EXPLAINED: What is China’s United Front and how does it operate?

Evidence is mounting of clandestine Chinese influence operations in the heart of America. Just in the last few months, a former aide to the governor of New York state and her husband were arrested for alleged illicit activities promoting the interests of China; a Chinese democracy activist was arrested and accused of spying for China; and a historian was convicted of being an agent for Beijing. The three separate cases of former Albany functionary based on expert testimony. United front groups often have innocuous sounding names, like the Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification or the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. Many appear to be ordinary overseas Chinese community organizations, and are found in business and even in multinational corporations. Lurking behind or within them, though, are government or party agencies – very often China’s powerful intelligence, security and secret police agency. “United front groups are used – very specifically – to hide the Ministry of State Security,” said Peter Mattis, head of the non-profit Jamestown Foundation. “This is why I like to think of the United Front Work Department as the tall grass that is sort of deliberately cultivated to hide snakes,” he told RFA. What is the history of China‘s ’united front’ work? Under the Moscow-led Comintern in the 1920s, the Chinese Communist Party adapted Soviet revolutionary Vladimir Lenin’s concept of forming a “united front” – forging temporary alliances with friends and lesser enemies in order to defeat greater enemies. After Mao Zedong’s Communists took power in 1949, united front work focused internally on co-opting Chinese capitalists and intellectuals, who were brought to heel and persecuted in the 1950s under Mao’s vicious ideological campaigns. Supporters await the arrival of Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to Kings Park in Perth, Australia, June 18, 2024. Citizens of Taiwan have for decades been pressured by united front efforts to support unification with the Communist-controlled mainland. The recent imposition of draconian national security legislation in Hong Kong has made citizens and exiles who oppose those authoritarian steps in formerly free Chinese territory targets of united front pressure. These targets are not alone and the list is growing, with Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand also grappling with Chinese influence campaigns that smack of united front work. “There’s no clear distinction between domestic and overseas united front work: all bureaus of the UFWD and all areas of united front work involve overseas activities,” the report from Australia’s ASPI said. “This is because the key distinction underlying the United Front is not between domestic and overseas groups, but between the CCP and everyone else,” it said. The Chinese Embassy in Washington told Radio Free Asia that the United Front’s domestic role is to “promote cooperation between the (Communist Party) and people who are not members of it.” Outreach to the diaspora “helps give full play to their role as a bridge linking China with the rest of the world,” the embassy spokesperson’s office said in an e-mailed statement. “Its work is transparent, above-board and beyond reproach,” it said. “By making an issue out of China’s United Front work, some people are trying to discredit China’s political system and disrupt normal exchange and cooperation between China and the United States.” Additional reporting by Jane Tang of RFA Investigative. Edited by Malcolm Foster. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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Wei Guoqing, founding general of China’s People’s Liberation Army. (People's Liberation Army)

China Honors Wei Guoqing Tied to Cannibalism in Full-Honors Burial Ceremony

Beijing, China — The ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) recently reburied the ashes of Wei Guoqing, a founding general of the People’s Liberation Army and former regional party chief in Guangxi, with full honors, despite his notorious association with atrocities during the Cultural Revolution. The high-profile burial ceremony, held on October 24 at Beijing’s Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery—a final resting place for China’s top leaders and revolutionary heroes—was attended by relatives of late revolutionary leaders Zhu De and Peng Dehuai. Wei’s legacy is overshadowed by his role in the brutal Guangxi Massacre, where factional violence during the Cultural Revolution led to the deaths of an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 people through methods like beheadings, stoning, drowning, and even cannibalism. Investigative Journalism Reportika recently highlighted similar cases in its report on China’s Soft Power Propaganda Network, which examines how the CCP shapes narratives by honoring figures with violent histories while downplaying their actions to project a cohesive revolutionary image. Public Outrage and Satire News of Wei’s burial sparked outrage on Chinese-language social media, with comments characterizing Wei as a “butcher” and satirizing the CCP’s willingness to honor a figure associated with such violence. One user on X (formerly Twitter) remarked, “Babaoshan is already packed full of demons and monsters – there’s always room for one more,” while another joked, “Paying tribute to a legendary gourmet,” accompanied by an image of Wei with a fictional KFC backdrop. These comments reflected disgust, referencing notorious fictional killers and highlighting the lasting resentment in Guangxi over his legacy. Symbolism and Political Commentary Experts suggest the burial of Wei’s remains is politically symbolic. Feng Chongyi, a professor at the University of Technology in Sydney, argued that honoring Wei signals President Xi Jinping’s positioning as a political heir to Mao Zedong, endorsing the Cultural Revolution’s “struggle” tactics. “By giving him the honor of entering Babaoshan, Xi Jinping is endorsing the persecution mania of the Cultural Revolution,” Feng said, noting parallels between Xi’s approach and Mao’s. Professor Yang Haiying of Japan’s Shizuoka University added that Wei’s burial reflects the CCP’s unwillingness to distance itself from the violent legacies of the Cultural Revolution. Investigative Journalism Reportika’s report emphasized that the CCP continues to honor violent figures as a means to reinforce its revolutionary ethos, using their stories to control narratives in a way that bolsters the CCP’s own historical legacy. Wei Guoqing died on June 14, 1989, days after the Tiananmen Square massacre ended student-led pro-democracy protests. His ashes remained in storage until this recent burial, renewing public discourse around his legacy and the lasting impacts of the Cultural Revolution’s brutality. Reference: https://www.rfa.org/english/china/2024/11/02/china-enshrines-cultural-revolution-leader-guangxi-massacre-cannibalism

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To Lam moves to secure full term at pinnacle of Vietnamese power

To Lam’s recent relinquishing of the presidency of Vietnam is no sign of weakness or a challenge to his leadership. It was a logical step toward securing a full term as Communist Party general secretary. In a system that prides itself on collective leadership, there was consternation within the Communist Party of Vietnam, or CPV, about Lam’s rapid accumulation of power over the past year. The National Assembly has been signaling since August that this transfer of power would happen. For Lam, the presidency was just a stepping stone. While he seemed to enjoy the diplomatic function and traveled to eight countries in his brief five month tenure, and there’s a logic to the most powerful person being the country’s top representative, his priority is getting elected to a full term with his team at the 14th Party Congress in January 2026. While Lam may be the CPV general secretary, he still needs the support of the party Central Committee, and there are other power centers that he has to contend with. He has nothing like Xi Jinping’s hold over the Communist Party of China. Stacking the Politburo The 18-member Politburo elected at the 13th Party Congress in January 2021 has fallen to a low of 12 members. Lam has moved to fill the ranks. There have been five new Politburo members elected since May, including his protege, Luong Tam Quang at the Ministry of Public Security, or MPS. Deputy Prime Minister of Vietnam Tran Luu Quang delivers a speech at the Nikkei Forum “Future of Asia” in Tokyo on May 25, 2023 Lam understands that the party’s legitimacy comes through performance. Lam is not just stacking the Politburo; he’s appointing allies, especially those from his home province of Hung Yen, across key party positions. Lam installed another MPS deputy, Nguyen Duy Ngoc, as the head of the Central Committee office, a very powerful behind-the-scenes position in personnel issues and agenda setting. Lam now has his eyes and ears at the nerve center in the Central Committee. Ngoc also serves on the CPV’s 12-member Secretariat, which runs the party’s day-to-day affairs. Institutional checks Also new to the Secretariat is Le Minh Tri, who heads the Central Committee’s Civil Affairs Committee and is the prosecutor general of the Supreme People’s Procuracy. Le Hoai Trung, Lam’s top foreign policy adviser, who has been by his side in all foreign trips and meetings, also serves on the Secretariat. Lam is also moving to neutralize opposition. He appointed Vu Hong Van, a police major general also from Hung Yen, as deputy chairman of the Central Inspection Commission. Its chairman, Tran Cam Tu, is the one person on the Politburo who could cause the general secretary some trouble. He heads an investigative body with powers to investigate senior leadership that’s beyond Lam’s control. And as a reminder that Lam is not in complete control, on Oct. 25, the Politburo elected Tu as the standing chairman of the Secretariat, over Lam’s preferred candidate, Nguyen Duy Ngoc. Soldiers march in a parade in Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam, May 7, 2024. The other institutional check is the People’s Army. While armies tend to dominate politics in Southeast Asia, in Vietnam, power is the security police, a reflection of the regime’s fear of popular color revolutions. In addition to Lam and Luong Tam Quang, there are four other members of the Politburo who came up through the Ministry of Public Security. Many have looked to the military as an institutional check on the MPS, which is why the election of Luong Cuong to the presidency on Oct. 21 is seen as so important. Gen. Cuong is a career political commissar, becoming the chief of the Vietnam People’s Army’s General Political Department in 2016. As the top party official in the military, he also served on the Secretariat since 2016, becoming its standing chairman when Truong Thi Mai was forced to resign in May. In addition to Cuong, Minister of National Defense Phan Van Giang serves on the Politburo. Shoring up army ties Lam has been trying to build ties to the military. As general secretary, he is concurrently the chairman of the Central Military Commission, the highest defense decision-making body. In that capacity, he routinely meets with different military units and leadership. Lam’s also trying to carefully make his mark on personnel. He promoted Trinh Van Quyet, the current head of the General Political Department, to the Secretariat. He promoted three other senior officers from Hung Yen Province, including Deputy Minister of National Defense Hoang Xuan Chien, and Lt. General Nguyen Hong Thai, the commander of Military Region 1, which borders China. Even if the generals aren’t happy with a cop as chairman of the Central Military Commission, Lam is slowly putting his people into leadership positions. And all this matters, because the army comprises 11-13% on the Central Committee, the largest single bloc. Lam understands that getting allies into key positions should make himself unassailable just over a year from now at the 14th Congress. Through Luong Tam Quang, he can continue to investigate rivals. Other allies are in charge of personnel selection and drafting key party documents. The Communist Party of Vietnam has a culture of collective leadership – a norm that Lam briefly violated. By ceding the presidency, especially to a military man, he neutralizes some of the opposition to him, while giving up very little real power. In his consolidation of power, Lam took down eight different rivals on the Politburo since December 2022, a period of unprecedented political churn. Any more turmoil could be counter-productive. Lam seems to have succeeded in getting all his ducks in a row to be elected to a full term in January 2026. So rather than see the relinquishing of the presidency as a sign of weakness, it’s more accurate to think of it as a sign of growing political strength. Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College in Washington and an adjunct at Georgetown…

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North Korea

North Korea Intensifies Inspections on Propaganda Speakers called the Third Network

Ryanggang Province, North Korea — North Korea’s main anti-socialism inspection division is conducting door-to-door checks in the northern Ryanggang province to ensure that government-installed propaganda speakers in every household are functioning. Known as the “Third Network,” these speakers deliver local government messages, propaganda songs, and emergency alerts, often deemed critical for mobilization during times of crisis. Unified Command 82, established in 2021 to consolidate anti-socialism inspection units, is leading the current inspections, marking the second round of checks this year following a similar operation in March. Since October 11, residents have been required to listen to daily patriotic war songs and follow all government broadcasts, residents told Investigative Journalism Reportika under anonymity. By October 21, the inspections intensified, with inspectors identifying citizens who were either missing speakers or not actively tuning into the broadcasts. Households lacking a working speaker have been advised to purchase one through the post office, while those failing to comply are being publicly reprimanded. According to a local agricultural worker, many rural homes face challenges with the Third Network, with some areas still disconnected due to infrastructure issues dating back to the 1990s economic crisis. As a solution, officials proposed that residents donate dried ferns or omija berries to fund the purchase of broadcasting lines from China. However, this proposal has met resistance, as rural citizens are already struggling to meet basic needs. With a looming deadline at the end of November, officials warned that local party leaders may face severe punishment if they fail to restore full speaker functionality in their communities. However, previous years’ similar threats of punishment have reportedly gone unenforced.

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Cashing In

North Korea is sending more than 10,000 Korean People’s Army troops to fight for Russia in Ukraine, with some 3,000 already moved close to the front in western Russia. The deployment, under a security partnership pact North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russia’s Vladimir Putin signed in June, has raised concern among the U.S. and allies South Korea, Japan and Ukraine. Critics see mercenary motives in Pyongyang, which will receive cash and technology for the mission. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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Church in village of Myanmar’s Catholic leader bombed in junta raid

Read RFA coverage of these topics in Burmese. Junta forces damaged a church in the home village of Myanmar’s most prominent Christian, Cardinal Charles Maung Bo, one of several religious buildings destroyed in fighting between the military and pro-democracy forces, residents told Radio Free Asia on Thursday. Bo, Myanmar’s Roman Catholic leader, lives in the main city of Yangon and was not in Mon Hla village, in the central Sagaing region, when a junta drone bombed St. Michael’s Church on Wednesday night. “They’ve destroyed an entire side of the church, the whole right side,” said one woman in the village, who declined to be identified in fear of reprisals. The church’s bell tower and nave were also damaged, she said. Opponents of the junta have accused the military of targeting Christian and Muslim places of worship, destroying hundreds of them in its campaign against insurgent forces and their suspected civilian supporters. Bo has in the past called for attacks on places of worship to end and in 2022, he called for dialogue after a raid by junta forces on his home village. The junta’s spokesman in the Sagaing region said he “didn’t know the details of the situation yet.” About a third of Mon Hla’s population are Roman Catholic, rare for a community in predominantly Buddhist Myanmar’s central heartlands. Its residents trace their origins back to Portuguese adventurers who arrived before British colonial rule. Residents said it was not clear why the military attacked the village as there was no fighting with anti-junta forces there at the time. Thirteen people were wounded in two previous attacks on the village in October, they said. There were no reports of casualties in the Wednesday night attack on Mon Hla. Many villagers fled from their homes the next day when drones reappeared in the sky, the woman said. “We had to flee yesterday. Then today, the drones retreated so we could return. Now, we’ve fled again,” she said. The Sagaing region has seen some of the worst of the violence that has swept Myanmar since the military overthrew an elected government in early 2021. Insurgents groups set up by pro-democracy activists are waging a guerrilla campaign in many parts of Sagaing, harassing junta forces with attacks on their posts and ambushes of their convoys. The military has responded with extensive airstrikes, artillery shelling and, increasingly, drone attacks. In Kanbalu township, about 40 kilometers (25 miles) to the north of Mon Hla, junta forces attacked two villages, Kyi Su and Kyauk Taing, torching about 400 homes including two Buddhist monasteries and two mosques, residents there told RFA. “Our people had to run from the bombs dropped by drones,” said one resident of Kyi Su. “But for those who ran, their homes were raided and burned.” “Two monasteries are in ashes and two of our Muslim mosques are unusable.” Residents said many of the destroyed homes were simple, thatch huts, put up to replace homes destroyed in earlier fighting. RELATED STORIES Mass killings on the rise in Myanmar for fourth straight year Myanmar junta forces kill dozens in attack on monasteries Aid workers arrested, killed amid junta crackdown in Myanmar Translated by Kiana Duncan. Edited by RFA Staff. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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Russia Ukraine War

Tensions Escalate as North Korean Troops Enter Russian Combat Zones : Ukrainian intelligence

Summary:Ukrainian intelligence has reported intercepted calls revealing concerns among Russian troops about Russia’s integration of North Korean soldiers into its combat units near the Ukrainian border. With around 10,000 North Korean troops allegedly stationed in Russia’s eastern region and more expected to arrive in Kursk, the situation marks a significant development in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This report examines the recent collaboration between Russia and North Korea, the operational challenges faced by Russian troops, and the potential impacts on regional security. Intelligence Findings According to Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Agency, intercepted audio reveals frustration among Russian soldiers stationed in Kursk. The Russian troops expressed concerns about the logistics, leadership, and resources required to effectively integrate North Korean forces. In one intercepted call, a Russian soldier expressed outrage over orders to allocate already scarce Russian armored vehicles to the North Korean troops. Another soldier noted a shortage of translators, leading to an ad-hoc arrangement where Russian servicemembers attempted to manage language barriers themselves. In a particularly contentious call, a soldier used a derogatory term to refer to North Korean troops, reflecting cultural and operational divides that could further complicate Russia’s integration efforts. North Korean Forces and Strategic Deployment The Pentagon recently confirmed that around 10,000 North Korean troops are now stationed in Russia, with a projected deployment to Kursk in the coming weeks. This represents a marked increase from prior estimates, signaling an accelerating commitment by North Korea to support Russian military efforts. Command and Control Issues:To address language and communication barriers, Russia reportedly assigned one translator and three Russian personnel for every 30 North Korean soldiers. However, intercepted calls indicate Russian soldiers doubt that these measures will ensure effective command and control over the mixed units. These logistical and command challenges raise questions about the combat effectiveness of these newly integrated units. Intervention from South Korea:Amidst the Russian-North Korean alliance, Ukraine has strengthened ties with South Korea. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol have initiated intelligence sharing and plan to exchange military delegations. Both leaders expressed concerns over the potential combat role of North Korean troops near the Russia-Ukraine border. Diplomatic Developments North Korea’s Foreign Minister arrived in eastern Russia, marking her second trip within six weeks. While she is scheduled to meet Russian officials in Moscow, Kremlin sources report that Russian President Vladimir Putin has no plans to meet with her. This visit underscores North Korea’s increasing engagement with Russia amidst mounting global sanctions. Implications for the Russia-Ukraine Conflict The integration of North Korean soldiers may provide a temporary boost in manpower for Russia but presents significant operational challenges. If Russia deploys these troops to the frontlines, the linguistic and logistical issues could weaken unit cohesion and effectiveness. Additionally, South Korea’s engagement with Ukraine may introduce new intelligence-sharing capabilities that could counteract North Korea’s involvement in the conflict. Conclusion:As North Korean troops move closer to active combat zones, the Russia-Ukraine conflict enters a new phase of international entanglement. Operational inefficiencies and geopolitical tensions continue to evolve as the conflict broadens, with the involvement of North Korean forces and heightened South Korean-Ukraine relations potentially altering the strategic calculus on the ground.

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Marshall Islands wins Human Rights Council seat with climate, nuclear justice agenda

Marshall Islands was elected on Wednesday to sit on the United Nations Human Rights Council, or HRC, from next year, with climate change and nuclear justice as its top priorities. Currently there are no Pacific island nations represented on the 47-member peak U.N. human rights body. Marshall Islands stood with the full backing of the Pacific Islands Forum, or PIF, and its 18 presidents and prime ministers. The HRC’s mission is to promote and protect human rights and oversee U.N. processes including investigative mechanisms and to advise the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Addressing the General Assembly in September, Marshall Islands President Hilda Heine warned that “common multilateral progress is failing us in the hour of greatest need, perhaps most at risk are human rights.” She said accountability must apply to all nations “without exception or double standard.” “Our own unique legacy and complex challenges with nuclear testing impacts, with climate change, and other fundamental challenges, informs our perspective, that the voices of the most vulnerable must never be drowned out,” she said in New York on Sept. 25. Aerial view of a surge of unexpected waves swamping the island of Roi-Namur in the Marshall Islands, pictured Jan. 21, 2024. (Jessica Dambruc /U.S. Army Garrison-Kwajalein Atoll/AFP) In 2011, Marshall Islands along with Palau issued a pioneering call at the General Assembly to urgently seek an advisory opinion on climate change from the International Court of Justice on industrialized nations’ obligations to reduce carbon emissions. While they were unsuccessful then, it laid the foundation for a resolution finally adopted in 2023, with the court due to begin public hearings this December. Heine has been highly critical of the wealthy nations who “break their pledges, as they double down on fossil fuels.” “This failure of leadership must stop. No new coal mines, no new gas fields, no new oil wells,” she told the General Assembly. When Marshall Islands takes up its council seat next year, it will be alongside Indonesia and France. Both have been in Heine’s sights over the human and self-determination rights of the indigenous people of the Papuan provinces and New Caledonia respectively. For years Indonesia has rebuffed a request from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights for an independent fact-finding mission in Papua and ignored the Pacific Islands Forum’s calls since 2019 to allow it to go ahead. “We support ongoing Forum engagement with Indonesia and West Papua, to better understand stakeholders, and to ensure human rights,” she told the General Assembly. In May, deadly violence erupted in New Caledonia over a now abandoned French government proposal to dilute the Kanak vote, putting the success of any future independence referendum for the territory out of reach. Heine said she “looks forward to the upcoming high-level visit” by PIF leaders to New Caledonia. No dates have been agreed. President of the Republic of the Marshall Islands Hilda Heine addresses the 79th United Nations General Assembly at U.N. headquarters in New York, U.S., Sept. 25, 2024. (Reuters/Eduardo Munoz) Countries elected to the council are expected to demonstrate their commitment to the U.N.’s human rights standards and mechanisms. An analysis of Marshall Islands votes during its only previous term with the council in 2021 by Geneva-based think tank Universal Rights Group found it joined the consensus or voted in favor of almost all resolutions. Exceptions include resolutions on human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories where it “has generally voted against,” the report released ahead of the HRC election said. As part of its bid to join the council, Marshall Islands committed to reviewing U.N. instruments it has not yet signed, including protocols on civil and political rights, abolition of the death penalty, torture and rights of children. BenarNews is an RFA-affiliated online news organization. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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Myanmar junta expands mandatory remittance for migrant workers

 Read RFA coverage of this topic in Burmese. Myanmar workers in Laos must remit a quarter of their salary back home, the junta’s minister of labor said, the latest cohort of migrant workers forced to exchange earnings at an artificially low rate as the military struggles to acquire foreign currency. The Ministry of Labor has already implemented increasingly strict measures on migrant workers in neighboring Thailand to pay taxes, remit part of their salary at an artificially low exchange rate through junta-owned banks and pay additional fees to receive vital documentation.  On Tuesday, Minister of Labor Myint Naung met Myanmar factory workers in Vientiane to tell them remittances needed to be submitted through “official channels,” his ministry said in a statement. Myanmar’s economy has been in freefall since the generals ousted an elected government in early 2021, bringing tentative political reforms and economic growth to a halt and ushering in bloody turmoil. Foreign investment has dropped precipitously in the three and a half years since the coup while overall, the economy has contracted by nearly 20%, according to the World Bank. Myanmar’s 2024 gross domestic product growth estimates have been halved to 1%, in large part due to widespread conflict and junta mismanagement. Desperate for foreign exchange, the junta has increasingly turned to tapping its many migrant workers. In Laos, where hundreds of thousands of Myanmar workers are believed to be employed in services, agriculture and manufacturing, workers fretted about how much of their money would be left after the new deduction through official junta channels, in addition to a 2% tax they are required to pay the Myanmar embassy. “For basic workers like us, it’s not OK at all,” said one worker who declined to be identified for safety reasons. “We’re only getting 80 yuan (US$11) a day and then we have to subtract the cost of food. After that, we have to transfer our salary through a broker,” said the worker at a factory where wages are paid in the Chinese currency.  Myint Naing, in a speech outside of the Alpilao International Sole Limited garment factory, said workers could make the transfer once a month, or for up to three months at a time. “Whether it’s using official banking systems, through the Central Bank of Myanmar from someone who has a Remittance Business License, or it’s an international money transfer service linked through a bank system, you must transfer the money to your family,” he said. But the worker said the exchange rate the junta set was crippling. “It’s so low. After sending it through the places they say we have to use to transfer, what’s left isn’t enough for our families,” he said. The civilian shadow National Unity Government, or NUG, that was set up after the coup by members of the ousted civilian administration, has denounced the junta’s rules for migrant workers as a systematic violation of their rights.  “Both the military and its finances are in crisis,” the NUG’s vice labor minister, Kyaw Ni, said in a statement. “As the military’s failures increase, they need to replenish with money from people. So they’re turning to workers in Laos.”  RELATED STORIES: Political instability since coup prompts foreign investment exit from Myanmar  Shuttered Thai offices leave Myanmar migrants in legal limbo Thai police detain 26,000 migrant workers from Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia Translated by Kiana Duncan. Edited by RFA Staff. We are : Investigative Journalism Reportika Investigative Reports Daily Reports Interviews Surveys Reportika

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