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Category: Middle East

Taking over from the inside: China’s growing reach into local waters

Editor012 mins

On March 14, 2016, Argentina’s coast guard detected a Chinese vessel fishing illegally in national waters. When the ship attempted to ram the coast-guard cutter, the Argentinians opened fire on the vessel, which soon sank.  The Lu Yan Yuan Yu 10 was one of eleven Chinese squid vessels that the Argentine navy has chased for suspected illegal fishing since 2010, according to the government.  But one year after the incident, Argentina’s Fishing Council announced that it would grant fishing licenses to two vessels owned by the same Chinese operator that owned the ship the Argentine navy had chased the previous year. These ships would sail under the Argentine flag through a local front company.  The decision seemed to violate Argentine regulations that not only forbid foreign-owned ships from flying Argentina’s flag or fishing in its waters but also prohibit granting licenses to operators with records of illegal fishing. The move may have been a contradiction, but it is an increasingly common one around the world. Over the past three decades, China has gained supremacy over global fishing by dominating the high seas with more than 6,000 distant-water ships. When it came to targeting other countries’ fishing grounds, Chinese fishing ships typically sat “on the outside,” in international waters along sea borders, running incursions across the line into domestic waters.  In recent years, from South America to Africa to the far Pacific, China has increasingly taken a “softer” approach, gaining control from the inside through legal means by paying to flag in their ships so they can fish in domestic waters without the risk of political clashes, bad press, or sunken vessels.  Infographic by The Outlaw Ocean Project This method typically involves going around prohibitions on foreign shipowners by partnering with local residents and giving them majority ownership stakes. Through these partnerships, Chinese companies can register their ships under the flag of another country, gaining permission to fish in that nation’s territorial waters.  Sometimes Chinese companies sell or lease their ships to locals but retain control over decisions and profits. In other places, these companies pay fees to gain fishing rights through “access agreements.” From Micronesia to Iran Chinese companies now control nearly 250 flagged-in vessels in the waters of countries including Micronesia, Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, Morocco, and even Iran. Many of these companies have been tied to a variety of fishing crimes.  Trade records show that some of the seafood caught on these vessels is exported to countries including the United States, Canada, Italy, and Spain. Mar del Plata is Argentina’s largest fishing port and the headquarters for many fishing companies. Many Argentine-owned fishing vessels have, however, been neglected in recent years. In some parts of Mar del Plata’s port, those vessels now sit neglected or sunken, unused and unsalvageable. (Pete McKenzie/The Outlaw Ocean Project) Most countries require ships to be owned locally to keep profits within the country and make it easier to enforce fishing regulations. “Flagging in” undermines those aims. And aside from the sovereignty and financial concerns, food security and local livelihoods are also undermined by the export of this vital source of affordable protein, often to Western consumers.  In the Pacific Ocean, Chinese ships comb the waters of Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Micronesia, according to a 2022 report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service.  “Chinese fleets are active in waters far from China’s shores,” the report warned, “and the growth in their harvests threatens to worsen the already dire depletion in global fisheries.”  The tactic of “flagging in” is not unique to the Chinese fleet. American and Icelandic fishing companies have also engaged in the practice.  But as China has increased its control over global fishing, Western nations have jumped at the opportunity to focus attention on its misdeeds.  Even frequent culprits can also be easy scapegoats. When criticized in the media, China pushes back, not without reason, by dismissing their criticism as politically motivated and by accusing its detractors of hypocrisy.  Still, China has a well-documented reputation for violating international fishing laws and standards, intruding on the maritime territory of other countries and abusing its fishing workers.  Two local men fish in Mar del Plata, Argentina, in March 2024. (Pete McKenzie/The Outlaw Ocean Project) History of misbehavior In the past six years, more than 50 ships flagged to a dozen different countries but controlled by Chinese companies have engaged in crimes such as illegal fishing and unauthorized transshipments, according to an investigation by the Outlaw Ocean Project.  China’s sheer size, ubiquity and history of misbehavior is raising concerns.  In Africa, Chinese companies operate flagged-in ships in the national waters of at least nine countries. In the Pacific, an inspection in 2024 by local police and the U.S. Coast Guard found that six Chinese flagged-in ships in the waters of Vanuatu had violated regulations requiring them to record their catch in logbooks. In August 2019, a reporting team inspected a Chinese fishing vessel off the coast of West Africa. (Fábio Nascimento/The Outlaw Ocean Project) China’s control over local resources is not constrained to domestic waters. In Argentina, China has provided billions of dollars in currency swaps, providing an economic lifeline amid domestic inflation and hesitancy from other lenders.  China has also made or promised billion-dollar investments in Argentina’s railway system, hydroelectric dams, lithium mines, and solar and wind power plants.  This money has bought Beijing the type of influence that intervened in the fate of the crew from the Lu Yan Yuan Yu 10. When the ship sank, most of the crew were scooped up by another Chinese fishing ship and returned to China.  However, four of them, including the captain, were brought to shore, put under house arrest and charged with a range of crimes by a local judge who said the officials had endangered their own crew and the coast guard officers who chased them. China’s foreign ministry soon pushed back against the arrest. Three days later, Argentina’s foreign minister told reporters that the charges had “provoked a reaction of great concern…

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Authorities in Xinjiang rearrest son of prominent Uyghur businessman

Editor05 mins

Authorities in Xinjiang rearrested the son of a prominent Uyghur businessman two days after he was released from “re-education” in March and days before before his wedding, two relatives with knowledge of the situation told Radio Free Asia. Abuzer Abdughapar, 24, who worked at a car dealership in Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi, was rearrested on March 25 by public security authorities, said his uncle Abdusattar Abdurusul, citing information from other relatives in Almaty, Kazakhstan. He was supposed to get married on May 11, an event to which his relatives in Almaty had been invited, Abdusattar said. The reason for Abuzer’s arrest is unknown, and authorities have not informed Abuzer’s family about his whereabouts. Abuzer was first arrested and detained in 2017 in his hometown of Ghulja – or Yining in Chinese – after spending a year studying Turkey. He was sent to a “re-education” camp and released nearly a year later.   His rearrest is an example of how authorities are apprehending Uyghur detainees, who have already served time in “re-education” camps or prisons, under various pretexts to eliminate what Chinese authorities deem “threats to national security.”  Among those rearrested are entrepreneurs and philanthropists, and Uyghurs who have traveled abroad, especially to Muslim countries. Abdughapar Abdurusul in an undated photo. (Courtesy of Abdusattar Abdurusul) “I heard there [was] a 100-day clearance going on which entailed the rearrest of people who were arrested and released before,” Abdusattar said. “The Chinese government is trying to erase us.”   Mutallib, the Almaty-based older brother of Abuzer’s grandmother, confirmed the young Uyghur’s rearrest. “We heard he was arrested on March 25 and that he has not been released,” he said. “The wedding was paused as well. Up to now, we don’t know his whereabouts or the reason for his arrest.” Chinese police officers at the Public Security Bureau in Urumqi refused to answer questions about Abuzer’s rearrest when contacted by RFA. Father arrested in 2018 His father tried to bribe authorities in Urumqi to release Abuzer, but they lied to him and disappeared after receiving the money, Abdusattar said. In 2018, authorities also arrested Abuzer’s father, Abdughapar Abdurusul, a prominent philanthropist and owner of a multimillion-dollar import-export company in Ghulja that does business with Kazakhstan, for taking an unsanctioned Muslim pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia and “tax evasion,” Abdusattar said. They also detained Abuzer’s mother, Merhaba. The family’s fixed assets, companies and houses worth more than several hundred million dollars were confiscated, he said. Merhaba later died in a “re-education” camp. Abdughapar had been sentenced to death, but was released in 2020, said his older brother Abdusattar, a businessman who lives in Europe. Abdusattar said he believes that Abuzer and Abdughapar were released after he went public about their detentions via Western media, including RFA. Authorities re-arrested Abdughapar a second time in summer 2021, but released him a few months later, his brother said. The cause of his arrest is unknown. Translated by RFA Uyghur. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Matt Reed.

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Another day, another fraud case in Vietnam

Editor012 mins

The week that Vietnam was in an official state of mourning for Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, whose tenure was centered on a “Blazing Furnace” anti-corruption campaign that toppled dozens of top officials, another big corporate fraud trial began in a Hanoi court.  While its scale and scope pale in comparison to the Van Thinh Phat scandal orchestrated by businesswoman Truong My Lan, who was convicted and sentenced to death in April 2024, the FLC (Finance, Land, and Commerce) scandal is garnering significant media attention.  Trinh Van Quyet, was a young, brash, high-flying tycoon, and briefly in 2021, the country’s wealthiest person.  Established in 2010, his property company, FLC, quickly grew into a sprawling conglomerate with some 17 subsidiaries and affiliated companies in real estate, resorts and golf courses, as well as Bamboo Airways, once the second largest privately-owned airline in the country.   Quyet, 49, was arrested in March 2022 along with his two sisters for stock market manipulation, appropriation of property, and fraud. Authorities arrested 47 other people, including FLC executives and several regulators. In all, 15 relatives are on trial. At least one other FLC executive is at large. FLC Group CEO Trinh Van Quyet holds a model of a Boeing Dreamliner passenger jet at his office in Hanoi, July 30, 2018. (Nhac Nguyen/AFP) Perhaps more importantly, police arrested the former chairman of the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange, Tran Dac Sinh, its director, Le Hai Tra, and two other bourse executives. The four were charged with “abusing positions and powers while performing official duties.” Quyet is accused of running $156 million “pump and dump” stock fraud between May 2017 and January 2022. He had his two sisters and 43 other family members establish some 500 different brokerage accounts.  False documents Quyet and his family members traded FLC stock amongst themselves at a frenzied pace, creating the perception of demand and causing the price to soar. On many occasions, his sister would cancel a stock purchase at the last minute, having already created the impression that the shares were in demand. In another scheme, from 2014-2016, Quyet had family members and employees at another subsidiary, FLC Faros Construction, falsify documents to make it look as though they were making investments and increasing the firm’s charter capital from VNĐ1.5 billion ($59,000) to VND4.3 trillion ($169 million).  Thus when the once loss-making private company was publicly listed, which was only possible because of the intervention of corrupt bourse officials, it appeared to be worth significantly more than it was.  Police escort FLC Group CEO Trinh Van Quyet to court on July 22, 2024, for his trial on fraud charges in Hanoi. (Anh Tuc/AFP) Quyet and other defendants quickly sold the 391 million of 430 million shares that they controlled, netting $142 million, and collapsing the stock price for other investors. All in all, the various schemes resulted in the six listed FLC companies seeing the value of their shares rise between 70% and 1,700%.   In addition to the fraud, Quyet sold large shareholdings without notifying financial regulators, a requirement for corporate executives. In January 2022, he sold nearly 75 million shares of FLC stock, collapsing share prices, and prompting the Ministry of Public Security to open an investigation.  RELATED STORIES Mendicant monk Thích Minh Tuệ offers an embarrassing contrast to Vietnam elites Breaking the laws of the land: Vietnam’s real estate scandals Ouster of parliament chief bares Vietnam corruption, power struggle Cleaning house in the Communist Party of Vietnam ahead of Tet Meet To Lam, Vietnam’s Communist Party chief and successor to Nguyen Phu Trong  Regulatory shortfalls The FLC case matters for three reasons. First, it was only possible because the regulators were in on the fraud. As was the case in Truong My Lan’s massive fraud case at Saigon Commercial Bank, the scheme was abetted by poorly paid regulators.  This once again raises the question “who regulates the regulators?” If Vietnam cannot get a baseline financial regulatory system running, it will negatively impact its domestic capital markets, corporate governance, and deter foreign investment.   While the Ministry of Public Security did a good job in investigating the fraud, as they did with Lan’s Van Thinh Phat (VTP) and Saigon Commercial Bank, it never would have gotten to this point if there was proper regulatory oversight. Second, while Vietnam’s stock market is not that large, it stands as one of the few opportunities for Vietnamese citizens to invest their money.  With a lack of confidence in their currency, Vietnamese tend to buy gold. In fact, in the past half year, the price of gold in Vietnam was trading well above international prices. The government had to auction off some of its gold reserves just to cool the market.  A woman displays gold at a shop in Hanoi, Oct. 11, 2009. (Kham/Reuters) Vietnamese also buy real estate, but that’s not always a safe investment. The domestic real estate market in Vietnam resembles China’s in many ways. Many property firms are saddled with debt and have defaulted, especially on dollar-denominated bonds.  A domestic credit crunch caused by the VTP scandal in late 2022 led to even more defaults and stalled real estate projects. Many Vietnamese were left paying mortgages on unfinished real estate that they could neither inhabit, nor rent.  The third place Vietnamese park their savings is in the stock market. The majority of shares in the Vietnam stock market are owned by individual, not institutional, investors. So when there is widespread fraud, it really hurts the burgeoning middle-class.   Quyet’s fraud was fairly simple, but the effects were widespread: There were nearly 100,000 victims. Although Quyet has paid some $8.3 million in restitution, it’s a drop in the bucket.  Cost to taxpayers Third, the FLC fraud trial has an impact on the larger economy.  The company – which is one of the largest private companies in the country – is still in operation, but barely.  The Ho Chi Minh Stock exchange delisted the company due to the fraud. Trading…

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Hun To went after the press; who really won?

Editor09 mins

ANALYSIS He is the notorious playboy cousin of Cambodia’s prime minister, and has long been viewed as the family’s fixer for all things they would rather not come into public view.  Hun To has reportedly been investigated by Australian police for heroin trafficking; faced questions in connection to threats against the family of slain political analyst Kem Ley, which fled to Australia in 2016 and; in recent years, reporting by Al Jazeera and The Australian newspaper has tied him to cyber slavery, scam compounds and drug smuggling.   But in bringing lawsuits against those news organizations, he inadvertently highlighted how Australia – a key regional partner for Cambodia – is running out of patience for the Hun dynasty’s antics.  Earlier this month, Hun To scored an apparent victory after he secured an out-of-court settlement over a years-long dispute with The Australian. The outlet agreed to retract a 2-year-old story it had published about Hun To that “some readers may have understood” to have alleged that he “was linked to human trafficking, cyber scams and drug importation,” the paper wrote.  “The Australian did not intend to make any such allegations against Mr Hun and accepts his denials of such conduct.” The retraction marked the conclusion of a defamation case Hun To had brought against The Australian in December 2022. It came just after the Australian government had declined to renew his visa, RFA has learned – even though he had spent decades living part-time in the country and he and his family owned extensive business and property interests around Melbourne.  While Canberra gave no reason for its decision, Hun To’s lawyers insisted in court complaints seen by RFA that the rejection was spurred by news stories from The Australian and Al Jazeera linking him to organized crime, fraud factories and human trafficking in his native Cambodia.  A case launched in parallel by Hun To against Al Jazeera is ongoing. The Qatari state-funded outlet did not respond to a request for comment. Australian libel law is notoriously plaintiff-friendly, particularly in cases where the defendant is a news organization. This growing reputation led the author of a 2019 New York Times op-ed to dub the island nation “the defamation capital of the world.”  In Australian defamation cases, the burden of proof uniquely rests with the defendants. No other type of case places such burden on the party being sued. In such a legal environment, defendants run higher risks of losing and incurring hefty damages, and that has often encouraged news organizations to settle out of court. The retraction might have gone little noticed until Hun To’s lawyer, Adam Lopez – who has been known for taking on controversial defamation cases – took to LinkedIn to gloat about his victory. The dispute with The Australian had been “resolved on a confidential basis,” he noted, suggesting that the newspaper had made further concessions beyond the retraction.  Cambodia press and social media users quickly picked up the story, with some simply reporting on the retraction and others criticizing The Australian or the Australian court system.   With the scrubbing of the controversial story, Hun To enjoyed precisely one day of victory.  On July 10, news broke suggesting Hun To’s business interests were neck deep in exactly the type of allegations for which The Australian had just apologized. Elliptic, a financial compliance firm specializing in tracing cryptocurrencies, published a report alleging that a “Cambodian conglomerate with links to Cambodia’s ruling Hun family” had laundered more than US$11 billion for cyber scammers. The name of the company was Huione Pay, and Hun To is one of its three directors.  A subsequent report by Reuters found evidence that Huione Pay had processed cryptocurrency worth $150,000 that had been stolen by the sanctioned North Korean hacking collective known as Lazarus. In response to the allegations, National Bank of Cambodia, the country’s central bank, told Reuters that it “would not hesitate to impose any corrective measures” on Huione, although it said so “without saying if such action was planned,” the news agency drily noted. Following the revelations, digital finance company Tether announced that it had frozen $29 million of cryptocurrency held by Huione following a “a direct request from law enforcement.” Whether the latest news make Hun To reconsider going after the press, however, seems unlikely, said Phil Robertson, director of Asia Human Rights and Labor Advocates.  Hun To “would be wise to abandon his case since all the dirt has come out on Huione, but he won’t because he’s a shameless, arrogant, rights-abusing tycoon who believes that whatever he does, the ruling Hun family will have his back.” Neither Huione’s nor Hun To’s lawyer had responded to requests for comment as of publication. These allegations are far from the first time Hun To has caught negative publicity. Australian MP Julian Hill spoke in Parliament last March arguing that Hun To and other politically connected Cambodian figures “should never again be granted visas to visit Australia.”  His speech charted Hun To’s long and checkered links to Australia, noting that as early as 2003 Australian police had sought to arrest him on suspicion of heroin trafficking. Since then, Hun To and his wife acquired millions of dollars’ worth of property in Australia, Hill added, “with seemingly no legitimate explanation for where their wealth has come from.” “It’s no secret that Hun To has his finger in lots of pies — drug trafficking, illegal deforestation, animal trafficking, illegal gambling,” Hill said. “Most recently, we’ve heard reports he’s dipping his toes into human trafficking, as well. That’s diversifying, isn’t it?”

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Thai natural gas project suspended after pipeline explosions in Myanmar

Anti-junta forces capture camps in central Myanmar township

Editor07 mins

An anti junta group in Myanmar’s Mandalay region is continuing to make gains in a key township following the collapse of a truce between insurgent armies and the military who seized power in a 2021 coup. The Mandalay People’s Defense Force, or PDF, captured a junta camp at the Alpha cement factory in Madaya township on July 14, and one at Taung Ta Ngar two days later, it said in a statement on Tuesday. Madaya is just 30 km (19 miles) north of Mandalay, the capital of the region and Myanmar’s second-largest city. The Mandalay PDF has been fighting alongside the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, since late October 2023.  The TNLA, which has also teamed up with the Arakan Army and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army as part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, pushed back junta forces in several regions before agreeing a shaky China-brokered truce with the junta in January. When the ceasefire collapsed on June 25, the TNLA attacked Mandalay’s Mogoke township and several towns in Shan state to the region’s east, while the Mandalay PDF focused much of its attention on Madaya and Singu townships in Mandalay region. The defense force said it had captured 28 junta camps as of Wednesday. Weapons and ammunition seized after Mandalay PDF captured the junta base at the Alpha cement factory in Madaya township, Mandalay region in a photograph released on July 16, 2024. (Mandalay PDF) Mandalay PDF spokesman Osmon, who goes by one name, told Radio Free Asia Myanmar’s military suffered heavy losses in the battle for Madaya. “There were many casualties on the side of the junta in these operations. We have seized corpses and arrested junta soldiers,” he said. “There were some casualties on the side of Mandalay PDF.”  Osmon didn’t disclose the numbers of casualties on either side but said the PDF took more than 150 prisoners. He added the group is now engaged in a fierce battle with junta forces at Madaya’s Kyauk Ta Dar base. RELATED STORIES Myanmar junta steps up security in Mandalay as fighting spreads across region  Thousands stuck between checkpoints on Myanmar road amid renewed fighting Thousands displaced in Myanmar’s Mandalay region On Tuesday, three people were killed when a shell hit Madaya town, close to its train station and main market. “It happened around 8 a.m.,” said a resident who didn’t want to be named for fear of reprisals. “A 44-year-old woman, a 30-year-old woman and a two-year-old girl were killed.” The man said he didn’t know which side had fired the shell, while another resident said the blast happened close to where junta troops were stationed. “It was about 10 to 14 meters away from them,” he said, also requesting anonymity for security reasons. “It was also close to where the junta soldiers always come to drink tea.” RFA phoned the junta spokesman for Mandalay region, Thein Htay, for details on the fighting in Madaya, but he did not answer calls. The National Unity Government, a shadow government formed by members of the civil administration ousted in the 2021 coup, said on June 27 that PDFs and their allies have made sweeping gains in Mandalay region and Shan state to the east, in a campaign it dubbed “Operation Shan-Man.” The Mandalay PDF said it had captured 11 junta camps in Singu township,  80 km (50 miles) north of Mandalay city, by July 7. Now the junta is fighting back, damaging around 100 houses and injuring more than 20 people in airstrikes on July 16, as it seeks to flush PDF forces out of Singu town. The PDF’s Singu-based head of information, Than Ma Ni, said the junta carried out more than 20 airstrikes on Tuesday and also bombarded the town with heavy artillery.  “The junta’s air force has been striking all day as Mandalay-PDF has taken over Singu town,” he said Wednesday. “There were no deaths, but those who were hit by shrapnel have been moved to a safe place and are receiving medical treatment. The entire town was pretty much destroyed.” Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Mike Firn and Taejun Kang.

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Myanmar junta steps up security in Mandalay as fighting spreads across region

Editor06 mins

Junta forces have tightened security in Myanmar’s second-biggest city, Mandalay, while shelling civilians elsewhere in the region, after coming under renewed attack from an alliance of insurgent forces battling to end military rule. A shell killed a seven-year-old boy and a woman in her 30s after it exploded in a residential area of Mandalay region’s Mogoke town on Monday evening, residents told Radio Free Asia Tuesday.  Another four-year-old girl and a 60-year-old woman, as well as a woman and man both in their 30s, are in critical condition, said one Mogoke resident, asking to remain anonymous for security reasons. “A child and a grandmother were seriously injured by shrapnel that hit them in the neck,” he said. “It was not easy to send them to the hospital, so they were treated at home by people who have some medical knowledge.” The shells were fired from a junta camp on Strategic Hill in eastern Mogoke, a ruby-mining town about 200 km (120 miles) north of Mandalay city. Over half the town’s population has fled after fighting intensified between junta troops and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, which has taken control of western Mogoke, residents said.  RELATED STORIESMyanmar rebel army calls ceasefire after junta airstrikeThousands stuck between checkpoints on Myanmar road amid renewed fightingMyanmar insurgent allies capture strategic Shan state town from junta The TNLA is part of an alliance of three ethnic minority insurgent forces known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The alliance launched an offensive last October, codenamed Operation 1027 for the date it began, and pushed back junta forces in several regions. After a five-month ceasefire ended on June 25, the TNLA, and allied forces attacked junta camps in Madaya, Singu and Mogoke townships in Mandalay region, and Hsipaw, Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Lashio towns in Shan state to the east. Stepping up Security The TNLA and its allies have also turned their attention to junta bases near Mandalay region’s capital, causing the military to step up security in Mandalay city, residents said.  One city resident, who wished to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals. told RFA that after Operation 1027 resumed in late June, the junta had increased the number of outposts around Mandalay and its historic palace. “We’re getting a sense that the areas around the palace are more secure. They also installed heavy weapons on top of Mandalay Hill and also on Yankin Hill,” he said. “Security has been increased a lot. If there was a place with four or five soldiers before, there are about 10 soldiers now.” Troops are also stationed on top of high-rise buildings in the city’s Chanmyathazi township, one resident said, also asking for anonymity to protect his identity.   “The junta troops are stationed on the top floors of Ma Ma-29 and No. 49 buildings,” he said, adding that soldiers also occupied buildings in the Myayenanda, and Aungpinlel neighborhoods, as well as Mandalay’s industrial zone. “The troops asked residents to leave in order for soldiers to be stationed there.”  Army personnel are also stationed in Inwa (Inn Wa) town, 32 km (20 miles) south of Mandalay city, which is close to a junta air force base, he added. On Monday, the junta closed the Mandalay-Madaya Road after fighting with allied rebel forces near Madaya township’s Kyauk Ta Dar village, which is just 27 km (17 miles) away from Mandalay city. According to the Mandalay People’s Defense Force, the group had captured 25 junta camps in Madaya township and 11 in Singu township as of July 7.  RFA called Mandalay region’s junta spokesperson Thein Htay for more information on increased security and the attack on Mogoke, but he did not answer phone calls. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn. 

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Seven dead, including 3 children, killed in Myanmar clash

Editor04 mins

Shelling during a clash in northern Myanmar killed seven civilians on Wednesday, including three children, residents told Radio Free Asia, as fighting between junta troops and ethnic minority insurgents escalated following the breakdown of a ceasefire. Fighters from the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and their junta army rivals blamed each other for the death of the civilians when shells hit their homes in the town of Lashio in northern Shan state. Fighting between the junta soldiers from the Northeast Command and the autonomy-seeking rebels resumed on June 25 after the collapse of a ceasefire brokered by Chinese officials in a series of meetings that began in January.  The Ta’ang National Liberation Army announced the capture of 26 junta camps in the days following the end of the ceasefire. RELATED STORIES Junta troops destroy roads in northern Myanmar as renewed fighting looms China awaits junta approval to resume border trade with Myanmar’s Shan state Talks between Myanmar rebel alliance and junta focus on Chinese interests The fighting in Lashio escalated on Wednesday with one shell killing a family of six in their house, said a resident, who declined to be identified in fear of reprisals.  “It happened while they were eating in the kitchen. The dead bodies have been sent to the morgue,” he said. “We’ve heard the sound of heavy guns firing all morning but I’m not sure if the junta army or the revolutionary group was responsible.” Those killed were Zel Zaung, 14,  Dwel Aung and Zel Nwel, both 15, Sai Khon and May Yi, both 30, and  Mar Gyi, 70. A shell hit another Lashio house early in the day, killing a woman and wounding two men, residents said. RFA could not confirm their identities.  The Ta’ang National Liberation Army and civilians blamed the junta for the deaths but the junta blamed the rebels in posts on its Telegram channels. RFA called Shan state’s junta spokesperson Khun Thein Maung for more information on the attacks but calls went unanswered. Fighting between the two groups has also affected Namhu and Nampawng villages near Lashio town. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn. 

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Lao central bank governor removed amid economic crisis

Editor05 mins

National Assembly lawmakers on Tuesday removed the governor of Laos’ central bank at the end of its legislative session as top officials search for ways to address the country’s inflation and economic woes. The assembly approved a proposal from Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone to transfer Bounleua Sinxayvolavong, the governor of the Bank of Lao P.D.R., to a position in Luang Prabang province, according to the assembly’s vice-chairwoman, Sounthone Xayachack. Laos’ economy hasn’t recovered much from blows brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic. International tourist numbers remain low, jobs are scarce and many younger workers have sought higher-paying jobs in Thailand or elsewhere in the region. Also, higher fuel prices and the steady depreciation of the Lao currency, the kip, have fueled inflation, according to a report from the Lao Statistics Bureau in May.   Laos’ economic problems are now affecting “the future of its food security and nutrition” in the country, according to the Asian Development Bank, or ADB. Inflation has had a big impact on food prices, which has reduced people’s purchasing power and has forced many households “to devise food-coping strategies, such as reducing food consumption and meal frequency to bridge their nutritional needs,” the ADB said in a report last month. The kip weakened by 31% against the dollar last year – a trend that was expected to continue this year, the World Bank has said.  Laos’ high debt service obligations have constrained the government’s ability to respond “to immediate issues of high inflation, which has placed pressure on people’s incomes and living standards, as well as long-term labor productivity issues,” the report said. Minister of Finance Santiphab Phomvihanh told lawmakers last month that the government will need at least US$10 billion this year to cover all debt-related expenses, but the central bank – had so far only brought in US$3 billion. ‘Talk and talk’ Lawmakers on Tuesday also approved a resolution that recommended the government address a teacher shortage, the increasing numbers of student drop-outs, the national debt and uncontrolled mining operations. The Assembly also passed or amended 13 different laws, including laws on property rights, investment promotion, environmental protection and anti-corruption. “Our country has two national priorities – solving economic-financial woes and cracking down on drugs,” lawmaker Sinava Souphannouvong said at a meeting last week.  “I’m urging the government to set cracking down on corruption as the third national priority,” he said, pointing out that neighboring Vietnam adopted a campaign against corruption. The reality, though, is that corruption “happens from the top,” according to a former government official in southern Laos who asked to remain anonymous to speak freely about the workings of government. “The inspection agency dares not inspect the top and other high-ranking officials,” he told Radio Free Asia. “Only low-ranking officials have been punished.” A businessman also believed that there will be no real impact from the government’s campaign against corruption. “Oh, they just talk and talk, but nothing will happen,” he told RFA . “They also have two other national priorities: solving economic-financial problems and cracking down on drugs. But they have failed to implement these two priorities. I think they’re going to fail on the third one as well.”  Translated by Max Avary. Edited by Matt Reed.

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Workers say some 60 Cambodian rescued maids still in Saudi Arabia

Editor04 mins

Some 60 Cambodian maids who complained publicly about abuse and labor rights violations remain stranded in Saudi Arabia, several workers told Radio Free Asia, several months after pleading with diplomats and others for help. The women, who went to the Middle Eastern country for jobs, said they have been physically abused by their employers and denied food and sleep. Some said they hadn’t been paid or were told they would be required to work for longer than their contracts stipulated. The maids and other workers in Saudi Arabia first sought Cambodian government intervention and assistance in March.  In April, Cambodia’s Labor Ministry said 78 migrant workers who had been misled into working in Saudi Arabia had been placed in hotel rooms under the care of Cambodian diplomats.  Two dozen women returned home in May. Another 48 women have since been flown back to Cambodia, according to Em Bopha, one of the workers who is still in Saudi Arabia.  A total of 133 Cambodian workers have been removed from their abusive employment situations. The 60 workers still in Saudi Arabia have been staying at several different facilities while diplomats arrange for their return, she said. Cambodian company Fatina Manpower Co. Ltd. helped arrange the contracts between the workers and their Saudi employers, and is now working on their return.  The remaining workers suspect the delay in sending them back to Cambodia is rooted in Fatina Manpower’s inability to pay compensation to partner companies in Saudi Arabia, Em Bopha said.  The owner of Fatina Manpower, Man Teramizy, is a senior official at Cambodia’s Ministry of Labor. Radio Free Asia was unable to reach the ministry’s spokesperson, Katta Orn, for comment on June 24. Cambodia’s ambassador to Egypt, Uk Sarun, said a group of about a dozen maids who left one of the holding facilities for a day on June 20 has complicated diplomatic efforts to coordinate their return.  The workers have been frustrated by the delays and uncertainty, Em Bopha said. But fleeing from the facility was “insulting,” Uk Sarun told RFA. “We have tried very hard,” he said. “We are still waiting for responses [from the company]. But now it’s a little more difficult. I asked them for understanding and I told them to return to the company’s facility.”  Translated by Sovannarith Keo. Edited by Matt Reed.

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North Korea draws navigable group in round 3 of FIFA World Cup Asian qualifiers

Editor05 mins

The road to the 2026 FIFA World Cup for the North Korean team will go through three Middle Eastern countries and two former Soviet republics, the Asian Football Confederation decided in a  drawing for the third round of qualifiers in Kuala Lumpur Thursday. North Korea was drawn into Group A along with  Iran, Qatar, Uzbekistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Kyrgyzstan. Though the team, known by supporters as the Chollima, have the lowest world ranking among the six teams, Group A offers a chance for qualification, with only Iran ranked among the world’s top 30 teams.  In drawing Group A, North Korea avoids an inter-Korean showdown, with South Korea heavily favored to dominate Group B, full of Middle Eastern minnows Iraq, Jordan, Oman, Palestine and Kuwait. Group C, meanwhile, is the “Group of Death,” with powerhouses Japan, Australia and Saudi Arabia drawn together, and Bahrain, China and Indonesia rounding out the group. In the second round, North Korea finished second in its group behind Japan and ahead of Syria and Myanmar. They crushed Myanmar 6-1 in Yangon and 4-1 in a home match played in Vientiane, Laos. The campaign also featured a strong showing against 17th-ranked Japan in Tokyo, where they lost 1-0. But North Korea forfeited the home match because they refused to host. North Korea fans in the stands before the match against Japan, March 21, 2024 in Tokyo. (Issei Kato/Reuters) North Korea hasn’t hosted a home match since the last World Cup cycle, playing South Korea to a 0-0 draw in Pyongyang in 2019. The third round will kick off on Sep. 5, with North Korea set to face Uzbekistan in Tashkent. Should the Chollima finish in second place or higher after playing each member of Group A home and away, the team would advance to the 2026 FIFA World Cup in Canada, the United States and Mexico. Finishing the group in third or fourth place would advance North Korea to a fourth round of qualifying, where six teams would vye for two more spots in 2026 or a berth in the inter-confederation playoffs. Questions remain as to whether North Korea will host its own home matches or continue to coordinate them with third countries. Although the country has reopened its borders that had been shuttered since the beginning of the COVID pandemic in 2020, it may not be ready to welcome teams from other countries and their fans. The Chollima are very popular among fans in their home country, but the team also has fans from outside its borders. Should the team advance to the finals and play on U.S. soil, Paul Han, a North Korean escapee who lives in Indianapolis, would cheer for the North Korean players, he told RFA Korean. “I cheer for North Korea especially when they play against South Korea, the United States, or Japan,” he said. “It’s a matter of the fate of those players, because they can be sent to a place where the sun and moon cannot be seen (if they lose).” Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong.

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Investigative Journalism Reportika © March 2022 by Ij-Reportika is licensed under CC BY 4.0