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Category: South Asia

Vietnam coast guard holds rare live fire exercise

Editor04 mins

Vietnam’s coast guard has held a rare live fire exercise to test responses to security threats, in an area off its central coast on the South China Sea. The Sept. 5-11 exercise was conducted by the Vietnam Coast Guard Region 3, in the waters off Binh Thuan province, the force said in a press release. Coast Guard Region 3 with headquarters in Ba Ria-Vung Tau province is one of Vietnam’s four coast guard zones, responsible for safeguarding its claims in the South China Sea as tensions are rising in the regional waterway. The tactical training and live five exercise – aimed at boosting combat readiness – is “one of the top priorities” of the coast guard, Col. Nguyen Minh Khanh, Region 3’s deputy commander, was quoted as saying. Coast guard personnel were responding to multiple scenarios such as “threats to sovereignty and security,” illegal incursions into Vietnam’s waters by foreign vessels, piracy and search-and-rescue and disaster relief. Vietnam coast guard personnel during live fire exercises Sept. 5-11, 2024. (Vietnam Coast Guard) Photographs and video clips released by the coast guard show troops, equipped with artillery, anti-aircraft guns and rocket launchers, shooting at airborne targets as well as firing water cannons and warning off foreign ships. “They have accomplished all the tasks with excellence,” Col. Khanh said. Vietnam rarely publicizes such activities despite having invested heavily in developing its coast guard in recent years.  RELATED STORIES Philippine coast guard ship leaves disputed shoal in South China Sea Vietnam, Philippines to sign defense cooperation agreement Vietnam’s coast guard to hold first drills with Philippines The U.S. coast guard is reportedly planning to transfer the last of three Hamilton-class cutters to Vietnam in the near future.  Maritime security is a defense priority for Vietnam, one of six parties that claim parts of the South China Sea, along with China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan. Vietnam coast guard personnel during live fire exercises Sept. 5-11, 2024. (Vietnam Coast Guard) China, however, holds the most expansive claim and its authorities have become more aggressive against neighboring countries in disputed waters. This month, coast guard vessels from Vietnam and the Philippines took part in their first joint drills off Manila but they limited their activity to firefighting and search-and-rescue as Vietnam is careful not to be seen as siding militarily with any country. The Philippines and China have this year been in a tense standoff over disputed features in the South China Sea.  The Philippines last week recalled a coast guard vessel from the disputed Sabina Shoal but officials pledged never to “abandon our sovereign rights over these waters.”  Edited by Mike Firn. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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Shortages in Myanmar lead to ‘socialist-era’ economy

Editor013 mins

Read RFA coverage of these stories in Burmese. The queue for cooking oil stretches down a Yangon street. Householders turn up before dawn to fill a plastic bottle at a subsidized rate in Myanmar’s commercial capital – the latest evidence of a tanking economy. “If you can come early, you will get your quota early. If you are late, you might end up with nothing … and have to start all over again the next day,” Daw Htoo, whose real name was changed in order to protect her identity, told RFA Burmese. “You have to wait for your turn for about two and a half hours everyday,” she said of the palm oil, which costs 20% less than the price of peanut oil sold outside government-subsidized shops. “Some have been waiting since 5 a.m.” Daw Myint, a resident of Yangon’s Thaketa township in her 70s, told RFA that with the price of peanut oil now more than 20,000 kyats (US$4) per viss, which is equal to about 1.7 kilograms or 3.5 pounds, “we simply can’t afford to use it anymore.” In a country wracked by conflict since the military takeover three-and-a-half years ago, basic products are becoming more scarce.  People wait in line to purchase palm oil, Sept. 4, 2024 in Yangon. (RFA) Also, import restrictions are impeding the supply of basic medicines, deepening a humanitarian crisis. “It’s like we’re going back in time to when you had to line up for everything,” said a Yangon businessman who requested anonymity to avoid trouble with authorities. “Palm oil isn’t a rare product … This commodity is abundant and sold competitively around the world, but it’s being rationed in Myanmar.” Older residents say it reminds them of life under a previous military regime, led by Ne Win, when Myanmar followed a socialist political model. Under the system, all major industries were nationalized, including import-export trade, leading to price controls and the expansion of the black market to account for as much as 80% of the national economy. RELATED STORIES Red Cross chief calls for greater aid access after visit to Myanmar Political instability since coup prompts foreign investment exit from Myanmar Pumps run dry in Myanmar as forex crisis pushes up prices In late July, junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing announced that the country’s current situation is “most suited to socialist-era cooperative systems,” implying that, with Myanmar’s economy in freefall, the population should prepare to make sacrifices. One such sacrifice is cooking oil, according to residents and business owners in the country’s largest city Yangon. Major inconvenience Amid the conflict that has engulfed Myanmar since the military’s February 2021 coup d’etat, local production of vegetable oils from peanuts, sunflower seeds and sesame has dwindled or ceased entirely, forcing consumers to rely on imported palm oil to prepare their meals. But the junta has put restrictions on the hard currency needed to import palm oil, creating a shortage and a price jump in local markets. Yangon residents told RFA Burmese that the price of one viss container of palm oil now costs 16,000 kyats (US$3.20) – up from 8,000 kyats in January and 6,500 kyats in December 2023. Meanwhile, the value of the kyat has dropped from 3,500 kyats to 5,600 kyats per U.S. dollar over the same period. Early this month, a ration system went into effect, through which residents can purchase a maximum of half a viss each day at the subsidized price. An elderly woman buys palm oil Sept. 4, 2024. (RFA) An elderly woman in Yangon’s Lanmadaw township told RFA that the ration system is a major inconvenience. “If we were able to buy one viss at a time, we would only need to line up once a week,” said the woman who, like others interviewed for this report, spoke on condition of anonymity due to security concerns.  A restaurant owner in Yangon’s North Dagon township told RFA that she has had to buy palm oil from the local market to supplement what she can buy through the junta’s ration system, because half a viss is not enough to meet her business’s daily needs. “Not only does it take time for us to buy palm oil [under the ration plan], but we can only buy a half viss at a time, which is only enough to cook five portions of rice,” she said. Attempts by RFA to contact the office of the junta’s Department of Consumer Affairs in Yangon for further clarification about the palm oil ration plan went unanswered. ‘Life-threatening’ Meanwhile, it has become increasingly difficult for people displaced by conflict to access essential medical supplies due to the junta’s restrictions on medical imports and a national shortage,  According to aid workers and those who have fled fighting, the demand for medicine is particularly acute among those displaced by conflict in Sagaing region, Chin state, Kachin state, northern Shan state, Magway region and Rakhine state. “We are dealing with cases of seasonal flu and diarrhea here – it’s definitely a life-threatening situation,” said a displaced person from Chin state’s Kanpetlet township. “Access to medicine would be helpful, but it’s simply not available. The biggest challenge is the inability to purchase the necessary medication.” A pharmacy in Yangon, Myanmar, Jan. 12, 2008. (Patrik M. Loeff via Flickr) Aid workers said that the transportation of medicine to Chin state, where approximately 250,000 war displaced are located, has become difficult due to road blockades imposed by the junta.  “The main issue is that the junta shuts down the roads whenever fighting intensifies, making transportation extremely difficult,” said one person assisting the displaced. “Pharmacy owners … are required to submit a list of their products to the junta’s General Administration Department and under these conditions, they are reluctant to sell openly. Everything is operating in secrecy right now.” According to a July 1 statement from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, more than 3 million people are internally displaced across Myanmar due to ongoing military…

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An overdue farewell to Southeast Asia’s pro-democracy icons

Editor013 mins

A decade ago, Southeast Asia seemed poised for democratic transformation, spearheaded by three icons: Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi, Cambodia’s Sam Rainsy and Malaysia’s Anwar Ibrahim.  Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy was on the cusp of a historic election victory, potentially gaining entry into government for the first time in the army-run nation.  Sam Rainsy’s Cambodia National Rescue Party had narrowly lost to the ruling party in the 2013 elections, but momentum hinted at a possible win at the next ballot.  Meanwhile, Anwar’s People’s Pact coalition won the popular vote in Malaysia’s 2013 elections, marking the start of a new political era. During a late 2013 visit, Sam Rainsy suggested in a meeting with his fellow pro-democracy icons that they should “work together to promote democracy in our region.” Fast forward to today, and all three have either fallen from power or seen their legacies tarnished—and the region’s democratic transformation now seems more distant than ever. Cambodian exiled political opponent and leader of the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), Sam Rainsy, in Paris, on July 27, 2023. (Joel Saget/AFP) Suu Kyi, ousted in early 2021, saw her international reputation go up in smoke for her defense of the military’s genocide against her country’s Muslim Rohingya minority.  Sam Rainsy went into exile in 2015 and his party dissolved two years later as the ruling Cambodian People’s Party tightened its authoritarian chokehold. Rainsy now writes financial updates with little hope of returning to Cambodia.  Anwar became Malaysia’s prime minister in 2022 but has abandoned his once-professed liberal, secular ideals. His government has launched “lawfare” campaigns against opponents.  In August, Malaysian prosecutors charged Muhyiddin Yassin, the leader of the opposition, with sedition for complaining that the king hadn’t asked him to form a government last year.  Anwar’s pluralist appeal has gone out of the window.  He’s unpopular with Malays, he has defended a deputy prime minister accused of corruption, his speeches are flecked with anti-Semitism and anti-Western vitriol, and he has drawn Malaysia closer to China and Russia. Anwar visited Moscow this month and now declares support for China’s “reunification” of Taiwan.  “Anwar had been a favorite of Western reporters and officials, heralded as a man who could liberalize Malaysian politics,” the Economist recently wrote. Since taking power, he has been “a very different kind of leader.” A milder form of tyranny One shouldn’t mourn the passing of Southeast Asia’s icons, the disappearance of a handful of individuals who were supposed to drag the region by their own sweat and sacrifice into a freer future.  There was too much focus on personalities rather than policies; too much about a single person’s fate to become premier and not on the people they were supposedly fighting for.  Suu Kyi was the National League for Democracy; she was destined to save Myanmar because her father had done the same when Burma emerged from British colonial rule in the 1940s.  Even before Sam Rainsy’s party was dissolved, it had become cleaved between the factions loyal to him and another leader. They, too, saw themselves as the embodiments of salvation for an entire country.   Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi in Oslo on June 15, 2012. (Markus Schreiber/AP) As Suu Kyi and Anwar showed, you sacrifice your entire life in exile, imprisonment, scorn and harassment, and once you finally attain power, you believe you damn well need to stay there, whatever it costs.  After all, losing power means a return to tyranny and the bad old times—so a milder form of tyranny is justifiable to prevent that.  Southeast Asia isn’t unique; the worst leaders are those who have taken a long walk to power.  Seldom does a revolutionary not become a counter-revolutionary. Rarely does the liberal in opposition remain a liberal in power.  Suu Kyi gambled – badly – that publicly defending the military’s genocidal actions against the Rohingya was the price worth paying to prevent a military coup. She should sacrifice up the few for the apparent benefit of the majority, she reasoned.   The end of idolatry should allow Southeast Asian democrats to focus on strengthening political institutions rather than idolizing individuals.  A new example in Thailand The region should look at what’s happening in Thailand.  Unique in Southeast Asia, Thailand’s progressive movement has created a pro-democracy “archetype”— someone young, Western-educated, good-looking, conversant in English, ideally with a business background, and very social media savvy.  Pita Limjaroenrat, who employed this archetype to make his Move Forward Party the country’s largest at last year’s elections, was more of a character than an icon.  Pita played this role with Move Forward, but it was the same character that Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit played before him with the Future Forward party, Move Forward’s predecessor party, and that Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut now plays as leader of People’s Party, the successor to Move Forward.  This is a clever tactic. If the leader is disbarred from politics, as Thanathorn and Pita were, then someone else can easily assume the role, as Natthaphong has done.  If the party is dissolved, as Future Forward and Move Forward were, you make a new one led by the same character with the same script.  This prevents a party from being consumed by one person – à la Suu Kyi. It turns the dissolution of a party into an inconvenience, instead of the death knell of an entire movement, as was the case with Sam Rainsy and the Cambodia National Rescue Party.  Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in Berlin, Germany, March 11, 2024. (Liesa Johannssen/Reuters) It means that if the leader wins power, he knows he is there because of the script he has been given, not the one he’s written. The rest of Southeast Asia would be better off developing their own archetypes, not waiting for the next icons to appear.  Neither is the end of Southeast Asia’s pro-democracy icons a bad thing for the West, which was too quick in the 1990s and 2000s to put its faith in a few personalities being able to drive…

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More Rohingya are arriving in Bangladesh, as Rakhine state burns

Editor08 mins

Some 20,000 Rohingya have entered Bangladesh in the last three months as they flee worsening conditions in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, with some new arrivals taking shelter in rented houses outside U.N.-administered camps, refugees and local officials say. The uptick comes with Bangladesh enmeshed in political turmoil and amid worsening violence in Rakhine, which lies just across its southeastern border. Arakan Army insurgents have been waging a fierce campaign to wrest control of the state from Myanmar’s military government.  “There is a terrible situation in Rakhine. There is no condition to stay there. No food, no shelter, no treatment for sick people,” said Mohammed Feroz Kamal, who arrived last week from Rakhine’s Maungdaw district. “Drone attacks are being carried out, especially on the people who have gathered to flee to the border in that country,” he told BenarNews. “Hundreds of people are dying. ”I saw many dead bodies on the way.” RELATED STORIES  Myanmar rebels say victory is near after battle near Bangladesh border Rohingyas face ‘gravest threats since 2017’ as fighting rages in western Myanmar Rohingya refugees drown fleeing Myanmar’s war as concerns mount Some 5,000 Rohingya who fled recent fighting waiting to cross to Bangladesh Rohingya community leader Mohammed Jubair, chairman of the Arakan Rohingya Society for Peace and Humanity, said at least 20,000 people had crossed into Bangladesh during the past three months.  But a Bangladeshi official put the number at around 16,000. “They used the poor law-and-order situation as an advantage,” Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner Mohammed Mizanur Rahman told BenarNews, referring to the chaotic and lawless atmosphere in Bangladesh before and after the Sheikh Hasina government fell in early August. Earlier this week, in the face of new cross-border arrivals, Bangladesh transitional government head Muhammad Yunus called on the international community to speed up efforts to resettle Rohingya refugees in third countries. The “resettlement process should be easy, regular and smooth,” Yunus said during a meeting on Sept. 8 with the International Organisation for Migration, Reuters reported. The interim administration headed by Yunus, a Nobel Peace Prize winner and pioneer of microcredit loans, has been struggling to maintain law and order since Hasina resigned and fled the country amid student-led, anti-government protests. Two Rohingya families who recently escaped from Myanmar have taken refuge in this multistory building in Teknaf, Bangladesh, Sept. 10, 2024. (Abdur Rahman/BenarNews) This week, a BenarNews correspondent visited several villages, including the municipal town of Teknaf, which lies along the border with Myanmar.  According to local officials, Rohingyas are crossing the frontier into Bangladesh every day. “Border Guard Bangladesh and Bangladesh Coast Guard are working to prevent Rohingyas at the border,” Mohammed Adnan Chowdhury, executive officer of Teknaf Upazila sub-district, told BenarNews. “However, some Rohingyas are entering the border in the middle of the night. Many of them are renting houses in the main towns of the city and entering the villages.” He and others described how the recent influx differed from those in the past, including in 2017 when some 740,000 Rohingya fled into Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar district over a period of months. Rented digs Most of the new arrivals are businessmen or from relatively well-to-do families in Maungdaw district, Rohingya community leaders said. Feroz, who paid a broker 50,000 Bangladeshi taka (US$418) to enter Bangladesh, is now spending 4,000 taka (US$33) per month to stay in a six-room, tin-roofed house in Teknaf alongside two other Rohingya families already living there.  Another Rohingya, Nur Shahed, is staying in an apartment with another Rohingya family in Teknaf’s Shilbania neighborhood  He said he had intended to take his family to the Kutupalong refugee camp, but there was no more space.  “So many people like me have taken shelter here in villages and in rented houses,” he told BenarNews. Mohammed Rafiq stands at the door of a building in Teknaf, Bangladesh, where he is now living in an apartment with his family after fleeing from Myanmar’s Rakhine state, Sept. 10, 2024. (Abdur Rahman/BenarNews) Immigration expert C.R. Abrar, a professor at Dhaka University, underlined that regardless of their income status, the new arrivals were being forced to come to Bangladesh to save their lives. “Therefore, they should not be treated as criminals under any circumstances; they should be given facilities and security as refugees,” he said, noting that Bangladesh — with its huge refugee population — should pass laws on how to treat them, and participate in related international agreements.  “Those who are outside the refugee camps are in a more vulnerable situation than those inside the camps,” he said. “They are likely to face various forms of harassment and violence. Therefore, they should be taken to the camps, from a humanitarian point of view, as the primary task.” BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated online news organization. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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EXPLAINED: Why are there questions about foreign judges in Hong Kong’s high court?

Editor010 mins

A decision by Hong Kong’s top court in August to uphold the convictions of seven of Hong Kong’s most prominent pro-democracy activists, including newspaper publisher Jimmy Lai, has not only raised fears for freedom of the press but also questions about the role of foreign judges. One of the quirk’s of Hong Kong’s system negotiated when Britain handed it back to China in 1997 was foreign judges in the judiciary. They have long been upheld as a testament to the commitment to the rule of law. But criticism is growing that they legitimize an administration that fails to uphold values of political freedom and freedom of expression. Chris Patten, the last British governor of Hong Kong, made a pointed remark after the Hong Kong court’s August ruling, describing the verdict as one that “revealed the rapidly deteriorating state of the rule of law in Hong Kong.”   “This unjust verdict is further compounded by the involvement of Lord Neuberger, a former head of Britain’s Supreme Court, in this decision,” he said. David Neuberger is a British judge who served as the president of the British Supreme Court from 2012 to 2017. After his retirement, Neuberger participated in Hong Kong’s judicial system as part of the Court of Final Appeal, or CFA, which has the power of final adjudication and the ability to invite judges from other common law jurisdictions to join the court when necessary.  He said in August his role as a judge in Hong Kong was to decide cases that come before him according to the law. A man (bottom R) waits at a traffic light outside the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong on March 31, 2022. (Isaac Lawrence/AFP) Why does Neuberger sit at the CFA? Hong Kong’s CFA was established on July 1, 1997, as part of the city’s legal framework under the Basic Law, which serves as its mini-constitution. The CFA replaced the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London as Hong Kong’s highest court after the end of British colonial rule. The Basic Law set out the city’s judicial system, which includes the CFA, the High Court, District Court, magistrates’ courts, and other specialized courts. It also ensured that Hong Kong’s common law system would continue. Cases in the CFA are heard by the chief justice, three permanent judges chosen by the chief justice, and a non-permanent judge who can be from Hong Kong or another common law jurisdiction. They are also selected by the chief justice. Under the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, an overseas non-permanent judge must be a judge or a retired judge of a court of unlimited jurisdiction in either civil or criminal matters in another common law jurisdiction. They should also ordinarily reside outside Hong Kong. There are no restrictions on the type of cases an overseas judge may preside over. Government officials and legal figures in Hong Kong often cite the presence of overseas judges as proof of international confidence in the independence of Hong Kong’s judiciary.   As of Sept. 11, there were seven overseas non-permanent judges at the CFA.  A supporter of media mogul Jimmy Lai, founder of Apple Daily, holds signs as his prison van leaves the Court of Final Appeal, in Hong Kong, China, Dec, 31, 2020. (Tyrone Siu/Reuters) What are the recent debates? The engagement of overseas judges has come under public scrutiny, particularly after some resignations following the implementation of a Beijing-imposed national security law in June 2020. The United States, Britain and other countries have criticized the law under which many Hong Kong residents have been prosecuted for dissent and media outlets shut. Only judges nominated by the city’s chief executive can sit on national security cases but the list of nominees is not made public, media has reported. The Hong Kong government said that any judge, regardless of nationality, was “eligible for designation” under the national security law, but in the small number of national security law cases that have reached the top court, no overseas judge has sat. A pro-establishment barrister and government adviser, Ronny Tong, questioned whether the city needed judges who owe their allegiance to other countries. They should not preside over national security cases, particularly if they came from countries “hostile to China or Hong Kong,” he said.  Social media critics question the foreign judges’ “luxurious” lifestyle. They are flown into Hong Kong on an ad hoc basis, enjoying first class travel and a generous salary for their visits, which typically last 29 days, media critics said. A statue of Lady Justice at the Court of Final Appeal is pictured, in Hong Kong, China, Sept. 5, 2023. (Tyrone Siu/Reuters) What are the foreign judges’ positions? Some of foreign judges who have stepped down since 2020 have questioned their roles under an administration that they say no longer respects basic rights and freedoms. In 2020, senior Australian judge James Spigelman cited the impact of the National Security Law as he stepped down. Two years later, U.K. Supreme Court justices Robert Reed and Patrick Hodge resigned following concerns raised by the British government. Other British judges, Jonathan Sumption and Lawrence Collins, resigned in June.  Collins cited the “political situation in Hong Kong” in a brief statement about his departure, while Sumption wrote in the Financial Times that Hong Kong was  “slowly becoming a totalitarian state”. “The rule of law is profoundly compromised in any area about which the government feels strongly,” Sumption said, adding that it was “no longer realistic” to think that the presence of overseas judges could help sustain the rule of law in Hong Kong. A spokesperson for Hong Kong’s judiciary said in June that its “operation will not be affected by any change in membership of the court”. Hong Kong’s government rejects any suggestion that the courts are subject to political pressure. It says the national security law, introduced after mass protests in 2019, was necessary to ensure the stability that underpins the financial hub’s prosperity. Edited by Mike Firn.  We are…

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Sluggish property revenues hit Hong Kong fiscal reserves

Editor010 mins

Read RFA coverage of this topic in Cantonese. Falling revenue from land auctions — once a mainstay of the city’s fiscal strength — has hit Hong Kong government coffers hard in recent months, resulting in a spike in the fiscal deficit and dwindling fiscal reserves. Government expenditure between April and July topped HK$242.6 billion (US$31 billion), with revenue at just HK$90.1 billion (US$11.5 billion) over the same period, resulting in a cumulative year-to-date deficit of HK$135.4 billion (US$17.4 billion), the government said. The government reported a budget deficit of about HK$100 billion (US$12.8 billion) for the fiscal year that ended in March 2024, almost double its earlier estimate. The latest figures from April through July suggest it could be on track for an even larger hole in public finances in the fiscal year ending March 31, 2025. Hong Kong reported a budget deficit of HK$257.6 billion for the 2020-21 fiscal year, the largest deficit in 20 years, reflecting huge government expenditures during the early years of the COVID-19 pandemic. Apartment blocks at Oi Man housing estate, May 8, 2024, in Hong Kong. (Dale De La Rey/AFP) But the deficit, which analysts say is mostly the result of reduced revenues from land auctions and recently cut stamp duties, hasn’t disappeared since then, largely due to a flagging property market and a post-lockdown economic slump. Fiscal reserves stood at HK$599.2 billion (US$76.8 billion) as of July 31, their lowest level in 14 years. However, the figures have taken into account proceeds and payouts on recent government bond transactions, the government said in an Aug. 30 statement. Fiscal obligations Hong Kong is obliged under its constitution, the Basic Law, to avoid deficits by keeping spending within revenue limits, yet the city has reported four deficits in the past five years. “The government has slowed down the supply of land to give the market time, but the Hong Kong property market is facing structural changes,” Joseph Ngan, former finance channel chief at i-CABLE News, wrote in a recent commentary for RFA Cantonese. “The effect of the stimulating measures at the beginning of this year has now worn off, and real estate prices have seen further downward pressure in recent months,” Ngan wrote. “This has impacted developers’ willingness to invest in land, and will eventually mean a huge fiscal deficit.” The situation has left some government departments charged with managing affordable housing and cultural assets in dire financial straits, including the Housing Authority, which runs the city’s public housing estates, and the Urban Renewal Authority, which spearheads urban redevelopment and refurbishment projects. Hong Kong apartment buildings, May 15, 2024. (Dale De La Rey/AFP) Such departments are now in need of fresh injections of capital, analysts said. The Housing Authority, which relies on public housing rentals and the sale of premium-free Home Ownership Scheme housing as its main income, is in a similar situation.  Revenue in recent years has been lower than expected, leaving the body with an operating surplus that shrank from HK$12.6 billion (US$1.6 billion) in 2023 to HK$2.6 billion (US$330 million). Public rental housing revenue is expected to move into the red this fiscal year, with a projected deficit of around HK$2.143 billion (US$276 million) next year.  Housing construction promised At the same time, the Hong Kong government has pledged to speed up construction of more than 10,000 subsidized housing units within the next five years, boosting annual construction expenditure by HK$10 billion (US$1.2 billion) to HK$40 billion (US$5 billion).  The authority has tried to staunch the losses by slashing discounts to its affordable Home Ownership Scheme private sector apartments from 62% last year to just 30% this year, but the move has made it harder to sell the apartments in what was already a difficult market. Financial commentator Simon Lee said the authority was forced to sell off some of its public housing assets in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997. “The Housing Authority was the first to be affected when the real estate market froze during the 1997 financial crisis,” Lee said. “Public housing rentals can carry on when the market is strong, but Hong Kong is tied into the public policy model of real estate subsidies.” He said the government also holds a stake in train and subway operator MTRC, and subsidizes it to build housing and other developments on its land, and around stations. A worker walks past a large advertisement photo of a property project of the China Evergrande Group outside its local headquarters in Hong Kong, Oct. 4, 2021. (Vincent Yu/AP) Meanwhile, the Urban Renewal Authority has been issuing bonds in a bid to raise enough funds. “Exorbitantly high construction costs and high interest rates, coupled with high prices for previously acquired land … have put considerable pressure on the [Urban Renewal] Authority,” Joseph Ngan told RFA Cantonese’s Free to Talk Finance show. “The reversal in the real estate market has left a lot of property-related public bodies under tremendous pressure,” he said. Bond sale The Urban Renewal Authority’s recent triple-tranche HK$12 billion (US$1.5 billion) senior bonds offering under its US$3 billion Medium Term Note Programme will help to fund its capital expenditure on urban renewal projects and for general corporate purposes, the authority said in an Aug. 21 statement. The offering was well-received by a diverse group of high-quality local and overseas investors, including banks, asset managers, corporations, insurance companies, hedge funds, central banks, official institutions, family offices and private banks.  It had a peak combined orderbook of over HK$22.8 billion (US$2.9 billion), representing an oversubscription rate of around 2 times, the statement said. The bond sale came after the authority suffered its first loss in nine years in 2022/23, totaling more than HK$3.9 billion last year. Projected construction costs this year will run to HK$64.3 billion (US$8.2 billion), but current cash reserves are only HK$18 billion (US$2.3 billion). The authority has also been allowed to borrow up to HK$25 billion (US$3.2 billion) under government guarantees. Translated by Luisetta Mudie. Edited by…

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Vietnam defense minister Phan Van Giang visits US to boost ties

Editor09 mins

Updated Sept. 10, 2024, 07:03 a.m. ET. Vietnam’s minister of national defense Phan Van Giang is in the U.S. to bolster bilateral security cooperation amid rising tensions in the South China Sea. Vietnam is among the states that claim at least part of the waterway and it has been seeking to strengthen its maritime capabilities, including with purchases of defense technologies and equipment. Giang’s trip is his first official visit to the U.S. since he took office in April 2021. Hanoi and Washington upgraded their relations to the top tier of comprehensive strategic partnership in September 2023, during a visit by U.S. President Joe Biden to Vietnam. Yet their security and defense cooperation, deemed highly sensitive as the two countries fought each other in the past, remains limited and has focused mainly on the legacies of the Vietnam War, such as searching for American soldiers missing in action and decontamination of areas affected by toxic chemicals. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin (R) welcomes Vietnamese Defense Minister Gen. Phan Van Giang (L) to the Pentagon in Washington, Sept. 9, 2024. (AP Photo/Kevin Wolf) Gen. Giang and his counterpart, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, had a meeting on Monday at the Pentagon, during which they “underscored the importance of working together to overcome war legacies,” according to a summary provided by the Department of Defense. They also “discussed opportunities to deepen defense cooperation, including on defense trade, industrial base resilience, and information sharing,” the department said without providing  further details. Shopping list According to the U.S. government, from 2016 to 2021, it authorized US$29.8 million – a relatively small amount – in defense articles to Vietnam via direct commercial sales. The Defense Department also has more than $118 million in active foreign military sales to Vietnam, mainly of trainer aircraft. This budget would be greatly expanded if Vietnam decided to procure more U.S. equipment, analysts say. “Defense equipment suppliers and subcontractors can expect increased demand for naval combatants, aerial defense, intelligence systems, and surveillance and reconnaissance equipment,” the U.S. government’s International Trade Administration said in its commercial guide. “Maritime security and air defense is where Vietnam has the biggest need, but I would expect Vietnam would start with maritime security first, as this dovetails with U.S. expectations,” said Alexander Vuving, a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii “But there is no clear-cut distinction between maritime security and air defense. For example, aircraft, radars and missiles are essential in both,” Vuving told Radio Free Asia. RELATED STORIES Closer Vietnam-US ties not based on Beijing issues, says conference Vietnam hosts its first international defense expo Vietnam mulls law that may open market to foreign arms firms US Defense Secretary Austin Meets in Hanoi With Vietnamese Officials The United States and Vietnam signed in 2015 a so-called Joint Vision Statement on defense relations – their most important document setting out defense cooperation, in which maritime security was highlighted. The U.S. has given the Vietnam coast guard two Hamilton-class cutters – a third one is scheduled to be delivered in the near future – as well as tactical drones and patrol boats. Veteran regional military watcher Mike Yeo said that coast guard cutters “would be an obvious item” on Hanoi’s shopping list. “But another possibility is the approval for transfer of subsystems to Vietnam such as jet engines for Korean FA-50 light attack planes should Vietnam decide to buy them,” Yeo said.  “Vietnam hasn’t bought the FA-50 yet but it seems like a logical choice going forward and as the engine used is a U.S. design an export clearance will be needed for any buyers,” he added. Not targeting China The United States lifted its lethal arms embargo on Vietnam in 2016, enabling it to procure U.S. equipment but “it will depend mainly on Vietnam’s needs and the prices,” said Vuving. Vietnam’s defense budget has not been made public, but could be about $7.8 billion in 2024, according to GlobalData. It remains dependent on cheaper Russian arms and equipment but there are efforts to diversify supplies with a major defense expo in Hanoi in 2022 and a second one slated for this December. Before the meeting with Gen. Giang on Monday, Secretary Austin said his department had accepted an invitation to the event that is due to be attended by defense suppliers from dozens of countries including Russia, India, the United Kingdom, Israel and France. Vietnam’s big neighbor China did not attend the first Vietnam Defense Expo and has yet to confirm its attendance at the second. A visitor looks into the U.S. Excelitas’ Merlin-LR Image Intensifier weapon-mounted sight during a defense expo in Hanoi on October 2, 2019. (Nhac Nguyen/AFP) Hanoi is always cautious not to antagonize Beijing while deepening ties with Washington, insisting that any effort to modernize its military is purely for self-defense and not aimed at any  country. “China will watch Vietnam-U.S. relations very closely,” said Vuving. “Beijing is unhappy with any progress in U.S.-Vietnam relations.”  Edited by Mike Firn. Updated to clarify Phan Van Giang’s schedule. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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Rebel army captures major Myanmar navy training base

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Read coverage of this story in Burmese. Insurgents in western Myanmar have captured an important military training base after a month of fighting, the rebel army said in a statement, dealing what is likely to be a severe blow to the embattled military. .Arakan Army troops seized the Central Naval Diving and Salvage Depot between Thandwe township’s Maung Shwe Lay and Kwin Waing village in Rakhine state on Thursday, said the ethnic minority insurgent force battling for self-determination.  The Arakan Army, or AA, said the facility was the last naval base held by junta forces in Thandwe township, and it was defended on a “huge-scale” by the junta’s air force and navy as well as more than 1,200 soldiers, including many new graduates from the base. “More than 400 junta soldiers were killed during our attack, and junta weapons, ammunition and equipment were seized,” the AA said in  its statement.  Radio Free Asia was not able to independently verify that toll and the junta main spokesperson, Major Gen. Zaw Min, Tun did not respond to requests for comment.  The AA posted pictures of its fighters standing by a diving boards at the training center. The base is a major navy training facility and its loss will be of huge significance for the military, said Pe Than, a former member of parliament for the Arakan National Party, which in the past had affiliations with the AA. “Losing such a base will affect training as well as fighting. They’ve destroyed the navy and weakened the army, like cutting a man off at the waist,” he said. He said the Danyawaddy Naval Base in Kyaukpyu township, to the north of Thandwe, was the navy’s last facility in Rakhine state. “The military is like a bird with one wing now,” he said. Arakan Army forces after capturing the junta’s Central Naval Diving and Salvage Depot in Rakhine State on Sept. 5, 2024 (Arakan Army Information Desk) The loss of the base will not only dent the junta’s morale and reputation but also bring in more resources for the AA through the control of goods coming through a nearby port, he said. The AA said it expected junta retaliation against civilians in the area. Human rights investigators say junta forces have been increasingly attacking civilian targets as they lose ground to insurgent forces in different parts of the country. The military denies attacking civilians. The Arakan Army, which launched a new offensive against the military in November, controls nine townships in Rakhine state and one in neighboring Chin state, and is battling to take full control of three other townships.  Junta forces have launched crackdowns in the north of the state, near the Bangladesh border, and across the neighboring Ayeyarwady region after AA gains in the south of the state. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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EXPLAINED: The (worrying) popularity of caterpillar fungus

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By now the army of scavengers has retreated from the high hillsides of the eastern Tibetan plateau, their bounty in hand. Harvest season for yartsa gunbu (དབྱར་རྩྭ་དགུན་འབུ།), or caterpillar fungus, typically runs from May to July, when winter snows have receded and thousands of rural, ethnic Tibetans can prospect for what’s also known as “soft gold.”  It’s hard to overstate the importance these few weeks hold for the people who climb the steep slopes. Collecting caterpillar fungus —  which is used to treat a variety of ailments — can account for as much as 90% of a rural family’s annual income.  But high demand has spurred overharvesting, making it harder to find the fungus in its natural environment. Climate change poses another challenge. Warmer temperatures on the high plateau are reducing the length of winter, a critical time for yartsa gunbu. Now a new threat is emerging, sources inside China say: artificial varieties designed to fill the gaps between supply and demand, in the form of either cultivated fungi or fake products altogether. Although Chinese authorities have tried to regulate the sale of cultivated fungus, interviews with Tibetans and online videos that attract tens of thousands of viewers say imposters have infiltrated the market. “It will definitely jeopardize the lives of thousands of Tibetan herders and farmers whose income depend on the wild yartsa,” said Lobsang Yeshi, who has practiced traditional Tibetan medicine at Men-Tsee-Khang in Dharamshala, India, for the past 20 years.  A local resident pulls out a caterpillar fungus west China’s Qinghai province May 12, 2007. (Simon Zo/Reuters) What is caterpillar fungus and where does it come from? Yartsa gunbu translates to “summer grass, winter bug.” The Ophiocordyceps sinensis – its scientific name – releases spores that sink underground and infect the larvae of ghost moths, so called for the white color of males. The yartsa gunbu takes over, commandeering the caterpillar’s nervous system, consuming its organs and finally, in spring, emerging from its head as a brown stoma at altitudes of greater than 13,000 feet (4,000 meters). Its methods have drawn comparisons to the fungus that stars in the HBO hit zombie series, “The Last of Us.” Harvested intact, it’s about the length of a little finger and shaped like a caterpillar with a stem attached.  Yartsa gunbu is found primarily in the Himalaya mountains and the Tibetan plateau. The Yushu Tibetan Autonomous prefecture in Qinghai province, east of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, is a particularly good place to look. Thousands of its residents set up makeshift camps from which they hike into the thin air. The annual harvest is reportedly around 300 million fungi that can cost $7 a pop or more, leaving a multi-billion dollar market.  A jar of caterpillar fungus on sale at a herbal medicine shop in Queens, New York, Aug. 23, 2024 (Lobsang Gelek/RFA) What is caterpillar fungus used for? Yartsa gunbu has been used in Tibetan and Chinese traditional medicine to treat heart, liver and lung ailments. More recently, it acquired a reputation for improving sexual stamina in men and women. (“Himalayan Viagra” is another moniker.) Studies have shown possible benefits, though scientists say more clinical research is needed. Users consume yartsa gunbu by brewing it with hot water similar to how tea or herbal infusions are prepared, or chewing it as it comes. Some put it in soups and other recipes. Lesser specimens are ground into powders. Why are people growing a fungus ?  Pluckers like to pick the fungus before it releases spores, limiting its ability to reproduce and leading to its population decline. China has encouraged the development of cultivated yartsa gunbu, and one company has reportedly solved the puzzle, synthetically growing the O. sinensis fungus found in the wild.  But some individuals are trying to cultivate fungus varieties on their own. That, fungus traders say, has undercut prices and, because the buyer’s remain suspicious of its medicinal properties, consumer confidence, several sources told RFA.  In Guangzhou, a major market, “there is a hesitancy of customers in buying because of too much artificial fungus in the market,” one trader said. A Tibetan living in Qinghai province said prices have dropped nearly 20% this year.  In New York, a retailer said he can still sell a single piece of wild fungus for $14, but “there are a lot of fake and cultivated yartsa” undercutting the business, he said. “Nowadays, people are selling thousands of artificial yartsa online per day, as well as in shops, jeopardizing the original yartsa business,” he said. Studies have shown that cultivated fungus can replicate the chemical compounds of natural varieties, though there are differences.  A local resident displays a few caterpillar fungus, Qinghai province, China, May 12, 2007. (Simon Zo/Reuters) What is China doing to protect the market? Chinese authorities seem to be aware of the financial risks to some of their poorest populations.  In April, the Chinese government in Qinghai, tried to control the artificial plantation of yartsa gunbu. But a trader in Nagchu, Tibet Autonomous Region, an area that historically has been among the best for finding wild yartsa gunbu, said enforcement has been lax. “Chinese authorities have come out with a lot of rules saying that the artificial fungus is banned,” the trader said. “But the on-ground reality is that the Chinese authorities are not strictly monitoring or stopping the sale of artificial fungus. And this is making it tough for us to sell the real fungus.”  Lobsang from RFA Tibetan contributed to this article. Edited by Jim Snyder and Boer Deng. Check out our reports Author: Investigative Journalism Reportika

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