultivate outside [on a pilgrimage] if there had not been so many crowds, affecting traffic safety and social order.” In the video, which shows footage of him being thronged by what appears to be hundreds of followers, VTV slams what it says is false information about Tue’s arrest over the past week and claims that “opposing forces” have exploited his case “to distort Vietnam’s policy on religion.” ‘More reliable’ Then, on Monday, a second video of Tue appeared that allayed people’s concerns. It was a rather mundane video published by police in Gia Lai province, in southern Vietnam where his permanent residence was registered, showing Tue receiving a new national ID from the police department’s Order and Administration Management Division. In the video, Tue enters the division’s “Office for ID application and pick-up,” where he meets with a police officer who explains the card’s benefits, such as its use for air travel and health check-ups. Tue is then interviewed about his thoughts on receiving the new ID, which he says “will be very good if it can be used to ensure my right to self-cultivation.” The video ends with Tue saying that he is healthy enough to return to his study of the Buddha’s teachings. A screenshot from a Youtube video uploaded June 9, 2024 shows an interview aired by VTV with independent monk Thich Minh Tue, left, in which he said he agreed to stop walking the streets. (VTV24 via Youtube) On Monday, Nguyen Viet Dung, a former prisoner of conscience who on June 7 launched a petition demanding that Vietnamese authorities disclose Tue’s whereabouts, told RFA Vietnamese that while the public was “skeptical” about the VTV interview, “many agreed that the Gia Lai provincial police video was more reliable.” “The people’s greatest wish was to see their beloved monk be safe,” he said. “Therefore, their greatest wish, to a certain extent, has been fulfilled.” Family request to ‘protect image’ Meanwhile, a lawyer on Monday dismissed a claim made in the VTV video that Tue’s family had called on authorities to “handle those who took advantage of [his] images and uploaded them to social media,” saying that only Tue has the right to make such a request. On June 9, a document requesting the assistance of authorities, purportedly sent by Tue’s older brother Le Anh Tuan to police in Gia Lai’s Ia To commune, was circulated online, as well as a document asking police to verify that Tuan is Tue’s sibling. The second document was approved and signed by Ia To Commune Police Captain Ksor Hue. Neither of the documents were dated and RFA was unable to independently verify their authenticity. Regardless of whether the documents were indeed sent by Tue’s brother, lawyer Ha Huy Son of the Hanoi Bar Association told RFA that they would still be invalid under Vietnamese law. “As Mr. Minh Tue (whose real name is Le Anh Tu) is over 18 years old and has sufficient behavioral and legal capacity, defending his interests and privacy is his responsibility – no one can do it for him,” he said. Attempts by RFA to reach Tuan to verify the information in the two documents went unanswered Monday. Translated by Anna Vu. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.

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Hong Kong exiles in UK and Canada lack access to billions of their savings

In April 2023, Hong Kong Watch found that Hong Kongers were being denied access to up to £2.2 billion (US$2.8 billion) of their hard-earned Mandatory Provident Fund retirement savings. Fast forward one year, and the number has only increased to over £3 billion (US$3.8 billion).  This act of transnational repression is placing an unnecessary financial and mental strain on an estimated tens of thousands of Hong Kongers in the UK and Canada who moved abroad under British National (Overseas) (BNO) passports, set up to allow a permanent residence pathway for them.  The Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) is a compulsory retirement savings scheme for the people of Hong Kong. Hong Kongers can ordinarily withdraw their entire account early if they make a statutory declaration that they have departed Hong Kong permanently with no intention of returning to resettle.  However, the Mandatory Provident Fund Authority, which oversees the provision of MPF schemes, released a statement in March 2021 saying that because the BNO passport was no longer recognised by the Hong Kong government as a valid travel document and proof of identity as of Jan. 2021. This means that those trying to withdraw their savings early cannot rely on the BNO passport or visa to support an application for early withdrawal of their funds.  A protester raises his British National Overseas passports during a candlelight vigil to mark the 31st anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, in Hong Kong, June 4, 2020. (Tyrone Siu/Reuters) Despite this, the MPF-related legislation, regulations, and terms of the deeds governing entitlement to MPF benefits in Hong Kong remain unchanged. Under the MPF trust deed, trustees including those based overseas like HSBC, Standard Chartered, Manulife and Sun Life, have a legal obligation to release MPF to beneficiaries who are able to provide evidence of their right to reside in a foreign country.  There is no reason that a BNO passport or visa should be denied under this deed. However, the latest research from Hong Kong Watch includes case studies detailing how Hong Kongers continue to be denied access to their MPF on the grounds that they hold a BNO passport or visa.  This includes many Hong Kong families in the UK, from a single mother who is unable to afford a heater for her son due to being denied £57,000 (US$70,000) worth of her MPF, to a family of five that is unable to afford a wheelchair accessible property for their severely disabled child due to the withholding of their MPF.  Individual hardship Others with withheld savings struggle to adapt to their new environments for financial reasons, to assist relatives in escaping from increasing repression in Hong Kong, and to start desired business ventures in the UK or Canada. Since 2021 and as recently as last month, Hong Kong Watch has documented numerous rejection letters from MPF trustees to Hong Kongers denying the early withdrawal of their MPF on the grounds that the BNO visa or passport is not a valid form of identification per the Hong Kong government’s lawless declaration.  I have spoken with a Hong Konger who has £90,000 (US$114,000) frozen in MPF assets, and another who had obtained Canadian permanent residency and was still denied access to their MPF by Manulife for simply arriving in Canada with a BNO passport.  The latter case is especially concerning, particularly after Manulife’s Global Head of Government Relations for Canada, Maryscott Greenwood, testified before the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration on Monday and claimed that Manulife had never denied a Hong Konger access to their savings on the basis of holding a BNO visa.  Having seen a written transcript of a call between the Hong Konger who was denied access to their MPF and Manulife, in which Manulife said, “even if you hold Canadian PR, it’s ineligible to withdraw the fund as a BNO passport holder,” this is simply not true. Maryscott Greenwood, Manulife’s global head of Government Relations for Canada, testifies via video before the Canadian Parliament’s Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, June 3, 2024. (Image from Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration video) Sun Life’s Head of Global Government Affairs and Public Policy, Laura Hewitt, also testified in the hearing.  It was unfortunate but unsurprising that despite having productive meetings with Hong Kong Watch prior to the hearing, both Manulife and Sun Life executives delivered cautious, pre-prepared answers and repeatedly failed to respond to direct “yes”  or “no” questions from the Canadian Parliament.  Fortunately, members of the Canadian Parliament including Tom Kmiec, Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Greg McLean, Paul Chiang, Fayçal El-Khoury, and Jenny Kwan, who is herself a prior BNO visa holder, were not satisfied with these non-answers.  The MPs pressed the business representatives on why they have withheld Hong Kongers’ own savings from them since 2021. Tom Kmiec asked both companies: “Why are you still operating in an autocratic, totalitarian regime that is dominated by Beijing?” The question remains unanswered. Tasks for London and Ottawa The next UK government should vow to provide clarification to UK-based MPF trustees that the BNO visa is intended to lead to “permanent settlement and British citizenship” to show their support for Hong Kongers in Britain.  London  should also pledge to raise and condemn this form of transnational repression with their counterparts in Hong Kong. On the campaign trail, the future UK government has the opportunity to present these pledges to 140,000 eligible Hong Kong BNO voters. The Canadian government should work with Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada to change the designation of BNO passport and visa holders from GBN )Great Britain) to CHN (China) or HKG (Hong Kong) on Canadian permanent residency cards to prevent further retaliation from the Hong Kong government. A man waves to family members before leaving for the United Kingdom at the Hong Kong International Airport, June 30, 2021. (Tyrone Siu/Reuters) With a current backlog of 9,000 permanent residency applications for Hong Kongers in Canada, this will only become a greater administrative issue in the near future if IRCC labels the nationality of…

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Arakan Army treatment of Rohingya minority poses challenge to Myanmar opposition

Evidence of Arakan Army culpability in mass arson attacks on Rohingya homes in western Myanmar’s Buthidaung township – where satellite imagery has confirmed that more than 400 homes were burnt to the ground – poses a serious challenge to the anti-junta opposition. While such attacks have ceased since the Arakan Army captured the majority Rohingya town, the rebels’ double-speak both weakens the prospects of an inclusive federal democracy, and is very shortsighted for the ethnic army’s leadership. As it is said, the truth is the first casualty in war, and so far here’s what we know happened: On May 18, the Arakan Army captured the last remaining four light infantry battalions and two border guard police camps in Buthidaung, following a multi-month siege. Immediately, over 400 homes in Rohingya residential neighborhoods were set ablaze. There is a chance of course that some of the fires were set by the retreating junta military, who had waged a genocidal campaign against the Rohingya in 2017-18. The military seems determined to stoke inter-communal tensions as it retreats from northern Rakhine state, and “false flag” operations are part of the military’s modus operandi. In a bizarre irony, the army has been conscripting Rohingya men into its depleted ranks to fight the Arakan Army, while at the same time, relying on radical groups, such as the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and the Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Army (ARSA), operating in the refugee camps in Bangladesh to recruit fighters. Despite the military’s own culpability in ethnic cleansing, they are trying to paint themselves as defenders of the Rohingya community, as the Arakan Army settles old scores. If the Arakan Army continues such attacks, they are making an alliance between the military and radical Rohingya groups including ARSA and the RSO, inevitable. Flames from burning homes in Buthidaung in Rakhine state, are seen above the treetops in this image provided by a Rohingya refugee, May 17, 2024. (Image from video via AP) While this is not surprising, it is exceptionally short-sighted in its thinking and undermines the effort to defeat Myanmar’s military and establish a federal democracy.  This should not come as a surprise. The Arakan Army’s position on the Rohingya has been two faced. Its leader, Tun Mrat Naing, has a decade-long track record of referring to them as “Bengalis”, parroting the Myanmar military’s own term for the Rohingya.  The arson attacks have also increased tensions between the Arakan Army leadership and the National Unity Government (NUG). Following the military coup in February 2021, the Arakan Army made a very important, if not surprising, statement in support of the NUG position that the Rohingya were a persecuted minority who were entitled to full citizenship, and that the one million refugees in Bangladesh should be repatriated. More intransigent after military gains But with military gains since the Three Brotherhood Alliance launched its offensive on October 27, 2023, the Arakan Army has become far more intransigent. Its leadership has signaled this change to their constituents, whether in social media or simply by greenlighting attacks by local units. The Arakan Army’s military gains are significant. They now claim to have seized 180 military camps and taken full control of eight of Rakhine’s 17 townships. While they have not moved on the state capital of Sittwe or the Chinese special economic zone in Kyaukphyu, they are controlling the roads in and out of them.  Should the Arakan Army complete their capture of Maungdaw, they will have driven the military out of the entire northern region of Rakhine. While the ethnic Rakhine army has stated their intention to liberate the entire state, for now they are trying to control the three main entry points into the northern part of the state in order to consolidate their power.  The military has scant deployments in southern Rakhine, meaning that the Arakan Army’s takeover of the entire state is not unthinkable.  Arakan Army troops pose in Buthidaung, Myanmar, in an image posted to social media May 18, 2024. (AA Info Desk via VKontakte) The Arakan Army has proven itself to be amongst the most effective fighting forces among the ethnic armed organizations. Their battlefield advances have spread the military thin and not allowed the junta to redeploy troops to Kachin, Kayah or northern Shan states, where regime forces have suffered serious setbacks.  Likewise, in eastern Myanmar, though opposition forces had to give up the border town of Myawaddy, the military has not been able to regain full control of the key Asia Highway. In short, military success has given the Arakan Army the opportunity to advance their short-term and parochial political interests at the expense of the national agenda to defeat the military. The Arakan Army’s stated commitments to the anti junta opposition’s long-term political goals, as stated by the NUG, should always be taken with a grain of salt.  They are the only ethnic army that has flirted with independence, and their authoritarian leanings show they are hostile to democracy and any political system that would force them to share power.  Prejudice with huge implications The United League of Arakan, the AA’s political arm, issued a statement on May 20 that denied any culpability for the Rohingya village torchings, apportioning the blame solely on the military. Its statements since then have been largely dismissive and continue to deny the attacks, while criticizing media reporting on civilian casualties. But evidence of their culpability is mounting, underscoring the reality that the Arakan Army does not like the Rohingya population, nor does it want to see large-scale resettlement from Bangladesh. The Arakan Army’s politics capitalize on Rakhine Buddhist prejudice against the Muslim community. The Arakan Army leadership is under intense pressure to renounce any violence towards the Rohingya. But the reality is that many of their troops were involved in the communal violence against them. This is simply a return to their default setting. The Arakan Army’s position has larger implications.  While they might have moved on from the 2017 ethnic cleansing, the international community, including…

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Experiences & Aspirations of Foreign Students in the USA

In an era marked by globalization and cultural exchange, the experiences of international students studying abroad provide invaluable insights into cross-cultural dynamics, educational systems, and societal perceptions. This is the second survey in the series of “The Survey Reportika” presented by the Investigative Journalism Reportika. This iteration aims to delve into the multifaceted experiences and perspectives of students from China, India, and South Korea studying in universities across the United States of America. These three countries are among the top sources of international students in the USA, making their perspectives particularly significant. Conducted anonymously, this survey gathered responses from 1,500 students, with 500 each from China, India, and South Korea, enrolled in various universities throughout the USA. The participants, while representing diverse academic disciplines and backgrounds, shared their candid insights on a range of topics, including their academic experiences, cultural adjustment, perceptions of freedom, views on their home countries, and reflections on their decision to study abroad. By exploring the perspectives of these students, this report endeavors to offer a nuanced understanding of their academic journeys, cultural adaptation processes, and evolving perceptions of their home countries and the USA. Through their anonymity, participants were able to express themselves freely, contributing valuable insights that can inform future discussions on international education, cultural exchange, and global citizenship. In the following sections, we present a detailed analysis of the survey findings, categorized into relevant themes, accompanied by reflections and implications drawn from the data. It is our hope that this report serves as a resource for educators, policymakers, and stakeholders interested in fostering a more inclusive and enriching educational environment for all students, regardless of their cultural background or nationality. Download the complete Report : Click Here Survey Overview Conducted from February 1, 2024, to April 30, 2024, this extensive survey engaged 1,500 participants from diverse backgrounds, seeking to delve into the sentiments of students from China, India, and South Korea pursuing higher education in the USA. Utilizing a hybrid approach that blends offline and online methods, the survey ensures comprehensive representation across genders, religions, and ethnicities. Designed to explore motivations, challenges, and aspirations, this study aims to provide a nuanced understanding of the experiences of international students abroad, contributing valuable insights to ongoing conversations on global education, cultural adaptation, and international relations. (Click on the following questions and representational images to read the opinions and survey statistics.) Q1: What motivated you to pursue higher education in the USA instead of your home country? Q2: From your experience, how would you rate the academic environment in the USA compared to your home country? Q3: How do you foresee studying in the USA impacting your future career compared to studying in your home country? Q4: How challenging have you found adapting to cultural differences between your home country and the USA? Q5: How important is it for you to maintain your connection to your native identity while living in the USA? Q6: Do you feel more personally free in the USA compared to China? Q7: How would you rate the differences in political and social freedoms between your home country and the USA? Q8: What do you see as the major challenges facing your home country today? Q9: After completing your course in the USA, how likely are you to stay in USA and work towards your career aspirations? Q10: What misconceptions about your home country have you encountered while living in the USA? Conclusion The survey highlights key motivations for international students choosing the USA for higher education. Among Chinese students, 36% cite dissatisfaction with China’s political system and restrictions on freedom. For Indian students, 34% are concerned about the rigidity and outdated nature of education system. Among South Korean students, 32% seek a global perspective and exposure to international cultures. These percentages underscore the perceived drawbacks of their home countries’ systems and the benefits of studying in the USA. The survey also reveals that 42% of Chinese students, 39% of Indian students, and 13% of South Korean students find the academic environment in the USA much better than in their home countries, highlighting greater academic freedom, diverse opportunities, and advanced resources in the USA. The survey highlights varied perspectives on political and social freedoms among international students. For China, 51% of respondents find freedoms much greater in the USA due to censorship and surveillance in China. In comparison, 39% of Indian students believe the USA offers greater freedoms, citing discrimination and women’s rights issues in India. For South Korea, 42% view freedoms as comparable between the two countries, but 29% see the USA as offering somewhat or much greater freedoms due to broader speech rights and a less hierarchical societal structure. Meanwhile, a notable 33% of Indian respondents believe political and social freedoms are greater in India, highlighting social schemes and constitutional protections. The survey highlights the career aspirations of international students after completing their studies in the USA. Among Chinese students, 76% plan to return to China to contribute to its development, while 11% are very likely to stay in the USA for career opportunities in tech hubs like Silicon Valley. Indian students show a strong inclination to remain in the USA, with 40% very likely to stay, inspired by successful Indian CEOs in the West. However, 39% prefer to return to India to aid its progress. South Korean students are more moderate, with 32% very likely to stay in the USA, 45% somewhat likely, and 23% planning to return home to apply their skills. In summation, the comprehensive survey captures the intricate tapestry of experiences and perspectives among international students studying in the USA. From motivations for pursuing higher education abroad to assessments of academic environments and considerations for post-graduation career paths, the survey provides valuable insights into the dynamics of cross-cultural interactions, educational aspirations, and societal contributions. It underscores the pivotal role of international education in fostering global understanding, facilitating personal and professional growth, and driving socio-economic development worldwide. By shedding light on the complex interplay of individual…

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North Korea recalls documentary about Kim Jong Un’s mother

North Korea has recalled a 2011 documentary that sang the praises of Kim Jong Un’s mother, two sources inside the country told Radio Free Asia, but the move is prompting people to wonder why the country has always maintained a level of secrecy about her identity and background. “Since her biographical information has never been officially stated, the recall on the film is actually raising suspicions,” a resident of the northeastern province of North Hamgyong told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons.  Most North Koreans don’t know her name – Ko Yong Hui – or that she was born in Osaka, Japan, or that her father, Ko Gyon Taek, managed a military factory in the city prior to the end of World War II.  The documentary, titled “Mother of Great Songun Korea,” leaves out all those facts, the sources said. In lieu of her name, the film referred to her as “respected mother” and showed many scenes of her at Kim Jong Il’s side during his official appearances.  Screenshot of the North Korea-produced documentary ‘Mother of Great Songun Korea’. (lovepink4200 via Youtube) It was distributed internally to high-ranking officials, government agencies, and the military on VCD, or video compact disc, in 2011, the same year that Kim Jong Il died. “Recently, judicial agencies such as the Provincial State Security Department and the Social Security Department have begun rounding up copies of propaganda materials,” the resident said. “Instructions were given to retrieve and delete documentary films related to the general secretary’s biological mother,” he said, explaining that “Mother of Great Songun Korea” was on the undisclosed list of now-banned materials. The recall was also confirmed by a resident of the northern province of Ryanggang, who told RFA in the now-banned documentary that “Ko Yong Hui, is touted as having ‘accumulated great achievements that brought about a bright future’” for North Korea. Made in Japan Ko was raised in Japan as part of the Korean minority in the country, and in 1962, the family moved to North Korea as part of a repatriation program.  In the early 1970s, Ko appeared as a dancer in the Mansudae Art Troupe – a popular group of musicians known for propaganda performances that glorify the state and its leaders. It is not known when she got together with Kim Jong Il, but she is believed to have met him in the early 1970s, and she bore him three children in the 1980s, including Kim Jong Un. Though most sources describe her as having been his mistress, some suggest she may have been his third wife. The government has never acknowledged any marriage between them, however. Screenshot of the North Korea-produced documentary ‘Mother of Great Songun Korea’. (lovepink4200 via Youtube) According to North Korea’s songbun caste system, Ko would be of the lowest caste because she was born in Japan, her father’s job supported the Japanese war effort, and her occupation as a dancer – which would tarnish Kim Jong Un’s image. Ko’s background does not neatly fit the nation’s founding myth that its leaders are descended from the so-called Paektu Line, named after the Korean peninsula’s tallest mountain, which is the setting of many of the Korean nation’s founding myths, including the lore of the Kim Dynasty. Kim’s grandfather, national founder Kim Il Sung is the progenitor of the line, and his first wife Kim Jong Suk – Kim Jong Il’s mother – fought alongside her husband in his guerilla army against Japanese rule prior to and during World War II, giving Kim Jong Il near mythical status as the legitimate son of two popular national heroes. “In the past, previous leaders inherited power based on the purity of the Paektu bloodline and the legitimacy of revolutionary traditions,” the North Hamgyong resident said.  “Details about the birth and lives of the leaders as well as their siblings, parents, grandparents and great-grandparents, were made public and promoted as patriotic examples.” Erasing sensitive information? In contrast, Kim Jong Un, due to his mother’s background, could be seen not as a third-generation revolutionary leader, but the illegitimate son of Kim Jong Il’s Japan-born mistress whose father supported the imperialist war effort. Screenshot of the North Korea-produced documentary ‘Mother of Great Songun Korea’. (lovepink4200 via Youtube) If it becomes widely known, that support of imperial Japan could cause problems for Kim Jong Un, Bruce Bennett, a senior researcher at the California-based RAND Corporation, told RFA. “Kim is trying to wipe out anything that would potentially challenge his control of the country,” said Bennett. “So the issue of his maternal grandfather having supported the Japanese I mean that’s something that could really hurt him potentially.  “And so that’s part of the history he wants to get rid of,” he said. Bennett said erasing facts about his mother might marginally help his case to stay in power, but it would be more helpful were he to improve the economy and his people’s lives. Screenshot of the North Korea-produced documentary ‘Mother of Great Songun Korea’. (lovepink4200 via Youtube) The lack of available information about Ko is causing residents to question what they have been told about their leader, Kim Jong Un, the Ryanggang resident said. “As the biography of the leader has not been made public even after him having been in power for 12 years, some are raising doubts about the identity of his mysterious birth mother,” he said. “The argument is that if there is no dishonorable family history in the pure Paektu bloodline, there is no reason not to disclose details about her.” Kim Jong Il was able to claim that his hereditary succession was legitimate because of the purity of his lineage to the Paektu bloodline, the second resident said.  Kim Jong Un claims the same lineage, but the secrecy appears to be giving people doubts. “Given the actions of the authorities, who are ordering the recall and destruction of copies of the already released documentary film about his mother, people are questioning whether his…

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Myanmar rebels claim junta outpost on Bangladesh border

An ethnic minority insurgent group has captured a junta base on Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh, sources close to the rebel group told Radio Free Asia on Friday. The Arakan Army, or AA, which resumed its battle against the junta for territory in Myanmar’s west in November, controls nine townships in Rakhine state and one in Chin state. In January, the AA turned its focus to Maungdaw, a strategic township for border relations with Bangladesh. On Thursday, AA troops captured junta Border Guard Station No. 6 in Inn Din village. Nearly 600 soldiers were stationed at the guard post, said one resident who wished to remain anonymous for security reasons. “The border guards, combined with forces from other outposts, were stationed in that camp,” he said. “A junta division commander was also posted there. There are many casualties from the junta side and some soldiers ran away.” In late May, junta airstrikes killed one civilian and wounded nearly a dozen in Maungdaw township. The AA launched an unsuccessful offensive against the same border post on Jan. 5, but were held back by the junta’s combined navy, air force and army.  RFA tried to contact AA spokesperson Khaing Thukha and Rakhine state’s junta spokesperson Hla Thein, but neither responded by the time of publication.  Junta troops built the post in 2017 after destroying a predominantly ethnic minority Rohingya village that was located there, residents told RFA.  The AA is also attacking Maungdaw’s Myin Hlut-based Border Guard Station No. 9. The insurgent group captured Maungdaw’s Border Police Command Office No. 1, which is the largest junta camp in Maungdaw township, residents said, adding that only five junta-occupied border guard posts remain in the township.  Rebels are maintaining attacks on Ann, Thandwe and Maungdaw townships, where the junta’s Western Regional Military Headquarters for Rakhine state is based. A ceasefire between the AA and the military broke down in November, at the same time that other ethnic minority and pro-democracy insurgents launched attacks that have put forces of the junta that seized power in 2021 under unprecedented pressure. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn.

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Conscription in Myanmar drives insurgent recruits: civilian government

Nearly 1,000 people eligible for conscription into the Myanmar military’s ranks are instead seeking training from the shadow civilian government’s armed forces, the group announced.  The junta, which seized power in 2021 and has since faced increasing desertions and military losses nationwide, announced the implementation of the People’s Military Service Law in February. The military has since recruited about 9,000 people through two rounds of conscription based on a lottery system. Many young people have fled the country out of fear that they may be drafted. Recruitment by junta soldiers has involved coercing young people, including minors, threatening violence or property destruction and most recently, threats and heavy fines for parents of draft dodgers as a third round of conscription approaches, residents say. About 960 people have chosen to seek training under the civilian National Unity Government’s People’s Defense Forces, or militias opposing the junta, the group’s southern military office said in a statement on Wednesday. The statement included photos of a recent graduation. The N.U.G. was formed by members of the civilian administration ousted in the February 2021 coup. A 28-year-old man eligible for military conscription under the junta in central Myanmar’s Mandalay Division told RFA he initially planned on going abroad, like many people already have, but he was now aiming to join anti-junta forces. “At first I was hesitant to put my family at risk but now I canceled my preparations to go abroad and work and have decided to take up arms. Now I am preparing and am still trying to connect with the training group,” he said, asking to remain anonymous for security reasons.  “I can’t take it anymore, mainly because of the [junta’s] injustice, the way they are killing and torturing people. Most young people would make the same decision. This is the only way left for us to root out the military dictatorship.” The National Unity Government’s Southern Military Headquarters No. 3 began accepting trainees to undergo basic military courses in April and May, it said in its statement. RFA phoned the headquarters for more information, but it could not be contacted due to limited telecommunications access. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn. 

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China sends glacial water from Tibet to the Maldives, raising concerns

China gifted 3,000 metric tons of Tibet’s glacial water to the island nation of the Maldives in two separate batches in March and May — the same months it unveiled and implemented water conservation regulations at home. The Water Conservation Regulations set limits on water usage within administrative regions and prioritize water conversation work in Tibet and other parts of China.  They were issued by China’s State Council on March 20, a week before it sent the first delivery of 1,500 metric tons of water in jugs to the Maldives, which is experiencing a scarcity of fresh water.  The regulations then went into effect on May 1, weeks before China donated the second batch of water jugs.  China finalized the deal with the Maldives during a November 2023 visit by Yan Jinhai, chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region, to the low-lying archipelago threatened by rising sea levels. The Maldives has forged strong bilateral relations with China and is a beneficiary of the Belt and Road Initiative, under which it has borrowed more than US$1 billion from Chinese banks in the past decade, according to Western think tanks.  Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu signed 20 agreements, including one for financial and military assistance, with Beijing during his inaugural state visit to China in January 2024.   The Maldives thanked the people of Tibet for their “generous donation,” which it expects will greatly support its island communities. Its freshwater resources are affected by erratic rainfall patterns and rising sea levels. Water shortages in Tibet But Tibetans inside Tibet said they face water shortages themselves because Chinese authorities have implemented systematic water conservation and management campaigns across various Tibetan villages and towns for over a decade. This has occurred while authorities have restricted the availability of water and set limits on water usage at the local level. “I have heard that China is donating bottled water from Tibet to other parts of the world for free for political gain,” said one source from the Tibet Autonomous Region, where Chinese authorities have carried out water conservation campaigns for over a decade.  “However, in Tibet, the local Tibetans do not have enough drinking water,” he said. “At times there isn’t enough water to even brush our teeth.” On March 27, the same day the Maldives said it received the first batch of water, the Water Conservancy Bureau of Ngari Prefecture, or Ali in Chinese, the birthplace of key South Asian rivers, began a series of year-long events for the general public to promote water conservation. In Nyingtri city, or Linzhi in Chinese, authorities have implemented the strictest water resources management system over the past several years and boast of its effectiveness.  “The water used to wash rice and vegetables can be used to mop the floor and water the flowers. … Nowadays, water-saving behaviors like this have become a conscious action of many citizens,” said a 2023 announcement by the city government. Meanwhile, Tibetans who have grown up on their ancestral land in Gangkar township in Dingri county, called Tingri in Chinese, are being forced to relocate to make way for the expansion of China’s water bottling facilities and industry, two sources said.  “Gangkar is known for its fertile pastureland and significant water resources from glaciers with 15 water springs in the region, which the local Tibetans have always relied on for their livelihoods,” said the first source.  Chinese authorities plan to move about 430 residents to take control of the water resources from the land, he said. Weaponizing water China’s move signals it is engaging in “water politics” and playing the long game for geopolitical gains in South Asia, experts said.  The Chinese government has projects underway to extract clean, clear and mineral-rich water to support the expansion of its premium mineral bottled water industry, they said. Beijing also wants to control water flows to lower riparian states such as India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, to further its own aspiration of regional dominance, experts said. “The imperative to address the threat of China weaponizing water in Tibet cannot be overstated,” wrote scholars Neeraj Singh Manhas and Rahul Lad in a March report titled “China’s Weaponization of Water in Tibet A Lesson for the Lower Riparian States” in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. With approximately 87,000 dams built, China poses a historic threat, having already dammed most internal rivers, they add, while calling for proactive measures to implement enduring policies to protect these vital Tibet’s water resources. Tibet is at the forefront of China’s “water wars” in the region, said Anushka Saxena, a research analyst at the Takshashila Institution, a public policy think tank in India.  Tibet’s eight major transboundary river systems have the capacity to turn China into “Asia’s water hegemon,” given that their water can be used for both domestic economic and foreign policy-related interests, as well as can be weaponized to cause harm to lower riparian states, she said. “In that light, China’s moves vis-à-vis export of water to Maldives cannot be isolated from the larger approach China is adopting to using Tibet’s water resources,” she added.

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Animal welfare group calls for end to dog and cat meat trade in Vietnam

A global animal welfare organization has begun a campaign in three major Vietnamese cities, calling for an end to the trade of dog and cat meat for human consumption, according to state media reports. The Vienna, Austria-based group, Four Paws, says the animals are killed cruelly and that the meat poses health risks from rabies and other diseases. Calling its campaign “Journey of Love,” the group is organizing educational activities in Ho Chi Minh City, Danang and Hanoi to raise people’s awareness about the negative aspects of the dog and cat meat business. “We believe now is the time to take immediate action against dog and cat meat trading activities, especially given the increasing incidence of diseases and epidemics,” Phan Thanh Dung, an officer from Four Paws’ Companion Animal Campaign, was quoted as saying by the Vietnam Law Newspaper. Every year, about 6 million dogs and cats are caught, transported and slaughtered for their meat in Vietnam, according to Four Paws. Most of them are stolen from communities or strays taken from the streets. Vendors in wet markets openly sell dead dogs and cats alongside live ones crammed into cages and waiting to be killed for human consumption, according to an August 2022 report by We Animal Media, an animal photojournalism agency that documents stories of animals used for human purposes. While the sale and consumption of dog meat is legal in Vietnam, the government banned the consumption of cats in 1998 but then canceled the directive in 2020, the report said.  Those who eat dog and cat meat run the risk of infection from potentially deadly bacterial diseases and parasites such as E. coli and salmonella, which are commonly found in contaminated meats, the report said.  Animal rights groups and Vietnamese activists have been working to end the practices of selling and consuming dog and cat meat, given the poor conditions in which the animals are kept and the killing process conducted in view of other animals. In late 2023, Four Paws and the People’s Committee of Hoi An, whose ancient town in central Vietnam is a UNESCO World Heritage Site, closed one of the municipality’s last remaining dog meat restaurants.  A survey conducted by Four Paws in Vietnam in early 2021 indicated that 91% of people believed the government should ban the dog and cat meat trade.  Also, 95% of respondents said they believed that eating dog and cat meat was not part of Vietnamese culture, and therefore supported ending the trade. Translated by Anna Vu for RFA Vietnamese. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.

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US Defense Secretary visits Cambodia amid concern about China

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin arrived in Phnom Penh on Tuesday for a brief visit, days after Cambodia and China wrapped up their biggest ever military exercise. During his one-day visit, Austin will meet top Cambodian officials “to discuss defense issues with the new Cambodian leadership,” the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh said in a statement.   “This is the first bilateral visit by a U.S. Secretary of Defense, and it is the second for Secretary Austin following his attendance at the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus in November 2022,” it said. Austin arrived in Cambodia from Singapore where he attended the annual Shangri-La Dialogue security forum. During the conference, the secretary sought to reassure U.S. allies of Washington’s “iron-clad” commitment in the region in the face of growing rivalry with China. China and Cambodia have just held a 15-day military exercise, both on land and at sea, with the participation of three Chinese warships, two of which have been in Cambodia for six months at the Ream naval base. The two corvettes were still seen docked at the base in Sihanoukville on Monday. The U.S government has said it has “serious concerns” about China’s plans for exclusive control over portions of the Ream Naval Base. Cambodia has repeatedly denied handing the base over to China. U.S.-Cambodian relations have become strained during the past decade partly over U.S. concerns about the suppression of Cambodia’s political opposition. In 2017, the Cambodian government suspended the joint Angkor Sentinel exercises between the two militaries and in 2018, the U.S. government suspended military assistance to Cambodia in response to its suppression of the  opposition. Cambodia under veteran leader Hun Sen rejected U.S. criticism of its domestic political conditions and built closer relations with China. Hun Sen stepped down as prime minister last year with his son, Hun Manet, taking over Turning a new page? Soon after arriving in Phnom Penh, Austin paid a courtesy call on Hun Sen, who is now president of the Senate. Hun Sen was accompanied by former defense minister Tea Banh in  the meeting. Austin also met  Prime Minister Hun Manet, a West Point military academy graduate, and Defense Minister Tea Seiha. Hun Manet and Tea Seiha are Hun Sen’s and Tea Banh’s sons, respectively. Chhengpor Aun, research fellow at The Future Forum, a Cambodian think-tank, said Austin’s visit gave Cambodia’s new leaders the opportunity to highlight more balance in their country’s diplomacy. “Secretary Austin will be much welcomed in Phnom Penh in general because his presence will help back up the Cambodian government’s attempt to prove it is still on the course of its promised neutrality in foreign relations,” said Chhengpor Aun. “The Ream naval base, the ever-growing Sino-Cambodian defense relations, and strained military-to-military ties between Phnom Penh and Washington will highly likely dominate Secretary Austin’s meetings with senior Cambodian officials.” Sailors stand guard near petrol boats at the Cambodian Ream Naval Base in Sihanoukville, Cambodia, July 26, 2019. (Reuters/Samrang Pring) Another analyst – Nguyen Khac Giang, visiting fellow at Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute – said that Austin’s decision to visit Cambodia instead of the close ally the Philippines or newly elevated strategic comprehensive partner Vietnam, “reflects the U.S.’s attempt to reconcile deteriorating U.S.-Cambodia relations.” “With Phnom Penh successfully transitioning leadership from Hun Sen to his son Hun Manet, Washington likely views this as a good moment for rapprochement,” Giang told Radio Free Asia, adding that while sensitive topics such as Chinese influence and the Ream naval base are likely be discussed, he thinks both sides “will focus more on potential cooperation and common interests, particularly as Cambodia will serve as the coordinator of the U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue Relations from 2024 to 2027.” The state-aligned Khmer Times newspaper said that with Hun Manet’s “outward-looking policies,” there’s a unique prospect to recalibrate any misunderstanding and to start a new chapter in the two countries’ relationship, provided that both sides “are genuinely sincere with each other.” The article by Pou Sothirak, senior advisor to the Cambodian Center for Regional Studies, and Him Raksmey, executive director of the Cambodian Center for Regional Studies suggested that the first thing for the U.S. to do wais to rethink its policy of targeted sanctions on Cambodian officials and members of the business elite, and restrictions on trade preferences “which are ineffective and counterproductive, compelling Cambodia deeper into economic reliance on China.” The Future Forum’s Chhengpor Aun agreed that the new generation of Cambodian leaders “presents a window of opportunities for improvement of U.S. relations” as Cambodia wants to secure a stable state of relations with the U.S., now its biggest export destination. Cambodia sold US$8.89 billion worth of goods to the U.S. in 2023, about 40% of its total exports, according to the Cambodian General Department of Customs and Excise.  However, “if the visit aims to woo Cambodia away from China or to push political reforms in Phnom Penh, Secretary Austin can be disappointed,” said Chhengpor Aun. “Sino-Cambodian ties are important for Phnom Penh political elites – be it the old guards or the new princeling generation – in terms of political and regime security,” he said. Edited by Mike Firn.

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