World Archives - Page 2 of 192 - Investigative Journalism Reportika

Nguyen Phu Trong left Vietnam’s Communist Party ripe for strongman rule

Editor5 days ago015 mins

On July 19, the Vietnamese Communist Party announced the death of its general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong. The previous day, it announced that Trong, 80, ostensibly the most powerful politician in the country, had been relieved of his duties for health reasons. He had missed several key meetings in recent months, and even when he did attend, he appeared shaky and unwell. He suffered a stroke a few years ago but seemingly bounced back. However, his near-unprecedented third term in office has been cut short. To Lam, the public security minister and promoted to state President last month, will now assume Trong’s duties. Having led the party since 2011, Trong attempted to reinvigorate an institution that, by the early 2010s, had become bogged down by individual rivalries, profit-seeking, and self-advancement. A man rides past a poster for the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in Hanoi on Jan. 22, 2021. (Nhac Nguyen/AFP) Corruption was so rampant the public was mutinous. Ideology and morality had fallen by the wayside. Pro-democracy movements threatened its monopoly on power. The private sector was not just fantastically wealthy, but desired more political power. But in what condition does Trong leave the institution he sought to fix? Externally, its monopoly on power is safer. It has increased repression of activists and democrats while appeasing the public through its high-profile takedown of the corrupt. The private sector has been constrained, too, so poses no threat to the party’s political authority. The economy has insulated the party from any meaningful repercussions from the West over human rights. ‘Blazing Furnace’ Within the Communist Party, however, Trong leaves behind a mess. Lam, as public security minister, and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, artfully used Trong’s signature “Blazing Furnace” anti-corruption campaign to advance their own interests, effectively purging anyone who might rival them for Trong’s job in 2026. More Politburo members have been sacked than at any time in memory. Two presidents have “resigned” in as many years. The Politburo is now filled mostly with military personnel and securocrats, the only two factions – and sometimes rivals – left with power. Lam, if he does formally become acting general secretary, which the Politburo will have to vote on, is in a prime position to maintain the job in 2026. One imagines he has very different ideas about the nature of the Communist Party than Trong. Early in the anti-corruption campaign, Trong remarked that he did not want to “break the vase to catch the mice.” That metaphor implied that tackling corruption should shield a delicate Communist Party, not smash it to pieces. Vietnam’s President To Lam, front right, and Cambodia’s Defense Minister Tea Seiha, back right, pay their respects in front of honor guards at the Independence Monument in Phnom Penh on July 13, 2024. (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP) However, in his quest to rid corruption from a corrupt institution, he eroded almost every check the Communist Party of Vietnam had to prevent a supreme leader figure from rising to the top. Trong violated the three major “norms” that the party introduced in the early 1990s. Politburo members were expected to retire at 65, and individuals could only occupy the most senior positions for a maximum of two terms. More importantly, no one person could hold at the same time two of the four most powerful positions: General Secretary, State President, Prime Minister, and Chair of the National Assembly. This “four pillar” (tu tru) system created a form of succession plan. Regular reshuffles and a separation of powers amongst the political elite would prevent the Communist Party from tilting towards dictatorship. Shattering the norms The norms created a structure in which politicians could fight over policies, often brutally, but without the entire apparatus collapsing because of division. There could be a regular rotation between different factions and geographic networks, meaning no one group was ascendant for too long. Hanoi called this “democratic centralism.” Of course, it’s not democracy, but it’s a form of pluralism that, in theory, had prevented the party from descending into dictatorships like North Korea, Cuba, or China under Xi Jinping. Trong broke every one of these rules. Between 2018 and 2021, he held the posts of party general secretary and state president simultaneously, the first person to do so since 1986. (Lam seems likely to repeat that.) Trong passed away during his third term as party chief, the first leader since Le Duan to have that record. He not only constantly had the party flout retirement-age limits for himself – he should have stepped down in 2021, if not earlier – but such exemptions have been handed out like confetti during his tenure. Vietnam’s Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong addresses a press conference after the closing ceremony of the Communist Party of Vietnam 13th National Congress in Hanoi on Feb. 1, 2021. (Manan Vatsyayana/AFP) At the same time, his anti-graft campaign has centralized power among an increasingly small number of Politburo members. Provincial party politics have been purged and constrained to give more power to the central party apparatus. The party dominates the government. The public security ministry is all-seeing. This was always going to happen. How else do you clean up an uncleanable organization in which power flows up and discipline is enforced only by those above you? The campaign increases the necessity of one section of the party to maintain power indefinitely. Who designates what is the true morality and which cadres are truly moral? Well, a certain clique of the party running the anti-corruption campaign In one speech on the theme, Trong urged the party to “strengthen supervision of the use of the power of leading cadres, especially the heads, push up internal supervision within the collective leadership; make public the process of power use according to law for cadres and people to supervise.” The purge is designed to enforce the view that no one has absolute power above the party. Anyone who uses the power must serve the…

A palm reading: Japan’s navigation plan for Pacific waters

Editor7 days ago6 days ago07 mins

The triennial meeting of the Japanese Prime Minister with the leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum – referred to as PALM – is normally not much of an attention grabber. But this year’s meeting, which has just concluded in Tokyo, makes it clear that Japan is looking to significantly ramp up its presence in the region. This comes on the back of increased bilateral engagement – think new embassies in Kiribati and Vanuatu – and a reinvigorated QUAD with a focus on resource and burden sharing among the membership of the strategic security partnership (Australia, India, Japan, USA). The joint declaration from this their tenth meeting, known as PALM10, with its associated action plan sets out what we can expect from Japanese engagement with the Pacific over the next three years. The use of the seven pillars of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent as a structure for future engagement is notable. The Blue Pacific concept was developed by Pacific nations as a home-grown framing to address their challenges. Other partners have inserted the term Blue Pacific into announcements and documents. However, this takes the recognition of the Pacific’s own framework to another level. It is particularly significant given that Japan’s former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe coined the term Indo-Pacific, which many in the Pacific islands region have resisted. Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum Baron Waqa (L) and Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida shake hands during the opening session of the 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM10) in Tokyo on July 18, 2024. (AFP) PALM10 sees a move to an “All Japan” approach to working with Pacific partners. Whilst several Japanese agencies are referenced in the outcome documents, the most notable is the prominence of the Japanese Self-Defense Force in future engagement. Japan’s military impacts in the Pacific islands region are well known and loom large in the regional memory. While the PALM10 action plan references the continuation of activities related to World War II, such as retrieval of remains and clearance of unexploded ordnance, new activities will see the Japanese presence in the region take on a markedly military aspect. This will add to what is an already crowded environment in which defense diplomacy has been increasing in recent years. However, Japan’s use of this strategy has been relatively limited until now. The PALM10 action plan refers to increased defense “exchanges” to consist of port calls by Japanese Defense Force aircraft and vessels. This may not be as easy to achieve as Tokyo officials might like. At the same time as PALM10 was in session in Tokyo, Vanuatu’s National Security Advisory Board refused a request for a Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force vessel to dock in Port Vila. The reasons for the refusal remain unclear. Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (C) speaks during the opening session of the 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM10) in Tokyo on July 18, 2024. (AFP) Other examples of increased use of the JSDF are the provision of capacity building to Pacific personnel for participation in peace-keeping operations and inclusion of a Self-Defense Unit in disaster relief teams to be deployed to Pacific island countries at their governments’ request. At the end of the Action Plan are items for “clarification.” Included in the list (of three) for Japan to clarify are two that continue this push for increased defense diplomacy. They are: a proposal to accept Pacific cadets into the National Defense Academy of Japan and to use the Japan Pacific Islands Defence Dialogue to foster “mutual understanding and confidence building.” The JPIDD has met twice, most recently earlier this year. We are now into the Pacific meeting season and in six weeks the 53rd Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting will convene in Nuku’alofa, Tonga. Japan is a longstanding dialogue partner of the forum. The ongoing review of regional architecture includes revisions to how dialogue partners are selected and accommodated. What was discussed and agreed at PALM10 will play a role in determining where at the Blue Pacific table Japan will sit.

Hun To went after the press; who really won?

Editor1 week ago7 days ago09 mins

ANALYSIS He is the notorious playboy cousin of Cambodia’s prime minister, and has long been viewed as the family’s fixer for all things they would rather not come into public view. Hun To has reportedly been investigated by Australian police for heroin trafficking; faced questions in connection to threats against the family of slain political analyst Kem Ley, which fled to Australia in 2016 and; in recent years, reporting by Al Jazeera and The Australian newspaper has tied him to cyber slavery, scam compounds and drug smuggling. But in bringing lawsuits against those news organizations, he inadvertently highlighted how Australia – a key regional partner for Cambodia – is running out of patience for the Hun dynasty’s antics. Earlier this month, Hun To scored an apparent victory after he secured an out-of-court settlement over a years-long dispute with The Australian. The outlet agreed to retract a 2-year-old story it had published about Hun To that “some readers may have understood” to have alleged that he “was linked to human trafficking, cyber scams and drug importation,” the paper wrote. “The Australian did not intend to make any such allegations against Mr Hun and accepts his denials of such conduct.” The retraction marked the conclusion of a defamation case Hun To had brought against The Australian in December 2022. It came just after the Australian government had declined to renew his visa, RFA has learned – even though he had spent decades living part-time in the country and he and his family owned extensive business and property interests around Melbourne. While Canberra gave no reason for its decision, Hun To’s lawyers insisted in court complaints seen by RFA that the rejection was spurred by news stories from The Australian and Al Jazeera linking him to organized crime, fraud factories and human trafficking in his native Cambodia. A case launched in parallel by Hun To against Al Jazeera is ongoing. The Qatari state-funded outlet did not respond to a request for comment. Australian libel law is notoriously plaintiff-friendly, particularly in cases where the defendant is a news organization. This growing reputation led the author of a 2019 New York Times op-ed to dub the island nation “the defamation capital of the world.” In Australian defamation cases, the burden of proof uniquely rests with the defendants. No other type of case places such burden on the party being sued. In such a legal environment, defendants run higher risks of losing and incurring hefty damages, and that has often encouraged news organizations to settle out of court. The retraction might have gone little noticed until Hun To’s lawyer, Adam Lopez – who has been known for taking on controversial defamation cases – took to LinkedIn to gloat about his victory. The dispute with The Australian had been “resolved on a confidential basis,” he noted, suggesting that the newspaper had made further concessions beyond the retraction. Cambodia press and social media users quickly picked up the story, with some simply reporting on the retraction and others criticizing The Australian or the Australian court system. With the scrubbing of the controversial story, Hun To enjoyed precisely one day of victory. On July 10, news broke suggesting Hun To’s business interests were neck deep in exactly the type of allegations for which The Australian had just apologized. Elliptic, a financial compliance firm specializing in tracing cryptocurrencies, published a report alleging that a “Cambodian conglomerate with links to Cambodia’s ruling Hun family” had laundered more than US$11 billion for cyber scammers. The name of the company was Huione Pay, and Hun To is one of its three directors. A subsequent report by Reuters found evidence that Huione Pay had processed cryptocurrency worth $150,000 that had been stolen by the sanctioned North Korean hacking collective known as Lazarus. In response to the allegations, National Bank of Cambodia, the country’s central bank, told Reuters that it “would not hesitate to impose any corrective measures” on Huione, although it said so “without saying if such action was planned,” the news agency drily noted. Following the revelations, digital finance company Tether announced that it had frozen $29 million of cryptocurrency held by Huione following a “a direct request from law enforcement.” Whether the latest news make Hun To reconsider going after the press, however, seems unlikely, said Phil Robertson, director of Asia Human Rights and Labor Advocates. Hun To “would be wise to abandon his case since all the dirt has come out on Huione, but he won’t because he’s a shameless, arrogant, rights-abusing tycoon who believes that whatever he does, the ruling Hun family will have his back.” Neither Huione’s nor Hun To’s lawyer had responded to requests for comment as of publication. These allegations are far from the first time Hun To has caught negative publicity. Australian MP Julian Hill spoke in Parliament last March arguing that Hun To and other politically connected Cambodian figures “should never again be granted visas to visit Australia.” His speech charted Hun To’s long and checkered links to Australia, noting that as early as 2003 Australian police had sought to arrest him on suspicion of heroin trafficking. Since then, Hun To and his wife acquired millions of dollars’ worth of property in Australia, Hill added, “with seemingly no legitimate explanation for where their wealth has come from.” “It’s no secret that Hun To has his finger in lots of pies — drug trafficking, illegal deforestation, animal trafficking, illegal gambling,” Hill said. “Most recently, we’ve heard reports he’s dipping his toes into human trafficking, as well. That’s diversifying, isn’t it?”

North Korea’s Kim in military talks with Russian vice defense minister

Editor1 week ago7 days ago05 mins

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has discussed the “importance and necessity” of military cooperation with Russia’s vice defense minister to “defend mutual security interests,” the North’s state media reported on Friday. Kim met a Russian military delegation, led by the vice minister, Aleksey Krivoruchko, in Pyongyang on Thursday, according to the Korean Central News Agency, or KCNA. “The talk shared recognition of the importance and necessity of the military cooperation between the two countries to defend mutual security interests,” the KCNA said. Kim reiterated his firm support and solidarity for Russia’s war with Ukraine and stressed the need for the militaries of the two countries to “get united more firmly” to develop bilateral relations, the news agency added. Krivoruchko is the first known ranking Russian military official to visit North Korea since a summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kim. The two met in Pyongyang for talks aimed at bolstering their economic and security relations and underscoring their shared defiance of Western sanctions. Under a new partnership treaty announced at their summit they agreed to offer each other military assistance “without delay” if either were attacked. Russia has been cozying up to North Korea since Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The United States has accused North Korea of sending Russia weapons for use in its Ukraine war but both North Korea and Russia deny that. RELATED STORIES North Korea, Russia agree to offer military assistance if either is attacked North Korea’s Kim hails Russia alliance, promises Putin support on Ukraine Putin arrives in North Korea, vows to boost cooperation and fight sanctions More balloons The military in U.S. ally South Korea resumed propaganda loudspeaker broadcasts toward North Korea in response to the North’s latest launch of trash-carrying balloons into the South. The broadcasts took place from Thursday evening to early Friday in areas near where the balloons were launched, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, or JCS, said on Friday. Since late May, North Korea has sent more than 2,000 trash-carrying balloons into the South in retaliation for the launch by anti-North Korea activists of balloons carrying propaganda leaflets towards the North. “The military’s response going forward will fully depend on North Korea’s actions,” the JCS said, without providing further details. On Thursday, the JCS said the latest North Korean balloons appeared to be traveling toward the northern part of Gyeonggi Province that surrounds Seoul, advising the public to not touch any fallen balloon and to report them to the military or police. South Korea resumed loudspeaker broadcasts last month as it fully suspended a 2018 inter-Korean military tension reduction agreement in response to the North’s launch of waves of trash-carrying balloons. Edited by Mike Firn.

To Lam: The man with the golden steak is now leading Vietnam

Editor1 week ago7 days ago08 mins

In the West, he may be best known for eating a gold-covered steak while his countrymen survive on an average of about US$10 a day. But in Hanoi, Vietnam’s new top leader To Lam has for years been seen as an operator whose decades in politics long paved the way for his ascent. On Thursday, that climb reached a new zenith after Vietnamese state media announced that Lam, 67, would take over the duties for Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. It comes less than two months after Lam was elevated to the Vietnamese presidency – a move that put him in pole position for the general secretary job, the most powerful in the country. Vietnamese President To Lam attends a press briefing with Russian President Vladimir Putin (not pictured), at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 20, 2024. (Minh Hoang/Pool via Reuters) The son of a Vietnamese police colonel, Lam began his career in public security in 1979. He joined the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1981, eventually rising to become the minister for public security – the country’s top security official – in 2016. In 2019, he was awarded the rank of general by then-president Trong. Security czar In his capacity as security minister, he focused on internal politics and counter-intelligence – areas that may well have helped him to later cement his political powers. The stint was not without controversy. In 2017, Lam was accused of being involved in the kidnapping of Trinh Xuan Thanh, a fugitive oil executive and former provincial official, in Berlin. Thanh later returned to Hanoi through Slovakia. The government denied kidnapping but the case led to a temporary rift in diplomatic relations between Germany and Vietnam. But it would fit a larger pattern of alleged transnational repression and quashing of dissent overseen by Lam. His term as security minister saw the arrests and suspected kidnappings of journalist critics, including RFA blogger Truong Duy Nhat, who disappeared in Thailand in 2019 but is now in jail in Vietnam serving a 10-year sentence. Golden steak and ‘Onion Bae’ In 2021, Lam was involved in another controversy after he was caught on video eating a piece of gold-plated steak at a luxury restaurant in London. A video clip of the general being fed a US$2,000 steak by celebrity chef Salt Bae went viral, causing a public outcry at home. This was followed by a draconian crackdown, including the arrest and jailing of a noodle-seller nicknamed “Onion Bae” who had dared to ridicule Lam by posting a parody of the incident to social media. He remains in jail. Lam subsequently ramped up anti-corruption crackdowns that saw off potential rivals within the party in what critics have said were clearly politically motivated investigations. Vietnamese President To Lam, left on red carpet, and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, right on red carpet, review the guard of honor at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 20, 2024. (Minh Hoang/AP) Lam’s enthusiastic implementation of this so-called “Burning Furnace” campaign led to the sacking of half a dozen senior ministers and Politburo members within the span of months beginning in 2022. Yet Lam and Trong, the ally he succeeds, are also said to have questionable hidden interests. In May, the Tiếng Dân newspaper revealed that a younger brother of To Lam, To Dung, was the chairman of the construction and real estate firm Xuan Cau Group, noting that the company had been conspicuously absent from any investigation even as it has won projects worth billions of Vietnamese dong with little oversight. Private man Little else is known about the private life of Vietnam’s new top man. He does not appear to have ever given any remarks to Western media and nothing in English has been written of his immediate family, though Vietnamese reports say he has been twice married, first to Vu Hong Loan, the sister of a Vietnamese police major general and currently to Ngo Phuong Ly. He appears to have several children. One daughter was revealed to have graduated from London’s prestigious School of Oriental and Asian Studies, or SOAS, in 2023. On the global stage, Lam has made clear his endorsement of the so-called “Bamboo diplomacy” Hanoi has undertaken to balance its relations between East and West. In June, he welcomed Russian President Vladimir Putin, weeks after his swearing in as president, calling him “comrade” and hailing a successful visit. Hanoi saw visits from Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden within the previous nine months. Whether his caretaker role becomes a more permanent one, there seems little likelihood that Lam would veer from the established path. At his presidential swearing-in in May, he promised to “continue to strengthen the party’s capabilities, its ruling power and combat prowess.” He may well be looking to strengthen the same in himself. Edited by Malcolm Foster.

Myanmar anti-junta activists accused of assassination plot die in custody, group says

Editor1 week ago7 days ago04 mins

Two members of an anti-junta group accused of trying to kill Myanmar’s junta leader died after being tortured during interrogation, a spokesperson for the group told Radio Free Asia. Seven people were arrested on June 8, allegedly in possession of two 107 mm rockets and launchers, near the site of a bridge opening ceremony attended by the junta leader, Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. Two more suspects were rounded up the following day, and another rocket was seized. Another four people were detained several days later in connection with the plot, junta-controlled media reported. The Yangon-based Dark Shadow urban guerrilla group said four of the people arrested were its members and two of them died after being tortured. ‘Comrade Shein Myint Mo Aung and Comrade Zaw Gyi died during the interrogation. Although we don’t know exactly what date they died, they died at Ba Yint Naung Military Interrogation Center,” said the spokesperson, who declined to be identified for fear of reprisals. “The other two Dark Shadow members, Myo Thein Tun and Ye Zaw Tun, have been out of touch with their families and we don’t know whether they are dead or are still alive.” Members of urban guerrilla groups were arrested by junta forces for allegedly plotting to kill junta leader Min Aung Hlaing, according to the junta-controlled newspaper, Myanma Alin on June 17, 2024. (Myanmar Military) The other nine people arrested, who are members of other guerrilla groups, are believed to be still in custody. RFA called the Yangon region’s junta spokesperson, Htay Aung, to ask about the suspects but he did not respond by the time of publication. RELATED STORIES Myanmar guerrilla groups claim responsibility for bombings Junta deploys first round of military recruits to Myanmar’s frontlines Drafting of women underway in Myanmar, despite junta claims to the contrary According to information released by junta-controlled newspaper Myanma Alin on June 17, the plot was foiled when informers told police the group was aiming to fire three 107 mm rockets at Yangon region’s Thanlyin Bridge No. 3 during its opening ceremony. Myanmar had been in turmoil since the military ousted an elected government led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi in early 2021 with many young democracy supporters taking up arms in a bid to end military rule after troops crushed protests. As of Thursday, more than 5,400 civilians have died due to extrajudicial killings, public crackdowns on protests and attacks by land and air across the country, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, . Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn.

As Myanmar junta falters, rival ethnic armies jostle in Shan state

Editor1 week ago7 days ago015 mins

The rout of military junta troops and seizure of territory across Myanmar’s border with China has brought the Three Brotherhood Alliance a new struggle in Shan state: dealing with a myriad of actors and shifting alliances seeking to profit from the rapidly changing political landscape. The region’s multiple well-armed ethnic armies include a powerful force that is a de facto ally of Beijing, groups that are aligned with the junta, and other militias with no allegiance to the democratic opposition National Unity Government or the fight to reverse the 2021 military coup. In northern Shan state, insurgent alliance members the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Defense Alliance Army (MNDAA) last month launched the second phase of Operation 1027, capturing key military outposts in the country’s largest state. The TNLA’s capture of the last junta camp in Nawnghkio, and its move south into Mogok, will complicate the movement of reinforcements and resupply of Lashio, northern Shan state’s biggest city and a commercial gateway between Mandalay and Muse on the Chinese border. Members of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Mandalay People’s Defense Force stand in front of the captured building of the Myanmar War Veterans’ Organization in Nawnghkio township in Shan state, June 26, 2024. (Mandalay People’s Defence Force via AP) China has put pressure on the alliance to halt the offensive, which started after violations of a cease-fire China negotiated in January. On July 13, the MNDAA announced a unilateral cease-fire would go into effect from July 14-18, out of respect for the Chinese Communist Party, which was convening a Third Plenum session in Beijing, While the two forces remain in positions around Lashio, their offensive has slowed for now. That’s not to say that hostilities have ceased: The junta continues to launch airstrikes. China has been unable to broker a new ceasefire, even though the Three Brotherhood Alliance had sent representatives to nearby Kunming for talks. The MNDAA and TNLA always fight back in self-defense. And with their newly captured Chinese-made anti-aircraft artillery, the two Shan state-based armies have more capacity to target the heavy-lift Mi-17 helicopters the junta uses to resupply and reinforce remote positions. RELATED STORIES Myanmar rebels rack up more gains as Operation 1027 enters new phase Myanmar insurgent allies capture strategic Shan state town from junta Ethnic army overruns junta command center in Myanmar’s Kokang region China awaits junta approval to resume border trade with Myanmar’s Shan state Inroads into Shan regions The turmoil in Shan state has drawn local actors – the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP) – off the sidelines. They are trying to limit the Brotherhood’s gains and exploit the weakness of the State Administrative Council, as the junta is formally known. Tensions between the TNLA and SSPP continue to fester, with both sides accusing the other of instigating attacks. July 13 talks between the two sides in Panghsang aimed at lowering tensions were declared successful by the TNLA. But while these have not escalated into a larger conflict, they’ve resulted in the SSPP not joining the fight against the junta. Indeed, the SSPP, along with the UWSA, seem to be abetting the junta. What we are seeing play out are ethnic loyalties and alliances in the complex Shan patchwork. At over 155,000 square kilometers 60,000 square miles), Shan state is not just the largest of Myanmar’s 14 states and administrative divisions, it makes up nearly a quarter of the total land area. The majority of the six million population are ethnic Shan, with nine other ethnic groups. The TNLA represents the roughly half a million Ta’ang, or Palaung people. The MNDAA is comprised of Mandarin-speaking ethnic Chinese based on the border with China’s Yunnan province. As a result of Operation 1027, the two Brotherhood armies are making significant inroads into ethnic Shan-dominated regions. The state has several ethnic resistance organizations composed of ethnic Shan, including the SSPP and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS). But they are bitter rivals and with limited manpower, equipment, and resources, and neither army controls a contiguous area, making a political map of central and southern Shan State look like a patch of leopard spots. Most of the armed groups in the region have been highly opportunistic and unprincipled. None joined the National Unity Government or picked up arms against the regime. All three groups have benefited from the insecurity caused by the coup, which allowed them to focus on their illicit business activities, including the production, sale, and/or taxation of methamphetamine. The Wa: rested and ready After Operation 1027 began last October 27, the SSPP attacked its rival the RCSS, on the grounds that it remained a National Ceasefire Agreement partner of the junta. While it was hoped that the SSPP would join Operation 1027, their limited operations against the junta’s ally last year was accepted as sufficient for the time being. The SSPP seemed to pledge support for the second phase of Operation 1027, but its tensions with the TNLA have put that on hold. In a surprise move, the United Wa State Army has started to move well outside of its Kokang autonomous region, centered on the border crossing to China at Panghsang (Pangsang). The UWSA captured the mountain town of Tangyan, which is 135 km (85 miles) south of Lashio, without firing a shot, then continued west and took Mongyai. There are now reports that the UWSA have moved west all the way to the Salween (Thanlyin) River – leading observers to ask, what’s going on? With 20-30,000 men, the UWSA, which grew out of the wreckage of the Communist Party of Burma, is one of the largest and best armed ethnic resistance organizations. Ostensibly an ethnic Wa organization, today its leaders are all Mandarin-speaking ethnic Chinese, and the group is seen as Beijing’s closest proxy. They’ve had autonomy since 1989. United Wa State Army soldiers march during a military parade in the town of Panghsang, April 17, 2019….

Thai natural gas project suspended after pipeline explosions in Myanmar

Anti-junta forces capture camps in central Myanmar township

Editor1 week ago7 days ago07 mins

An anti junta group in Myanmar’s Mandalay region is continuing to make gains in a key township following the collapse of a truce between insurgent armies and the military who seized power in a 2021 coup. The Mandalay People’s Defense Force, or PDF, captured a junta camp at the Alpha cement factory in Madaya township on July 14, and one at Taung Ta Ngar two days later, it said in a statement on Tuesday. Madaya is just 30 km (19 miles) north of Mandalay, the capital of the region and Myanmar’s second-largest city. The Mandalay PDF has been fighting alongside the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, since late October 2023. The TNLA, which has also teamed up with the Arakan Army and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army as part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, pushed back junta forces in several regions before agreeing a shaky China-brokered truce with the junta in January. When the ceasefire collapsed on June 25, the TNLA attacked Mandalay’s Mogoke township and several towns in Shan state to the region’s east, while the Mandalay PDF focused much of its attention on Madaya and Singu townships in Mandalay region. The defense force said it had captured 28 junta camps as of Wednesday. Weapons and ammunition seized after Mandalay PDF captured the junta base at the Alpha cement factory in Madaya township, Mandalay region in a photograph released on July 16, 2024. (Mandalay PDF) Mandalay PDF spokesman Osmon, who goes by one name, told Radio Free Asia Myanmar’s military suffered heavy losses in the battle for Madaya. “There were many casualties on the side of the junta in these operations. We have seized corpses and arrested junta soldiers,” he said. “There were some casualties on the side of Mandalay PDF.” Osmon didn’t disclose the numbers of casualties on either side but said the PDF took more than 150 prisoners. He added the group is now engaged in a fierce battle with junta forces at Madaya’s Kyauk Ta Dar base. RELATED STORIES Myanmar junta steps up security in Mandalay as fighting spreads across region Thousands stuck between checkpoints on Myanmar road amid renewed fighting Thousands displaced in Myanmar’s Mandalay region On Tuesday, three people were killed when a shell hit Madaya town, close to its train station and main market. “It happened around 8 a.m.,” said a resident who didn’t want to be named for fear of reprisals. “A 44-year-old woman, a 30-year-old woman and a two-year-old girl were killed.” The man said he didn’t know which side had fired the shell, while another resident said the blast happened close to where junta troops were stationed. “It was about 10 to 14 meters away from them,” he said, also requesting anonymity for security reasons. “It was also close to where the junta soldiers always come to drink tea.” RFA phoned the junta spokesman for Mandalay region, Thein Htay, for details on the fighting in Madaya, but he did not answer calls. The National Unity Government, a shadow government formed by members of the civil administration ousted in the 2021 coup, said on June 27 that PDFs and their allies have made sweeping gains in Mandalay region and Shan state to the east, in a campaign it dubbed “Operation Shan-Man.” The Mandalay PDF said it had captured 11 junta camps in Singu township, 80 km (50 miles) north of Mandalay city, by July 7. Now the junta is fighting back, damaging around 100 houses and injuring more than 20 people in airstrikes on July 16, as it seeks to flush PDF forces out of Singu town. The PDF’s Singu-based head of information, Than Ma Ni, said the junta carried out more than 20 airstrikes on Tuesday and also bombarded the town with heavy artillery. “The junta’s air force has been striking all day as Mandalay-PDF has taken over Singu town,” he said Wednesday. “There were no deaths, but those who were hit by shrapnel have been moved to a safe place and are receiving medical treatment. The entire town was pretty much destroyed.” Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Mike Firn and Taejun Kang.

Junta deploys first round of military recruits to Myanmar’s frontlines

Editor1 week ago09 mins

The first round of soldiers recruited under Myanmar’s controversial military draft law have completed their training and are being deployed to the frontlines of the junta’s war against rebels in the country’s remote border areas, their family members said Tuesday. The deployment marked the latest chapter in the junta’s bid to shore up its forces amid heavy losses against various ethnic armies and rebel militias since its 2021 coup d’etat, prompting the junta to enact the People’s Military Service Law in February. Under the law, men between the ages of 18 and 35 and women between 18 and 27 can be drafted to serve in the armed forces for two years. The announcement triggered a wave of assassinations of administrators enforcing the law and drove thousands of draft-dodgers into rebel-controlled territory and abroad. The military carried out two rounds of conscriptions in April and May, training about 9,000 new recruits in total. A third round of conscription began in late May, with draftees sent to their respective training depots by June 22. The first batch of recruits completed their three-month training on June 28, and family members told RFA Burmese on Tuesday that the new soldiers were sent to conflict zones in Myanmar’s Rakhine and Kayin states, and Sagaing region, beginning in early July. While the junta has never said how many recruits were trained in the first group, a mid-April report by the Burmese Affairs and Conflict Study, a group monitoring junta war crimes, indicated that it was nearly 5,000 young people from across the country. RELATED STORIES Thailand, Myanmar sign agreement on extradition of criminal suspects Junta military preparations point to brutal next phase in Myanmar conflict Dozens of officials carrying out Myanmar’s draft have been killed “My husband told me that orders from [the junta capital] Naypyidaw directed the deployment of new recruits from training batch No. 1 to conflict-affected areas, including Rakhine state,” said Nwe Nyein, the wife of a new recruit from Ayeyarwady region. “They [the junta] had previously said that new recruits under the People’s Military Service Law would not be deployed to the frontlines,” she said. “However, I am worried because my husband was sent to the remote border areas.” Nwe Nyein said that the second batch of recruits are expected to complete their military training on Aug. 2 and reports suggest that they will also be sent to the frontlines. Used as ‘human shields’ A resident of Myanmar’s largest city Yangon, who requested anonymity for security reasons, said that some people close to him had been injured in battles in northern Shan state and have since returned home. “A young man from our town was shot in the arm, but he never underwent an operation to remove the bullet,” the resident said. “He also said that almost all the new recruits sent to the frontlines had been killed, and their families didn’t even receive their salaries.” Recruits from the first batch of training under Myanmar junta’s people’s military service law seen on July 16, 2024. (Pyi Thu Sitt via Telegram) In southern Myanmar’s Tanintharyi region, residents told RFA that the junta is deploying new recruits to battle. Min Lwin Oo, a leading committee member of the Democracy Movement Strike Committee-Dawei, condemned the deployment of new recruits with only short-term military training, suggesting that they are being used as “human shields.” Flagging morale Former Captain Kaung Thu Win, who is now a member of the nationwide Civilian Disobedience Movement of former civil servants that left their jobs in protest of the military’s power grab, told RFA that the junta urgently needs more soldiers, and he expects that nearly all new recruits will be sent to the frontlines. “About 90% of these new forces will be dispatched to the battlegrounds, regardless of whether they engage in combat [with rebel groups] or target people [civilians],” he said. “Their [the junta’s] main objective is to ensure they have more soldiers equipped with guns.” Kaung Thu Win also said that the junta faces many challenges in its propaganda efforts to persuade new recruits to fight, but is also increasingly unable to trust its veteran soldiers as losses mount. Recruits from the first batch of training under Myanmar junta’s people’s military service law seen on July 16, 2024. (Pyi Thu Sitt via Telegram) Than Soe Naing, a political commentator, slammed the junta over the reported deployment and echoed the former captain’s assessment of the military’s low morale. “Young people are being sent to die after … [mere] months of military training,” he said. “Even veteran soldiers in their 60s who have been sent to the battlefield have lost their motivation.” 5 years of service? The junta has yet to release any information about the deployment of new recruits to the frontlines. Meanwhile, although the People’s Military Service Law states that new recruits must serve for a total of two years, reports have emerged that the junta is telling soldiers that they will have to fight for five. Junta officials have publicly denied the reports. Attempts by RFA to contact the office of the chairman of the Central Body for Summoning People’s Military Servants in Naypyidaw for further clarification went unanswered Tuesday. Translated by Aung Naing. Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.

Myanmar junta steps up security in Mandalay as fighting spreads across region

Editor2 weeks ago06 mins

Junta forces have tightened security in Myanmar’s second-biggest city, Mandalay, while shelling civilians elsewhere in the region, after coming under renewed attack from an alliance of insurgent forces battling to end military rule. A shell killed a seven-year-old boy and a woman in her 30s after it exploded in a residential area of Mandalay region’s Mogoke town on Monday evening, residents told Radio Free Asia Tuesday. Another four-year-old girl and a 60-year-old woman, as well as a woman and man both in their 30s, are in critical condition, said one Mogoke resident, asking to remain anonymous for security reasons. “A child and a grandmother were seriously injured by shrapnel that hit them in the neck,” he said. “It was not easy to send them to the hospital, so they were treated at home by people who have some medical knowledge.” The shells were fired from a junta camp on Strategic Hill in eastern Mogoke, a ruby-mining town about 200 km (120 miles) north of Mandalay city. Over half the town’s population has fled after fighting intensified between junta troops and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, which has taken control of western Mogoke, residents said. RELATED STORIESMyanmar rebel army calls ceasefire after junta airstrikeThousands stuck between checkpoints on Myanmar road amid renewed fightingMyanmar insurgent allies capture strategic Shan state town from junta The TNLA is part of an alliance of three ethnic minority insurgent forces known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The alliance launched an offensive last October, codenamed Operation 1027 for the date it began, and pushed back junta forces in several regions. After a five-month ceasefire ended on June 25, the TNLA, and allied forces attacked junta camps in Madaya, Singu and Mogoke townships in Mandalay region, and Hsipaw, Kyaukme, Nawnghkio and Lashio towns in Shan state to the east. Stepping up Security The TNLA and its allies have also turned their attention to junta bases near Mandalay region’s capital, causing the military to step up security in Mandalay city, residents said. One city resident, who wished to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals. told RFA that after Operation 1027 resumed in late June, the junta had increased the number of outposts around Mandalay and its historic palace. “We’re getting a sense that the areas around the palace are more secure. They also installed heavy weapons on top of Mandalay Hill and also on Yankin Hill,” he said. “Security has been increased a lot. If there was a place with four or five soldiers before, there are about 10 soldiers now.” Troops are also stationed on top of high-rise buildings in the city’s Chanmyathazi township, one resident said, also asking for anonymity to protect his identity. “The junta troops are stationed on the top floors of Ma Ma-29 and No. 49 buildings,” he said, adding that soldiers also occupied buildings in the Myayenanda, and Aungpinlel neighborhoods, as well as Mandalay’s industrial zone. “The troops asked residents to leave in order for soldiers to be stationed there.” Army personnel are also stationed in Inwa (Inn Wa) town, 32 km (20 miles) south of Mandalay city, which is close to a junta air force base, he added. On Monday, the junta closed the Mandalay-Madaya Road after fighting with allied rebel forces near Madaya township’s Kyauk Ta Dar village, which is just 27 km (17 miles) away from Mandalay city. According to the Mandalay People’s Defense Force, the group had captured 25 junta camps in Madaya township and 11 in Singu township as of July 7. RFA called Mandalay region’s junta spokesperson Thein Htay for more information on increased security and the attack on Mogoke, but he did not answer phone calls. Translated by RFA Burmese. Edited by Kiana Duncan and Mike Firn.

Category: World