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Category: Europe

Putin to visit Vietnam to affirm traditional partnership

Editor011 mins

On the afternoon of March 2, 2001, the packed hall at Hanoi’s Vietnam-Russia Friendship Palace erupted in cheers and applause as President Vladimir Putin walked in. The energetic 49-year-old shook hands and chatted with members of the audience before delivering a warm address.  A similar gathering of alumni of Russian universities and institutes is planned in Hanoi on Wednesday for Putin, who is in his fifth term as Russia’s president, and will be on his fifth visit to Vietnam.  Yet it’s hard to expect an equally enthusiastic welcome for the Russian leader this time in a country where, though fondness for Russia remains strong, its invasion of Ukraine has eroded some support, analysts say. A crowd of Hanoi’s residents try to reach visiting Russian President (L) for a hand-shake as the Russian leader leaves the temple of the Literature in Hanoi on March 2, 2001. (Hoang Dinh Nam/AFP) Russia has a close, long-standing relationship with Vietnam and is one of Hanoi’s few comprehensive strategic partners. However, after more than 20 years, the relationship between the old allies has changed substantially. Vietnam has adopted an open-door policy since the mid-1980s and has since normalized relations with countries it fought in the past, including China and the United States.   Hanoi takes great pride in its so-called bamboo diplomacy, that enables it to befriend  former foes while maintaining old friendships. “Putin’s visit is highly symbolic,” said Nguyen Ngoc Truong, a senior Vietnamese diplomat turned foreign affairs analyst. “It reflects Vietnam’s independent, self-reliant and multilateral foreign policy.” RELATED STORIES North Korea’s Kim promises Putin full support for Russia’s Ukraine war Vietnam’s fraternal ties with Russ are put to the test Bear East: RFA Special report on Russia’s influence in Asia “Vietnam invited U.S. and Chinese top leaders to visit last year so this visit shows once again that Hanoi is pursuing its foreign affairs principles without exception,” Truong told RFA. “There is still a part of Vietnam’s society that is deeply Russophile, but it is shrinking. The Ukraine war has also led to a shift in the way the Vietnamese public view Russia, and Putin personally,” the analyst added. ‘Low expectations’ Putin is set to arrive in Hanoi from Pyongyang where he held talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to boost the ties of two countries both at odds with the West. The Russian president is expected to spend about 24 hours in Hanoi and to meet the four most senior Vietnamese leaders – the general secretary of the Communist Party, the state president, the prime minister and the National Assembly’s chairman. Putin’s delegation will discuss cooperation projects in various areas, including energy and defense, but no major agreements are expected. Vietnamese police officers stand guard near the Opera House in preparation for the security rehearsal ahead of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Vietnam, in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 19, 2024. (Athit Perawongmetha/Reuters) Trade between Vietnam and Russia stands at just US$3.7 billion, lagging far behind that with the United States — to the tune of US$97 billion — and with China — US$131 billion. Russia is still Vietnam’s biggest supplier of weapons but purchases have decreased markedly over the past five years and Hanoi did not place any new orders last year.  U.S. sanctions have also made payment to Russia difficult so the two sides would have to “discuss a new financial mechanism,” according to Nguyen The Phuong, a Vietnamese political scientist at the University of New South Wales in Australia. “It is impossible for Vietnam to wean off Russia’s weapons overnight,” Phuong said. “It still has to rely on Russia for a long time to come as it’s very hard to find alternative sources.” Russian experts said Vietnam will also be mindful not to irk the United States too much with Putin’s trip. “Vietnam as an export-oriented economy depends much more on the U.S. so it will act with an eye on Washington, and Beijing as those countries are much more important for Vietnam than Russia these days,” Kirill Kotkov, head of the Center for Far Eastern Countries Studies in St. Petersburg, told Russian media. “If there is a conflict with China, for instance, Russia will not be able to support Vietnam like we did in 1979 and the Vietnamese know that,” Kotkov added, referring to a brief but bloody Sino-Vietnam border war. Valuable partner Vietnam is not a member of the International Criminal Court, or ICC,  and so has no obligation to act on an arrest warrant it issued for in 2023 over alleged war crimes in Ukraine. Still, a spokesperson for the U.S. embassy in Hanoi, voiced disapproval of Putin’s visit. “No country should give Putin a platform to promote his war of aggression and otherwise allow him to normalize his atrocities,” the spokesperson told Reuters when asked about the impact of the visit on ties with the U.S. “If he is able to travel freely, it could normalize Russia’s blatant violations of international law.” Despite such U.S. misgivings, Hanoi remains a steadfast friend and partner to Moscow, analysts say. “Vietnam has never joined any anti-Russian forces and blocs, nor has it supported any embargoes or sanctions aimed at isolating Russia,” Russian analyst Grigory Trophymchuk, told the Vietnam News Agency. “For the Russian Federation, this is particularly valuable from a geopolitical point of view.” Vietnamese children play near Lenin statue in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 29, 2023. (Tran Viet Duc/RFA) Putin’s visit comes as Vietnam is going through an unprecedented upheaval in its domestic politics, largely because of an anti-corruption campaign, called “blazing furnace”, initiated by Communist Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong. The campaign, and the infighting it has generated, has led to the departure of six members of the party’s Politburo and the ascent of To Lam, a former minister of public security, to state president. General Secretary Trong – and not Vietnam’s president – is the host of Putin’s trip, as well as of the previous trips by U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi…

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Thai Senate adopts historic bill legalizing same-sex marriage

Editor09 mins

People rejoiced in the streets of Bangkok and other Thai cities on Tuesday after the Senate passed a bill that puts Thailand on the cusp of becoming the first Southeast Asian nation to legalize same-sex marriage. With the two houses of the Thai legislature having now adopted legislation that provides equal marriage rights to LGBTQ people, the bill will become law within 120 days after the king signs it and it is published in the Royal Gazette. The legislation is expected to unlock previously denied legal rights for Thai same-sex and non-traditional couples, such as adoption or the ability to make health care decisions for their partners’ behalf, human rights activists said.  A majority of senators attending the session voted in favor of its passage. About 100 of the 250-member Senate were not present for the vote. Out of 152 voters, 130 approved, four disapproved and 18 abstained, said Gov. Singsuk Singprai, the first vice president of the Senate, who chaired Tuesday’s session. The scene outside Government House in Bangkok was filled with rainbow colors of the Pride flag as gay people and others gathered to celebrate this landmark moment for Thailand’s LGBTQ community.      “As an LGBTQ person who is in love and wants to marry another woman, we have long hoped that we would have equal rights and dignity, just like the heterosexual couples who can marry and start families,” Ann “Waaddao” Chumaporn, an LGBTQ organizer and community spokesperson, said during Tuesday’s Senate deliberations on the Marriage Equality Bill.    _________________________________RELATED STORYTogether three decades, Thai same-sex couple hopes for legal recognition _________________________________ The bill proposes replacing terms such as “husband” and “wife” with “spouse” in Section 1448 of Thailand’s Civil and Commercial Code.  “We hope that changes in Thailand will ignite a spark for other countries in Asia. Although this law is not 100% perfect, from an international human rights organization’s perspective, it makes Thai law more aligned with international standards,” Mookdapa Yangyuenpradorn, a Southeast Asian human rights associate at Fortify Rights, told BenarNews, an affiliate of Radio Free Asia. If and when the bill becomes law, Thailand would join Taiwan and Nepal as the only countries in Asia to recognize the rights of same-sex couples to wed. Members of the LGBTQ+ community celebrate after Thailand’s Senate passed a marriage equality bill to legalize same-sex unions, outside Government House in Bangkok, June 18, 2024. (Patipat Janthong/Reuters) Isa Gharti, a public policy researcher at Chiang Mai University, said the vote demonstrates progress in accepting sexual diversity. “This shows the societal advancement in Thailand in terms of accepting sexual diversity and safeguarding the rights of the LGBTQ community to equality both legally and in human dignity. This is a positive sign that will make Thai society more open, although there are still some voices of opposition,” Isa said. “Going forward, Thailand must also address deeply entrenched gender discrimination and biases in education, employment, and public health,” Isa said. “It’s essential to educate the public to foster understanding and reduce stigmatization of sexual diversity.” ‘Beautiful and powerful’ In Thailand, a Buddhist-majority politically conservative country, legislation around same-sex marriage has been more than two decades in the making.  An earlier marriage equality bill, introduced by opposition lawmakers from the progressive Move Forward Party, reached its second reading in November 2022, but didn’t move beyond that because of a series of legislative delays. It died when Parliament dissolved in March 2023 ahead of the general election two months later.  This year, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved the current bill, with 400 of 415 lawmakers present endorsing it at its final reading in March. Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, who is a backer of marriage equality, has said his government was working toward Bangkok hosting World Pride 2028. “We have fought a long time because we believe in all equal rights,” Srettha wrote on his X account after the vote. “Today is our day. We celebrate to ‘diverse’ love, not ‘different’ [love]. Love is beautiful and powerful.’ Supporters of LGBTQ+ rights march toward Government House in Bangkok as they celebrate the Senate’s approval of a same-sex marriage bill, June 18, 2024. (James Wilson-Thai News Pix/BenarNews) The movement for legal recognition of same-sex marriage began during the Thaksin Shinawatra government in 2001. At the time, the Ministry of Interior proposed amendments to the marriage law, but dropped them because of public opposition. A military coup forced Thaksin from the prime minister’s office in 2006. In 2012, the government of Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, introduced the Civil Partnership Bill for consideration. While this bill did not grant full marriage rights to same-sex couples, its progress was halted by another military coup in 2014 that drove her from the same office. The Move Forward Party proposed the Marriage Equality Bill in the lower House in 2022. Simultaneously, the administration of then-Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha submitted the Civil Partnership Bill for consideration.  While the two bills shared similarities, the Civil Partnership Bill would have established a “life partnership” status for same-sex couples, granting them fewer legal rights than “marriage.” The House term ended before either bill could be passed. After Tuesday’s Senate vote, Plaifah Kyoka Shodladd, an 18-year-old who identifies as non-binary, took the floor and thanked everyone who supported the legislation, calling it a “force of hope” that will help Thailand become more accepting of diversity, the Associated Press reported. “Today, love trumps prejudice,” Plaifah said. BenarNews is an online news outlet affiliated with Radio Free Asia.

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Myanmar’s junta takes desperate measures to stem capital flight

Editor014 mins

The rumors were everywhere: A politically connected crony, U Thein Wai, better known as Serge Pun, was called in for questioning.  While he was not arrested, the military’s questioning of the CEO of Yoma Bank and eight directors of other subsidiaries under his control is another indicator of just how dire Myanmar’s economic situation is.  The 71-year old Sino-Burmese tycoon sits atop a massive business empire of some 50 different interrelated companies. The most important of these are First Myanmar Investment Company (FMI), Serge Pun and Associates (SPA), and, of course, Yoma Bank.  While largely invested in real estate through Yoma Land, SPA is one of the largest conglomerates in the country, with investments in real estate, construction, banking and financial services, Suzuki automobile assembly, the KFC franchise and healthcare.  Yoma Bank is one of the largest private banks in Myanmar and has been in important overseas conduit, especially after the US government sanctioned two state banks in June 2023. Yoma Bank has ties to the military, lending to both the military-owned Mytel and Pinnacle Asia, which is owned by Min Aung Hlaing’s daughter, Khin Thiri Thet Mon. Yoma Bank CEO U Thein Wai, also known as Serge Pun, smiles as electronic trading commences during the opening day of trading at Yangon Stock Exchange, March 25, 2016. (Gemunu Amarasinghe/AP) In November 2022, the State Administrative Council, as the junta is formally called, bestowed on him the honorific Thiri Pyanchi, granted for outstanding performance.  Pun’s ties to the military are deep enough that the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation divested their 4.55% equity stake in Yoma Bank in December 2022, selling it to FMI. This is not to say that Pun has been completely pro-military. Compared to other cronies, he’s been much less so. He’s hedged his bets and incorporated holdings in Singapore and Hong Kong. Arguably he would be a lot wealthier were it not for the coup, but he’s worked within the reality of the coup. So what prompted the Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs, the feared military intelligence service, to come calling? In short, facilitating capital flight.  Real estate roadshow In late May, a group of five executives of a real estate firm, Minn Thu Co., held an unauthorized roadshow, selling Bangkok condominiums. Minn Thu had allegedly established unauthorized bank accounts in Thailand to facilitate the sales.  Thai real estate is being pitched to Burmese as a safe investment at a time when the kyat has fallen to a record low of over 5,000 kyat per dollar, while soaring inflation eats into the currency’s purchasing power.  Gold has reached record rates: 5.8 million kyat per tical (15.2 grams, .54 oz) – 4.5 times the pre-coup rate of 1.3 million kyat. Over 20 gold dealers have been arrested recently, accused of engaging in speculation.  The beleaguered middle class is desperately searching for a place to park what’s left of their assets after more than three years of conflict. Four of the five businessmen who staged the roadshow have been arrested, and one other executive is at large.  A customer waits to withdraw money at Yoma Bank in Yangon, June 17, 2013. (Soe Zeya Tun/Reuters) To serve as a deterrent to others, the junta arrested three people who purchased the condos, having illegally transferred assets overseas. Yoma Bank is believed to have assisted in financing the purchases by  transferring assets to Bangkok in violation of the junta’s currency controls. Military intelligence officials are also investigating whether Yoma Bank is offering what are de facto mortgages for overseas real estate, as an investment vehicle, in contravention of Myanmar law. In recent days, the junta has expanded their investigation into over 100,000 private bank transfers. Capital flight began immediately after the coup. Radio Free Asia reported the purchase of THB2.5 billion (US$69 million) and THB 3.7 billion (US$100 million) in Thai real estate in 2022 and 2023, respectively.  In the first quarter of 2024, Burmese were the second largest group of foreign nationals to invest in Thai real estate, according to the Bangkok Post, having purchased at least 384 units, worth THB2.2 billion ($60 million). Estimates, though, are far higher, as many properties are believed to have been purchased using Thai nominees.  Focus on funds And of course, the revelation that junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s own children have moved their own assets to Thailand was a huge embarrassment for the regime. Aung Pyae Sone owns a condominium worth around $1 million in Bangkok, while Khin Thiri Thet Mon has two accounts at Siam Commercial Bank.  Reports are emerging that Khin Sri Thet Mon purchased a condo in the ultra swank SCOPE Langsuan, which was completed in May 2023, and where a three bedroom unit sells for $4.2 million to over $15 million. The SAC has deployed uniformed personnel to both public and private banks since mid-2021 to block transfers to the civil disobedience movement, the National Unity Government, and ethnic resistance organizations. But soon after that, they also began monitoring capital flight. The junta is increasingly cracking down on the informal banking sector, known as hundi, that is used by at least 40 percent of overseas workers. In early June, the regime froze the accounts of 39 additional hundi dealers, following the crackdown on 20 others in January.  The hundi system keeps desperately needed foreign exchange out of the formal banking system, where people and companies are forced to convert it to kyat at artificially low exchange rates. Given the state of the economy, capital flight is the rational choice for Burmese with the means.. Myanmar junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and his wife, Kyu Kyu Hla, visit a Buddhist monastery in Thailand in February 2018. (Myanmar military) The World Bank has reported on the dire state of the economy, which has shrunk by nearly 20% since the coup. The poverty rate is now 32%, while 2024 GDP growth estimates have been halved to 1%.  The NUG estimates that the junta has printed 30 trillion kyat…

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China’s dependency on potash imports could give tiny Laos rare leverage

Editor012 mins

Let’s start with the good news – potentially great news, in fact – for Southeast Asia: Laos could be sitting on 10 billion tons of potash, one of the three main fertilizers used in global agriculture.  In 2022, a subsidiary of the Chinese company Asia-Potash International announced a $4.3 billion investment in a potash mining venture in Khammouane province. This deal grants exploration rights to 48 square kilometers for potassium ore.  The company reckons it can start with producing 1 million metric tons of potash annually, scale up to 5 million tons by 2025 and eventually reach 7 to 10 million tons. For a comparison, Canada, the world’s largest potash producer, exported around 23 million metric tons, valued at approximately $6.6 billion, in 2023. In 2022, Laos’s potash exports were valued at approximately $580 million, representing about 1.7 percent of global supply. It isn’t inconceivable that Laos will become a global player.  Location helps Laos Geography is key. Next door is China, the world’s largest importer of food and food inputs, and the world’s third-biggest purchaser of potash. China imports around 8 million metric tons each year, about half of its demand, although that is increasing.  China is the world’s biggest producer of potatoes, which are very reliant on potassium. China’s potato heartlands – Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan provinces – are on Laos’ doorstep. Guangdong province, China’s main banana producer, isn’t too far away.  There’s ample room for Laos to expand potash exports in Southeast Asia, too. Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest potash importer, bought around $2.1 billion worth in 2022, with Laos holding a 6 percent market share.  Malaysia, the sixth-largest importer, spent around $1 billion on potash, with Laos having a 2 percent share. Laos is already the largest supplier of potash to Vietnam, with exports worth about $82 million in 2022. Officials with Sino-Agri International Potash Co., Ltd. and the Lao government sign a memorandum of understanding March 24, 2023, to build a smart eco-industrial city in Khammouane province. (Pathedlao) If, for instance, Laos was to replace suppliers like Jordan and Israel and capture a 20% share of China’s potash import market, its exports could rise to around US$750-800 million, making potash Laos’ second-largest export product, after energy.  Right now, the spot price for potassium chloride is US$307 per metric ton. So, loosely, 10 million tons exported a year would bring in around US$3 billion.  Expectations shouldn’t be that high, though. It’s one thing for a Chinese investor to promise to produce 10 million tons a year and it’s another thing for it to actually deliver it.  And because it’s a Chinese firm selling the goods, most of the money won’t stay in Laos. And there are already the same complaints as with every Chinese investment: Asia-Potash International isn’t hiring local workers.  Geopolitics Nonetheless, estimates vary, but there still could be between $30 million and $300 million in annual revenue for the Lao state. Almost certainly it will be towards the lower end, but it’s not to be sniffed at by the badly-indebted government.  However, consider the geostrategic implications.  Up until now, China hasn’t really needed Laos. It lacks the strategic importance of Cambodia, with its naval base on the Gulf of Thailand, or the trade routes offered by Myanmar, where China is developing a $7 billion port to access the Indian Ocean for oil and LNG imports from the Gulf.  In 2022, Laos accounted for a mere 0.1 percent of China’s total imports; food makes up less than a tenth of that, so Laos isn’t a solution to China’s future food insecurity. A bulldozer works on a large hill of potash at the Dead Sea Works in Israel’s Sodom area, Feb. 16, 2016. (Menahem Kahana/AFP) China’s primary import from Laos is pulped paper, not energy. Instead, China constructs hydropower dams and coal-fired stations in Laos, which generate electricity sold to Thailand and Vietnam.  Geostrategically, Laos is a useful ally for Beijing to have because of its ASEAN membership, but Vientiane holds little weight in the regional bloc.  Should something drastic occur in Laos – such as the fall of the ruling communist party or the emergence of an anti-China government – Beijing would be displeased and Chinese investments would be at risk, but China’s national security would be unaffected.  That situation changes if Laos becomes a significant supplier of potash. If projections are correct and Laos can produce between 7-10 million tons of potash annually, it could theoretically more than meet China’s entire import demand. That makes Laos a national security interest for Beijing. Food security The Chinese government is preparing itself for military conflict. It knows that in the event it launches an invasion of Taiwan or attacks a rival state in the South China Sea, the West will hammer it with economic sanctions so damaging it would make the retribution reaped on Russia look like a slap on the wrist.  Self-sufficiency and diversification are the buzzwords. But it’s doubtful that China – arguably the country most dependent on world trade and on U.S. protection of shipping routes – could survive such sanctions.  Even short of war, food security has long been a major concern for China., for reasons too long to go into. According to Xi Jinping, the supreme leader, food security is the “foundation for national security.”  Beijing is also concerned that its reliance on imported fertilizer inputs “could pose a major threat to its food security”. There’s no way China can achieve the food self-sufficiency that Xi wants, as was spelled out in a detailed study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a U.S. thinktank. Farmers operate rice seedling transplanters in Taizhou, in eastern China’s Jiangsu province, June 12, 2024. (AFP) China can domestically produce enough nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers, the latter essential for phosphate-hungry rice. But almost all of China’s phosphate is produced in Xinjiang and Tibet, far away from the rice-growing Han heartland and where the local population is largely hostile to rule by Beijing. China will remain…

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China gives 6 patrol boats to Myanmar’s military junta

Editor04 mins

China has delivered six patrol boats to Myanmar’s military junta, fulfilling a promise made in 2020 to the country’s previous democratically elected civilian government, the Chinese Embassy said in a statement on Wednesday. The patrol boats that were handed over in Yangon on Tuesday will be used in law enforcement efforts to control gambling and drug trafficking and in rescue and water resources protection activities, the embassy said. But a former army officer, who wished not to be named for security reasons, told RFA that the vessels could also be useful for naval military operations in Rakhine state, which has several well-traveled rivers and an Indian Ocean coastline. Rakhine state has seen intense fighting between military junta troops and the ethnic minority insurgent Arakan Army since last November. “If these boats are modified a little bit, weapons could be installed,” the former army officer said.  A navy patrol boat donated by China is docked at Lanmataw jetty in Yangon, Myanmar, June 12, 2024. (RFA) Four of the patrol boats are 48 meters long (157 feet), and the other two are 28 meters long (91 feet), the embassy said. The civilian government under the National League for Democracy first requested the vessels in 2018. China’s projects in Rakhine An agreement was made in 2020 during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s two-day visit to Myanmar, in which several deals were signed to implement multibillion dollar infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative. The projects include a US$1.3 billion deep-sea port in Rakhine state’s Kyaukphyu, as well as the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, a 620 km (1,000 mile) high-speed railway and road network that will run from China’s Kunming city through Myanmar’s major economic hubs and on to the port. The corridor will ultimately give China crucial access to the Indian Ocean at Kyaukphyu. The military junta removed the civilian government and seized power in February 2021. A resident of Kyaukphyu township who closely monitors the Chinese projects told RFA that the Chinese ambassador visited Kyaukphyu on Monday. Human Rights Watch found in 2022 that the Myanmar junta had used Japan-funded passenger ships during military operations in Rakhine state. “The Myanmar junta’s misuse of Japanese development aid for military purposes effectively makes Japan a backer of the junta’s military operations,” Asia program officer Teppei Kasai said at the time. When asked via email on Wednesday if the patrol boats could be used for military purposes, the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar directed RFA to a statement posted on its Facebook page. RFA’s attempts to contact junta spokesman Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun to ask about the patrol boats were unsuccessful on Wednesday. Translated by Aung Naing. Edited by Matt Reed and Malcolm Foster.

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Hong Kong exiles in UK and Canada lack access to billions of their savings

Editor012 mins

In April 2023, Hong Kong Watch found that Hong Kongers were being denied access to up to £2.2 billion (US$2.8 billion) of their hard-earned Mandatory Provident Fund retirement savings. Fast forward one year, and the number has only increased to over £3 billion (US$3.8 billion).  This act of transnational repression is placing an unnecessary financial and mental strain on an estimated tens of thousands of Hong Kongers in the UK and Canada who moved abroad under British National (Overseas) (BNO) passports, set up to allow a permanent residence pathway for them.  The Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) is a compulsory retirement savings scheme for the people of Hong Kong. Hong Kongers can ordinarily withdraw their entire account early if they make a statutory declaration that they have departed Hong Kong permanently with no intention of returning to resettle.  However, the Mandatory Provident Fund Authority, which oversees the provision of MPF schemes, released a statement in March 2021 saying that because the BNO passport was no longer recognised by the Hong Kong government as a valid travel document and proof of identity as of Jan. 2021. This means that those trying to withdraw their savings early cannot rely on the BNO passport or visa to support an application for early withdrawal of their funds.  A protester raises his British National Overseas passports during a candlelight vigil to mark the 31st anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, in Hong Kong, June 4, 2020. (Tyrone Siu/Reuters) Despite this, the MPF-related legislation, regulations, and terms of the deeds governing entitlement to MPF benefits in Hong Kong remain unchanged. Under the MPF trust deed, trustees including those based overseas like HSBC, Standard Chartered, Manulife and Sun Life, have a legal obligation to release MPF to beneficiaries who are able to provide evidence of their right to reside in a foreign country.  There is no reason that a BNO passport or visa should be denied under this deed. However, the latest research from Hong Kong Watch includes case studies detailing how Hong Kongers continue to be denied access to their MPF on the grounds that they hold a BNO passport or visa.  This includes many Hong Kong families in the UK, from a single mother who is unable to afford a heater for her son due to being denied £57,000 (US$70,000) worth of her MPF, to a family of five that is unable to afford a wheelchair accessible property for their severely disabled child due to the withholding of their MPF.  Individual hardship Others with withheld savings struggle to adapt to their new environments for financial reasons, to assist relatives in escaping from increasing repression in Hong Kong, and to start desired business ventures in the UK or Canada. Since 2021 and as recently as last month, Hong Kong Watch has documented numerous rejection letters from MPF trustees to Hong Kongers denying the early withdrawal of their MPF on the grounds that the BNO visa or passport is not a valid form of identification per the Hong Kong government’s lawless declaration.  I have spoken with a Hong Konger who has £90,000 (US$114,000) frozen in MPF assets, and another who had obtained Canadian permanent residency and was still denied access to their MPF by Manulife for simply arriving in Canada with a BNO passport.  The latter case is especially concerning, particularly after Manulife’s Global Head of Government Relations for Canada, Maryscott Greenwood, testified before the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration on Monday and claimed that Manulife had never denied a Hong Konger access to their savings on the basis of holding a BNO visa.  Having seen a written transcript of a call between the Hong Konger who was denied access to their MPF and Manulife, in which Manulife said, “even if you hold Canadian PR, it’s ineligible to withdraw the fund as a BNO passport holder,” this is simply not true. Maryscott Greenwood, Manulife’s global head of Government Relations for Canada, testifies via video before the Canadian Parliament’s Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, June 3, 2024. (Image from Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration video) Sun Life’s Head of Global Government Affairs and Public Policy, Laura Hewitt, also testified in the hearing.  It was unfortunate but unsurprising that despite having productive meetings with Hong Kong Watch prior to the hearing, both Manulife and Sun Life executives delivered cautious, pre-prepared answers and repeatedly failed to respond to direct “yes”  or “no” questions from the Canadian Parliament.  Fortunately, members of the Canadian Parliament including Tom Kmiec, Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Greg McLean, Paul Chiang, Fayçal El-Khoury, and Jenny Kwan, who is herself a prior BNO visa holder, were not satisfied with these non-answers.  The MPs pressed the business representatives on why they have withheld Hong Kongers’ own savings from them since 2021. Tom Kmiec asked both companies: “Why are you still operating in an autocratic, totalitarian regime that is dominated by Beijing?” The question remains unanswered. Tasks for London and Ottawa The next UK government should vow to provide clarification to UK-based MPF trustees that the BNO visa is intended to lead to “permanent settlement and British citizenship” to show their support for Hong Kongers in Britain.  London  should also pledge to raise and condemn this form of transnational repression with their counterparts in Hong Kong. On the campaign trail, the future UK government has the opportunity to present these pledges to 140,000 eligible Hong Kong BNO voters. The Canadian government should work with Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada to change the designation of BNO passport and visa holders from GBN )Great Britain) to CHN (China) or HKG (Hong Kong) on Canadian permanent residency cards to prevent further retaliation from the Hong Kong government. A man waves to family members before leaving for the United Kingdom at the Hong Kong International Airport, June 30, 2021. (Tyrone Siu/Reuters) With a current backlog of 9,000 permanent residency applications for Hong Kongers in Canada, this will only become a greater administrative issue in the near future if IRCC labels the nationality of…

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Arakan Army treatment of Rohingya minority poses challenge to Myanmar opposition

Editor013 mins

Evidence of Arakan Army culpability in mass arson attacks on Rohingya homes in western Myanmar’s Buthidaung township – where satellite imagery has confirmed that more than 400 homes were burnt to the ground – poses a serious challenge to the anti-junta opposition. While such attacks have ceased since the Arakan Army captured the majority Rohingya town, the rebels’ double-speak both weakens the prospects of an inclusive federal democracy, and is very shortsighted for the ethnic army’s leadership. As it is said, the truth is the first casualty in war, and so far here’s what we know happened: On May 18, the Arakan Army captured the last remaining four light infantry battalions and two border guard police camps in Buthidaung, following a multi-month siege. Immediately, over 400 homes in Rohingya residential neighborhoods were set ablaze. There is a chance of course that some of the fires were set by the retreating junta military, who had waged a genocidal campaign against the Rohingya in 2017-18. The military seems determined to stoke inter-communal tensions as it retreats from northern Rakhine state, and “false flag” operations are part of the military’s modus operandi. In a bizarre irony, the army has been conscripting Rohingya men into its depleted ranks to fight the Arakan Army, while at the same time, relying on radical groups, such as the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and the Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Army (ARSA), operating in the refugee camps in Bangladesh to recruit fighters. Despite the military’s own culpability in ethnic cleansing, they are trying to paint themselves as defenders of the Rohingya community, as the Arakan Army settles old scores. If the Arakan Army continues such attacks, they are making an alliance between the military and radical Rohingya groups including ARSA and the RSO, inevitable. Flames from burning homes in Buthidaung in Rakhine state, are seen above the treetops in this image provided by a Rohingya refugee, May 17, 2024. (Image from video via AP) While this is not surprising, it is exceptionally short-sighted in its thinking and undermines the effort to defeat Myanmar’s military and establish a federal democracy.  This should not come as a surprise. The Arakan Army’s position on the Rohingya has been two faced. Its leader, Tun Mrat Naing, has a decade-long track record of referring to them as “Bengalis”, parroting the Myanmar military’s own term for the Rohingya.  The arson attacks have also increased tensions between the Arakan Army leadership and the National Unity Government (NUG). Following the military coup in February 2021, the Arakan Army made a very important, if not surprising, statement in support of the NUG position that the Rohingya were a persecuted minority who were entitled to full citizenship, and that the one million refugees in Bangladesh should be repatriated. More intransigent after military gains But with military gains since the Three Brotherhood Alliance launched its offensive on October 27, 2023, the Arakan Army has become far more intransigent. Its leadership has signaled this change to their constituents, whether in social media or simply by greenlighting attacks by local units. The Arakan Army’s military gains are significant. They now claim to have seized 180 military camps and taken full control of eight of Rakhine’s 17 townships. While they have not moved on the state capital of Sittwe or the Chinese special economic zone in Kyaukphyu, they are controlling the roads in and out of them.  Should the Arakan Army complete their capture of Maungdaw, they will have driven the military out of the entire northern region of Rakhine. While the ethnic Rakhine army has stated their intention to liberate the entire state, for now they are trying to control the three main entry points into the northern part of the state in order to consolidate their power.  The military has scant deployments in southern Rakhine, meaning that the Arakan Army’s takeover of the entire state is not unthinkable.  Arakan Army troops pose in Buthidaung, Myanmar, in an image posted to social media May 18, 2024. (AA Info Desk via VKontakte) The Arakan Army has proven itself to be amongst the most effective fighting forces among the ethnic armed organizations. Their battlefield advances have spread the military thin and not allowed the junta to redeploy troops to Kachin, Kayah or northern Shan states, where regime forces have suffered serious setbacks.  Likewise, in eastern Myanmar, though opposition forces had to give up the border town of Myawaddy, the military has not been able to regain full control of the key Asia Highway. In short, military success has given the Arakan Army the opportunity to advance their short-term and parochial political interests at the expense of the national agenda to defeat the military. The Arakan Army’s stated commitments to the anti junta opposition’s long-term political goals, as stated by the NUG, should always be taken with a grain of salt.  They are the only ethnic army that has flirted with independence, and their authoritarian leanings show they are hostile to democracy and any political system that would force them to share power.  Prejudice with huge implications The United League of Arakan, the AA’s political arm, issued a statement on May 20 that denied any culpability for the Rohingya village torchings, apportioning the blame solely on the military. Its statements since then have been largely dismissive and continue to deny the attacks, while criticizing media reporting on civilian casualties. But evidence of their culpability is mounting, underscoring the reality that the Arakan Army does not like the Rohingya population, nor does it want to see large-scale resettlement from Bangladesh. The Arakan Army’s politics capitalize on Rakhine Buddhist prejudice against the Muslim community. The Arakan Army leadership is under intense pressure to renounce any violence towards the Rohingya. But the reality is that many of their troops were involved in the communal violence against them. This is simply a return to their default setting. The Arakan Army’s position has larger implications.  While they might have moved on from the 2017 ethnic cleansing, the international community, including…

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North Korea recalls documentary about Kim Jong Un’s mother

Editor010 mins

North Korea has recalled a 2011 documentary that sang the praises of Kim Jong Un’s mother, two sources inside the country told Radio Free Asia, but the move is prompting people to wonder why the country has always maintained a level of secrecy about her identity and background. “Since her biographical information has never been officially stated, the recall on the film is actually raising suspicions,” a resident of the northeastern province of North Hamgyong told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons.  Most North Koreans don’t know her name – Ko Yong Hui – or that she was born in Osaka, Japan, or that her father, Ko Gyon Taek, managed a military factory in the city prior to the end of World War II.  The documentary, titled “Mother of Great Songun Korea,” leaves out all those facts, the sources said. In lieu of her name, the film referred to her as “respected mother” and showed many scenes of her at Kim Jong Il’s side during his official appearances.  Screenshot of the North Korea-produced documentary ‘Mother of Great Songun Korea’. (lovepink4200 via Youtube) It was distributed internally to high-ranking officials, government agencies, and the military on VCD, or video compact disc, in 2011, the same year that Kim Jong Il died. “Recently, judicial agencies such as the Provincial State Security Department and the Social Security Department have begun rounding up copies of propaganda materials,” the resident said. “Instructions were given to retrieve and delete documentary films related to the general secretary’s biological mother,” he said, explaining that “Mother of Great Songun Korea” was on the undisclosed list of now-banned materials. The recall was also confirmed by a resident of the northern province of Ryanggang, who told RFA in the now-banned documentary that “Ko Yong Hui, is touted as having ‘accumulated great achievements that brought about a bright future’” for North Korea. Made in Japan Ko was raised in Japan as part of the Korean minority in the country, and in 1962, the family moved to North Korea as part of a repatriation program.  In the early 1970s, Ko appeared as a dancer in the Mansudae Art Troupe – a popular group of musicians known for propaganda performances that glorify the state and its leaders. It is not known when she got together with Kim Jong Il, but she is believed to have met him in the early 1970s, and she bore him three children in the 1980s, including Kim Jong Un. Though most sources describe her as having been his mistress, some suggest she may have been his third wife. The government has never acknowledged any marriage between them, however. Screenshot of the North Korea-produced documentary ‘Mother of Great Songun Korea’. (lovepink4200 via Youtube) According to North Korea’s songbun caste system, Ko would be of the lowest caste because she was born in Japan, her father’s job supported the Japanese war effort, and her occupation as a dancer – which would tarnish Kim Jong Un’s image. Ko’s background does not neatly fit the nation’s founding myth that its leaders are descended from the so-called Paektu Line, named after the Korean peninsula’s tallest mountain, which is the setting of many of the Korean nation’s founding myths, including the lore of the Kim Dynasty. Kim’s grandfather, national founder Kim Il Sung is the progenitor of the line, and his first wife Kim Jong Suk – Kim Jong Il’s mother – fought alongside her husband in his guerilla army against Japanese rule prior to and during World War II, giving Kim Jong Il near mythical status as the legitimate son of two popular national heroes. “In the past, previous leaders inherited power based on the purity of the Paektu bloodline and the legitimacy of revolutionary traditions,” the North Hamgyong resident said.  “Details about the birth and lives of the leaders as well as their siblings, parents, grandparents and great-grandparents, were made public and promoted as patriotic examples.” Erasing sensitive information? In contrast, Kim Jong Un, due to his mother’s background, could be seen not as a third-generation revolutionary leader, but the illegitimate son of Kim Jong Il’s Japan-born mistress whose father supported the imperialist war effort. Screenshot of the North Korea-produced documentary ‘Mother of Great Songun Korea’. (lovepink4200 via Youtube) If it becomes widely known, that support of imperial Japan could cause problems for Kim Jong Un, Bruce Bennett, a senior researcher at the California-based RAND Corporation, told RFA. “Kim is trying to wipe out anything that would potentially challenge his control of the country,” said Bennett. “So the issue of his maternal grandfather having supported the Japanese I mean that’s something that could really hurt him potentially.  “And so that’s part of the history he wants to get rid of,” he said. Bennett said erasing facts about his mother might marginally help his case to stay in power, but it would be more helpful were he to improve the economy and his people’s lives. Screenshot of the North Korea-produced documentary ‘Mother of Great Songun Korea’. (lovepink4200 via Youtube) The lack of available information about Ko is causing residents to question what they have been told about their leader, Kim Jong Un, the Ryanggang resident said. “As the biography of the leader has not been made public even after him having been in power for 12 years, some are raising doubts about the identity of his mysterious birth mother,” he said. “The argument is that if there is no dishonorable family history in the pure Paektu bloodline, there is no reason not to disclose details about her.” Kim Jong Il was able to claim that his hereditary succession was legitimate because of the purity of his lineage to the Paektu bloodline, the second resident said.  Kim Jong Un claims the same lineage, but the secrecy appears to be giving people doubts. “Given the actions of the authorities, who are ordering the recall and destruction of copies of the already released documentary film about his mother, people are questioning whether his…

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US Defense Secretary visits Cambodia amid concern about China

Editor09 mins

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin arrived in Phnom Penh on Tuesday for a brief visit, days after Cambodia and China wrapped up their biggest ever military exercise. During his one-day visit, Austin will meet top Cambodian officials “to discuss defense issues with the new Cambodian leadership,” the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh said in a statement.   “This is the first bilateral visit by a U.S. Secretary of Defense, and it is the second for Secretary Austin following his attendance at the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus in November 2022,” it said. Austin arrived in Cambodia from Singapore where he attended the annual Shangri-La Dialogue security forum. During the conference, the secretary sought to reassure U.S. allies of Washington’s “iron-clad” commitment in the region in the face of growing rivalry with China. China and Cambodia have just held a 15-day military exercise, both on land and at sea, with the participation of three Chinese warships, two of which have been in Cambodia for six months at the Ream naval base. The two corvettes were still seen docked at the base in Sihanoukville on Monday. The U.S government has said it has “serious concerns” about China’s plans for exclusive control over portions of the Ream Naval Base. Cambodia has repeatedly denied handing the base over to China. U.S.-Cambodian relations have become strained during the past decade partly over U.S. concerns about the suppression of Cambodia’s political opposition. In 2017, the Cambodian government suspended the joint Angkor Sentinel exercises between the two militaries and in 2018, the U.S. government suspended military assistance to Cambodia in response to its suppression of the  opposition. Cambodia under veteran leader Hun Sen rejected U.S. criticism of its domestic political conditions and built closer relations with China. Hun Sen stepped down as prime minister last year with his son, Hun Manet, taking over Turning a new page? Soon after arriving in Phnom Penh, Austin paid a courtesy call on Hun Sen, who is now president of the Senate. Hun Sen was accompanied by former defense minister Tea Banh in  the meeting. Austin also met  Prime Minister Hun Manet, a West Point military academy graduate, and Defense Minister Tea Seiha. Hun Manet and Tea Seiha are Hun Sen’s and Tea Banh’s sons, respectively. Chhengpor Aun, research fellow at The Future Forum, a Cambodian think-tank, said Austin’s visit gave Cambodia’s new leaders the opportunity to highlight more balance in their country’s diplomacy. “Secretary Austin will be much welcomed in Phnom Penh in general because his presence will help back up the Cambodian government’s attempt to prove it is still on the course of its promised neutrality in foreign relations,” said Chhengpor Aun. “The Ream naval base, the ever-growing Sino-Cambodian defense relations, and strained military-to-military ties between Phnom Penh and Washington will highly likely dominate Secretary Austin’s meetings with senior Cambodian officials.” Sailors stand guard near petrol boats at the Cambodian Ream Naval Base in Sihanoukville, Cambodia, July 26, 2019. (Reuters/Samrang Pring) Another analyst – Nguyen Khac Giang, visiting fellow at Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute – said that Austin’s decision to visit Cambodia instead of the close ally the Philippines or newly elevated strategic comprehensive partner Vietnam, “reflects the U.S.’s attempt to reconcile deteriorating U.S.-Cambodia relations.” “With Phnom Penh successfully transitioning leadership from Hun Sen to his son Hun Manet, Washington likely views this as a good moment for rapprochement,” Giang told Radio Free Asia, adding that while sensitive topics such as Chinese influence and the Ream naval base are likely be discussed, he thinks both sides “will focus more on potential cooperation and common interests, particularly as Cambodia will serve as the coordinator of the U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue Relations from 2024 to 2027.” The state-aligned Khmer Times newspaper said that with Hun Manet’s “outward-looking policies,” there’s a unique prospect to recalibrate any misunderstanding and to start a new chapter in the two countries’ relationship, provided that both sides “are genuinely sincere with each other.” The article by Pou Sothirak, senior advisor to the Cambodian Center for Regional Studies, and Him Raksmey, executive director of the Cambodian Center for Regional Studies suggested that the first thing for the U.S. to do wais to rethink its policy of targeted sanctions on Cambodian officials and members of the business elite, and restrictions on trade preferences “which are ineffective and counterproductive, compelling Cambodia deeper into economic reliance on China.” The Future Forum’s Chhengpor Aun agreed that the new generation of Cambodian leaders “presents a window of opportunities for improvement of U.S. relations” as Cambodia wants to secure a stable state of relations with the U.S., now its biggest export destination. Cambodia sold US$8.89 billion worth of goods to the U.S. in 2023, about 40% of its total exports, according to the Cambodian General Department of Customs and Excise.  However, “if the visit aims to woo Cambodia away from China or to push political reforms in Phnom Penh, Secretary Austin can be disappointed,” said Chhengpor Aun. “Sino-Cambodian ties are important for Phnom Penh political elites – be it the old guards or the new princeling generation – in terms of political and regime security,” he said. Edited by Mike Firn.

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New school for overseas Tibetan kids aims to preserve language

Editor011 mins

In a bid to help preserve Tibet’s language and culture, a nonprofit organization in northern India is transforming one of its facilities into a boarding school where children of Tibetans living overseas can go to live and study. The Dharamsala, India-based school being created by the Tibetan Children’s Villages, or TCV, is accepting applications for the academic year starting Aug. 1 for children entering grades four to eight.  There are already several Tibetan boarding schools elsewhere in India, but this will be the first time one is being created for the children of overseas Tibetans. The Lower Tibetan Children’s Villages school (TCV) is seen in Dharamsala, India. (TCV) The move comes as China intensifies its policies to suppress — or even eradicate — Tibetan and other ethnic languages and cultures and replace them with Mandarin and Han Chinese customs. Chinese officials in Tibet and in Tibetan-populated areas in China’s western provinces are using government-run boarding schools to assimilate Tibetan children culturally, religiously and linguistically, rights groups say. Schools become ‘battleground’ Tibetan students are being forcibly removed from their homes and immersed in a Mandarin-language curriculum without an opportunity to learn the Tibetan language or culture. “Tibetan schools are the battleground for CCP ideology,” said Kai Mueller, the Berlin-based executive director and head of U.N. advocacy at the International Campaign for Tibet, referring to the Chinese Communist Party. “We have noted so many forms of indoctrination towards Tibetan children in school that it is quite astounding,” he said. The Lower TCV school in Dharamsala, India, is being renovated as a new boarding school for Tibetan children from abroad. (TCV) The types of indoctrination include poetry competitions on Chinese President Xi Jingping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics, field trips to Communist Party museums, and school visits by Chinese officials and members of the Chinese military who teach children about national unity, Mueller said. “The Chinese rulers are using ever new methods to try to transform young Tibetans into loyal Chinese,” he said.  “Their main starting point is language,” he said. In a two-pronged approach, Chinese officials work to dissuade children from learning their mother tongue by sending them to compulsory boarding schools and make Mandarin attractive to young Tibetans, Mueller said. “In this way, the Chinese leadership wants to destroy the youth’s connection to traditional Tibetan culture and language,” he said. Students learn about tuberculosis at the Tibetan Children’s Villages lower school in Dharamsala, India, in this undated photo. (TCV) Grassroots idea For this reason, many Tibetans both inside and outside Tibet urged Tibetan Children’s Villages to set up a boarding school for children from overseas, TCV Director Sonam Sichoe told Radio Free Asia. The proposal was then approved by the network’s board.  The school’s main priority will be to teach Tibetan language skills and cultural traditions, while simultaneously receiving a modern education that is on par with the West, Sichoe said. So far, about 15 students from the United States, Canada, Australia, Denmark and Germany have enrolled. Regardless of the numbers, the school will proceed as planned, he said. In the dormitories, the children from overseas will be mixed with students from India so that they don’t end up speaking only English, he added. The Lower TCV school in Dharamsala, India, is being renovated as a new boarding school for Tibetan children from abroad. (TCV) Tuition, room and board cost US$350 per child per month, Sichoe said.  Because the children are expected to come from different countries, the main medium of teaching academic subjects will be in English to ensure ease of understanding and communication, he said.  Studio Nyandak Dharamsala, a design company whose local employees are all TCV alumni, is working with school administrators to renovate the campus. Changes include the installation of Western toilets, single beds instead of bunk beds, water heating facilities and solar panels.  Expanded network Set up in 1960 as a nursery for Tibetan children, TCV was established after the Dalai Lama proposed a center to care for kids who had been orphaned or separated from their families while fleeing after China’s annexation of Tibet in 1959. Since then, the organization expanded its footprint across India to become a network of boarding schools caring for over 15,000 children. The Dharamsala-based Lower TCV campus — now being renovated into a residential school for overseas children — came about in the 1980s after the main TCV school was inundated with children who had been smuggled out of Tibet by Tibetan parents during China’s liberalization program of that period. Earlier this year, Jetsun Pema, the younger sister of the Dalai Lama who led the school for many years, received the Pearl S. Buck award from Randolph College in Lynchburg, Virginia, in recognition of her service. Students of the Tibetan Children’s Villages lower school perform a drum line in Dharamsala, India, in this undated photo. (TCV) Parents’ reactions Migmar Bhuti, a Tibetan in New York, welcomed the new boarding school, saying it would enable Tibetan children to more effectively learn and preserve the Tibetan language and culture at an early age. But she also expressed concern over whether math, English, science and the social sciences would be adequately taught. “Since the Lower TCV School is planning to only take in students from the fourth to eighth grades, I wonder if that will allow the children to catch up in their classes when they move back here from the ninth grade, or whether they will need to drop a grade,” she told RFA Tibetan. Given that academic and vacation schedules in the West differ from those in India, school officials are in discussions with parents about these concerns, said Choeying Dhondup, TCV’s general-secretary. The Lower TCV school in Dharamsala, India, is being renovated as a new residential school for Tibetan children from abroad. (TCV) Kalsang Dorji, a father of two children and principal of a Sunday school for Tibetan children in Berkeley, California, said Tibetans there have wanted a dedicated residential school to teach their language and culture to…

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Investigative Journalism Reportika © March 2022 by Ij-Reportika is licensed under CC BY 4.0